Turning everywhere,getting nowhere: experiences of seeking help for mortgage delinquency and their implications for foreclosure prevention

The growing literature on financial, demographic, and institutional aspects of the foreclosure crisis largely neglects the experiences and actions of homeowners. This in-depth account of homeowners' responses to mortgage delinquency and the success of the strategies they employ to prevent foreclosure is based on focus groups conducted in 2006 with low- and moderate-income homeowners, and nonprofit housing professionals in five US cities. The events precipitating mortgage delinquency often set off a cascade of trouble placing multiple demands on homeowners' financial, emotional, and social resources. Homeowners pursued foreclosure prevention assistance from a variety of sources including their lender, social welfare agencies, and nonprofit homeownership organizations, but encountered many obstacles to resolving mortgage delinquency. Their unsuccessful attempts to secure assistance contributed to financial and emotional strain and sometimes worsened prospects of preventing foreclosure. Despite the numerous federal policies developed to address the problem of foreclosure, the experiences described by participants in this study continue, indicating the need for more systematic, enforceable, and preventive policies to address foreclosures in the future.     

Preventive servicing is good for business and affordable homeownership policy

Abstract

This article documents the growing importance of preventive servicing—business practices that emphasize early intervention in delinquency and default management practices that also help financially troubled borrowers avoid foreclosure. We suggest that the loan servicing side of the affordable housing delivery system may be underappreciated and undercapitalized.

We use a database of more than 28,000 affordable housing loans to test several preventive servicing‐related propositions and find that after we control for loan and borrower characteristics, the likelihood that a delinquent mortgagor within this universe will ultimately default varies significantly across servicers. This suggests that loan servicing is an important factor in determining whether low‐ and moderate‐income borrowers who fall behind in their mortgage payments will end up losing their homes through foreclosure. It also suggests a need for policy makers to incorporate preventive servicing into affordable homeownership programs.     

State mortgage foreclosure policies and lender interventions: Impacts on borrower behavior in default

Due to the rise in foreclosure filings, policymakers are increasingly concerned with helping families in financial distress keep their homes. This paper tests the extent to which distressed mortgage borrowers benefit from three types of state foreclosure polices: (1) judicial foreclosure proceedings, (2) statutory rights of redemption, and (3) statewide foreclosure‐prevention initiatives. Based on an analysis of borrowers in default who reside in 22 cross‐state metropolitan statistical area pairs, state policies generally have weak effects. Both judicial foreclosure proceedings and foreclosure prevention initiatives are associated with modest increases in loan modification rates. Using a matching procedure, a lender's letter promoting mortgage default counseling was associated with increases in loan modifications, decreases in loan cures, and decreases in foreclosure starts. The effects of the letter were also stronger in states with judicial proceedings. © 2011 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Rolling the Dice on Foreclosure Prevention: Differences Across Mortgage Servicers in Loan Modifications and Loan Cure Rates

Mortgage servicing has garnered increased attention since the foreclosure crisis. As the interface between borrowers and investors, servicers make the decision to either grant a loan modification or to foreclose. This study examines servicer loan modification practices for a national sample of delinquent subprime loans, and assesses the extent to which those practices are associated with foreclosures. The research reveals significant differences across servicers in loan cure rates, which are related to servicers’ propensity to offer loan modifications and to the level of relief offered to borrowers. The observed differences across servicers and the implications of this heterogeneity for foreclosure prevention underscore the importance of additional data, research, and policies that can increase the uniformity and transparency of servicing practices.     

Homeownership counseling performance: How can it be measured?

Abstract

Homeownership counseling encompasses several educational activities. Early approaches focused on reducing the risk of default and foreclosure among participants in government‐assisted mortgage programs, but more recent approaches have focused on increasing homeownership opportunities among low‐income and minority households. Unfortunately, little is known about the effectiveness of these approaches in terms of the number of new homeowners and the mitigation of default risk. To address that gap, this article presents a theoretical and methodological framework to evaluate counseling efforts.

