NATO–Russia security challenges in the aftermath of Ukraine conflict: managing Black Sea security and beyond

NATO’s relationship with the Soviet Union and then Russia has been central to defining the European regional and global security configuration for decades. This article explores the potential consequences of the Ukrainian conflict for the current and future NATO–Russia relationship. The analysis focuses on defining specific challenges and risks for NATO and Russia in managing the evolving security environment of the Black Sea region. The author offers an assessment of the potential for future NATO–Russia clashes or cooperation in the Black Sea, and for broader regional and global security. Some recommendations are suggested for managing the future NATO–Russia relationship during this period of heightened uncertainty and risk.     

Towards conflict or cooperation? The Ukraine crisis and EU-Russia relations

The Ukraine crisis and Russia’s contribution to it have raised numerous concerns regarding the possible emergence of a new ‘Cold War’ in Europe. At the same time, Ukraine’s popular choice and enthusiasm for European integration expressed clearly on the streets of Kyiv seem to have caused Russia to adopt a (neo)revisionist attitude. In this context, relations between Russia and the EU (and the West for that matter) have been limited, frozen and directed on path towards conflict. This article analyses how the traditional dichotomy between conflict and cooperation in EU–Russia relations was replaced by conflict in the context of the Ukraine crisis. The article contends that the breakdown of the symbolic and peaceful cohabitation between the EU and Russia has been influenced by the fact that both actors have chosen to ignore key tensions that characterized their post-Cold War interactions. The article identifies three such tensions: the first emphasizes divisions between EU member states and their impact on coagulating a common EU approach towards Russia; the second (geopolitical) tension highlights the almost mutually exclusive way in which the EU and Russia’s security interests have developed in the post-Soviet space; finally, the third contends that a clash of values and worldviews between the EU and Russia makes conflict virtually unavoidable.     

Destined for deadlock? Russia,Ukraine, and the unfulfilled Minsk agreements

ABSTRACT

Bringing peace, security, and stability to the war-torn region of Donbas has proven to be a challenging – some would say near-impossible – task. The “Minsk II” agreement, signed in February 2015, was supposed to put an end to the armed hostilities, resolve the underlying political issues, and gradually restore Ukrainian government control of the country’s eastern border. None of this has happened. Despite continuous Western support and pressure, progress in the implementation of the peace plan signed in Minsk has been slow, also after the much-anticipated Paris summit of the “Normandy Four” (Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France) in December 2019. This article discusses the underlying causes of the current stalemate, emphasizing factors such as the inherently complex nature of the conflict, the process through which “Minsk II” came into being, the vague and ambiguous language of this and other agreements, practical challenges related to the timing and sequencing of agreed-upon measures, and Russia’s persistent non-acknowledgement of its role in the conflict.     

Τhe energy parameters of the Russian–Ukrainian–EU impasse: dependencies,sanctions and the rise of ‘Turkish Stream’

The overwhelming dependency of Ukraine on Russian energy and the lack of any short-to-medium term diversification of European Union (EU) oil and gas supplies away from Moscow dictate a cooperative approach vis-à-vis Russia in dealing with the Ukrainian crisis. The EU is unable to impose any more severe sanctions on Russia’s energy industry without provoking a major negative impact on its own troubled economy. The continuation of the current confrontational friction in EU–Russian energy relations will most likely consolidate Russia’s decision to seek the elimination of its gas transit dependence on Ukraine after 2020. Such a target will be very difficult to attain by the end of this decade, even if Russia will be able to partly replace the now abandoned South Stream project with Turkish Stream.     

IS THIS RUSSIA’S MOMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

Sir Jeremy Greenstock, formerly British permanent representative to the UN, who has had long experience of dealing with Russia in the context of diplomacy, considers whether the current moment of Russian dominance in Syria and the Middle East, combined with the recent general disengagement of the western powers in the region, could be considered as marking the beginning of a general period of Russian hegemony in the Middle East. The article takes into account the global geopolitical situation, the recent history of Russia and the Middle East, the consequences of western intervention in Iraq, and the motivations of the Russian government particularly in view of its recent engagement in Ukraine.     

Russia and its supporters in Europe: trans-ideology à la carte?

The impact of crisis in Ukraine on EU–Russia relations appears twofold. On the one hand, it revealed the high degree of disdain all across Europe to Moscow's neo-imperial approach. On the other hand, it unveiled a great deal of affection and sympathy to Kremlin's policy among a number of non-mainstream but significant groups within the EU. In this article, we mirror the major troubles of today’s Europe, as seen from Moscow’s perspective, with four nodal points of the Kremlin’s hegemonic discourse: social conservatism, nation state-based policies, independence from the US influence and the glorification of Russia’s self-inflicted mission of fighting contemporary neo-fascism. Our analysis of non-mainstream political parties in EU member states, sensitive and responsive to the Kremlin’s agenda, suggests that Putin's regime and Russia sympathizers in Europe pragmatically use each other, thereby challenging the classical ideological paradigms. This translates Russia’s policies into a trans-ideological repertoire of different discourses that differently resonate among the groups of Russia sympathizers.     

