Peacebuilding as Security in ‘Failing’ and Conflict-Prone States

Abstract

Peacebuilding activities in conflict-prone and post-conflict countries are based upon the assumption that effective—preferably liberal—states form the greatest prospect for a stable international order, and that failing or conflict-prone states represent a threat to international security. Peacebuilding is therefore a part of the security agenda. This has brought obvious benefits, most obviously much-needed resources, aid and capacity-building to conflict-prone countries in the form of international assistance, which has contributed to a decline in intrastate conflicts. However, there are a number of negative implications to the securitization of peacebuilding. This article considers the implications of this, and concludes that it is difficult to mediate between conventional and ‘critical’ views of peacebuilding since they are premised upon quite different assumptions regarding what peacebuilding is and what it should be.     

IN IT FOR THE LONG HAUL? POST‐CONFLICT STATEBUILDING,PEACEBUILDING, AND THE GOOD GOVERNANCE AGENDA IN TIMOR‐LESTE

Statebuilding after conflict often entails liberal peacebuilding measures. The end of the UN mission in post‐conflict Timor‐Leste in December 2012 provides a unique opportunity to investigate statebuilding in practice. The liberal peacebuilding agenda has met with stiff academic resistance—mainly from the critical theorist camp—and is questioned as an appropriate measure of …statebuilding success. We deploy instead the good governance (GG) agenda as a hybrid local‐liberal guide. Drawing on field work, interviews, and secondary documents, we investigate what we see as four key, intertwined and overlapping aspects of GG: state capacity including the establishment of a state bureaucracy, participation and the engagement of civil society, institution building and rule of law, and corruption control and transparency. We note GG provides a useful policy heuristic, while abstract “one‐size‐fits‐all” liberal peacebuilding models, which avoid the complexities of machinery of government issues, the time taken to develop institutions, and historical and contextual environments of countries, are likely to face severe problems. New states may be dependent on external forces to maintain monopoly of violence. The reversibility and uncertainty of statebuilding and the decades‐long commitment needed by international agencies are noted. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Postwar Reconstruction,the Reverse Course and the New Way Forward: Bis Repetitas?

Abstract

While comprehensive studies on UN peacebuilding assert that ‘learning has not … been one of the strengths of the United Nations’ (Chesterman 2004, p.256), research so far has largely ignored the UN's institutional infrastructure for learning. This essay seeks to contribute to closing this gap by surveying the evolution of the UN's learning infrastructure from the early 1990s to the present. Despite some progress in recent years, the lack of resources, coordination and political will means that turning the UN bureaucracy into a learning organization is unfinished business at best. Rather than focusing all attention on the new Peacebuilding Commission, policymakers and researchers alike should invest additional resources in analysing and strengthening the learning capacity of the UN peacebuilding apparatus.     

Security Provision after Regime Change: Local Militias and Political Entities in Post-Qaddafi Tripoli

This paper discusses the way the newly formed political entities and the local militias engage in statebuilding practices during Libya's transitional period of 2011–12. Focusing on the encounters between these actors in the security field, it provides insight into the capacity and strategy of national actors to build state structures and to develop the political arrangements that they deem necessary. It does so by identifying the key actors involved, as well as the interactions between them and the constantly evolving relations of control, power and authority. It shows how actors in the security field engage with each other in their efforts to expand and to institutionalize networks and influence, and the competition and alignments with other security actors that are active in the transitional phase and thereafter.     

Is the Future of SSR non-linear?

This article explores issues around security sector reform (SSR) and the involvement of the international community in peace-building. It argues that the international architecture which surrounds SSR privileges a particular form of knowledge that reflects a technocratic approach to security, and illustrates this by systematically examining the literature. Research on the literature itself shows that three core themes dominate: state-centric approaches, technocratic approaches, and approaches to local ownership. These comprise a current, linear approach to SSR that ignores much of the critical literature on peace-building. The article then goes on to draw on some of this critical literature to develop an alternative approach to SSR building using a non-linear approach which incorporates a better understanding of institutional politics, an emphasis on process rather than structures, and analysis of hidden politics.     

