The Effect of Tax and Expenditure Limitations on Revenue Volatility: Evidence from Colorado

Much of the research on tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) focuses on the impact that limits have on the size of the public sector or the distribution of expenditures at the state and local levels. While these results shed light on the extent to which TELs succeed in reducing government spending, they do not have much to say about the impact of TELs on government budgeting or financial planning, despite the fact that voters support TELs in the hope of reducing government inefficiency (Courant, Gramlich, and Rubinfeld 1980; Ladd and Wilson 1982). This paper examines the effect of TELs on the stability of government revenues; sound tax policy entails controlling the volatility of revenues in order to plan more effectively for the future. Using panel data from Colorado's Division of Local Government as well as the Census Bureau's Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances, this paper examines the impact of Colorado's 1992 Taxpayer's Bill of Rights (TABOR) on local government finances. Results from difference‐in‐difference estimation suggest that TELs increase revenue and expenditure volatility.     

Tax and Expenditure Limitations and the Fiscal Response of Local Government: Asymmetric Intra-Local Fiscal Effects

This article empirically investigates the effects of introducing statewide measures to limit the ability of local jurisdictions to raise revenue or make expenditures. It does so in intervals of five years over a 25-year period, using fiscal observations for 31,804 units of local government in 787 metropolitan counties across the contiguous United States. Specifically explored is the effect of tax and expenditure limitations on the variation in revenues and expenditures between general purpose governments and school districts within county areas. Rather than imposing a uniform constraint across jurisdictions, tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) are associated with increased variation across both general purpose and school district revenues and expenditures and, by implication, increased service differentials. Effects are found to be asymmetric, with increased variation greatest within counties comprising the urban core and those with relatively more disadvantaged populations. The implications are that TELs are most constraining on the ability of governments serving economically less prosperous and at risk populations to meet public service needs. Such differential effects are of more than questionable merit and are the result of the application of blunt instruments to what is often an undemonstrated need. The outcome impairs both the efficiency and responsiveness of the local public sector.     

The limits of tax and expenditure limits: TEL implementation as a principal-agent problem

Previous scholarship has shown that Tax and Expenditure Limits (TELs) often fail to constrain government growth. This paper views the implementation of TELs as a principal-agent problem. Agency theory predicts that delegation is affected by the preferences of agents and the costs of monitoring those agents. Using panel data for the US states from 1970 through 2008, I conduct an empirical test of the validity of the principal-agent model for TELs. I find that state spending limitations are only effective at cutting the growth of state and local spending under the direction of agents who have a preference for limited government. Additionally, state property tax limitations are only effective when monitoring does not require costly coordinated action. These findings contradict an alternative theory of TEL implementation that looks towards the policy’s origin. My research suggests that the arrangements of delegation determine when and under what conditions TELs effectively reduce government growth.     

Constitutional Tax and Expenditure Limitation in Colorado: The Impact on Municipal Governments

Tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) have become a pervasive influence on local government fiscal affairs. Explanations for the spread of TELs suggest that voters thought local government was growing more than needed. Thus, TELs were intended to constrain growth and reduce the size of local governments. This article's purpose was to determine the impact of two separate kinds of TELs, one a property tax measure, and the other a comprehensive revenue and expenditure limit, upon the growth of municipal governments in Colorado. Using a panel data set on municipal budgets (1975–1996), the article demonstrates three major points: 1) the effectiveness of a TEL in achieving reductions in local government revenue and spending growth depends upon the nature of the TEL; 2) the comprehensive TEL did effectively constrain growth and reduce local government reliance on the property tax, despite the local options for exemption; and 3) TELs do not have uniform impacts among governments of different population.     

A rent-seeking model of TELs

Tax and expenditure limits or TELs are constitutional or statutory constraints on the fiscal powers of government. Since the taxpayer revolt beginning in the late 1970s, TELs have been introduced in twenty-three states. In recent years a number of studies attempting to test the impact of TELs have found little evidence that TELs significantly reduced the growth of state government. In this study we challenge the implicit Leviathan model that underlies most of these studies, and offer an alternative rent-seeking model. Econometric tests provide support for this rentseeking model, and indicate that TELs have been significant in reducing the growth of state government, at least in the short run. “... the very principle of constitutional government requires it to be assumed, that political power will be abused to promote the particular purpose of the holder; not because it always is so, but because such is the natural tendency of things, to guard against which is the especial use of free institutions”     

The effects of fiscal contraction on innovation in the public sector

Beginning in the mid-1970s, fiscal limitation laws, shrinking revenue bases in older cities, and reductions in state and federal grants all have reduced the resources available to carry out the functions of local government. What do these changes portend for the amount of innovation in local government, the types of innovations that are introduced, and the processes of introduction? This paper examines these questions by reviewing the literature on factors related to innovation in public service agencies and reorienting its implications in the new fiscal environment. We conclude that on the whole the innovative process in the public sector has fallen on hard times. Yet, we identify those factors that a creative, innovative administrator can use to advantage in a period of fiscal constraints to bring about innovation. We also identify types of innovations that are likely to succeed.     

