Sharpening a Knife Cleverly: Organizational Change, Policy Paradox, and the "Weaponizing" of Administrative Reforms

Prior research has leavened substantially our understanding of how, why, and with what consequences public organizations respond to pressures for administrative reforms. Left underdeveloped theoretically, however, is the hypothesis that agency actors may also assess the ability of administrative reforms both to advance their policy goals and to become "weapons" in battles within agencies for advancing them. To illustrate this possibility, this article analyzes how the Clinton administration's National Performance Review and related Defense Reform Initiative interacted with its efforts to "green" the U.S. military in the post–Cold War era. Analysis of this clash between defense and environmental values indicates that (1) agency actors did evaluate the potential impacts of administrative reforms on their policy goals before supporting or opposing them; (2) they tried to hijack those reforms as weapons for advancing their policy goals in intraorganizational battles; and (3) the "weaponizing" of these reforms produced policy complications and consequences that proponents neither anticipated nor welcomed. Thus, reform in the administrative domain created unanticipated consequences by spilling over into the policy domain and being hijacked, weaponized, or otherwise miscarried or used opportunistically in intraorganizational policy battles. The study concludes by arguing that these dynamics merit more attention than they have received from either administrative reform proponents or researchers seeking to develop theories of administrative reform.     

Does agency competition improve the quality of policy analysis? Evidence from OMB and CBO fiscal projections

Public management scholars often claim that agency competition provides an effective institutional check on monopoly authority, and hence, leads to improvement of administrative performance in public sector agencies. This logic was central for creating the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in 1975 to challenge the policy information provided by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). We challenge this conventional wisdom by demonstrating that CBO has failed to enhance the quality of U.S. fiscal policy analysis on its own terms; nor has it spurred improvements in OMB's performance. Our empirical results indicate that the quality of OMB's fiscal projections has often deteriorated since the establishment of CBO as a rival bureau. We also show that both public and private information is being shared by these agencies to produce a similar caliber of task outputs. The broader implications of our study indicate that although politicians face incentives to employ agency competition in governmental settings, this type of bureaucratic strategy does not necessarily enhance the quality of administrative performance. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

The Obama Administration's Challenges after the “War on Science”: Reforming Staffing Practices and Protecting Scientific Integrity in the Executive Branch

In this article, we examine the difficult leadership position President Barack Obama inherited as he took office with respect to science and technology policy making and implementation, particularly following the Bush administration and years of the so‐called “war on science.” We contend that the Obama administration's challenge is not only to take substantive policy action, but also to reform certain administrative practices, particularly in light of the previous administration's practice of the politics of strategic vacancies, a managerial technique that rearranges an agency's ideological inclinations not through the usual forms of active politicization (i.e., by filling the appointee ranks with like‐minded ideologues) but instead by “starving” the agency of staff and co‐opting its agenda that way.     

Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise

We investigate how aspects of "civil service" systems of personnel management interact with bureaucratic discretion to create expert bureaucracies populated by policy-motivated agents. We construct a dynamic model in which bureaucrats may invest in (relationship-specific) policy expertise and may or may not be interested in policy choices per se. The legislature makes sequentially rational grants of discretion, which serve as incentives for expertise investment and continued service only for policy-motivated bureaucrats. Bureaucratic policy preferences and the legislature's agency problem vis-à-vis bureaucracies develop endogenously in the model. Bureaucratic expertise can be supported in equilibrium only at a cost of its politicization; "neutral competence" is inconsistent with strategic incentives of bureaucrats. We identify several conditions that support the development of an expert bureaucracy in equilibrium, including security of job tenure and control over policy issues for policy-motivated bureaucrats.     

Interacting Capacities: The Indirect National Contribution to Subnational Service Provision

Different levels of government often interact on the ground, providing closely related services. While multilevel governance arrangements have been studied broadly, scarce literature has explored the contribution of national governments to achieving subnational policy goals. By reconceptualizing administrative decentralization as coexisting devolution (to subnational governments) and deconcentration (through field units), this research explores the indirect national contribution to subnational performance by delivering associated services. This article tests the following hypotheses: (1) there is a positive effect of national deconcentrated capacity on subnational policy outputs, and (2) under policy overlap, this contribution diminishes with increasing levels of subnational capacity. While Colombian schooling is decentralized, the national government indirectly contributes to education through a national agency that administers child protection services. Analyzing data for Colombian subnational governments over a decade reveals that national capacity boosts education provision while the least endowed regions benefit the most, thus providing evidence supporting both hypotheses.     

