Reform,corruption, and growth: Why corruption is more devastating in Russia than in China

This article explains why massive political corruption appears to be incompatible with economic growth in Russia but compatible with very rapid economic growth in China. The common assumption is that corruption is bad for economic performance. So how can we explain the puzzling contrast between Russia and China? Is Russia being more severely “punished” for its corruption than China? If so, why? This article demonstrates that three intervening factors—comparative advantage, the organization of corruption, and the nature of rents—determines the impact of corruption on economic performance, and that these factors can explain the divergent outcomes. The article thereby offers an alternative to statist explanations of the Russia-China paradox.     

Discussing conflict in contemporary China

The research suggests there is a gap in the peace studies and conflict resolution literature, with little representation or understanding of Chinese perspectives. In a project to address this gap, the researchers conducted interviews individually with 30 participants identified as ‘ emerging leaders’, who came from diverse universities and parts of the Peoples’ Republic of China. This paper reports on the language used by young emerging leaders to talk about conflict, the main concepts that were discussed and what meanings may be communicated in the context of contemporary China. The research method was developed in collaboration with Chinese academics, was elicitive and dialogic, used context-grounded vignettes of conflict scenarios and aimed to build a foundation for deepening dialogue and engagement. The findings are important theoretically for a more inclusive peace and conflict studies literature and have practical implications for the way in which relationships with China may best be approached.     

Towards an integrated model of corruption: opportunities and control in China

This article uses a transaction costs approach to synthesize micro- and macro-theories of corruption in an analysis of corruption in post-Mao China. Macro-theories of corruption include functional, political-institutional, revised modernization, and cultural approaches. These approaches are integrated through a micro-model developed from the principal-agent model and a rational choice model of crime. The micro-model focuses on: the frequency of corrupt opportunities and the stakes involved, external control such as legal sanctions, and internal control or moral constraints. Within this context, this study reveals that corruption during the post-Mao China period was caused by the surge of such opportunities and the failure of internal and external control.     

Individual rights and collective rights: Labor's predicament in China

Despite the government's active legislation to protect workers, labor rights still remain widely ignored and poorly enforced in China. Structural constrains, such as the state's development strategy biased on efficiency over equity, tight labor markets, and the lack of an effective safety net, cannot fully explain why Chinese workers have had so little impact on the environment in which they work and the violations of their rights often occur. Using Marshall's theory of citizenship rights, this article explores the structure of China's labor rights for an explanation. It argues that while Chinese labor legislation stipulates workers' individual rights regarding contracts, wages, working conditions, pensions, and so on, it fails to provide them with collective rights, namely the rights to organize, to strike, and to bargain collectively in a meaningful sense. The lack of collective rights is one of the major factors that render workers' individual rights vulnerable, hollow, unenforceable, or often disregarded. Labor legislation that enables workers to act collectively is crucial for safeguarding their individual rights.     

Growth,governance and corruption in Bangladesh: a re-assessment

This paper revisits Bangladesh’s ‘double paradox’ – sustained macroeconomic growth despite the poor state of governance and a high level of corruption – by critically reviewing trends in governance and corruption indicators during 1990–2017 vis-à-vis other South Asian countries. In addition, we draw upon data from a purposefully designed survey of manufacturing firms to assess the state of economic governance in the export-oriented ready-made garments (RMG) sector, the country’s main source of foreign exchange and driver of economic growth. Consistent with the country’s poor ranking in a host of indicators of investment climate and corruption perception, in-depth interviews of RMG factory owners confirm the high cost of doing business in various forms. We also find no evidence of growth-mediated improvements in indicators of governance. On the contrary, our review of print media reports suggests a growing governance deficit in the country’s financial sector. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for the country’s future growth as well as performance of the RMG sector.     

