In Search of the Government in Local Government: Coalition Agreements and Office Payoffs in Norway

The politics of European local government is often assumed to take place in a rather depoliticised and non-partisan environment. This feature is especially apparent in Norway, where local government institutions are designed to create a high degree of consensus and accommodation. No local cabinet takes office, and therefore no formal roles of a majority government and an opposition are offered. This paper tells a different story, however. Following the 1999 elections many municipalities are now experiencing partisan cooperation based on binding political agreements. In these cases the common practice of proportional distribution of the important political positions is replaced with a 'winner takes all' principle, as only the majority constellation is rewarded with office payoffs. Given that this form of cooperation is the closest analogue to any cabinet formation at the local level, it is clearly of interest to uncover under which conditions it occurs. The empirical analysis therefore uses variation in structural, socioeconomic and political characteristics to predict the local coalition behaviour. The empirical model captures some important determinants in the variation of structural characteristics, and, as expected, explicit and binding coalition agreements are found in the large and central municipalities. Socioeconomic setting is furthermore important, since municipalities with a high degree of financial autonomy and poor policy performance experience this kind of formalised cooperation more frequently. Systematic effects are also found for political characteristics, with electoral volatility, party fragmentation and functional organisation models all increasing the probability of coalition agreements.     

Planning Models in Sweden and Norway: Nuancing the Picture

This article nuances the picture given in current research of Swedish policy implementation and planning as consistent and predictable, and Norwegian policy implementation and planning as more unpredictable and fragmented. It does so by adding a discussion of the sources of legitimacy in each of the two national settings, arguing that each system has its distinct pros and cons. The Swedish planning system and local plan practices rest more firmly on a hierarchical mode of governance which is strong on operational efficiency, but suffers from a weaker sense of ownership to the plan outcome among private and civil society actors. In the Norwegian planning system and local plan practices, a combination of hierarchical and interactive governance measures, boasts a broader anchorage and resource division among public, private and civil society actors. However, this system experiences a lower operational efficiency due to the willingness to reconsider former decisions in order to find a viable compromise among different stakeholders in local plan processes, as well as stronger fragmentation due to the privatization of Norwegian detail planning. The empirical basis of the article is: a comparison of the two countries' plan legislation in terms of the inclusion of non‐public actors in plan provision and plan formulation; and four case studies of planning processes concerning the future use of an urban green area.     

Moving Policy Theory Forward: Connecting Multiple Stream and Advocacy Coalition Frameworks to Policy Cycle Models of Analysis

The stages/policy cycle, multiple streams, and Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) approaches to understanding policy processes, all have analytical value although also attracting substantive criticism. An obvious direction for research is to determine whether the multiple streams framework and the ACF can be refined and applied to other dimensions of policy‐making set out in the policy cycle model. This article argues that extending and modifying Kingdon's framework beyond the agenda‐setting stage is best suited to this endeavour. Doing so makes it possible to bring these three approaches into alignment and enhances our understanding, although retaining the core insights of each.     

Coalition from the Inside Out: Women of Color Feminism and Politico-Ethical Coalition Politics

This article turns to 1980s US women of color feminism to develop a notion of politico-ethical coalition politics as an alternative to contemporary articulations of activist coalition politics that obscure the high-stakes politics of coalescing across hostile race, class, gender, sex, and sexuality divides. Rethinking political joining outside of notions of ontological spectacle and ethical community, women of color feminists such as Bernice Reagon, Audre Lorde, and Gloria Anzaldúa encourage a uniquely political conception of coalition that resists appeals to political indeterminacy while still anticipating the power struggles and danger inherent to working in coalition. This understanding of coalition, I argue, is best thought of as politico-ethical insofar as the political commitment to undermining interlocking oppressive forces grounding such efforts is overtly self-reflexive, thereby encouraging an ethical sensibility characterized by love, existential transformation, and a reconceptualization of identity and consciousness in coalitional terms.     

