The Discourse of Terror Threats: Assessing Online Written Threats by Nigerian Terrorist Groups

Online threats by terrorist groups are viewed as a special type of discourse that sends menacing explicit messages, expressing not only an intention to cause a direct physical harm to the threatened, but also to show a commitment to destroy public property or cause a change of system or government. This study applies critical discourse analysis with some insights from pragmatics to analyze the discourse-pragmatic contents of terror threats by two terrorist groups in Nigeria—Boko Haram and Ansaru. Explicit and implied threats are examined from seven online publications by these groups written between 2009 and 2012. This study shows that terror threats by Nigerian terrorist groups are intertextually and ideologically related to threats associated with Al Qaeda and global jihad, which also goes further to establish their strong link and influence with other terror groups around the world. The findings also show that the structure of terror threats is significantly different from the conventional formula for verbal threats.     

Groups,Networks, or Movements: A Command-and-Control-Driven Approach to Classifying Terrorist Organizations and Its Application to Al Qaeda

Appropriately describing the properties and defining the boundaries of terrorist groups is frequently challenging. Public and policy discussion of Al Qaeda as a group, network, or broad social movement is described as an example of this problem, with an emphasis on the consequences of placing a terrorist organization in each of these different categories. To resolve the confusion that such uncertainties can introduce into discussion, an approach is described focusing on the strength of command-and-control linkages within an organization for laying out the differences between groups, networks, and movements and defining the boundaries between them.     

From Ocalan to Al Qaida: The Continuing Terrorist Threat in Turkey

The most recent terrorist attacks in Turkey suggest a new phase in the country's war against terrorist groups. Although the PKK has largely been neutralized as a major threat to internal stability, the continued existence of other militant organizations--particularly Islamist groups who appear to be cooperating with elements of al Qaida--suggests continued security problems for the government.‐     

Microfinance Group Processes and Crises: Responses to Economic and Psychological Threats

We examine micro-finance institutions (MFI) group processes simulating potential default by members, often the tipping point of crises. Using structural equation methods to develop measurement models and experimental methodology to test causal effects of economic and psychological threats we effectively capture the risks perceived by individual borrowers. We defined these threats in terms of a given financial loss and reputation loss. The results show that members make the subtle distinction between different types of peer pressure and joint liability. We also show that psychological threats perceived by borrowers are key to understanding MFI group processes, especially as triggers to a repayment crisis.     

Challenges for Effective Counterterrorism Communication: Practitioner Insights and Policy Implications for Preventing Radicalization,Disrupting Attack Planning,and Mitigating Terrorist Attacks

Growing concerns about small-scale, low sophistication terrorist attacks, and the difficulties they present for security services, make public coproduction of security increasingly necessary. Communication to ensure that the public(s) is aware of the role they can play will be central to this. This article, based on interviews with thirty expert practitioners, explores challenges associated with communication designed to prevent radicalization, interdict attack planning and mitigate the impacts of a terrorist attack in the United Kingdom and Denmark. The interplay between these challenges and the contemporary terrorist context are analyzed, highlighting that new, or adapted, communications and approaches may be necessary.     

As a Fish Swims in the Sea: Relationships Between Factors Contributing to Support for Terrorist or Insurgent Groups

This article reviews and synthesizes social science knowledge on the connections between popular support and terrorist/insurgent sustainment. After distinguishing between “sympathetic of” and “supporting,” the author identifies support requirements of terrorists and insurgents, the range of sources of support, and motives for support. A scheme of relationships between factors contributing to strength of support is essayed. As a caveat to population-centered approaches to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, the article concludes that support is not “one size fits all,” and that certain factors, when present, are more amenable to policy influence than others. These conclusions suggest that it is imperative that practitioners of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency be mindful of the specifics of their case when seeking to undermine support.     

Looking Back to the Future: Threats to the Success of Restorative Justice in the United Kingdom

Abstract

Recent years have witnessed an entrenchment of restorative justice principles and practices in the youth and adult criminal justice systems of the United Kingdom. This research presents a comparative analysis of the findings of two empirical studies—one of a police restorative cautioning scheme conducted 15 years ago, and the second a contemporary study of youth offender panels. In this research, we argue that restorative justice practices in the United Kingdom are repeating history, rather than learning from it. Specifically, we argue that if restorative justice programs continue to proliferate with the same shortcomings—most notably, inadequate victim involvement, failure to provide a genuine role for the community, and targeting only relatively low-level crime—the future for restorative justice in the United Kingdom is likely to be bleak.     