Sex-Based Occupational Segregation in U.S. State Bureaucracies, 1987–97

Is the extent of sex-based occupational segregation in U.S. state bureaucracies related to agency policy missions? Drawing on arguments by Lowi (1985), we contend that levels of sex-based occupational segregation in state bureaucracies vary depending on whether an agency's policy mission is distributive, regulatory, or redistributive. We employ data on the distribution of administrative and professional employees by sex in several types of state agencies across all 50 states for 1987–97. Our findings indicate high levels of occupational segregation among administrative cadres in agencies with distributive and regulatory policy commitments; however, professional workforces in these agencies have become less gender segregated over time. We find no evidence of occupational segregation among administrative and professional workforces in redistributive agencies. We argue that researchers need to examine the relationship between glass walls and other kinds of sex-based employment impediments, such as glass ceilings.     

Extreme idealism and equilibrium in the Hotelling–Downs model of political competition

In the classic Hotelling–Downs model of political competition, no pure strategy equilibrium with three or more strategic candidates exists when the distribution of voters’ preferred policies is unimodal. I study the effect of introducing two idealist candidates to the model who are non-strategic (i.e., fixed to their policy platforms), while allowing for an unlimited number of strategic candidates. Doing so, I show that equilibrium is restored for a non-degenerate set of unimodal distributions. In addition, the equilibria have the following features: (1) the left-most and right-most candidates (i.e., extremists) are idealists; (2) strategic candidates never share their policy platforms, which instead are spread out across the policy space; and (3) if more than one strategic candidate enters, the distribution of voter preferences must be asymmetric. I also show that equilibria can accommodate idealist fringes of candidates toward the extremes of the political spectrum.     

Effects of Administrators' Aspirations,Political Principals' Priorities,and Interest Groups' Influence on State Agency Budget Requests

This article addresses a long‐standing question in public budgeting: What factors influence bureau/agency budget request decisions? Empirical results confirm the complexity of variables that explain different levels of budget requests by over 1,000 state administrative agencies. The expected significant influence of administrator (agency head) aspirations was clearly present. But other important sources enter into the decision of agencies to satisfy rather than maximize. These include the strategic roles, activities, and priorities of governors, legislatures, and interest groups. These political principals' influence operates to constrain, discipline, or even augment agency budget requests.     

The Role of Political Ideology in the Structural Design of New Governance Agencies

This paper employs theories of structural politics and delegation to develop a set of propositions about the legislative delegation of authority to quasi-governmental entities, known as "quangos." Legislators have incentives to condition their choice of structure for an organization charged with implementing policy on their own political attitudes toward "good government." The quasi-independence of quangos provides credibility for legislators to commit to a process that takes policy making out of their hands while creating a structure that increases the likelihood of achieving their policy goals. Theoretical implications are empirically examined using data on the financial autonomy of Dutch public bodies. The results support the argument that it is important to consider politicians' ideologies directly in governance studies because they form the key component of structural politics.     

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Little more than a decade ago the basic structure of the Canadian public service was radically reformed. In accordance with recommendations of the Glassco Royal Commission on Government Organisation the central agencies were restructured and their relations with departments reconstructed to shift as much as possible the location of responsibility for financial and personnel management to the departments. The Treasury Board, a statutory committee of Ministers, separated from the Department of Finance which handles economic and revenue policy, became the Government's management agency responsible for budgeting as well as financial and personnel administration. It was also cast in the role of "employer" for purposes of collective bargaining, which was introduced into the Service at the same time and thereby aligned labour relations in the Service with the system which had prevailed in the private sector since the Second World War. Responsibility for recruitment and promotion of staff according to "merit" was vested in the Public Service Commission, an independent agency reporting directly to Parliament, which also has some advisory functions in respect of training. These legislatively-based changes were accompanied, especially after Mr. Trudeau became Prime Minister in 1968, by construction of an elaborate Cabinet committee system and more policy coordination at the administrative level by an expanded Privy Council Office. Structural change was reinforced by changes in methods of operation. Over the next few years new techniques in budgeting, which was placed on a program basis, policy evaluation and performance measurement were introduced. Under the guiding hand of the Planning Branch in the Treasury Board Secretariat, increasing emphasis was given to planning and research in central agencies and departments.     

