Ethno‐political activity and the psychology of terrorism

Abstract

Studies of terrorist psychology have typically focused either on single individuals or group dynamics within the organizations that these individuals have joined. Less attention has been paid to the background conditions which give rise to these individuals and organizations, even for environments in which generalization appears to be feasible. This paper focuses on one such environment. Its principal goal is to highlight the theoretical connections between a society's ethnic cleavages; the development of ethno‐political activity, especially organized violence and terrorism; and the implications of this activity for the functioning of institutions in “democratic” and “non‐democratic” societies. A related objective is the identification of policy responses to latent or manifest ethno‐political activity and an assessment of their potential efficacy. These points are illustrated by examining a small ethnic group, the South Moluccans in Holland, which would appear to have had little motivation to engage in violence or terrorism, but some of whose members nevertheless did.     

Challenging the "Received View": De-demonizing Hamas

Abstract

Violence against abortion clinics and other activities directed toward patients and staff of abortion facilities have been termed terrorism by the pro‐choice movement. However, the Federal Bureau of Investigation denies that these actions are terrorism. Instances of abortion clinic violence for 1982–1987 were examined in order to determine whether there is a correspondence between these incidents and definitions or models of terrorism. It appears that these incidents do fit the classification of “limited political” or ‘subrevolutionary” terrorism. Reasons why the FBI has made the decision not to include these acts as forms of terrorism are entertained. One is that current international tensions have resulted in a preoccupation with only certain types of events which for administrative, i.e., juris‐dictional, reasons have come to essentialize terrorism. Another explanation, posited by pro‐choice activists, is that the FBI's decision is a consequence of political influence: the current administration is openly anti‐choice.     

Rewarding Fire with Fire: Effects of Retaliation on Terrorist Group Dynamics

Abstract

Comparative studies of the psychology of terrorism indicate that there is no one terrorist mindset, A theme in common among the disparate groups is the strong need of marginal alienated individuals to join a group of like‐minded individuals with a similar world view that “it's us against them, and they are the cause of our problems.” This strong need to belong gives particular force to the power of group dynamics. While the ideology is the glue that holds the group together and serves as the rationale for its actions, terrorists do not commit acts of terrorism for ideological reasons. The amelioration of the societal injustice which they indicate incites and justifies their terrorism does not reduce the lure of terrorism, because of the powerful hold of the group on its members.

Paradoxically, a policy of reactive retaliation with the goal of deterring terrorist acts may have the opposite effect and reinforce the mind set of the terrorist. For the group under threat, the external danger has the consequence of reducing external divisiveness and uniting the group against the outside enemy. The survival of the group is paramount because of the sense of group identity it provides.

Identifying the locus of control is of crucial significance in estimating the effects of counter‐terrorist policies upon a terrorist group. For the autonomous terrorist cell, active retaliation may reinforce the cohesion of the group; for the corporate terrorist organization, issues of organizational survival may become paramount. Neither the terrorist group nor the terrorist organization can be forced to give up terrorism, for to do so would be to lose their reason for being. For state‐supported and directed terrorist groups on the other hand, the terrorist group in effect serves as a paramilitary group under central government control. In this situation, group and organizational considerations are less relevant, for the object of the counter‐terrorist policy is the government of the sponsoring state. Since the survival of the state and national interests are the primary values, retaliatiatory policies, can, in the short run, have a deterring effect. In the long run, the most effective anti‐terrorist policy is one which renders the terrorist career less attractive to potential members, facilitates terrorists leaving the group, and reduces external support.     

FBI analysis of terrorist incidents in the United States — 1982

Abstract

When analyzing terrorism in Germany, attention normally focuses on the Rote Armee Fraktion, better known as Baader‐Meinhof gang. Already in the early years of the RAF there existed different groups, such as the Movement 2nd June, which often rivaled and strongly critized the elitist avant‐gardism of Andreas Baader, Ulrike Meinhof, and Gudrun Ensslin. Today only a small fragment of the some 350 terrorist acts and 500 acts of sabotage (1985 statistics) can be attributed to the RAF. Germany's other terrorists, the Revolutionary Cells and autonomous/anti‐imperialist groups have long ago outdone the RAF and become a much graver threat to the internal security of the Federal Republic. Though similarities in rhetoric and operational approach exist between the RAF and these groups, the existing underlying differences are strong and until recently have prevented cooperation. The hunger strike campaign of the winter 1984/1985 appears to present a change in policies on behalf of the Cells.     

The U.S. Navy's role in countering maritime terrorism

Abstract

There have been few spectacular acts of maritime terrorism. About ninety‐five percent of all incidents of what would be classified as transnational maritime terrorism involved bombings, hijackings, and “other” attacks. Nearly all of these took place when ships were in port, and the victims were predominantly merchant ships. Only a small number of terrorist attacks have been reported against men‐of‐war–none against U.S. Navy ships. Bombing, including various forms of mining, comprises the major threat to merchant ships, while the dangers of U.S. Navy ships would be aggravated by the presence of nuclear weapons or nuclear propulsion plants.

