Equality of resources and the demands of authenticity

One of the most distinctive features of Ronald Dworkin’s egalitarian theory is its commitment to holding individuals responsible for the costs to others of their ambitions. This commitment has received much criticism. Drawing on Dworkin’s latest statement of his position in Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), we suggest that it seems to be in tension with another crucial element of Dworkin’s own theory, namely, its endorsement of the importance of people leading authentic lives – lives that reflect their own values. We examine this tension between responsibility and authenticity, and some strategies Dworkin does and could deploy to defuse it, which we think are unsuccessful. We then propose a solution for reconciling the demands of responsibility and authenticity, which is, so we claim, friendly to Dworkin’s fundamental commitments but which leads to a revisionist interpretation of the demands of equality of resources.     

Choice, Responsibility and Equality

Should responsibility for disadvantage constitute a matter of fundamental concern for egalitarians? An important strand of contemporary egalitarian thought – a strand that Elizabeth Anderson calls 'luck equality'– argues that responsibility for disadvantage should constitute a decisive concern for any acceptable egalitarian theory. Luck equality therefore requires a defensible account of responsibility; and disagreements regarding the nature and extent of responsibility for disadvantage have become central in the egalitarian literature. Anderson argues that luck equality's focus on responsibility reflects a misunderstanding of the point of equality. If persuasive, her argument would establish that egalitarian thought may do without a defensible account of responsibility. Although she fails to establish this claim, she does argue persuasively that luck equality employs the notion of responsibility overly strenuously. Her critique suggests that egalitarians must qualify their acceptance of the precept that 'genuine choice excuses otherwise unacceptable inequalities'.     

Responsibility, Luck, and the 'Equality of What?' Debate

Ronald Dworkin's recently published book, Sovereign Virtue (hereafter SV), appeals to arguments that are popular within, and ideas that are fundamental to, liberal egalitarianism. These arguments and ideas need to be distinguished and unpacked. The purpose of this paper is partly to do this and to cast doubt on the adequacy of various moves made by Dworkin. In addition, and more importantly I argue that the analysis of the 'equality of what?' debate reveals a tension at the heart of contemporary liberal egalitarianism between the Kantian aspiration to eliminate luck and the contemporary aspiration to do political philosophy without metaphysics.     

Are There Any Global Egalitarian Rights?

This article considers whether or not there are any global egalitarian rights through a critical examination of the political philosophy of Ronald Dworkin. Although Dworkin maintains that equal concern is the special and indispensable virtue of sovereigns and the hallmark of a fraternal political community, it is far from obvious whether the demands of equality stop at state borders. While some scholars in the field—most notably Thomas Pogge—posit the existence of negative rights in relation to social and economic inequalities at the global level, here I try to defend the existence of positive global egalitarian rights by appealing to Dworkin’s own two principles of ethical individualism. I also set out the framework for a version of what I call global luck egalitarianism based on Dworkin’s equality of resources and try to respond to David Miller’s charge that comparative principles of justice do not apply at the global level.

Fairness to non-participants: a case for a practice-independent egalitarian baseline

Proponents of practice-dependent egalitarianism argue that egalitarian duties and entitlements only apply among participants in morally relevant practices. In this paper, I argue that these views are implausible because they allow for objectionable treatment of non-participants. I show that it is impossible, on the basis of practice-internal considerations alone, to determine the extent to which the pursuit of practices can permissibly limit the opportunities of non-participants. There are opportunities beyond the current holdings of practices to which no one has a privileged claim (such as unowned natural resources), and the distribution of which is a matter of justice. A just distribution of such unowned distributive goods, though, requires a practice-independent distributive baseline. I further show that such a baseline can only be egalitarian because all alternative baselines face serious objections. From this I conclude that any plausible theory of distributive justice must accept some form of equal practice-independent distributive entitlements.     

How generous should egalitarians be?

Abstract

Lippert-Rasmussen has proposed a new version of luck egalitarianism: equality of concern. In this article, I argue that equality of concern is more generous than its two luck egalitarian rivals. That is, against equality of opportunity for welfare, it is more generous in that it recognises shortfalls in the satisfaction of one’s impersonal concerns as potentially inegalitarian. Against equality of resources, it is more generous in that it advocates more extensive compensation. I suggest that equality of concern’s generosity regarding impersonal concerns is justified but its generosity regarding compensation is not. Equality of resources, however, faces other problems, and so I argue that a hybrid of equality of concern and equality of resources would be the more attractive luck egalitarian view.     