A successful counseling program is defined as one that assists a household with a low long‐term probability of ownership in buying a home and reducing its default risk. We concede that the methodological requirements for evaluating counseling are somewhat restrictive. However, if we establish an evaluation procedure using these goals as a framework, we can more accurately determine the effects of counseling on the sustainability of low‐income homeownership.     

Outlook: The subprime lending crisis: Focus on the problem: Subprime borrowers in trouble

Abstract

Public policy should be directed at serving the large number of borrowers who have recently taken out subprime loans and who are at serious risk of losing their homes when their mortgages reset. Practicing forbearance and providing counseling for defaulting homeowners, as well as allowing them to refinance into a Federal Housing Administration loan, can be particularly helpful. Broad changes in housing programs and in the structure of the mortgage market should be considered on their merits as good or bad public policy for the long term, not simply as solutions to the subprime problem.     

The Effects of Foreclosure Counseling for Distressed Homeowners

In the face of the housing market downturn of the late 2000s, policymakers promoted third‐party mortgage default counseling as a way to help people at risk of losing their homes to avoid foreclosure. Using a unique data set of monthly loan payments remitted to investors combined with administrative data from a national counseling agency, this study estimates the effects of default counseling on the probability that troubled mortgage borrowers will lose their homes to foreclosure. Borrowers are actually more likely to miss loan payments after receiving counseling, but the probability of losing a home to foreclosure drops after counseling, suggesting that counseling policies may be beneficial during housing crises.     

The Influence of Homebuyer Education on Default and Foreclosure Risk: A Natural Experiment

The recent housing crisis has generated debate over the benefits and risks of policies and programs promoting homeownership for low and moderate income households. One important facet of this conversation is whether prepurchase homebuyer education (HBE) is effective in reducing default or foreclosure risk. Studies to date have primarily focused on default risk and have faced challenges in accounting for borrower selection into HBE. This study analyzes the outcomes of a natural experiment in the provision of a classroom‐based HBE program during the start‐up phase of a down payment assistance loan program at Tennessee's state housing finance agency in 2002. A competing risks analysis of monthly payment data from 2002 to 2009 for 732 mortgages indicates that, after controlling for borrower, mortgage, and economic factors, HBE did not reduce default risk, but was associated with 42 percent lower odds of foreclosure. Among borrowers who defaulted, HBE was associated with an increased probability of curing a first default and of avoiding foreclosure post‐default. Policymakers should consider the timing and intensity of HBE programs needed to influence default risk and how HBE may promote sustainable homeownership by influencing borrowers’ help‐seeking behavior and strategies for resolving defaults.     

Location‐Efficient Mortgages: Is the Rationale Sound?

Location efficient mortgage (LEM) programs are an increasingly popular approach to combating urban sprawl. LEMs allow families who want to live in densely populated, transit‐rich communities to obtain a larger mortgage with a smaller down payment than traditional underwriting guidelines allow. LEMs are premised on the proposition that homeowners in such “location‐efficient” areas can safely be allowed to breach underwriting guidelines designed to prevent mortgage default because they have lower than average automobile‐related transportation expenses and more income available for mortgage payments. This paper employs records of more than 8000 FHA‐insured mortgages matched with data on various measures of location efficiency to test this proposition. The results suggest that it does not hold and that LEMs—like other low‐down‐payment mortgage programs—will raise mortgage default rates. This cost must be weighed against any potential anti‐sprawl benefits LEMs may have. © 2001 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Foreclosing on the American dream? The financial consequences of low-income homeownership