Managing Fiscal Federalism: Revenue Allocation Issues

Like most federal systems, Nigeria has a revenue distributionsystem in which the national government shares revenues withstate and local governments. Since the early 1970s, the bulkof revenue has been collected by the national government. Muchof this revenue has been derived from petroleum taxes and miningrents and royalties. Various proportions of this revenue havethen been distributed to state and local governments under arevenue allocation system (RAS) using different formulas. Akey problem, however, is that revenue allocations since 1970have been driven largely by political considerations and byformula factors, such as jurisdictional population and stateequality, rather than by factors associated with economic developmentimperatives.     

Economic Effects of State‐Level Tax and Expenditure Limitations

As a result of devolution, state governments have taken on greater responsibility for financing and providing public services. Increasingly, states have adopted state‐level tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) to manage the growth and size of state budgets. The adoption of TELs is supported by claims that they have a positive effect on state economies, although such claims lack empirical evidence and have been contested by several scholars. Despite the ongoing debate about validating the actual economic effects of state‐level TELs, there is a lack of empirical assessments of their effects. The empirical results of this article indicate that the presence of state‐level TELs has a negative effect on the level of employment but no effect on the state's personal income per capita. The presence of state‐level TELs has no effect on either the growth of personal income per capita or the growth of employment.     

Local government grants and income tax revenue: Redistributive politics in Norway 1900–1990

An important aspect of the welfare state is public provision of private goods, primarily education and health care. In Norway the provision of these services has been organized through the local public sector. The development of the welfare state has to a large extent been the development of welfare communes. The important revenue sources of the local and county governments, grants and income tax revenue, have been controlled nationally, and the paper addresses the determinants of these revenues during 1900–1990. The approach combines a demand model of local public services emphasizing price and income-elasticities with a political economy model of central government ideology and strength. The decision making is understood as bargaining between the government and interest groups, and the political structure consequently is of importance for the policy outcome. The analysis shows how politics matter, and the results indicate that a minority coalition government implies 30% more grant and income tax revenue to local and county governments than one party majority in the long run.     

Government revenue and expenditure in an agrarian economy: North Arcot District in South India

This paper uses disaggregated data to assess the recent history and geography of revenue mobilization and expenditure allocation in a district where rice production increased by 50 per cent during the decade 1973–83 and where gross urban output (to judge from research in one market town) increased in real terms by a factor of 8. At the district level, land revenue is a small and unstable component of revenue despite the dynamism of the rice economy. Furthermore rice is exempt from commercial taxes, which are eight times more important than land revenue, just under half of which derives from traded agricultural goods. Despite the region's commercial dynamism, real revenue has increased by only 76 per cent over the decade, suggesting substantial evasion. The district appears to be a net donor to the state fisc. Direct expenditure shows urban bias (being 60 per cent more per caput than rural expenditure), though the gap has been narrowing. Despite this trend the rice-producing sector appears to be a net beneficiary from direct revenue and expenditure. A rural micro-level case study shows that the village panchayat is a net donor and the urban panchayat union a net recipient of an unstable quantum of revenue. A case study of an urban municipality shows real revenue declining over the decade, forcing an increasing dependence upon discretionary grants from the state government, which cannot prevent a deterioration in urban infrastructure. Indirect revenue and expenditure shows a recent trend towards the rural population. Public sector employment is numerically significant, urban, and has average incomes equal to the top decile of rural cultivators.     

Does Foreign Aid Promote the Expansion of Government?

Building on the literature on public finance, I seek to advance our understanding of variations in government size by exploring the impact of official development assistance on fiscal policy. I hypothesize that foreign aid operates in accordance with the "flypaper effect," systematically generating incentives and opportunities for the expansion of government spending. Results from a time-series cross-sectional regression analysis of growth in government spending over the 1970–99 time period are consistent with the hypothesis. For middle- and lower-income nations, aid represents an important determinant of government expansion. Looking at the tax and revenue side of the equation, however, reveals a more perverse pattern of response: aid promotes not only increased spending but also reduced revenue generation. The results have important implications from both a theoretical and policy perspective. Inter alia they point to the potentially self-defeating nature of efforts to promote market-oriented programs of state retrenchment via development assistance as well as to the importance of incorporating international transfers into future research on government spending.     

Federal, state, and local governments: evaluating their separate roles in US growth

We use US county level data from 1970 to 1998 to explore the relationship between economic growth and government employment at three levels: federal, state and local. Increases in federal, state and local government employments are all negatively related to economic growth. We find no evidence that government is more efficient at lower levels. While we cannot separate out the productive and redistributive services of government, we document that the county-level income distribution became slightly more unequal from 1970 to 1998. We conclude that a release of government-employed labor inputs to the private sector would be growth-enhancing.     

