‘The limits of international leadership’: The Eisenhower administration,East‐West trade and the cold war, 1953–54

This article examines the Eisenhower administration's trade policy towards the Soviet Union in 1953–54. It argues, contrary to previous scholarship on the subject, that the liberalization of East‐West trade controls in August 1954 cannot be attributed solely to the presidential leadership of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Instead, whilst Eisenhower played a significant role in changing American embargo policy, it was the Churchill government which provided the impetus required for the revision of the international export control lists. Despite conflict and confrontation over the shape and contents of the new embargo between Washington and London, the two governments forged a compromise in the summer of 1954.     

“Trade with the Devil”: Rubber,Cold War Embargo,and US–Indonesian Relations, 1951–1956

This article examines the issue of rubber in US–Indonesian relations in the 1950s. Indonesia, attempting to promote its economic development, sought to sell natural rubber to the Communist People's Republic of China. In so doing, it risked alienating the United States, which for its part led anti-PRC trade embargo efforts while at that same time attempting to woo Third World neutrals such as Indonesia. The article explores the course and complexities of this issue on both sides, and concludes that, in the end, Washington decided that enforcing an increasingly questionable rubber embargo was not worth a rupture in relations with Jakarta. It also finds that President Eisenhower, although keenly aware of the issues at stake, did not provide the decisive leadership that would allow Washington to take the initiative, rather than react to circumstances, regarding the sale of rubber to the People's Republic of China.     

Eisenhower, the British and the security of Hong Kong, 1953-60

This article is an examination of Hong Kong's importance within British-American security arrangements in the Far East during the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Archival evidence indicates that the Eisenhower Administration accepted a greater deal of commitment to the defence of Hong Kong during the 1950s — a period of significant hostility between the United States and the People's Republic of China. To understand this policy evolution in the broader context, this study evaluates the differences in British and American attitudes towards China during the 1950s and the effect of this on US policy towards Hong Kong.     

The Eisenhower Administration and Public Diplomacy in India: An Ambivalent Engagement, 1953–1960

The United States–India relationship was fraught with misapprehension and ideological disagreement during the 1950s. Public diplomacy provides a valuable context for examining these dynamics. This analysis assesses the planning, deployment, and reception of American public diplomacy to India under President Dwight Eisenhower, a period encompassing Washington’s 1954 alliance with Pakistan and economic aid to India in 1957–1958. Public diplomacy reflects the Administration’s difficulty in clarifying its interests in India. The rhetorical and moralising approach of India’s leadership, and their prominence in the global non-aligned movement, contributed greatly to this ambivalence. Public diplomacy planning highlights Washington’s difficulties in confronting India’s identity in world politics; it struggled to craft messages on racial attitudes, consumerism, and Communism, whilst Soviet public diplomacy gave strong competition throughout the period. At the same time, several aspects of American public diplomacy resonated with Indian audiences, indicating that there was the possibility of a closer American relationship with India had Washington taken a different high policy approach to the region.     

Eisenhower,the British and the security of Hong Kong, 1953–60

This article is an examination of Hong Kong's importance within British‐American security arrangements in the Far East during the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Archival evidence indicates that the Eisenhower Administration accepted a greater deal of commitment to the defence of Hong Kong during the 1950s — a period of significant hostility between the United States and the People's Republic of China. To understand this policy evolution in the broader context, this study evaluates the differences in British and American attitudes towards China during the 1950s and the effect of this on US policy towards Hong Kong.     

Britain, the United States and the Syrian crisis, 1957

This paper seeks to analyze the Syrian Crisis in 1957 and its impact on the Anglo-American reconciliation after the dispute over Suez in the previous year. The Middle East remained at the forefront of British and American continued regional instability and led to close allied cooperation over the perceived Soviet threat in Syria. This ensured that by the time of the Washington Conference in October 1957 both Macmillan and Eisenhower agreed that the Middle East required a joint Anglo-American policy to safeguard vital regional interests.     

