浅析公共物品供给中政府与第三部门的角色

在全球性的“治理”变革中 ,第三部门将与政府一起共同承担管理公共事务、提供公共物品和服务的责任。政府源于社会 ,服务于社会 ,政府在公共物品提供中扮演着生产者、安排者或提供者两种角色。在当前 ,我国政府一方面继续担当生产者角色 ,另一方面又担当起培育第三部门的职责。随着我国市场经济的发育、成熟以及第三部门的发展壮大 ,我国政府将逐渐实现由公共物品的生产者向安排者或提供者的角色转换 ,同时第三部门也可扮演公共物品的提供者和生产者的角色。     

地方政府公共物品供给的理念创新

地方性公共物品因其区域性宜实行分别供给,地方政府应承担起地方性公共物品的供给职能。由于传统行政文化的牵引、计划经济体制的惯性和公共物品供给的复杂性等,地方政府供给理念存在偏差,即片面追求政绩,对民众需求考虑不够;供给物品的质量不高,质量意识不强;政府垄断供给,没有认识到其他主体在供给中的重要作用;地方政府责任意识不强等。因此,地方政府应进行理念创新,即树立以民为本,质量至上,供给主体多元化以及责任理念,保证为民众提供优质高效的公共物品。     

外溢性地方公共物品的有效供给:政府合作社制度--地方政府间博弈的一个林达尔均衡

公共物品的层次性决定了地方公共物品只能由地方政府供给;而外溢性地方公共物品的存在使得地方政府在这类公共物品供给的过程中相互博弈。地方政府间博弈必然引致地方公共物品供给的有效性问题。有效的制度创新是解决地方公共物品供给困境的基本路径。政府合作社制度使地方政府间合作通过经济契约制度化,是地方公共物品供给过程中政府博弈的一个有效的林达尔均衡。     

公共物品非营利组织提供的可行性研究

公共物品领域存在的单一政府提供的状况，带来了公共物品生产的低效和短缺。打破公共物品政府提供的垄断局面，是政府改革的重要内容。非营利组织所具有的“非营利性、自治性、志愿性”等特征，使得它在克服公共物品领域存在的市场失灵和政府失败方面，具有不可替代的积极意义。     

关于地方政府提升公共物品供给能力的思考

政府垄断公共物品的提供与生产,是当前我国政府管理中存在的一个突出问题。政府可以是公共物品的提供者,但并不一定非是公共物品的生产者不可。要建立新的公共物品管理机制,使公共物品领域成为政府与市场共同调节的领域,建立社会参与机制,发挥政府、企业和公众的积极性,建立分级管理机制,规范各级政府间的权责关系。公共物品经营的模式应多元化,主要应有:公有公营;公有私营;私有私营;社会或使用者提供。     

论县级政府公共决策的科学化和民主化

公共决策是县级政府的一项重要管理职能。目前,我国县级政府在决策内容、目标、程序以及权限等方面还存在诸多不足,这与现行管理体制、决策者自身素质、人文环境和任免考核制度有关,因此必须加以改革和完善,以促使公共决策的科学化和民主化。     

公共物品的私人供给机制及其政府行为分析

公共物品包括纯粹公共物品和准公共物品 ,对其严格分类是进一步分析其有效供给的基础。在公共物品供给机制上 ,有公共部门供给和私人供给两种途径选择 ,其中 ,在公共物品私人供给机制的选择上 ,存在必要性与可能性 ,但归根到底 ,仍然需要政府公共部门的有效运作才能保证公共物品供给的充分实现。     

公共物品非营利组织供给的理论依据

由于非营利组织不仅从数量上丰富了公共物品的多样化,而且从质量上提高和改善了公共物品的公众满意度,其意义正受到日益广泛的关注。公共物品领域政府和市场双重失灵的存在,为公共物品非营利组织供给提供了客观必要性;公共物品的复杂多样性特征,使得公共物品非营利组织供给不仅必要而且可能;非营利组织的非营利、非政府、自治志愿性特征,为公共物品的“非市场、非政府”供给提供了现实途径。     

论网络技术对公共物品提供之影响

公共物品提供是政府主要经济职能之一,但时常存在低效问题.网络技术因其在信息处理方面的特点,有利于政府对民众偏好的把握和监督信息的公开,从而有利于提高公共物品提供效率,但同时网络的应用也附带产生了一些负面影响.     