Debating Opportunities, Outcomes and Democracy: Young and Phillips on Equality

Within recent egalitarian theory, the ideal of equal opportunity holds considerable sway. Liberal egalitarians increasingly concentrate on refining this ideal, as do a number of Marxist theorists. At the same time many radical critics are unhappy with various aspects of this hegemony of equality of opportunity, and this article examines the reasons for their unhappiness, as well as two possible solutions. The first would be to reject equal opportunities in favour of another conception of equality, or to argue that the ideal can only play a limited role within an egalitarian project. Another would be to try to radicalise the idea of equal opportunities: to argue that equality of opportunity can be a transformative ideal if it is interpreted sufficiently broadly or deeply. We can identify Anne Phillips with the first approach, and Iris Young with the second. On the question of whether equality of opportunity can provide an overarching normative framework for egalitarian politics, Young's response is in the positive, whereas Phillips' is in the negative. The article critically addresses this dilemma, and concludes by siding with Phillips, by arguing that equality of opportunity is not capable of standing in as an overarching normative principle for egalitarian politics.     

The Radical Critique of Economic Inequality in Early American Political Thought

This article examines the ideological roots and historical development of an early radical economic egalitarian tradition in American political thought. It concentrates on a group of thinkers and social critics that were active from the 1820s through the beginning of the Civil War. Inspired by republican themes, they forged a radical critique of the emerging capitalist order and a skepticism of economic modernity. By reworking the republican political notion of an equality of social relations as an essential context for individual liberty, these radical critics posed a challenge to the emerging capitalist order. They would also be unique in the way that they analyzed the workings of this new economic system arguing that it was a mechanism that would systematically reproduce economic inequality eroding republican forms of government and society making them a distinct voice in America's egalitarian tradition.     

Putting Equality in Place: The Normative Foundations of Geographic Equality of Opportunity

This article explores the normative principles underlying the geography of opportunity perspective and provides a justification for equalizing the geographic dimensions of economic opportunity. The article proposes a conception of geographic equality of opportunity (GEO) that provides an account of: (a) why geographic equality matters; (b) why opportunities are the appropriate currency of geographic equality; and (c) how the geographic distribution of resources and residential mobility relate to equality of opportunity. GEO requires that certain geographic resources be spatially uniform or equally accessible, and that any differences in economic outcomes be traceable to autonomous choices and not morally arbitrary conditions such as one’s race or birth location.     

Administrative Justice: A Libertarian Cinderella in Search of an Egalitarian Prince

This article argues that the political significance of the Coalition government's proposed changes to administrative justice, including the abolition of the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council, is in danger of passing unnoticed, despite its potential significance for the Big Society agenda. It suggests that the retrieval of genuine perspective lies in paying closer attention both to the contemporary importance of administrative justice and to the political debates of the 1950s and 1960s, which set opposing views of administrative justice in broadly libertarian and egalitarian contexts respectively. It concludes that the recovery in particular of an egalitarian account of administrative justice is necessary to animate, and rebalance, the debate. Administrative justice might then be perceived as an essential part of a broader political vision and a significant aspect of social justice more ambitiously conceived.     

当代公共管理研究的范式观--一项经验研究

以经验事实为依据,勾画出了指导当代美国公共管理研究的范式观.在经验分析的基础上,作者认为,有关公共管理领域是否具有知识核心及其与学科的发展之间的相关性的争论正越来越不重要,因为答案已经显现.重要的是从事公共管理研究的学者应具有清醒的学科自我意识以及对现有的范式有更为清晰的把握.公共管理学科对本领域的常规科学研究活动的自觉意识能够给本学科提供更为清晰的研究焦点,能够提升澄清谬见的敏锐性,进而推动公共管理理论的发展.     