Coalition formation and polarisation

Party ideology plays an important role in determining which government coalitions form. Research on coalition formation tends to focus on the ideological distance between coalition parties. However, the distribution of preferences within the coalition, and the legislature, also has implications for which government coalition forms – that is, a party's willingness to join a coalition depends not only on its prospective coalition partners, but also on the alternative coalitions it could form. Several hypotheses about the effects of legislative polarisation are offered and tested using data on coalition formation in 17 parliamentary democracies in the postwar period. This article also demonstrates how the traditional measure of ideological divisions within coalitions fails to capture certain aspects of ideological heterogeneity within the cabinet (and the opposition) and how Esteban and Ray's polarisation index helps in addressing these deficiencies.     

Coalition politics and accountability

The paper introduces the possibility of coalition government into the theoretical study of political accountability and analyzes the accountability of coalitions as a problem of team production. It is shown that coalition governments can be held accountable in the presence of an electoral alternative. Accountability becomes problematic if it is certain that at least one of the coalition parties stays in power after the elections. Such a coalition (sometimes called a ‘unity government’) can not be given appropriate collective incentives. To incentivate government performance, voters make one coalition party responsible for the outcome. This, however, makes the other coalition party interested in sabotage. The paper analyzes the resulting conflict and characterizes optimal voter strategy.     

Making words count: Coalition agreements and cabinet management

The cabinet is a central actor in policy making in parliamentary systems. Yet, relatively little is known about how coalition cabinets operate. The delegation of decision‐making authority to ministers invites policy drift, which threatens the cohesiveness of the cabinet's policy programme. Cabinets employ a variety of methods to contain policy drift. The writing of coalition agreements is among the major tools, but there are others, including limiting ministerial autonomy and the use of junior ministers to shadow ministers. The present study demonstrates that coalition agreements are written to contain policy drift and that it is directly related to the degree of hierarchy in the cabinet. It studies the factors that affect the likelihood of a coalition agreement being written and how extensive they are, if written. Among these are the ideological diversity found in the cabinet, the use of alternative methods for controlling ministers and the complexity of the bargaining situation.     

Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary Scrutiny

Policymaking by coalition governments creates a classic principal‐agent problem. Coalitions are comprised of parties with divergent preferences who are forced to delegate important policymaking powers to individual cabinet ministers, thus raising the possibility that ministers will attempt to pursue policies favored by their own party at the expense of their coalition partners. What is going to keep ministers from attempting to move policy in directions they favor rather than sticking to the “coalition deal”? We argue that parties will make use of parliamentary scrutiny of “hostile” ministerial proposals to overcome the potential problems of delegation and enforce the coalition bargain. Statistical analysis of original data on government bills in Germany and the Netherlands supports this argument. Our findings suggest that parliaments play a central role in allowing multiparty governments to solve intracoalition conflicts.     

Coalition incentives and party bias in Chile

This article revisits the debate over Chile's binomial electoral rules and its consequences and examines how the new electoral system conceived by a democratic congress altered political competition. It utilizes a seat-vote model of multiparty competition to analyze party bias under the binomial rule. This approach differs substantively from prior studies of the Chilean case that focused primarily on the disproportionality of aggregate results. In contrast to earlier analyses, the findings reveal that the allocation of the seats under the binominal resulted in significant party bias benefiting the main parties of the right. This bias, however, was eliminated after the electoral reform. The new rule continues to provide majoritarian benefits to parties receiving larger shares of votes, but this effect is less pronounced than before. It is now easier for small parties to gain seats, which has increased party fragmentation. However, we show that coalition incentives, which were heralded as one of the main advantages of the binomial rule, are also significant under the new rule in use since 2017.     

Budget Deficits and Coalition Governments

This paper shows that compromise between different ideologicalmotivations within multiparty governments may result in a biastoward running budget deficits even if all parties in thecoalition prefer balanced budgets. The deficit bias increases withthe degree of ``polarization'' of the ideological motivations andgenerally decreases with the degree of concentration of powerwithin the government. Although the analysis is conducted assuminga proportional representation electoral system, the results willalso apply to majoritarian systems if the winning party comprisesideologically different constituencies. The relationship betweenbudget deficits and multiparty governments is investigated usingdata from a sample of eight European Union countries for the period1971–1990. Analysis on pooled data is partly in line with the theory.Time series within country analysis is less favorable: we findclear support to the theory only in the case of Italy.     