后税费时代的农村公共产品供给研究——基于县乡政府的视角

提供均等化的公共产品是发达国家的施政纲领和各级政府的基本职责。对此,许多国家建立起了现代财政均衡制度以保证各级政府在全国范围内提供较均等的公共产品。在我国,随着税费改革的施行,进一步加剧了农村公共产品供给的困境,严重的影响着社会的稳定与发展,阻碍着社会主义和谐社会的建构进程。本文基于县乡政府的视角,探讨了县乡政府在农村公共产品供给中的行为逻辑以及路径选择,希翼对农村公共产品的供给有所裨益。     

Does Federalism Weaken Democratic Representation in the United States?

The framers of the U.S. Constitution explicitly designed federalismto enhance representation. Because powers are divided amongmultiple governments, citizens are able to exert pressure onthe elected officials of various governments in an effort toachieve desired outcomes. If one government is not doing whatcitizens prefer, they can seek it from a different government.This assumes that individuals form opinions about the functionsperformed by different governments. Given the complexity offederalism, this may be an unrealistic assumption for many citizens.Original survey data uniquely suited to explore this questionsuggest that citizens do behave in a fashion consistent withthe federalist framework. Moreover, the actual change in theassignment of functional responsibilities across governmentsbehaves as if it responds to public opinion.     

Local government grants and income tax revenue: Redistributive politics in Norway 1900–1990

An important aspect of the welfare state is public provision of private goods, primarily education and health care. In Norway the provision of these services has been organized through the local public sector. The development of the welfare state has to a large extent been the development of welfare communes. The important revenue sources of the local and county governments, grants and income tax revenue, have been controlled nationally, and the paper addresses the determinants of these revenues during 1900–1990. The approach combines a demand model of local public services emphasizing price and income-elasticities with a political economy model of central government ideology and strength. The decision making is understood as bargaining between the government and interest groups, and the political structure consequently is of importance for the policy outcome. The analysis shows how politics matter, and the results indicate that a minority coalition government implies 30% more grant and income tax revenue to local and county governments than one party majority in the long run.     

Local interests,central leadership,and the passage of TRA86

The U.S. federalist public economy is an ever-evolving system of financing and expenditure responsibilities between local, state, and federal governments. The past decades have seen a significant centralization of responsibility for the financing of state and local public services through grants-in-aid and federal tax subsidies. This article advances a model of local constituent influence in central government fiscal policies which seeks to explain this trend, and then examines how strong executive branch and congressional leadership might begin to control the local pressures for central government financing. TRA86 is offered as one example in which this leaedership proved effective. The general lesson is that good fiscal policy in federalist public economies requires not only capable local governments, but central government political institutions with the strength to meet national needs as well.     

The Mythology of Privatization in Contracting for Social Services

States and municipalities have privatized services in an effort to improve their cost‐effectiveness and quality. Competition provides the logical foundation for an expectation of cost savings and quality improvements, but competition does not exist in many local marketplaces—especially in the social services, where governments contract primarily with nonprofit organizations. As government increases its use of contracting, it simultaneously reduces its own public‐management capacity, imperiling its ability to be a smart buyer of contracted goods and services. This article examines two questions about the privatization of social services based on interviews conducted with public and nonprofit managers in New York state: Does social services contracting exist in a competitive environment? And do county governments have enough public‐management capacity to contract effectively for social services? The findings suggest an absence of competition and public‐management capacity, raising the question of why governments contract when these conditions are not met.     

Reframing Democracy: Governance, Civic Agency, and Politics

Developments in public affairs that stress governance— not simply government—hold possibilities for reframing democracy. Governance intimates a paradigm shift in the meaning of democracy and civic agency—that is, who is to address public problems and promote the general welfare? The shift involves a move from citizens as simply voters, volunteers, and consumers to citizens as problem solvers and cocreators of public goods; from public leaders, such as public affairs professionals and politicians, as providers of services and solutions to partners, educators, and organizers of citizen action; and from democracy as elections to democratic society. Such a shift has the potential to address public problems that cannot be solved without governments, but that governments alone cannot solve, and to cultivate an appreciation for the commonwealth. Effecting this shift requires politicizing governance in nonpartisan, democratizing ways and deepening the civic, horizontal, pluralist, and productive dimensions of politics.     