Counter terrorism as carried out by the U.S. Navy involves actions to deter or defeat direct terrorist activity (against the ship itself) and indirect activity (against other U.S. interests). U.S Navy ships are especially well organized, constructed, and equipped to deal with the former, but they would be virtually powerless to assist U.S. merchant ships against the most probable threats (bombing, hijacking, and attacks) in the most probable location (overseas ports).     

Nuclear terrorism: Threat,perception, and response in South Asia

Abstract

This paper seeks to answer the question: What should be done in South Asia in response to the dangers of nuclear blackmail and terrorism? The relevance of the recommendations of the Nuclear Control Institute's International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism is explored. The authors examine conventional terrorism in the context of increased nuclear activities and provide an overview of recent nuclear developments in the region. Policy recommendations are given, and specific proposals are made to counter the threats of nuclear blackmail and terrorism.     

United nations resolutions against international terrorism

Abstract

Nine years after the Munich Massacre of 11 Israeli athletes and after a request by the Secretary‐General for the General Assembly to act on the problem, the General Assembly reached a general consensus on a terrorism resolution. The resolution endorses a UN committee's recommendations to refrain from assisting terrorism in any way and to cooperate in the final elimination of terrorism. Negotiation of the resolution was difficult because third world countries did not want to weaken opposition to “colonial, racist, and alien regimes,” and they have held back from approving an international convention that would require trying or extraditing those accused of terrorist crimes. Problems of constitutional protection to individuals in democracies and of political asylum also stand in the way of an overall convention. Nevertheless, the General Assembly resolution has been useful in promoting cooperation among states to eliminate terrorism and in encouraging support for conventions against specific types of terrorism such as hijacking, taking of hostages, attacking diplomatic targets, and supporting nuclear terrorism.     

On learning terrorism

Abstract

The complex phenomenon of terrorism has been explained in a variety of ways, ranging from the narrowly psychological to the broadly political. Many of these hypotheses appear to have merit, although, standing alone, each tends to be inadequate or incomplete. Focusing on the psychological explanations of root cause, the instant discussion proposes that the hitherto neglected or taken‐for‐granted principles of human learning, particularly those of cognitive‐behavioral conditioning, can provide a useful and significant component to these explanations. The competence and commitment to the ways and means of terror are in large measure produced, intensified, and sustained through learning. Evidence, chiefly from psychological studies, is adduced to support this hypothesis. A few formal, sometimes state‐sponsored training programs based more or less on conditioning are briefly described. Some of the doctrines, particularly those that underpin Middle East terrorism and provide the justification and substantiation of what is taught, are also mentioned. It is suggested that the same procedures by which terrorism is indoctrinated may, in conjunction with other procedures, be employed to prevent and combat it. Although this strategy, in the present uncongenial socio‐cultural and geopolitical environments, will doubtless be difficult if not impossible to implement, it deserves to be explored as another potentially effective tool in the developing armamentarium of counter‐terrorism.     

In defense of the realm: Financing loyalist terrorism in Northern Ireland—part one: Extortion and blackmail

The revival of loyalist terrorism has been one of the most important developments in Northern Ireland in the 1990s. This article examines the recent fund‐raising activities of the two main loyalist paramilitary groups, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). The article focuses particularly on the financial importance of extortion and blackmail to the groups in the 1990s. It also explores how the loyalist paramilitaries have responded, as organizations, to the constant need for funds, a need that has continued unabated since both groups implemented cease‐fires in 1994. The paper concludes that because of internal arrangements, the loyalist groups are consistently risking the spread of corruption among their most senior members.     

The Changing Security Agenda in Southeast Asia: Globalization,New Terror,and the Delusions of Regionalism

One of the distinguishing features of international terrorism the past fifteen years has been the resurgence and proliferation of terrorist groups motivated by a religious imperative. Such groups are far more lethal than their secular counterparts, regarding violence as a divine duty or sacramental act conveyed by sacred text and imparted by clerical authority. Moreover, religious terrorism is not restricted to Islamic terrorist groups exclusively in the Middle East. The same characteristics—the legitimization of violence based on religious precepts, the sense of profound alienation and isolation, and the attendant preoccupation with the elimination of a broadly defined category of “enemies”—are also apparent among American Christian white supremacists, among some radical Jewish messianic terrorist movements in Israel, and among radical Sikh movements in India. Finally, as many of these groups embrace strong millennialist or apocalyptic beliefs, we may be on the cusp of a new and potentially more dangerous era of terrorism as the year 2000—the literal millennium—approaches.     

U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 1980s and the priorities for the 1990s

Abstract

The Department of State's counterterrorism coordinator discusses current patterns in international terrorism and cites three areas of growing concern: radical Palestinian terrorist groups, Libyan supported terrorism, and narcoterrorism in the Andean nations. He explains U.S. Government counterterrorism policy and assesses its effectiveness. The recent trend toward treating terrorists as criminals and applying the rule of law against them is examined. He also emphasizes the importance of pressuring countries that sponsor terrorism and of refusing to make deals with terrorists.     