Federal programs have consistently encouraged ever-lower-income households to buy homes, despite concerns about the long-term sustainability and desirability of homeownership from the perspective of wealth-building, especially since the recent housing market collapse and the epidemic of mortgage foreclosures. We ask in this paper: can very low-income households build wealth through sustainable homeownership, with the aid of an innovative public program? We answer this question by examining 122 very low-income households who purchased their homes between 1996 and 2007 after completing an extensive asset-building and homeownership education/counseling program offered by the Housing Authority of the City and County of Denver (DHA), called HOP. We analyze our own longitudinal surveys and focus groups, as well as data compiled from administrative agency sources, real estate records, and longitudinal census data from the Neighborhood Change Database and the Piton Foundation's Neighborhood Facts Database. We find that homeownership attained through HOP typically did provide very low-income households with opportunities to build home equity (both absolutely and relative to generic homeowner cohorts in Denver) and net wealth, although this was contingent on time of purchase and ethnicity. Our multivariate analyses revealed that changes in annualized home equity appreciation were associated with the ethnic composition of the neighborhood and age of property. Annualized wealth accumulation was associated with annualized home equity appreciation, being married throughout the tenure of homeownership, and year of home purchase. HOP homebuyers received exceptionally favorable initial mortgage terms and conditions, often enhanced with down-payment assistance from their own DHA escrow account or from local housing and neighborhood development organizations, resulting in a dramatically low rate of default and foreclosure to date. Moreover, HOP homebuyers were not immune to financial stresses, and the continuing lack of wealth for many makes them vulnerable to future interruptions in primary wage earner's employment or health. We discuss the implications for low-income homeownership policy and argue that the goal of expanding homeownership opportunities should not be abandoned.     

Homeownership and Nontraditional and Subprime Mortgages

This article documents the growth and geographic distribution of nontraditional mortgages (NTMs) and subprime mortgages during 2000-2006, and examines the association between these products and homeownership at the county level between 2000 and 2012. It finds a significant relationship between the origination of NTM and subprime mortgages during the boom and changes in the number of homeowners (positive during the 2000-2006 period and negative during the 2006-2012 period) but no significant relationship with the change in the homeownership rate. Looking at specific categories of the population, the results indicate a positive relationship between the presence of NTMs and subprime mortgages and increased numbers of homeowners for young households as well as for low income and minority households, but the relationship is smaller than for the general population. Overall, the relationship between NTMs and homeownership is stronger than the relationship between subprime mortgages and homeownership during the boom and it is less negative during the bust.     

Elderly interest in home equity conversion

Abstract

Few elderly homeowners liquidate their home equity to fund consumption. This article examines whether attitudes about housing, independence, and finances affect a homeowner's interest in home equity conversion. The results of a nationwide survey of elderly homeowners were analyzed by logistic regression to ascertain the relationship between interest in home equity conversion and economic, demographic, and attitudinal characteristics.

The results indicate that elderly homeowners most interested in home equity conversion own houses valued at $50,000 or less, are concerned about maintaining independence but not homeownership, and are not very concerned about future medical expenses. Thus, societal norms for maintaining single‐family homeownership and medical assistance programs that exempt home equity from requirements that participants spend all their assets to be eligible may be inhibiting the growth of home equity conversion programs.     

Which Nonprofit Organizations Borrow?

The tax benefit, bankruptcy value, and pecking-order theories of corporate capital structure are discussed in context of nonprofit organizations. A bivariate probit model shows that coefficients differ between models meaning mortgages and tax-exempt bonds are not equivalent forms of debt. Organizations with proportionally more program revenues, contributions, total assets, total revenues, and executive compensation are more likely to have a mortgage. Nonprofits that rely on special event fund-raising or contributions have a lower probability of using bond financing. The use of debt is also influenced by the nature of the organization's mission as measured through the NTEE classification.     

Originating lender localness and mortgage sustainability: an evaluation of delinquency and foreclosure in Indiana's mortgage revenue bond program

Originating lenders play a vital role in selecting and preparing borrowers for homeownership, directly and through partnerships with community entities. While previous research demonstrates the importance of originating lenders for mortgage access to low- and moderate-income borrowers, this analysis evaluates the influence of the originating lender, and in particular the localness of the lender, on mortgage sustainability (reduced delinquency and foreclosure). Employing data on more than 5,000 low- and moderate-income borrowers participating in Indiana's Mortgage Revenue Bond (MRB) program from 2004–2006, this analysis finds that the localness of the originating lender is significantly predictive of mortgage sustainability. After controlling for borrower, mortgage, and market characteristics, an increase in the localness of the lender is associated with a decrease in the probability of delinquency and foreclosure, particularly for higher risk (lower credit score) borrowers participating in the MRB program.     

