A comparative analysis of infractions in Texas alcohol establishments and adult entertainment clubs

A crucial yet disputed element in the attempt to regulate sexually oriented businesses has been the negative secondary effects these firms have on nearby businesses and residential communities. This paper addresses a new dimension of the negative effects from such businesses by examining data on administrative and criminal infractions inside a large number of sexually oriented businesses and a comparable group of alcohol establishments. We compare administrative and criminal violations data from the Texas Alcohol Beverage Commission for all adult entertainment clubs (AECs) serving alcohol against a randomly selected sample of bars in the State of Texas. We find that there are important differences between the clubs and bars in 10 of the 23 t-test comparisons. What is more, even though alcohol-related infractions are the most common type of infraction for both AECs and for bars, the number of sex- and drug-related offenses was consistently more prevalent for sexually oriented businesses than for bars. In contrast, the bars have much higher numbers of criminal violations, primarily because of the higher incidence of infractions involving minors. This paper contributes to the literature on negative primary and secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses.     

Unitary states and peripheral regions: a model of heterogeneous spatial clubs

Efficiency explanations of the wealth and size of nations provide useful insights into the history and current makeup of nations. We focus here on two related issues that matter, for instance, in large areas such as Western or Eastern Europe, or Canada. We develop an analytical framework for understanding the limits of constitutional unity. This microeconomic model of unitary states deals with two kinds of heterogeneity. First, preference distance or physical distance account for decreasing net benefits from expansion. Second, heterogeneity may involve a discontinuity in the spatial pattern of preferences: “peripheral behaviors” threaten unity. We integrate such behaviors into the model and draw some lessons as to the nature of an optimal constitutional area, discussing in particular the status of peripheral regions.     

Structuring Independent Adoptions: A Report of One Court's Program

Abstract The private adoption procedures established by statute in many states, allow for the placement of a child into the custody of perspective adoptive parents without an investigation by a licensed placement agency. Courts, which issue Waivers of Prior Written Approval, often do so without sufficient information about the Petitioners. The Allen Superior Court of Indiana has developed a procedure designed to furnish the court with sufficient information and to aid the adoptive parents through an education program. Results of the evaluation of the program are reported. Generally, the program was determined to be of value to the court.     

A Faction of One: Revisiting Madison's Notes on the Constitutional Convention

This essay on Madison's Hand: Revising the Constitutional Convention, Mary Bilder's revisionist account (2016) of James Madison's Notes on the Constitutional Convention argues that her central thesis, which is that Madison substantially revised the Notes long after the Convention adjourned, is groundbreaking but will have no effect on constitutional law. Madison's Hand is groundbreaking because the book yields many powerful insights into the deliberations of the Convention and into the evolution of Madison's thought. Nevertheless, constitutional practice in the Supreme Court and among elite lawyers is so divorced from the Notes that even a dramatic shift in their interpretation will not disturb the evolution of judicial doctrine applying the text written in 1787.     

浅析一人公司

一人公司的出现,是随市场经济的发展,个人出资经营者为追求有限责任利益,将其独资企业采取有限责任公司或股份有限公司形式的结果。我国公司法应当顺应世界立法潮流,明确地赋予一人公司之合法性,而暂不允许一人股份有限公司的设立;同时,通过完善公司法的一些规定,严格限制一人有限公司的股东滥用有限责任。     

With the One Coin for Fee: A.E. Houseman's Law

Any abstract would ruin the poetic economy ofthis text. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Service Conception: Just One Simple Question

It is crystal clear that the Service Conception includes at least three conditions, what I shall call: the ‘normal justification condition’, the ‘independence condition’ and the ‘dependence condition’. The overarching rationale of these conditions is that they ensure that authority is only justified when it provides the best means for the subject to conform to the reasons for action that she actually has. However, it is difficult to clarify whether Raz implicitly presupposes a fourth necessary condition. This condition might be called a ‘reliable belief condition’, that is, that the putative subject must reliably believe that the putative authority-agent satisfies the Service Conception (or more precisely, its other three conditions). In sum, the purpose of this paper is to pose Joseph Raz one simple question: is it a necessary condition of your Service Conception, that the subject believes that the authority-agent satisfies the Service Conception? As a matter of interpretation, different parts of Raz’s work appear to lead in entirely opposite directions: some parts clearly support the reliable belief condition, others do not. Regardless of Raz’s ultimate answer, however, the question reveals a broader inconsistency. Only if the Service Conception does include the belief condition will it support Raz’s claim that authority is consistent with one’s rational ‘self-reliance’, that is, acting upon one’s own judgement (including, as to who has authority). Only if the Service Conception does not include the belief condition will it support Raz’s perfectionist account of government. It seems Raz must choose between one or other.     

A Regulation of Bids for Dual Class Shares. Implication: Two Shares—One Price

This paper examines the consequences of a specific regulatory restriction on bids for dual class shares. Shares of different classes are often argued to have different prices because a premium will be paid to the superior voting shares in the case of a tender offer. This paper assumes a setup where regulations require that a tender offer pays the same relative premium to both classes of shares. In this setup, it is shown that both classes will sell at the same price as long as there is a strictly positive probability that either the current management is sufficiently strong or that a sufficiently strong rival will show up. Furthermore, under this weak condition the regulation is socially optimal in the sense that the management that provides the highest total firm value will be the management of the firm. Finally, the regulation is shown to favor (or protect) the holders of restricted voting shares and this is not necessarily at the expense of the holders of superior voting shares.The practical interest of this paper derives from the fact that some European countries have adopted different regulatory restrictions on bids for dual class shares. This has more or less occurred due to proposed EU Directives. The regulation examined in this paper applies to tender offers in Denmark. Empirical results on the voting premium in Denmark are shown to be consistent with the theoretical results in this paper.