Britain,the United States and the Syrian crisis, 1957

This paper seeks to analyze the Syrian Crisis in 1957 and its impact on the Anglo‐American reconciliation after the dispute over Suez in the previous year. The Middle East remained at the forefront of British and American continued regional instability and led to close allied cooperation over the perceived Soviet threat in Syria. This ensured that by the time of the Washington Conference in October 1957 both Macmillan and Eisenhower agreed that the Middle East required a joint Anglo‐American policy to safeguard vital regional interests.     

战略高科技解禁与印美关系

美国自1998年起对印实施高科技贸易制裁,涉及军民＂双用途＂的高科技项目禁运成为影响印美关系的重大障碍。随着近年来印美战略关系日益升温,印美民用核能合作启动,美国支持印度以特殊身份参与国际防扩散和军控机制,印美双方从各自的战略和经济利益出发,力图通过讨价还价推动高科技出口解禁的进程。奥巴马政府新近宣布对印度国防与民用航天部门解除制裁,表明印美双方围绕该重大问题的利益协调已取得突破性进展,美国多年的对印高科技禁运接近尾声。尽管印美围绕印度战略核发展的矛盾继续存在,但高科技贸易解禁将为印美战略关系提供新的活力。     

An 'Aladdin's lamp' for free enterprise: Eisenhower, fiscal conservatism, and Latin American nationalism, 1953-61

This study explores the Eisenhower administration's efforts to promote free trade and investment policies in Latin America. US officials believed that private capital investment, rather than US foreign aid, would best promote Latin American economic development and improve its abiliry to purchase American products. By eliminating the need for foreign aid, Latin American economic autarky complemented Eisenhower's zeal for fiscal conservatism. Although most scholars have focused on the primacy of anti-communism in Eisenhower's inter-American policies, this study contends that economic nationalism posed the greatest threat to Eisenhower's policies. US officials eventually responded by expanding aid to Latin America, but the additional economic aid was always intended to complement private capital, rather than replace it. This article, based upon the papers of influential administration officials and State Department records, sheds considerable light as to why the United States promoted free trade and investment policies in the developing world, as it still does today.     

艾森豪威尔处理苏伊士运河战争危机的经验及其对奥巴马政府的启示

1956年10月,以色列在美国总统大选前8天,不顾艾森豪威尔政府预先劝诫,在英、法两国幕后策划下,对埃及发动先发制人的打击。艾森豪威尔总统为此采取一系列行动,如诉诸联合国、启动对以经济制裁、甚至威胁驱逐其出联合国,最终实现被他称之为"侵略者"的三方无条件停火撤退。艾森豪威尔成功的范例给2012年面临同样难题的奥巴马提供了一些历史经验:美国的外交不能被一个小盟国所捆绑,即便他们曾是美国的"铁杆"朋友。美国只有坚持公正、理性与原则,且在冲突中支持受害者,才能最大程度上维护美国的利益与形象,并最终使美国成为中东最具有决定性的外部力量。     

Oil, the Suez canal, and sterling reserves: economic factors determining British decisionmaking during the 1967 Arab-Israeli crisis

This article assesses the importance of economic factors for the development of British Middle Eastern policy during the 1967 Arab-Israeli crisis, based on newly declassified government documents. Policy shifted from threatening unilateral action against Nasser to multilateralism and neutraliry shortly before the June war. Economic considerations will be put in the context of anti-interventionist voices in the cabinet, in the defence establishment and within US policy. The article concludes that important reasons for the shift were economic, namely threats of an oil embargo, reserve withdrawals, and Suez Canal closure at a time of fiscal difficulties in Britain. In addition, an ideological shift in cabinet from 'imperial hangover' to anti-interventionism underlay the policy change.     