Creatively interpreting policy to move science forward: Implementing participatory technology assessment at NASA

Entrepreneurial strategies and tactics are often subtle and indiscrete, adding to the mystery of how one goes about being an entrepreneur, particularly within bureaucratic agencies that are often set up to constrain such behaviors. The authors use a case study of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)'s public engagement practices to examine how entrepreneurs shift policy interpretations with administrative agencies. Findings describe three entrepreneurial strategies and tactics: (1) using one-on-one or small group meetings to connect to different audiences across organizations; (2) tying new policy interpretations to existing ones, so changes seem less radical; and, (3) positioning oneself in the middle of the action to control both narrative and progress. Conclusions discuss both practical mechanisms for shifting away from the status quo, and the theoretical contributions to a growing body of literature on strategic and tactical approaches of bureaucratic entrepreneurs in democratic systems.     

The Strategic Sources of Foreign Policy Substitution

While a growing body of work provides empirical support for the notion that political leaders "substitute" foreign policies depending on a variety of domestic political and economic conditions, little work examines the underlying strategic causes of substitution. This article argues that foreign states behave strategically in order to (a) avoid becoming the targets of domestically troubled executives or (b) to take advantage of the domestic trouble another state endures. Such "strategic interaction" delimits the set of foreign policies reasonably available to leaders in trouble at home, thus producing the impetus for policy substitution. This article develops a theoretical model of strategic behavior and policy substitution and reports empirical results of a multivariate probit model.     

Administrative Discretion and Environmental Regulation: Agency Substantive Rules and Court Decisions in U.S. Air and Water Quality Policies

The main challenge of the scholarship with administrative discretion is how to reach the appropriate balance between a commitment to legislative preferences and flexibility in regulating diverse targets in constantly changing environments. This article focuses on how regulators and courts interact in influencing the potential for administrative discretion in U.S. environmental policy. It creates an analytical framework highlighting the construction of substantive rules by an agency, the interpretation of agency rulings by courts, capacity of an agency for implementation, and legislative responsiveness to agency rulings. It analyzes several cases of the introduction of incentive-based economic instruments administered by the Environmental Protection Agency in air and water policies. The cases reveal the intensified and expanded production of substantive regulations by the agency and the trajectory of a struggle in the judiciary to advance both the legislative intent and the substantive goal of protecting the environment in a more cost-effective and less burdensome way.     

政府绩效视角下的行政管理体制改革战略反思——基于地方政府公务员的感知调查

改革开放以来,我国行政管理体制改革一直坚持以组织结构调整为主的模式.对于这一模式的影响,尤其对地方政府的影响,一直缺少科学层面的检验和理论层面的反思.本文选取政府绩效作为标杆,利用地方政府公务员的问卷调查数据,探索政府部门间关系和部门管理制度建设影响部门绩效的路径和程度,使用结构方程模型实证检验了行政管理体制改革战略在地方层面的有效性.结果表明,部门间关系作为政府结构的核心特征对于政府绩效并没有直接的影响作用,其影响作用是通过部门制度建设和部门文化间接发挥的;部门制度建设对政府绩效的整体影响要大于部门间关系.因此,在今后的改革中应该给予管理制度层面的改革更多的重视,通过局部的、具体制度的改革为整体的、基本制度的变革创造条件.同时,还应在改革过程中维护政府组织文化的凝聚力和激励性.     

DISPUTING AND REGULATORY POLICY: THE EXAMPLE OF A STATE PUBLIC UTILITY AGENCY

The literature on policy making has largely ignored the formulation and implementation of policy when governmental agencies process citizen disputes. In this essay we provide an initial exploration of the dimensions of agency policy making and policy implementation during dispute processing. Using a case study of dispute processing by a state public utilities regulatory agency, it appears that dispute processing contributes to evolutionary policy formulation and implementation by providing a context for the incremental adjustment and legitimation of continuing policies, by sponsoring negotiations leading to the serial adaption of existing policies to new circumstances, and by screening disputes and sharpening the issues in disputes so they are amenable to policy development through agency adjudicatory procedures. The findings of the case study suggest that processing of citizen complaints flowing into the "bottom" of an agency is potentially as important as the politics of the rule making and licensing procedural contexts in the conduct of regulatory policy.     

Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences

David E. Lewis Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540 e-mail: delewis{at}princeton.edu e-mail: clinton{at}princeton.edu (corresponding author) The study of bureaucracies and their relationship to politicalactors is central to understanding the policy process in theUnited States. Studying this aspect of American politics isdifficult because theories of agency behavior, effectiveness,and control often require measures of administrative agencies'policy preferences, and appropriate measures are hard to findfor a broad spectrum of agencies. We propose a method for measuringagency preferences based upon an expert survey of agency preferencesfor 82 executive agencies in existence between 1988 and 2005.We use a multirater item response model to provide a principledstructure for combining subjective ratings based on scholarlyand journalistic expertise with objective data on agency characteristics.We compare the resulting agency preference estimates and standarderrors to existing alternative measures, discussing both theadvantages and limitations of the method. Authors' note: We thank Tom Hammond, George Krause, and JoshuaTucker for helpful comments. We are grateful to Simon Jackmanand Shawn Treier for generously providing their code and oursurvey respondents for their time and expertise.     

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWER THEORY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES*

The ability of state leaders to influence economic growth and diversity within their states is a disputed issue within the literature on state economic development policy-making. This research contributes to this debate by developing comparative measures of state development agency power drawn from the emerging theory on organizational power. If state policy leaders have independent control over the economic performance of their states and if that influence is exercised through the administrative unit responsible for that activity, states which have supplied their agencies more resources and freedom in using those resources should outperform those states which have not.     

The complications of controlling agency time discretion: FDA review deadlines and postmarket drug safety

Public agencies have discretion on the time domain, and politicians deploy numerous policy instruments to constrain it. Yet little is known about how administrative procedures that affect timing also affect the quality of agency decisions. We examine whether administrative deadlines shape decision timing and the observed quality of decisions. Using a unique and rich dataset of FDA drug approvals that allows us to examine decision timing and quality, we find that this administrative tool induces a piling of decisions before deadlines, and that these “just-before-deadline” approvals are linked with higher rates of postmarket safety problems (market withdrawals, severe safety warnings, safety alerts). Examination of data from FDA advisory committees suggests that the deadlines may impede quality by impairing late-stage deliberation and agency risk communication. Our results both support and challenge reigning theories about administrative procedures, suggesting they embody expected control-expertise trade-offs, but may also create unanticipated constituency losses.     

Employee Engagement as Administrative Reform: Testing the Efficacy of the OPM's Employee Engagement Initiative

Researchers have long recognized administrative reform as a constant feature of American public administration. The employee engagement initiative of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has become one of the most prominent administrative reforms underway in the federal government. Like many reforms, the veracity of claims about this reform have gone untested. This article addresses this gap by testing the relationship between the OPM's employee engagement initiative and agency performance. After establishing the psychometric validity of the OPM's Employment Engagement Index, the authors use a five‐year panel data set of federal agencies and two‐way fixed‐effects regression to test the efficacy of this prominent reform. The analysis shows that efforts to encourage employee engagement generally have the expected relationship with performance, but the relationship varies according to the components that make up the index and the organizational level at which these efforts are expended.     

Policy competition in the 2002 French legislative and presidential elections

Abstract.  The French two-round system of presidential elections forces candidates to choose strategies designed to maximize their votes in two different, potentially conflicting strategic contexts: a first round contest between many candidates, and a second round between (typically) a left- and a right-oriented candidate. Following a constitutional change in 2000, furthermore, presidential elections are synchronized with legislative elections, more tightly linking presidential candidates to the policy platforms of the parties they represent. This article examines the consequences of policy positioning by presidential candidates, measuring, comparing and assessing positioning in the legislative elections and in the first and second presidential election rounds. The measures come from an expert survey taken in 2002, from content analysis of party manifestos and presidential speeches, and from the 2002 French National Election Survey. The findings provide hard empirical confirmation of two commonly perceived propositions: first, that Jospin's first-round loss resulted from strategic error in moving too close to the policy centre, and second, that Chirac's won an overwhelming second-round victory because he collected all of the voters from candidates eliminated in the first round.