Security governance in Europe: a return to system

The security governance literature has developed in four waves: the first is dedicated to matters of definition; the second to conceptual debate; the third to matters of application in the European setting and the fourth to how well the concept works in extra-European regions and at the global level. For all this effort, security governance as a concept remains problematic: it still has some way to go before it obtains clear definitional precision, conceptual clarity and a secure standing as concept in Security Studies. We address some of the theoretical and methodological difficulties common to the literature and argue that security governance has become overly preoccupied with agency and has thereby neglected structure. It has, in other words, obtained an actor-centered focus and so tended to conflate security governance as an analytical category with the specific actions of security actors. It has thus moved forward little in its ability to determine how and why security actors behave in the aggregate and whether that behavior reflects wider systemic properties. We thus ask in a third section whether it is worth returning to systemic thinking on security governance especially in the European context where the concept has had its most sophisticated application.     

A defence model for the Baltic states

It is often argued that the Baltic states should not be accepted in NATO because they are not defensible and NATO forces would not be able to intervene in time if they were attacked. This article presents a possible Baltic defence concept which appears to be well adapted to Baltic terrain and Baltic material and manpower resources, and which should at the very least impose significant delay (weeks) and heavy losses on a massive attack. Friendly intervention could be in the form of air strikes against aggressor columns blocked on the roads.     

从话语危机到安全危机：机理与应对

语言影响人们的思维和认知,是人与人、国与国之间交流和沟通的媒介,也是安全研究的重要维度。特定的话语可塑造威胁身份,叙述危机故事,对言语对象制造话语障碍,形成话语压力,建构话语危机,影响相关政策,使特定问题安全化,并影响安全程度的高低,导致不同的安全政策,甚至助推战争。中国在近三十年来一直面临来自西方世界的话语压力,在国际舆论场中经常陷入不利境地,有时由于某个话题成为舆论焦点,遭遇话语危机,如“中国威胁论”“中国强硬论”“中国威胁南海航行自由”“中国威胁世界秩序”以及中美“修昔底德陷阱”等。中国成为世界第二大经济体后日益成为世界关注的焦点,中国亟须研究和应对话语压力和话语危机。中国需要加大世界发声力度,提高话语主动性和自觉性;加大中国文化理念的国际宣传,重塑中国话语的国际语境;努力提升国际话语权;避免话语与行为的盲目自大,避免不必要的话语攻击和误解、有针对性地做好美国关于中国话语的改善工作。只有这样,才能够减少话语障碍和话语压力,有效缓解和化解话语危机。这是为中国塑造良好外部环境、提升中国国际形象、使中国与世界的互动更加顺畅的重要条件。     

The Rise of the Far Right in Europe and the Refugee Crisis

The rise of the far right in Europe has captured the attention of the international community in recent years.Its specific features are:an unprecedentedly strong influence,an obvious trend towards the moderate line,horizontal collaboration to expand its reach,and a very adept use of social media networks.The refugee crisis has given the far right an historical opportunity.The rise has also had a profound effect on European politics;it has deepened the political divide inside EU member states,and shaken up the traditional political values and the foundation of the union.The rise of the far right will likely not change Europe's political landscape,but problems of EU governance over its handling of the refugee crisis cannot be ignored.     

俄罗斯联邦安全会议的历史演进及对中国的启示

当前,国际局势发生着复杂而深刻的变化,国内安全与国际安全、传统安全与非传统安全问题相互交织、难解难分,世界各国都在采取各种措施应对国际安全局势的变化。俄罗斯的安全会议诞生于苏联解体前夕,作为苏联的继承国,俄罗斯接掌安全会议后,随着国内外局势的变化不断完善该机构的工作和决策机制。俄罗斯总统作为安全会议主席领导安全会议机构,协同国家各个关键参与部门,在事涉国家安全的内政外交方面,尤其在打击车臣恐怖势力方面,做出许多具有重要意义的决策,保证了俄罗斯国家经济发展、社会稳定和领土完整。俄罗斯安全会议还就经济、军事、人口、能源、生态、信息、科技等许多事关国家安全的重要领域出台了一系列战略构想。在国际关系领域,俄罗斯安全会议除出台对外政策构想、对独联体国家发展关系的方针政策外,还在2014年乌克兰危机的关键时刻,及时做出重要决策,有力地保障了俄罗斯的利益与国家安全。俄罗斯作为中国的重要邻国和全面战略协作伙伴,与中国面临着相似的内外安全问题,其设立安全会议的经验及具体运行机制等均对中国新设立的国家安全委员会具有重要的参考意义,值得中国认真研究、学习和借鉴。     

Fit for what? Towards explaining Battlegroup inaction

Abstract

The thrust of this paper concerns the case of the European Battlegroup (BG) non-deployment in late 2008, when the United Nations requested European military support for the United Nations Organisation Mission peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The argument is built on the fact that when, in official documents, the EU approaches the European security and ESDP/CSDP's military crisis management policy and interventions, it makes strong references to the United Nations and the UN Charter Chapter VII's mandate of restoring international peace and security. Such references make it seem that supporting the UN when it deals with threats and crises is a primary concern of the EU and the member states. These allusions lead to the main contention of this paper, that there is much ambivalence in these indications. The paper develops its argument from one key hypothesis; namely, that the non-deployment of a European BG in the DRC, at the end of 2008, constitutes a useful case study for detecting a number of ambiguities of the EU in respect of its declarations in the official documents establishing the European military crisis management intervention structure.     

