Identity and political preferences in Ukraine – before and after the Euromaidan

Abstract

Taking advantage of a panel survey in Ukraine before and after the Euromaidan, we analyze the relationship between ethnicity, language practice, and civic identities on the one hand and political attitudes on the other. We find that while ethnic identities and language practices change little on the aggregate level over the period, there has been a significant increase in the proportion of people thinking of Ukraine as their homeland. There has also been a large fall in support for a close political and economic relationship with Russia and some increase in support for joining the European Union. Nevertheless, we find that identities in general, and language practice in particular, remain powerful predictors of political attitudes and that people are more likely to shift attitudes to reflect their identities rather than modify their identities to match their politics.     

NATO–Russia security challenges in the aftermath of Ukraine conflict: managing Black Sea security and beyond

NATO’s relationship with the Soviet Union and then Russia has been central to defining the European regional and global security configuration for decades. This article explores the potential consequences of the Ukrainian conflict for the current and future NATO–Russia relationship. The analysis focuses on defining specific challenges and risks for NATO and Russia in managing the evolving security environment of the Black Sea region. The author offers an assessment of the potential for future NATO–Russia clashes or cooperation in the Black Sea, and for broader regional and global security. Some recommendations are suggested for managing the future NATO–Russia relationship during this period of heightened uncertainty and risk.     

Towards conflict or cooperation? The Ukraine crisis and EU-Russia relations

The Ukraine crisis and Russia’s contribution to it have raised numerous concerns regarding the possible emergence of a new ‘Cold War’ in Europe. At the same time, Ukraine’s popular choice and enthusiasm for European integration expressed clearly on the streets of Kyiv seem to have caused Russia to adopt a (neo)revisionist attitude. In this context, relations between Russia and the EU (and the West for that matter) have been limited, frozen and directed on path towards conflict. This article analyses how the traditional dichotomy between conflict and cooperation in EU–Russia relations was replaced by conflict in the context of the Ukraine crisis. The article contends that the breakdown of the symbolic and peaceful cohabitation between the EU and Russia has been influenced by the fact that both actors have chosen to ignore key tensions that characterized their post-Cold War interactions. The article identifies three such tensions: the first emphasizes divisions between EU member states and their impact on coagulating a common EU approach towards Russia; the second (geopolitical) tension highlights the almost mutually exclusive way in which the EU and Russia’s security interests have developed in the post-Soviet space; finally, the third contends that a clash of values and worldviews between the EU and Russia makes conflict virtually unavoidable.     

Τhe energy parameters of the Russian–Ukrainian–EU impasse: dependencies,sanctions and the rise of ‘Turkish Stream’

The overwhelming dependency of Ukraine on Russian energy and the lack of any short-to-medium term diversification of European Union (EU) oil and gas supplies away from Moscow dictate a cooperative approach vis-à-vis Russia in dealing with the Ukrainian crisis. The EU is unable to impose any more severe sanctions on Russia’s energy industry without provoking a major negative impact on its own troubled economy. The continuation of the current confrontational friction in EU–Russian energy relations will most likely consolidate Russia’s decision to seek the elimination of its gas transit dependence on Ukraine after 2020. Such a target will be very difficult to attain by the end of this decade, even if Russia will be able to partly replace the now abandoned South Stream project with Turkish Stream.     

Destined for deadlock? Russia,Ukraine, and the unfulfilled Minsk agreements

ABSTRACT

Bringing peace, security, and stability to the war-torn region of Donbas has proven to be a challenging – some would say near-impossible – task. The “Minsk II” agreement, signed in February 2015, was supposed to put an end to the armed hostilities, resolve the underlying political issues, and gradually restore Ukrainian government control of the country’s eastern border. None of this has happened. Despite continuous Western support and pressure, progress in the implementation of the peace plan signed in Minsk has been slow, also after the much-anticipated Paris summit of the “Normandy Four” (Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France) in December 2019. This article discusses the underlying causes of the current stalemate, emphasizing factors such as the inherently complex nature of the conflict, the process through which “Minsk II” came into being, the vague and ambiguous language of this and other agreements, practical challenges related to the timing and sequencing of agreed-upon measures, and Russia’s persistent non-acknowledgement of its role in the conflict.     

IS THIS RUSSIA’S MOMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

Sir Jeremy Greenstock, formerly British permanent representative to the UN, who has had long experience of dealing with Russia in the context of diplomacy, considers whether the current moment of Russian dominance in Syria and the Middle East, combined with the recent general disengagement of the western powers in the region, could be considered as marking the beginning of a general period of Russian hegemony in the Middle East. The article takes into account the global geopolitical situation, the recent history of Russia and the Middle East, the consequences of western intervention in Iraq, and the motivations of the Russian government particularly in view of its recent engagement in Ukraine.     