1958年印尼内战与艾森豪威尔政府的政策

美国对1958年印尼内战的干涉是美国与第三世界关系史上一个有代表性的事件。艾森豪威尔政府从美苏两极对抗的角度认知和处理美国与新兴的民族主义国家的关系,将美国对亚非民族主义国家的政策附属于美国对苏冷战战略。正是基于这样一种政策思维,美国对印尼内战采取了干涉政策。干涉行动的失败,迫使美国决策当局重新检视对印尼政策的基本构架,并着手制定一项更为可行、更能反映印尼政治经济和社会现实的政策。     

The EU's policy towards China and the arms embargo

Since the rise of the “Middle Kingdom” in recent years most European leaders consider this major Asian power as the most important opportunity and challenge in the years to come, not only economically and commercially but also politically and strategically. The EU's China policy is promising, and EU–China ties have been smooth and comprehensive despite bilateral trade and human rights disputes. Concerning Cross Strait relations the domestic political development in Taiwan has a strong impact on the peace and stability in the region because Beijing has never renounced the use of force against the island in case of its formal independence. Given its large bilateral trade deficit, the EU's potential arms exports to China remain significant to the European countries. But this prospect aroused great concern from the US, Russia and Japan. Nonetheless, the Anti-Secession Law from Beijing against Taiwan in mid March 2005 and the likely change of government in the German elections in autumn 2005 on top of the failures of the constitutional referenda in France and the Netherlands in June 2005 will affect the EU decision on the embargo.     

Learning to Pull the Strings after Suez: Macmillan’s Management of the Eisenhower Administration during the Intervention in Jordan, 1958

This analysis re-instates the importance of the 1958 British intervention in Jordan within the study of Anglo–American relations and the revisionist literature on Suez. It does so by challenging the idea of British subservience to American foreign policy after the 1956 crisis, and it reveals two key lessons learnt by London: that Britain’s economy, power, and influence were in decline and that Britain could no longer intervene in the Middle East without American support. Having learnt these lessons, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan proved to be a shrewd political actor who used the opportunity of the Jordan intervention to turn the policy of the Dwight Eisenhower Administration to British ends, regaining Britain’s maximum power and prestige for the minimum loss of resources.     

Just How Special is “Special”: Britain,Cuba, and US Relations 1958–2008 an Overview

In June 2008, despite intense lobbying from the Bush administration, the Council of Ministers of the European Union lifted the diplomatic sanctions on Havana that it had imposed in 2003 and agreed to resume a “comprehensive political dialogue” with the revolutionary regime. Instrumental in this decision was a change in policy by the UK that had hitherto stood against such a normalisation of relations. The move came as a surprise to many who had anticipated that the British would oppose the lifting of sanctions in deference to their “special relationship” with their transatlantic ally. However, as this overview suggests, the UK decision was not unusual. Even from the earliest days of the revolution, the UK has differed with the US over Cuba. By surveying the five decades of the UK–Cuba relationship since 1959 the article explains how the UK has maintained an ambivalent attitude towards Washington's embargo. While recognising US primacy of interest in Cuba, London has consistently attempted to follow an independent policy that at times has come between the close allies. It concludes that although the UK (along with other European partners and Canada) shares the US goal of seeing the end of Communism on the island, it has ironically helped to thwart this ambition. The history of the relationship provides an example of the limitations of unilateral economic sanctions as policy instruments. The failure of the US embargo to affect the behaviour of the Castro regime should be no surprise when Washington's closest ally has never fully agreed to it.     

Fracas in Caracas: Latin American Diplomatic Resistance to United States Intervention in Guatemala in 1954

The Eisenhower Administration claimed a diplomatic triumph—and a mandate to overthrow the elected government of Guatemala—after the Tenth Inter-American Conference held in Caracas, Venezuela, in March 1954, when 17 nations voted for an American resolution condemning international Communism. This article disputes the official story and some recent scholarly depictions of the conference. Caracas was the scene of intense Latin American opposition to the American agenda. Vote-buying was rampant as Washington made hundreds of millions of dollars worth of concessions to individual countries. Nonetheless, amendments pushed through by Latin American diplomats transformed the interventionist American resolution into a strong statement against intervention. The American “triumph” was actually a fiasco that called into sharp relief the difference between United States and Latin American understandings of the inter-American system, demonstrating Latin American diplomatic resistance to intervention and the limits of diplomacy's potential to constrain the actions of the most powerful American state.     

Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: Is There a Left–Right Divide on Trade Policy?

Are there noticeable differences among political parties in a country over their trade policy positions? Do left parties advocate different trade policies than right parties? In the advanced industrial countries where labor tends to be scarce, are left parties more protectionist than right ones, which represent capital owners? Political institutions within these democratic countries may affect the role of partisanship. We also investigate whether increasing globalization has led to more or less partisan polarization over trade policy. We examine 25 developed countries from 1945 to 1998 to see how their parties have competed over trade policy. Controlling for various factors, partisanship matters. Right parties consistently take more free trade stances than do left ones. Globalization and other international forces have also shaped both the nature and the extent of the domestic debate over exposure to international trade.     

1947年至1954年印度对藏政策的两面性探析

印度1947年独立后,以继承英国特权为由积极干涉西藏事务,直到1954年《藏印交通和通商协定》签订,它才正式承认中国对西藏的主权。本文在厘清1947-1954年印度对藏政策变化脉络的基础上,探究其政策＂两面性＂的表现和深层原因。文章认为印度政府从中印关系的前提出发对＂西藏问题＂持谨慎态度,但它最后承诺放弃在藏＂特权＂,却依然坚持以西藏牵制中国的战略思想。这一时期印度的对藏政策奠定了后来它对＂西藏问题＂的认知基调。     

Japan’s Middle East Policy, 1972–1974: Resources Diplomacy,Pro-American Policy,and New Left

Commentators generally accept that the Yom Kippur War and subsequent oil crisis crystallised Japan’s overtly pro-Arab stance. This analysis challenges that view—even after the oil embargo, Japan’s Middle Eastern policy was both discretely and, at times, blatantly pro-American. Admittedly, the Japanese government had a seemingly ambiguous attitude towards the Arab–Israeli conflict and on-going conflict between oil-producing countries and oil companies; however, responsible for formulating the Arab–Israeli policy, the Foreign Ministry preferred to follow American leadership in the region for reasons of national security and Cold War imperatives. The Foreign Ministry’s response to the 1972 Lod Airport Massacre, a radicalised Japanese New Left terrorist attack, revealed a determination to gain international credibility by more actively supporting the West. Lod buttressed the influence of the pro-American contingent in the government; and the 1973 Arab oil embargo did not undermine their position. Although the Cabinet eventually issued a public statement supporting the Arab cause to satisfy the Japanese public, the pro-American contingent succeeded surreptitiously in bringing the Cabinet together to uphold the American-led petroleum order as well as United States leadership in Cold War politics.     

An ‘Aladdin's lamp’ for free enterprise: Eisenhower,fiscal conservatism,and Latin American nationalism, 1953–61

This study explores the Eisenhower administration's efforts to promote free trade and investment policies in Latin America. US officials believed that private capital investment, rather than US foreign aid, would best promote Latin American economic development and improve its abiliry to purchase American products. By eliminating the need for foreign aid, Latin American economic autarky complemented Eisenhower's zeal for fiscal conservatism. Although most scholars have focused on the primacy of anti-communism in Eisenhower's inter-American policies, this study contends that economic nationalism posed the greatest threat to Eisenhower's policies. US officials eventually responded by expanding aid to Latin America, but the additional economic aid was always intended to complement private capital, rather than replace it. This article, based upon the papers of influential administration officials and State Department records, sheds considerable light as to why the United States promoted free trade and investment policies in the developing world, as it still does today.