The death of conservative Ireland? The 2018 abortion referendum

The outcomes of two recent Irish referendums - on marriage equality in 2015 and abortion in 2018 - have placed contemporary Irish voters in sharp contrast with their long-standing conservative Catholic reputation. These referendums also stand out internationally because of an associated deliberative innovation. This paper aims to explain the watershed abortion vote drawing on theories of generational change, issue-voting, cue-taking and deliberative democracy, using data from an exit poll at the 2018 abortion referendum. We show that cleavage and age effects are key to understanding the referendum outcome. These results offer insight into how societal processes such as rapid secularisation, generational replacement and democratic innovations shape politics. Moreover, voters who were aware of the deliberative innovation were more likely to support the liberal referendum option. To increase willingness to deviate from the status quo, engaging citizens actively in the debate is a fruitful approach.     

Cosmopolitan Democracy and the EU: The Case of Gender

Cosmopolitan democracy is one of the most debated models of transnational democracy. As a result of his prominence in this field, David Held has attracted much of the criticism and approval of this position. The critique and comment aimed at cosmopolitanism in general, and Held's work in particular, has provoked cosmopolitan advocates to respond, restate and develop their arguments. However, despite its considerable merit, this debate remains largely theoretical, and little has been done in terms of studying the realisation of cosmopolitanism in real-world settings. This article contributes towards the debate concerning the possibility of its actual application by mapping the principles of cosmopolitan democracy in relation to the EU polity and the issue of gender equality. It argues that the EU articulates certain cosmopolitan-comparable principles, and by studying areas where they are clearly exhibited, such as the issue of gender, that this helps us to critically evaluate their practicability and enables a response to criticisms levelled at cosmopolitan democracy. This article addresses two specific criticisms. Firstly, in view of the justiciable qualities of EU law, and its ability to give rise to formal individual rights, it is argued that claims regarding the inherently fictitious nature of cosmopolitan rights are unfounded. Secondly, while acknowledging that civic engagement takes a principally legal mode in relation to the issue of gender, this article rejects the claim that cosmopolitan democracy neglects the political aspects of citizenship. However, cosmopolitan scholars must extend their understanding of the relation between rights and the wider aspects of citizenship engagement, if they hope to realise the vision of an active citizenry that remains central to the cosmopolitan project.     

When the Earth Belonged to All: the Land Question in Eighteenth-century Justifications of Private Property

Liberal conceptions of property rights are commonly associated with the idea of absolute, exclusive individual ownership. This article aims to show that, and why land constituted a special problem for eighteenth-century justifications of private property. Kant and Adam Smith are taken as the major exponents of eighteenth-century liberalism—of its natural-rights basis and its utilitarian orientation respectively. Their arguments against the still-existing feudal encumbrances, that is,'collective' forms of landownership, reveal a fundamental tension between libertarian and egalitarian premisses in liberal theory. The vindication of full individual ownership rests crucially upon the right to equal liberty —to an initial equality of starting chances. Yet this assumption of a substantive equality becomes an empty phrase to the extent that the idea of society's original common entitlement to natural resources loses all practical, political meaning.     

Debt in just societies: A general framework for regulating credit

Debt presents a dilemma to societies: successful societies benefit from a substantial infrastructure of consumer, commercial, corporate, and sovereign debt but debt can cause substantial private and social harm. Pre‐crisis and post‐crisis solutions have seesawed between subsidizing and restricting debt, between leveraging and deleveraging. A consensus exists among governments and international financial institutions that financial stability is the fundamental normative principle underlying financial regulation. Financial stability, however, is insensitive to equality concerns and can produce morally impermissible aggregations in which the least advantaged in a society are made worse off. Solutions based only on financial stability can restrict debt without accounting for the risk of harm to persons least able to bear the risk, worsen preexisting inequalities, destroy or impair the net worth of households, and impose unfavorable distributive consequences. This article offers a new approach to assist policymakers in developing and evaluating regulation to take criteria in addition to financial stability into account, but which do not undermine the aim of financial stability. It calls for a luck egalitarian approach, offering policymakers options to take the debtor's choices into account while still accounting for cognitive mistakes people often make in debt decisionmaking. It offers a general framework for the underlying principles for the regulation of debt: its focus is not on any particular forms of debt or its regulation but in structuring debt regulation more generally. It offers a set of recommendations on how regulators can take concerns about luck and equality into account in regulatory design.     