Trendsetters,Trend Followers,and Individual Players: Obtaining Global Counterterror Actor Types from Proscribed Terror Lists

This article seeks to conceptualize global counterterror actor types by examining the designated terrorist organizations lists of six countries; the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Russia, and China. It is argued that these countries should be placed into one of three distinct categories: Trendsetters, Trend Followers, and Individual Players. Being able to classify countries according to these categories is important for global policymakers. It raises awareness of the differences between countries, and emphasizes that “one-fits-all” policies are inappropriate and have little chance of achieving global endorsement.     

Saddam Hussein: Political Psychological Profiling Results Relevant to His Possession,Use, and Possible Transfer of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to Terrorist Groups

This article applies psychological profiling data from the speeches and interviews of Saddam Hussein during the 1990 Gulf Crisis to many of the recent questions about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) policies and intentions that were pivotal to the decision to wage war in Iraq. Content analysis of Hussein's verbal comments prior to the invasion of Kuwait and after the introduction of coalition forces into Saudi Arabia were used to assess his psychological state, political attitudes, and decision-making processes under stress. The findings were then applied to the recent issues of Iraqi WMD possession, use, and possible transfer to terrorist groups. The results of this political psychological assessment of Hussein indicated that prior to his removal by coalition forces it was extremely unlikely that he had significantly reduced what he perceived to be Iraq's WMD capabilities. Analysis of Hussein's political psychology, sensitivity to threats, propensity for violent reactions, and tendency to miscalculate indicated that he had a very low threshold for WMD use and may not have waited to be attacked before using these weapons. The results also indicated that the same characteristics that made Hussein an extremely likely candidate for WMD use made it unlikely that he would transfer WMD assets to a terrorist group not under his direct control. Although examination of Hussein's decision making under stress indicated that the invasion would increase the likelihood of Iraqi WMD use, it was not seen as increasing the odds of Iraqi transfer of WMD to terrorist groups. However, the results also indicated the potential for Hussein to suffer from a significant series of cognitive biases with direct impact on his decision making regarding WMD, as well as his ability to use these weapons. Support was also noted for his potential to experience gaps in reality testing and immobilizing anxiety should the military struggle turn desperate for Iraq and for him personally. The implications for the characterization of leaders likely to use WMD were also examined.­     

Hitting Them Where it Hurts: A Joint Interagency Network to Disrupt Terrorist Financing in West Africa

Illicit trafficking networks in West Africa are a major funding source for violent extremist groups in the region. Although the United States has formed interagency constructs in the Caribbean and in Europe to counter illicit trafficking, there is a gap in West Africa. The corridor of smuggling routes from the shores of West Africa into North Africa provides extremist groups with the financing they need to continue their activities. By forming a third interagency organization in West Africa, the United States and its partners could strike a significant blow to violent extremist groups, which continue to threaten U.S. interests in the region.     

Die and Let Die: Exploring Links between Suicide Terrorism and Terrorist Use of Chemical,Biological, Radiological,and Nuclear Weapons

The use of suicide bombings by some organizations is often presented as evidence of eroding constraints among terrorists to use chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Besides a possibly more reckless approach to violence resulting from the weakened instinct of self-preservation, it is clear that suicide delivery of such weapons would have great tactical advantages over other forms of delivery. This article explores the often neglected nuances of contemporary suicide terrorism to explain why this practice does not necessarily make a mass-casualty chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack by a terrorist group more likely.     

发达国家农民工社会保障经验及对中国的启示

人权保障是当今国际社会的重要话题,受到国际社会的普遍关注。实践反复证明,资本主义市场经济条件下的广大劳工,不是市场经济的局外人,而是市场经济的重要主体;不是无足轻重的雇佣奴隶,而是对市场经济发展有重大影响的“利害攸关者”。     

Jihadist Highway to Jihadist Haven: Turkey's Jihadi Policies and Western Security

Turkish support to jihadists is not merely a tactic aimed at removing Assad from power. It stems from a strategic decision on the part of Turkish authorities to influence Middle East affairs through non-state actors, much as Iran has been doing for some time. Turkey's support of jihadists transiting into Syria and its establishment of close ties with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood are joint aspects of this strategy. Turkish authorities have permitted Al Qaeda sympathizers to use pro-government media to promote their beliefs. The authorities have adopted a new political language that fuels anti-American and anti-Western sentiments. Prosecutors who have attempted to prevent shipments of weapons to Al Qaeda–affiliated groups in Syria have been fired and in some cases incarcerated. Indeed, by now Turkish prosecutors and the Turkish National Police are thoroughly intimidated. Not a single counterterror operation has been launched to disrupt Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)’s networks or recruitment activities. The Turkish National Intelligence Organization has been given full responsibility to deal with jihadist activities, without any active oversight, and the police are loath to venture into their territory. As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Turkey's jihadi policies have direct and indirect impact on Western security. This article examines Turkey's jihadi policies by examining official statements, media reports, interviews, and fieldwork.