The neoliberal discourse on corruption as a means of consent building: reflections from post-crisis Turkey

This article draws attention to the ideological role that the neoliberal discourse on corruption has fulfilled in the promotion of the second generation reforms in Southern countries since the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. This discourse is ahistoric insofar as it fails to recognise corruption as a problem of modernity; biased insofar as it associates corruption with Southern countries' historical and cultural specificities only; contradictory in terms of its counter-productive anti-corruption strategies; and politicised as it has redefined ‘corruption’ as ‘rent-seeking’. In the absence of alternative radical conceptualisations, this essentially competition-induced neoliberal orthodoxy on corruption has been easily articulated within morality-based popular concerns in domestic politics and hence acquired a hegemonic capability. The article substantiates these arguments by examining the trajectory of the neoliberal anti-corruption agenda in Turkey with a particular focus on the developments of the post-2001 financial crisis period.     

Bureaucratic corruption in africa: causes,consequences and remedies

One of the critical policy issues in African management today is bureaucratic corruption. This problem has in some countries reached such proportions as to frustrate good policy intentions and to parayze management operations. The study examines the extent of bureaucratic corruption in selected African countries, analyzes their potential causes. Critically asesses their consequences on the pattern of political. socio-economic and administrative development, and reviews the effectivenes of remedies proposed or actually tried.     

Political corruption,economic performance,and electoral outcomes: a cross-national analysis

The current study examines how the incumbent government's economic performance plays a role in mediating the impact of political corruption on electoral outcomes in 115 developing countries with relatively higher levels of corruption than Western consolidated democracies. Borrowing theoretical insights from the information-processing theory of voting, this study finds that political corruption becomes a formative electoral factor when the regime fails to sustain a sufficient level of economic growth. Otherwise, political corruption is not a significant factor that shapes electoral outcomes, irrespective of the level of perceived corruption, because the economy occupies voters' minds as the most important issue, making it a more accessible issue than political corruption.     

Natural resources and corruption in post-war transitions: matters of trust

Many ‘post-conflict’ countries face difficulties in reaping the full benefits of their natural resource wealth for reconstruction and development purposes. This is a major issue given these countries’ needs and the risk of seeing ‘mismanaged’ primary sectors undermine a transition to peace. Bringing together debates about the ‘inequality-mistrust-corruption’ trap and relationships between natural resources and corruption, this paper suggest that some resource sectors may be more likely to foster inequalities, and thereby increase corruption and distrust, while others are less likely to do so. Reviewing arguments and empirical evidence, I point to the relative importance of transition contexts, stakeholder incentives and resource sector characteristics, and suggest how resource-related corruption may be better understood in relation to trust-building and reconciliation processes.     

Shari'a in Swat: A Dangerous Surrender to Islamists

President Barack Obama pledged in his first TV interview—with the Arab satellite channel Al Arabiya—that America under his watch would "listen with respect and not dictate" to the world. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has further announced that this country will no longer just throw around its military might but will pursue a "smart power" approach by tempering the use of hard weaponry with the "soft power" of persuasion and cultural attraction. Or, as Madame Secretary's husband Bill has put it, America will now lead through the power of example instead of the example of power.
The first exceedingly complex test of Obama's smart power strategy will be how to end George W. Bush's misguided "war on terror" in Afghanistan and Pakistan, keeping al-Qaida at bay without being swallowed by the quagmire of tribal politics. An array of experts from New Delhi to Paris offers their views in this section.     

Fighting corruption in public procurement in post-communist states: Obstacles and solutions

Anti-corruption efforts in Europe’s post-communist states have been less successful than anticipated. Criticism has been raised against the role of the international community in promoting anti-corruption programmes. Besides, such programmes have been deemed vague and “all-inclusive”. They have largely failed to address local factors “informing” corrupt behaviour in post-communist states, such as (a) negative perceptions of law, and (b) informal practice.‘ I'd be grateful if you could retain the original sentence as it is more precise.     

Governance of a public sector joint venture: the control challenges of dominated owners

Local governments increasingly choose to provide a wide range of services through cooperation with other local governments. Providing complex services through intergovernmental units creates collaboration risks and collective action dilemmas that need to be mitigated. Based on a longitudinal case study, an investigation is made into the dynamic processes in the governance of a public sector joint venture (JV) and the control challenges of dominated owners. The findings illustrate that the approach to mitigating collective action dilemmas is far less rational than that prescribed by the normative literature, resulting in control challenges at later stages in the relationship. Limitations in the assessment of collaboration risks are explained by drawing on resource dependence theory (RDT) arguments. Dynamic processes in the JV relationship create the need to adjust the governance system. However, adaptability is constrained by power asymmetry and control complexity.     