Citizen political knowledge and accountability: Survey evidence on devolution in Kenya

Devolution complicates citizens’ ability to assign responsibility for the provision of public goods and services to different tiers of government. Misattribution of responsibility limits the effectiveness of electoral accountability in the nested principal–agent relationships comprising voters, politicians, and bureaucrats. This raises two important questions. First, how do citizens learn about the functions of different tiers of government under devolution? Second, how do levels of political knowledge condition citizens’ evaluations of subnational governments? Using cross‐sectional and panel survey data from Kenya (2014–2018), this article shows that voters accumulate knowledge through exposure to government services, and that gender and partisanship mediate knowledge accumulation. In addition, exposed citizens are more likely to give positive evaluations of subnational politicians, despite the fact that such exposure may reveal subnational governments’ low capacity, ineffectiveness, and governance gaps. These findings advance our understanding of the dynamics of political accountability under devolution.     

Public Trust in Government in Japan and South Korea: Does the Rise of Critical Citizens Matter?

Based on the Asia Barometer Survey of 2003, 2004, and 2006, government performance, citizen empowerment, and citizen satisfaction with self‐expression values are associated with public trust in government in Japan and South Korea. This study finds, first, that government performance on the economy, controlling political corruption, the quality of public services, crime, and attention to citizen input are significantly associated with broad public trust in government in both Japan and South Korea. Likewise, citizens’ satisfaction with their right to gather and demonstrate and to criticize the government is closely connected to trust in central and local governments in Japan. In South Korea, citizens’ satisfaction with their right to gather and demonstrate is intimately linked to trust in local government. Implications for government leadership to enhance performance, transparency, citizen participation, and public trust in government are analyzed and elaborated upon in this insightful study.     

三方互动：规范我国地方政府间竞争的思考

在我国当前的制度环境下,地方政府在竞争中可以采取4种策略:约束“掠夺之手”、减少公共品的供给、将危机转嫁给不具流动性的要素、树立壁垒干预市场。规范地方政府间竞争应当避免地方政府采用第3、4种策略。为限制地方政府树立壁垒干预市场,从中央层面来看,需要建立全国统一大市场,推行以公平为基础的政策、制度化中央与地方的权力分配;从地方层面来看,需要转变地方政府职能,加强地方公共财政建设,构建地方特色;从社会层面来看,为限制地方政府转嫁竞争危机,需要充分发挥居民在地方政府间竞争中的裁决作用,发挥民营经济的力量以及发挥第三部门的力量。     

政府整体绩效评价:理论假说及其实证检验——以2008年度广东省为例

政府绩效评价是公共管理及政府管理创新的前沿课题。作为一个全新的范畴,政府整体绩效评价具有典型的本土特色。社会主义历史条件下,我国地方政府整体绩效评价构成了民意表达的基本路径,具有民主导向与技术完善的双重功能。本文提出了政府整体绩效评价结果导向的理论假设,并依据既定的技术方案,基于独立第三方立场和公众满意度导向,利用2008年度针对广东省地方政府整体绩效评价及公众满意度调查的系统数据,检验理论假设的科学性与合理性。研究表明,我国地方政府整体绩效评价是公民对政府表现的综合评价,其过程承担民意表达的功能,其结果将成为民主政治发展和行政体制改革的内在动力。     

Non‐Governmental Monitoring of Local Governments Increases Compliance with Central Mandates: A National‐Scale Field Experiment in China

Central governments face compliance problems when they rely on local governments to implement policy. In authoritarian political systems, these challenges are pronounced because local governments do not face citizens at the polls. In a national‐scale, randomized field experiment in China, we test whether a public, non‐governmental rating of municipal governments' compliance with central mandates to disclose information about the management of pollution increased compliance. We find significant and positive treatment effects on compliance after only one year that persist with reinforcement into a second post‐treatment year. The public rating appears to decrease the costs of monitoring compliance for the central government without increasing public and media attention to pollution, highlighting when this mode of governance is likely to emerge. These results reveal important roles that nonstate actors can play in enhancing the accountability of local governments in authoritarian political systems.