Dworkin on external skepticism and moral permissions

This article discusses Ronald Dworkin’s first objection against what he calls external moral skepticism, the view that denies truth-value to moral judgments. According to that objection, an external skeptic denies that substantive moral judgments can be true. But, at the same time, the objection goes, what follows from the skeptical view is that all actions are morally permissible, which is in itself a substantive moral judgment. We call this ‘the self-defeating argument.’ We argue that the objection’s success depends on how we interpret the idea of moral permission, an issue Dworkin does not clearly resolve. Against his objection, we advance two different arguments. First, once we learn what role the idea of moral permission plays in morality, we can see that any plausible view of some agent’s moral permission must acknowledge its complex character, and that the existence of a moral permission must have some impact on the balance of moral reasons for other agents. On this understanding, it is false that it follows solely from external skepticism that everything is permissible. Second, we argue that even if permissions have a simple character, not a complex one, they are plausible only when framed within a moral constellation of rights and obligations. So understood, it is, again, false that it follows from external skepticism that everything is permissible.     

The Scandinavian Democratic Model

Given the continuing importance of democracy as an analytic concept. this article seeks to compare Scandinavian practice with accepted general definitions and theories. Definitions that recognize contemporary political democracy as consensual and procedural seem most appropriate to the Scandinavian cases. Although remaining dynamic. political democracy has not been a contested principle for more than 50 years.
Efforts since 1945 to extend democracy to social and economic spheres have been more controversial, however. Welfare state measures enjoy broad support, not least for functional reasons. For many, however, such policies seek a broader social democracy instead of merely a humane 'safety net'. Economic democracy remains the most contested dimension. Seeking to transcend corporatism and rational collective bargaining, economic democracy seeks simultaneously to promote greater economic equality and participation while maintaining an efficient productive system.
The dynamic and expanded democratic model has engendered much domestic debate about means and ends. This has been, on balance, a source of reinvigoration.     

我国儿童早期照顾政策框架构建——基于资源平等理论视角

我国儿童早期照顾领域存在照顾责任公私分担失衡、照顾资源分布不均、照顾劳动性别分工和代际分工不合理等现象,亟待公共政策干预。立足我国现实,以德沃金的资源平等理论作为伦理基础,可提出儿童早期照顾政策的伦理依据,即以保障儿童与母亲权利为核心原则,以保障父母工作-家庭平衡、祖辈老年权益为辅助原则。在政策分析中,首先基于政策网络模型,阐述政策行动者的网络定位及他们在网络间的互动关系,厘清不同行动者之间的资源与权力交换机制;然后利用图尔敏结构模型,提出具有开放性和包容性的政策方案,并最终形成旨在保障儿童和照顾者权利、促进家庭和社会发展的我国儿童早期照顾政策框架。     

On Power and Responsibility

The article focuses on Lukes' treatment of the relation between power and responsibility. By attempting to draw a sharp distinction between power and structural constraint, I argue, Lukes unnecessarily excludes from his analysis a wide range of significant and inegalitarian social constraints on freedom. The article defends a more structural approach to the study of power, one that employs democratic evaluative standards. Power relations are more or less legitimate, by this view, depending on the extent to which they enable the people they affect to help shape and reshape them. Contra Lukes' claim that structural approaches are incapable of accounting for the relationship between power and responsibility, I argue that they are fully compatible with theories of political responsibility. Even if no identifiable agent or agents can be held morally responsible for creating a given relation of domination, those actors whose actions helped produce that relationship are obligated to attempt to understand and to change it.     

Constitutional Theories and Constitutional Rights: Federalist Considerations

This article examines the contemporary controversy over constitutionalinterpretation and the differing understandings of constitutionalrights that underlie it. We first consider the character andbasis for interpretivism, that is, a jurisprudence that delineatesrights by reference to the intent of the founders and to theconstitutional text. Next, we review the non-interpretivistalternative, focusing on Ronald Dworkin's influential accountof constitutional rights. We conclude that despite its strengths,Dworkin's position does justice neither to the constitutionaltext nor to the connection between structure and rights in theUnited States Constitution. Finally, considering constitutionaltheory from the broader perspective of state constitutionalism,we conclude that its insights are limited to the U.S. Constitutionand offer some suggestions for a more adequate constitutionaltheory.