Corruption in social relations: Bribe-taking,corruptibility, and corruption risks

This inquiry aims to investigate how the relational dynamics are imprinted on two critical dimensions of bribe-taking: corruptibility and corruption risks. Two treatments were randomly administered to 1400 subjects: single versus repeated interactions and strangers versus weak ties. The findings suggest that repeated interactions induce bigger bribe sizes, but also increase risks from whistleblowing and internal auditing. Weak ties mitigate bribe-taking willingness. Nevertheless, when coupled with repeated interactions, weak ties suppress the risks from whistleblowing, testifying the bifurcated effects. The tensions between corruptibility and corruption risks suggest that bribe-taking decisions are fraught with internal tensions, with the overall effects likely being a priori determined only in specific contexts. Such tensions are more intensified among true bureaucrats as they tend to claim bigger bribes and report more risks from internal auditing.     

Money matters: The role of public sector wages in corruption prevention

Economic theory as well as conventional wisdom from corruption-ridden countries suggest that low wages among public employees lead to corruption, but cross-sectional empirical research has largely failed to confirm this relationship. In this article, we investigate the relationship between experiences of corruption and wage levels for public sector employees, utilizing both objective and expert survey data, with global coverage. The statistical analysis shows that higher wages, as compared to the average wage in the country, is associated with less corruption. There is also some support, but weaker, for the hypothesis that corruption increases when wages fall below subsistence levels.     

正确认识中国的发展中国家属性

21世纪的头十年,国际形势进入大发展大变革大调整的时期,中国在全球经济发展史上写下了浓墨重彩之笔。在这辉煌的十年里,中国在经济总量上先后赶超意大利、法国、英国和德国。2011年2月14日,日本公布的经济数据证实中国又超过日本,经济总量跃居世界第二,成为全球经济总量排行榜上的“榜眼”。     

Land and grievances in post-conflict Sri Lanka: exploring the role of corruption complaints

There is a growing academic literature on both land and corruption in relation to post-conflict peace building. This paper aims to understand what role corruption complaints play in the nexus between land and grievances in post-conflict societies. Drawing on field material collected in Sri Lanka, the paper interrogates the role of corruption complaints in relation to a number of highly politicised and ethnicised post-conflict land issues, ranging from the return of idps and alleged new resettlement schemes to land grabbing for military, ‘development’ and/or commercial purposes. The comparatively high visibility of land use, and the fact that land-related corruption is likely to affect a specific set of people who lay claim to the land, makes it a particularly important area to address in research on corruption and post-conflict peace building.     

Brazil and Lula, 2005: crisis,corruption and change in political perspective

The election of Lula (Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva) as president of Brazil in October 2002 broke new ground: for the first time in Latin America a working man was directly elected as president of the Republic. Lula also came to power as leader of the Partido dos Trabalhadores, the Workers' Party, with its close links to ‘new unionism’, ‘liberation theology’ and mass social movements. The possibility of his election caused strong market reaction but, by the start of 2005, Lula and his government had reassured their critics on the right. They had also dismayed many supporters on the left, including members of the pt, by failing to tackle urgent social problems. Even so, on the basis of a strong economic performance and support in the polls, Lula seemed assured of re-election in October 2006. Suddenly, in May 2005, came the first revelations of a corruption scandal, leading to a crisis described as ‘the most extensive in the whole history of the Brazilian republic’. Lula lost some of his closest ministerial colleagues, and the pt most of its senior officers, with the threat of impeachment for Lula himself. That crisis is still unresolved, but has already severely damaged the pt, virtually paralysed government and made Lula's re-election seem ever more unlikely. This paper seeks to set the current crisis in wider political perspective and to reflect on its possible impact on a political system which in 2002, and even in 2004, gave evidence of supporting a robust and stable democracy.