Russia and its supporters in Europe: trans-ideology à la carte?

The impact of crisis in Ukraine on EU–Russia relations appears twofold. On the one hand, it revealed the high degree of disdain all across Europe to Moscow's neo-imperial approach. On the other hand, it unveiled a great deal of affection and sympathy to Kremlin's policy among a number of non-mainstream but significant groups within the EU. In this article, we mirror the major troubles of today’s Europe, as seen from Moscow’s perspective, with four nodal points of the Kremlin’s hegemonic discourse: social conservatism, nation state-based policies, independence from the US influence and the glorification of Russia’s self-inflicted mission of fighting contemporary neo-fascism. Our analysis of non-mainstream political parties in EU member states, sensitive and responsive to the Kremlin’s agenda, suggests that Putin's regime and Russia sympathizers in Europe pragmatically use each other, thereby challenging the classical ideological paradigms. This translates Russia’s policies into a trans-ideological repertoire of different discourses that differently resonate among the groups of Russia sympathizers.     

Gorbachev and the “National Question”: Restructuring the Soviet Federation

An American specialist on Russian economic law and managerial behavior examines the means by which enterprise directors cope with non-payments. Analysis is based primarily on evidence from six in-depth case studies of industrial enterprises in Moscow, Saratov, and Yekaterinburg. On-site observation of managerial routines complements intensive interviews with a range of managerial personnel and examination of sales contracts and other documentary records. The author identifies three basic patterns of adaptation to the threat of insolvency, the factors that explain the managers' behavioral choices, and the implications of these changes for the broader banking, inter-enterprise, and legal systems.     

Official Russian identity discourse in light of the annexation of Crimea: national or imperial?

Close examination and analysis of the Kremlin’s framing of Russia’s annexation of Crimea reveals that domestically it was presented in unprecedented national irredentist terminology, aiming at reunifying the Russian nation in one state. The Russian nation was largely described in ethno-lingual or ethno-cultural terms, while the Russian state was all but explicitly declared as a nation–state of ethnic Russians. The official identity discourse was marked by the recasting and unprecedentedly strong reassertion of boundaries between the Russian and Ukrainian nations, legitimizing Russian claims to Crimea. However, the changing references to the crisis in Eastern Ukraine illustrate how the Kremlin’s identity rhetoric is still mainly guided by considerations of political necessity, rather than dictated by some national or ideological vision. Significantly, the focus of the Russian official identity discourse shifted from the state to the nation. This marks a decisive departure from Putin’s earlier largely statist rhetoric in the 2000s, and a new stage of maturation and official acclamation of national ethnicization trends launched during his third presidential term. After years of sitting on the fence, the Kremlin reinvented itself as an active and initiating player in the nationalism field.     

After the Ukrainian crisis: Is there a place for Russia?

Revolutionary protests in Ukraine in winter 2014 resulted in the annexation of Crimea by Russia, and an anti-terrorist operation launched by Kiev in eastern Ukraine. What was a totally internal manifestation of displeasure with governmental policy transformed into an international security crisis. While Kiev considers it a Russian–Ukrainian conflict, Moscow perceives it as a Russian–West confrontation, claiming that the crisis was provoked by NATO’s desire to enlarge into the region where Russia’s vital interests lie. The article analyses the sources of the current Ukrainian–Russian conflict and looks into Russia’s place in post-crisis Ukraine. As history has shown, even those states which used to fight each other for centuries managed not only to find peace but to establish constructive relationships. Still, with the shift from material to ideological confrontation, there are fewer and fewer options for compromise.     

融合与冲突--论海外华侨华人的认同

二战后,海外华侨华人社会经过几十年的变迁,在完成从"过客型"到"定居型"的转变后,因应政治身份的变化,在文化上也逐渐融人所在国社会.笔者认为海外华人的认同,主要是文化认同,目前还处在一个过渡时期,这一时期融合与冲突并行.同时,在全球化时代,存在加速认同与冲突的二律悖反的现象,即海外华侨华人的文化认同一方面有强化的趋势,另一方面,这一趋势则有可能导致潜在的冲突.     

Continuity and change in instrumentalizing ‘The Precedent’. How Russia uses Kosovo to legitimize the annexation of Crimea

The article contributes to the efforts of understanding Russia’s legitimization endeavours by looking at the policy narratives centred around the so-called Kosovo precedent and the way they were perceived by different actors from Ukraine, Russia, and international experts. The aim of the paper is to scrutinize the process of politicization of contested international norms (in particular, territorial sovereignty and the right to self-determination) in the case of Russia’s legitimacy claims in Ukraine. In assessing the instrumentalization of the ‘Kosovo precedent’ in the Crimea crisis, we focused on three main elements identified in the selected policy narratives: the reinterpretation of history, the humanitarian and ethnic factor and the reinterpretation of Western actions in the Balkans.