After the Ukrainian crisis: Is there a place for Russia?

Revolutionary protests in Ukraine in winter 2014 resulted in the annexation of Crimea by Russia, and an anti-terrorist operation launched by Kiev in eastern Ukraine. What was a totally internal manifestation of displeasure with governmental policy transformed into an international security crisis. While Kiev considers it a Russian–Ukrainian conflict, Moscow perceives it as a Russian–West confrontation, claiming that the crisis was provoked by NATO’s desire to enlarge into the region where Russia’s vital interests lie. The article analyses the sources of the current Ukrainian–Russian conflict and looks into Russia’s place in post-crisis Ukraine. As history has shown, even those states which used to fight each other for centuries managed not only to find peace but to establish constructive relationships. Still, with the shift from material to ideological confrontation, there are fewer and fewer options for compromise.     

俄罗斯与东亚国家的原油贸易——价格分析的角度

近年,俄罗斯主要通过4条途径向东亚国家输送原油.由于这4条途径的油源地及输送方式不同,因此最终的交易价格也不相同.笔者选取2条途径--用铁路通过满洲里向中国输油和用油轮从萨哈林岛向日本和韩国输油--的贸易价格与俄罗斯对欧洲的离岸价格及中东原油对东亚国家的到岸价格进行比较分析,揭示俄罗斯原油在东亚石油市场的价格现状.本文还对通过东西伯利亚-太平洋管道的出口原油的价格作出预测,指出它的价格将高于目前中俄铁路原油贸易价格和同品质的中东原油价格.     

Continuity and change in instrumentalizing ‘The Precedent’. How Russia uses Kosovo to legitimize the annexation of Crimea

The article contributes to the efforts of understanding Russia’s legitimization endeavours by looking at the policy narratives centred around the so-called Kosovo precedent and the way they were perceived by different actors from Ukraine, Russia, and international experts. The aim of the paper is to scrutinize the process of politicization of contested international norms (in particular, territorial sovereignty and the right to self-determination) in the case of Russia’s legitimacy claims in Ukraine. In assessing the instrumentalization of the ‘Kosovo precedent’ in the Crimea crisis, we focused on three main elements identified in the selected policy narratives: the reinterpretation of history, the humanitarian and ethnic factor and the reinterpretation of Western actions in the Balkans.     

Identifying intentions: Latvian policy-makers’ perceptions of Russia’s intentions

There is much disagreement on the specific aspects of behavior that are the most useful for estimating intentions of potential adversaries. One view is that military capabilities are the most useful. Alternative views consider that an adversary’s domestic politics, or symbolic-normative aspects of its behavior, contain valuable information for assessing its intentions. This article tests these three competing views on Latvia as a case study, based on in-depth interviews with 10 high-ranking decision-makers. The article concludes that although the interviewees regarded information on the potential adversary’s military capabilities to be crucial for inferring its intentions, other indicators were also regarded as important.     

Radicalization of Russians in Ukraine: from ‘accidental’ diaspora to rebel movement

Abstract

The article examines different types of macropolitical identities in Ukraine and their interaction in establishing political order in the country. The authors argue that political institutional design was unfavourable to the Russian diaspora in eastern and southern regions. It hindered stable development of post-Soviet identity between Russians in the country. But during the Euromaidan protests, the Russians reacted to unpleasant political situation by exploring who they were and what social and political goals they had. Having been incipient for decades, the identity of the diaspora evolved in a soaring way within three or four months. The violent actions of the newly established government in Kiev radicalized the Russian diaspora. Diasporants started establishing alternative authorities in regions where government had no monopoly on the use of force. The involvement of Russia and international volunteers complexifies the situation in Donbass and the identity formation process in unrecognized republics also known as DNR and LNR.     

Fuel for thought? South Africa's position on the multilateralisation of the nuclear fuel cycle

The proponents of international nuclear fuel banks maintain that these banks will contribute to nuclear non-proliferation, whereas those opposing it maintain that nuclear weapon states support these banks in order to control and multilateralise the nuclear fuel cycle, thus preventing developing states from developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Global inequalities pertaining to nuclear energy continue to persist despite developing states’ efforts to reform the international nuclear energy regime. Moreover, some developing states maintain that these nuclear fuel banks perpetuate inequality in international relations. This is one of the reasons why some leading developing states, such as Brazil and South Africa, oppose these banks. South Africa, for example, intends to re-establish its nuclear fuel cycle and has declared uranium a strategic resource. Against the aforesaid, this article, following a constructivist approach, analyses the emergence and social construction of nuclear fuel banks as a practical expression of nuclear non-proliferation norms. The discussion also considers the inter-subjective understanding of these banks, as well as South Africa’s opposition to them. The article concludes with an analysis of the implications of these opposing views for global equity, equality, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.