The military dimension of Russia’s connection with Europe

The Russian challenge to the European security system is internal rather than external, because despite all the political efforts at distancing Russia from Europe, the indivisibility remains undiminished. The underlying assumption for Russia’s course is that the West is in irreversible decline, and the conclusion about the dissolution of the West-controlled world order is established in the key doctrinal documents. Instead of passively waiting for this meltdown to develop, it makes perfect sense for the Russian leadership to accelerate it pro-actively, using various levers, including military force. Moscow acts on the assumption that its “unconventional” methods could yield results only if augmented by military threats, against which the Europeans cannot master convincing counter-argument. The imperative to sustain and update credibility of these threats necessitates allocation of greater share of available resources to military build-up, which clashes with economic rationale of reducing this burden in the situation of protracted stagnation.     

俄罗斯的欧洲安全政策:从普京到"梅普组合"

普京时期俄罗斯的欧洲安全政策可以称之为"回归欧洲"政策。尽管普京执政期间该政策取得了一定的成果,但并没有达到预期的战略目标。新的领导核心"梅普组合"形成后,对其欧洲安全政策进行一系列的调整。未来俄罗斯的欧洲安全政策将以追求国家安全和欧洲安全事务平等发言权为目标建构其欧洲安全政策,从战略退缩走向积极防御,将重建"俄控区",运用经济手段,加强对欧洲国家的影响。     

How can European states respond to Russian information warfare? An analytical framework

How can European democratic states respond to Russian information warfare? This article aims to enable and spur systematic research of how democracies can respond to the spread of distorted information as part of information warfare. The article proposes four ideal-type models representing different strategies that democratic governments can employ; blocking, confronting, naturalising and ignoring. Each strategy is illustrated by ways of empirical examples of strategies applied by European states in view of what is regarded as an unwelcome Russian strategic narrative that is spread as part of information warfare. We problematise each strategy and explore reasons for why states choose one strategy over another. We then explore how different strategies might contribute to destabilise or stabilise the security environment and how they resonate with democratic values. Finally, we contribute to theorising on strategic narratives by highlighting that the choice of strategy will influence states in their formation of strategic narratives. We thus further theorising on strategic narratives by highlighting the link between strategies and narratives, thus identifying one central dynamic in how narratives are formed.     

乌克兰危机中的能源博弈及 对中国的影响

乌克兰危机发生后,2014年欧洲和国际能源市场总体上并未呈现大起大落态势,全球油气价格反而稳中有降,这一表象的背后隐藏着俄、美、欧之间复杂的能源博弈。虽然俄罗斯没有如2006年和2009年那样切断对乌克兰的天然气供应,能源供应也未成为本次危机中威胁乌克兰和欧盟国家的焦点事件。但鉴于俄、乌两国分别是全球最重要的能源生产国和过境国,能源仍可能是俄、美、欧各方推进自身内外政策的重要工具。在此次危机中,俄罗斯“以我为主”,坚持政经分离的政策,不希望政治冲突影响自身能源利益。美国“主动进攻”,试图通过金融工具来影响能源价格,利用俄罗斯经济与国际社会接轨的一面,对俄罗斯施加压力。相比之下,欧盟在能源供应来源方面虽然仍旧处于弱势和被动地位,但已开始加速多元化步伐,并将继续强化与美国的合作。俄、美、欧三方激烈的能源博弈,围绕地缘政治的权力逻辑和全球治理的建章立制逻辑而展开,直接推动俄罗斯能源出口重心东移,为中国主动对俄施展能源外交、中日韩能源合作以及中美能源经贸合作提供了机遇。作为世界能源领域的需求大国,中国应积极参与全球能源治理,以确保充足的外部能源供应和国内能源问题的解决。     

主体弥散化与主体责任的终结：ChatGPT对全球安全实践的影响

在人工智能时代,以ChatGPT为代表的人工智能通用大模型将可能冲击全球安全互动中的“主体责任制”,造成安全主体的模糊化与责任缺失、安全客体责任的离散化与安全责任追责难等一系列问题。由于人工智能技术由弱向强、迭代演进的技术发展逻辑,不同技术阶段的“主体性危机”与“责任危机”的形态和程度各异。在弱人工智能时代,低智性通用大模型的赋能作用可能会强化安全互动场域中的边缘安全主体责任。安全互动呈现出多重安全主体并存与安全客体责任离散的互动模式。在强人工智能时代,通用大模型被拟造为“类人”主体,成为多重安全主体中的一分子,安全互动呈现出无秩序形态。既有安全主体可能会表现出过度依赖算法和主体权力被侵蚀的特征,而安全客体则表现为普遍卸责和主体责任终结的特点。为解决上述问题,需要从安全主体互动的“主体间性”层面入手,在弱人工智能时代,可利用区块链与人工智能技术形成合力,并细化事前责任;而在强人工智能时代,则可凭借大国协调,在确立智能体“半主体”身份后,建立一种“监护人”制度,在主体间性的逻辑上开展全球安全实践。     

Plugging the capability-expectations gap: towards effective,comprehensive and conflict-sensitive EU crisis response?

Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the European Union (EU) has spent considerable time and energy on defining and refining its comprehensive approach to external conflicts. The knock-on effects of new and protracted crises, from the war in Ukraine to the multi-faceted armed conflicts in the Sahel and the wider Middle East, have made the improvement of external crisis-response capacities a top priority. But has the EU managed to plug the capability–expectations gap, and develop an effective, comprehensive and conflict sensitive crisis-response capability? Drawing on institutional theory and an approach developed by March and Olsen, this article analyses whether the EU has the administrative capacities needed in order to be an effective actor in this area and implement a policy in line with the established goals and objectives identified in its comprehensive approach.