Coalition government and electoral accountability

Single-party governments are commonly thought to be more clearly responsible for government policy than coalition governments. One particular problem for voters evaluating coalition governments is how to assess whether all parties within a coalition should be held equally responsible for past performance. As a result, it is generally argued that voters are less likely to hold coalition governments to account for past performance. This article uses data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project to assess whether and how the composition of coalition governments affects the way in which people use their votes to hold governments to account, and which parties within coalitions are more likely to be held to account for the government’s past performance.     

Coalition Government and Committee Power

Recent research suggests that committees in parliamentary democracies may, at least partly, be endogenous to the prevalence of coalition government. In this article, I examine the conditions under which parliamentary majorities reform legislative rules to expand or reduce committee power. I expect that, ceteris paribus, the greater the conflict inside the governing coalition, the higher the probability that parties in government will adopt reforms expanding committee power and the lower the chance that they will implement changes reducing such power. These expectations are tested using original new data on the reforms of committee agenda powers undertaken in eight European states within 20 years from democratic transition. I find some evidence to support the endogeneity of committee power to the ideological heterogeneity of parliamentary government.     

Unity and Distinctiveness in UK Coalition Government: Lessons for Junior Partners

Parties in coalition governments must address the ‘unity/distinctiveness’ dilemma: how to maintain governing cohesion, while sustaining individual identities. Within the Cameron–Clegg government this is a challenge for both parties, but it is more so for the Liberal Democrats as the junior partner. This paper considers how the Liberal Democrats negotiated this dilemma in relation to ministerial portfolio allocations. While the Liberal Democrat strategy of placing ministers in almost all departments has served the Coalition well in terms of governing unity, it has limited the extent to which they have been able to assert their distinctive contribution to Coalition policy‐making. This is demonstrated through an examination of the Liberal Democrats' influence on Coalition welfare policy. A lack of clear policy contributions is potentially highly damaging to the Liberal Democrats electorally, as it suggests that they have made little substantive contribution to the Coalition beyond propping up their Conservative partners. Accordingly, the paper reflects on lessons for junior partners in future UK coalition governments, suggesting that concentrating ministers within one or two departments may provide a more viable means of carving out a distinctive governing legacy.     

Interest Group Competition and Coalition Formation

This article investigates how interest group competition, a state of conflicting policy preferences stemming from how organizational memberships are defined, can resolve into conflict or cooperation. The strategic choices of competing lobbyists are modeled as the results of a trade-off between the need to represent members and please legislators, and the additional advocacy resources they hope to gain by agreeing to form coalitions with their competitors rather than fight them in resource-draining conflicts. Hypotheses derived from the model are tested with data from interviews with lobbyists on six issues taken up by the U.S. Congress from 1999 to 2002. The results suggest that while group members do have some limited power to constrain the policy positions taken on issues by their lobbyists, it is primarily the pressures from legislators and competitor groups that push lobbyists into collectively supporting coalition positions different from those desired by their members.     

Norway: Madisonianism Reborn

This article discusses citizen control in Norwegian parliamentary democracy, and specifically the changes that have recently taken place. Around 1960 Norway had reached a constitutional form that, apart from the consequences of proportional representation, looked much like a Westminster system. From that point on, however, Norwegian democracy has generally moved away from this model. A series of minority governments has given rise to parliamentary reassertion. The Norwegian party system has fragmented, and the individual parties have atrophied as mass membership organizations. A wave of corporatism and later a heightened assertiveness on the part of the judiciary have helped to contain parliamentary power. Two critical European Union membership referendums in 1972 and 1994 have firmly established the role of direct democracy in critical political decisions. And despite the results of these two popular consultations, international constraints have become ever more significant. Compared with most others in Europe, however, Norway is a relatively unconstrained polity. There are few important ways in which the citizenry is partitioned into multiple democratic principals, and the country is a reasonable fit to the parliamentary ideal type of an unfettered hierarchy controlled by the median voter. At the same time, the trend is unmistakably one towards greater policy‐making complexity and increasing constraints on policy makers. Norway's reluctant but seemingly inevitable incorporation into a larger Europe is the greatest and most decisive of these constraints, but it is not the only one. Judicial institutions are likely to play an increasingly important political role, and direct democracy perhaps likewise. And although central bank independence has met with greater scepticism than in most other European countries, it is not likely to be reversed. All in all, it seems that Norwegian parliamentary governance is becoming at least a little more Madisonian and a little less Westminsterian.