Security Sector Reform and Transitional Justice in Kosovo: Comparing the Kosovo Security Force and Police Reform Processes

Abstract

Transitional justice and security sector reform are critical in post-conflict settings, particularly regarding the reform of judicial systems, intelligence services, police, correctional systems, the military, and addressing systemic massive human rights abuses committed by individuals representing these institutions. Accordingly, the relationship between security sector reform and transitional justice mechanisms, such as vetting, the representation of ethnic minorities in key institutions, the resettlement and reintegration of the former combatants deserve special attention from scholars. This article presents a comparative analysis of the reform of police and security forces in Kosovo, and explores the causes of different outcomes of these two processes.     

Building a Repressive Peace: The Case of Post-Genocide Rwanda

Abstract

Security, economic recovery, democracy and statebuilding are seen as tenets of post-conflict peacebuilding in the academic literature. In Rwanda, 15 years of post-genocide peace were built through security, economic recovery and statebuilding, but without democratisation. The result was a repressive peace. The Rwandan case suggests that post-conflict peacebuilding does not require democracy; that elections can reinforce authoritarian tendencies; and that statebuilding can lead to a repressive peace. It also suggests that the repressive peace can be durable, at least in the short to medium term.     

Global Assemblages of Security Governance and Contemporary International Intervention

ABSTRACT

This article draws from the concept of assemblages in order to examine the component parts of contemporary international interventions. It argues that in contrast mainstream analyses of statebuilding and peacebuilding, as well as more critical treatments that tie interventions to the concept of 'international order', the concept of assemblages offers a more compelling vantage point from which to examine the disparate lines of forces that make up modern-day interventions. The article proposes an exploration of some of the component parts that sustain the current assemblage of governance, security, and international intervention and draws our attention to their self-sustaining rationalities.     

Security Sector Reform,Statebuilding and Local Ownership: Securing the State or its People?

It is widely acknowledged that while local ownership is one of the core principles of successful Security Sector Reform (SSR) programmes, the concept is narrowly interpreted in terms of who owns what. Moreover, the focus of SSR is often on building state institutions, rather than building the relationship between people and the state, which further limits the extent to which people, particularly at the community level, are engaged in SSR processes. It is argued that without ensuring meaningful and inclusive local ownership of SSR programmes, public trust and confidence in state security and justice sector institutions will be limited. Crucially, this will leave the state vulnerable to renewed outbreaks of conflict. To rectify this it is proposed that a hybrid SSR approach be promoted by incorporating community safety structures into SSR programmes.     

Privatization in Kosovo: ‘Liberal Peace’ in Practice

This article examines internationally led privatization in Kosovo as an example of international statebuilding. It concentrates on the period from 1999 to 2008, when privatization was planned and implemented under formal international management. International statebuilding is typically sought justified with the idea of ‘liberal peace’, and this article shows how the tension between the political and economic tenets of the idea of liberal peace manifested itself in Kosovo's internationally led privatization.     

RETRACTED: “I’m Not Leaving,I’m Not Afraid”: (Re)Visiting the Dysfunctional Systems of Justice on Gender-based Violence (GBV) in Uganda

This article has been retracted.     

The New China: Dynamism and vulnerability

Abstract

From 1998 to 2003, the Solomon Islands found itself in the grip of ‘the Tensions’, a violent civil conflict that left some 200 people dead, more than 20,000 displaced, and countless others subjected to torture, rape, fear and intimidation. In the aftermath of the conflict, two dominant approaches to post-conflict justice emerged. The first, implemented by the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), favoured a ‘rule of law’ approach according to which large numbers of militants on both sides were arrested and processed through the criminal justice system resulting, in many cases, in the imposition of lengthy period of imprisonment. The second, ‘reconciliation’ approach, favoured local, grassroots, traditional and indigenous justice processes and were routinely implements by community groups, women's organisations and the churches. This article demonstrates that in the absence of a formally planned transitional justice process, these two approaches to post-conflict justice have come into serious tension with proponents of each accusing the other of hampering their justice efforts. It examines those tensions and analyses the extent to which the Solomon Islands’ Truth and Reconciliation Commission, designed in part to provide a bridge between the rule of law and reconciliation approaches, has been able to quell this new set of tensions.