The potential and limitations of mortgage innovation in fostering homeownership in the United States

Abstract

This article presents an empirical analysis of mortgage innovation as a vehicle to enable renters, especially those from traditionally underserved populations, to realize home‐ownership. It examines the financial and underwriting criteria of a typology of mortgage products, from those adhering to historical standards to some of today's most liberal loans, and develops synthetic models to account for all direct purchase costs. These models are calibrated using 1995 data on renter demographic and financial characteristics from the Survey of Income and Program Participation.

Compared with historical mortgages, today's more innovative loans increase the number of renters who could hypothetically qualify for homeownership by at least a million and expand potential home‐buying capacity by $300 billion. Certain policies could greatly expand the potential gains. Nevertheless, even the most aggressive innovations can play only a limited role in efforts to deliver the material benefits of homeownership to underserved populations.     

Real Denial Rates: A New Tool to Look at Who Is Receiving Mortgage Credit

ABSTRACT

The observed mortgage denial rate (ODR), calculated from Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, is often used to measure mortgage credit availability, but it does not account for shifts in applicants’ credit profiles. In this article, we develop an additional tool, which we call the real denial rate (RDR), as a way to account for credit differences and hence more consistently measure denial rates and mortgage credit accessibility. We match HMDA data with CoreLogic proprietary data to obtain both borrower demographic information (e.g., income and race and ethnicity) and mortgage credit characteristics (e.g., loan-to-value ratios, debt-to-income ratios, and credit scores). We account for shifts in applicants’ credit profiles by considering only the denial rate of low-credit-profile applicants. Our RDR results show that conventional mortgages have higher denial rates than government mortgages do, racial and ethnic differences are smaller than the ODR indicates but are not eliminated, and small-dollar mortgages have higher RDRs, particularly in the government loan channel.     

Comment on Michael A. Stegman et al.’s “Preventive servicing is good for business and affordable homeownership policy”: What prevents loan modifications?

Abstract

After discussing the article by Stegman et al., this comment describes the barriers to preventive servicing for securitized residential loans and assesses the importance of loan modifications, given the recent increases in default and foreclosure rates for subprime loans. Several hurdles slow or reduce such modifications, even those that help borrowers and investors alike. For example, self‐interest may reduce servicers’ willingness to modify loans rapidly. In addition, underlying securitization agreements may impede servicers’ ability and discretion in this area. Further, tax laws that govern a common securitization entity may limit modifications, as may accounting standards. Finally, “tranche warfare,” the sometimes contradictory fiduciary duties servicers have toward investors holding different tranches of securitized pools, may decrease their ability or their willingness to modify loans.

This comment concludes that barriers to effective loan modifications should be reduced or eliminated where feasible, but that the securitization of subprime loans creates risks for borrowers.     

Segregation and the Geography of Creditworthiness: Racial Inequality in a Recovered Mortgage Market

The subprime boom and subsequent foreclosure crisis highlighted risk associated with pursuit of the American Dream of homeownership. People of color and those living in segregated areas were particularly harmed by the dramatic rise and fall of the housing market. Almost a decade after the economy’s collapse, questions remain about racial and spatial disparities in access to mortgage credit. I leverage Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data to explore mortgage application outcomes in 2014. Well into the economy’s recovery, minority borrowers remained at a disadvantage in the mortgage approval process. Whereas 71% of White applicants were approved for home loans, approval rates were lower for Asians (68%), Latinos (63%), and Blacks (54%). Black and Latino borrowers were also significantly more likely to receive higher cost loans than Whites, a practice that has accelerated since the foreclosure crisis. Results suggest that segregation exacerbated racial disparities as lenders funneled expensive credit into isolated minority communities. Furthermore, the differences between White and minority outcomes were largest in census tracts where subprime lending was common in 2006 and foreclosures accumulated during the Great Recession. Together, these findings indicate how spatially organized markets have racialized consequences in a highly segregated society.