Property Tax Responses to State Aid Cuts in the Recent Fiscal Crisis

Many states experienced fiscal crises at the beginning of this decade. Some responded by cutting state aid to local governments. This paper explores the extent to which local governments responded to these aid cuts by raising property taxes. The authors hypothesize that changes in aid help explain the observed differences in per capita property tax revenue changes across states. They find that on average school districts increased property taxes by 23 cents for each dollar cut in state aid. These results highlight the important role that the property tax plays in maintaining the stability of the state and local sector.     

Effects of Federal Tax Reform on Local Finances

The federal Tax Reform Act of 1986 promised to be fair, simple,and revenue neutral to the federal treasury. Tax reform, however,was not revenue neutral with respect to all state and localtreasuries. Indeed, tax reform entailed a restructuring of thebalance of power in federal-state-local relations. In particular,new restrictions on the tax-exempt bond authority of state andlocal governments are requiring significant shifts in traditionallocal debt policy. Furthermore, the Supreme Courts recent decision,South Carolina v. Baker, raises additional concerns about thestatus of state and local tax-exempt bond issues. The natureof future relations between the federal government and localgovernments is likely to be molded more by the federal tax codeand by erosion in state authority over fiscal matters than byfederal grant-in-aid programs of the kind that have characterizedthe past quarter century of intergovernmental relations.     

Government Risk-Financing Pools: An Assessment of Current Practices

Since 1970, state and local governments have experienced two “insurance crises;” the first occurred in the mid- to late-1970s and the second in the mid-80s. The result has been a twenty-year period of time in which state and local governments have been able to afford insurance only intermittently-if insurance has been available at all. In response to this problem, local governments, government associations, and state governments created alternative risk-finartcing mechanisms to provide coverage for themselves. These mechanisms, commonly referred to as self-insurance pools, enable local governments within a state to pool together risks and resources to finance the costs of fortuitous losses. In 1988, the first comprehensive examination of pooling practices was undertaken through a nationwide survey. This article reports the findings from the first follow-up study since the 1988 survey and further extends knowledge of pooling and pooling practices.     

State Policies Affecting Cities and Counties in 1991: Shifting Federalism

States experienced considerable fiscal distress in 1991 as the recession led to widespread revenue shortfalls. In this environment, discretionary spending did not fare well. This article discusses five major policy areas: (1) state financial aid; (2) major changes in the "sorting out" of responsibilities between the state and local governments; (3) revenue diversification; (4) changes in limitations imposed on local taxes; and (5) new mandates handed down to cities and counties.     

State Actions Affecting Cities and Counties, 1990–1993: De Facto Federalism

States experienced considrable fiscal stress during the first four years of the 1990s. This has led to changes in five policy areas: (1) state financial aid; (2) local revenue diversification; (3) "sorting out" of responsibilities between the state and local governments; (4) tax and spending limitations; (5) and mandate relief. Some of the most significant changes occurred in California, Colorado, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, and Wisconsin.     

“新公共管理运动”的困境与转型——新西兰公共部门改革的反思及参鉴

新西兰公共部门改革是"新公共管理运动"的先锋,作为"改革实验室"和"政策创新者",因其彻底性、持续性及成效性被誉为"改革的典范"。然而近年来,西方公共管理学界提出了若干质疑,甚至认为"新公共管理运动已经死亡"。本文在考察新西兰公共部门改革实践的基础上,对实践模式的局限性及时代转换的压力两方面的批判性反思进行了梳理和分析:其"公平"与"公共"价值已经失落?是"经济学帝国"的扩张?还是"新泰勒主义"的表现?亦或是随着改革主题的衰落,数字时代治理的来临。对这一改革的实践发掘和理论反思对于当前我国政府职能转换与行政改革具有重要的参鉴价值:首先,推进改革的政府需要具备必要的能力基础;公共部门改革的核心命题是转变理念,优化政府职能,提高政府的效率和效能;而改革能否顺利推进,取决于广大民众和政府之间的深入互动;此外,改革需要尊重地方政府的主动性,充分发挥其作用。     

Tax and expenditure limitations and the fiscal relationships between state and local governments

This paper uses comprehensive data on state and local tax and spending limitations for forty-nine states between 1976 and 1990 to estimate the effects of these limits on the fiscal relationships between state and local government. Results indicate that tax and spending limits on local governments are only partially effective in reducing revenues because political agents bypass limitations by transferring revenue reliance to unconstrained revenue sources, or because unconstrained levels of government take on additional revenue responsibilities. In particular, the empirical analysis demonstrates that binding local government fiscal constraints are associated with reductions in local revenues and increases in state aid to local governments. In contrast, state government limitations are related to reductions in both state and local own source revenues.     

Leviathan in a dual economy

This paper studies the policies of a leviathan state with an ambition to make money and to stay in power. The economic framework is a developing country characterized by dual markets. Government revenue is raised by taxing the agricultural sector. Part of this revenue is offered to the politically influential urban population in the form of low productive but well paid public sector employment. I calculate the optimal level of rural taxation from the point of view of the Leviathan and investigate its effects on migration, industrialization, public sector employment and urban unemployment in different political scenarios.