The Bulgarian connection: Drugs,weapons, and terrorism

Abstract

The Bulgarian government is involved in sub‐version of Western governments, almost certainly orchestrated in Moscow, involving drugs, weapons, and terrorism. Despite U.S. efforts to work with Bulgaria to curb the illicit traffic of drugs and weapons, cooperation has been virtually nil. This has prompted some members of Congress to probe Bulgaria's motives, and on February 26, 1985, Senator Alphonse D'Amato introduced a bill, S. 515, the Bulgarian Interrelation Review Act, directing the President to conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward Bulgaria. This article analyzes that legislation, the dimension of the drugs and terrorism connection in Bulgaria, and offers further recommendations in dealing with the issue.     

Medical technology in combatting terrorism

State‐sponsored terrorism is a form of coercion, backed up by the threat and use of violence, to achieve political ends. These terrorist tactics also involve signaling of intentions and responses between the terrorist sponsor and those whom it targets. Accordingly this study examines Iranian state sponsorship of anti‐U.S. terrorism in the period of 1980–1990 as an example of political communication aimed at manipulating U.S. policy through the threat and use of violence. Official Iranian media are quantitatively content‐analyzed to demonstrate their systematic use of threat‐projections as warnings and indications to the U.S. in this period.     

The ambiguities of political terrorism in Central America

Abstract

Over the last ten years left‐wing terrorism in Central America has spawned a number of related and opposed phenomena. Right‐wing terrorism has become very active but has degenerated into pseudo‐left‐wing terrorism and finally into gangsterism. Examples of this are the alleged Chacon group in El Salvador and the related activities of the Zimeri gang in Guatemala. Non‐Central American factors have also come into play, such as connections with the PLO and the activities of Cuban exile groups. This situation has made it extremely difficult to label any individual act of terrorism as being related to the Right or to the Left.     

Reluctant terrorists? Transcaucasian social-cemocracy, 1901 – 1909

This article discusses the development of Transcaucasian social-democratic terrorism from 1901 to 1909. For two reasons the ‘psychohistorical’ model emphasising the subjective and irrational aspects of terrorism has only limited value for the Transcaucasian case. First, the significance of the contextual factor is powerfully underscored by the phenomenon of workers' ‘economic terrorism’. It was not uncommon even, for workers to blackmail reluctant party organisations into supporting the killing of their enemies. Secondly, the social democrats were not driven by irrational urges but followed a rationally motivated and selective terrorist strategy. They attempted to limit or prevent workers' terrorism from below, the ‘anarchist’ potential of which they considered a threat to the organised mass struggle. They set their hopes on a division of labour, with a militant but mostly peaceful workers' movement and terrorism as the prerogative of the party.     

Failure and Disengagement in the Red Army Faction

This article examines the factors that have contributed to the end of the Red Army Faction (RAF), and places particular emphasis on the causes and characteristics of individual disengagement of RAF members from the armed struggle. It discusses the evolution, ideology, and decline of each of the three generations of the RAF. The article's contribution is twofold. First, by assessing both contextual- and individual-level factors that led to the group's demise, the article bridges two approaches to analyzing the demise of terrorist organizations—the literature on how terrorism ends and why individuals disengage from terrorism. Second, the article helps build a growing empirical body of work on the demise of terrorist groups that can be used to confirm, challenge, or refine existing hypotheses on how terrorism ends, while formulating new ones. The article concludes that different factors contributed to the decline of each subsequent generation of the RAF. Successful German police efforts played a critical role in thwarting the RAF's first generation. Lack of public support and recruits, due in large part to an escalation of terrorist violence, hastened the decline of the second generation of the group. The third generation suffered from serious interorganizational strife, exacerbated by a government initiative that offered to release those RAF members from prison who renounced terrorism.     

Offshore energy terrorism: Perspectives on a problem

Abstract

This essay examines prevailing perspectives on the prospect of terrorist sabotage against the offshore oil and gas industry in the Gulf of Mexico. It contrasts the dominant “wait‐and‐see” attitude in the United States with counterterrorist preparations by the North Sea countries, and suggests some of the reasons for this difference in attitudes.     

The need for international cooperation in combating terrorism

Abstract

As this paper briefly notes, an elaborate international legal system has been established to combat terrorism. But this system has two primary deficiencies: There are serious gaps in the current law and the law already on the books is not being implemented vigorously. The paper examines the specific nature of the gaps and recommends the establishment, under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council, of a committee to oversee implementation of the antiterrorist conventions. The paper also examines some recent work of a less well‐known branch of the United Nations, the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control. Finally, the paper considers the possibility of establishing an international criminal court with jurisdiction over drug trafficking and related acts of terrorism, a proposal that is currently on the agenda of the United Nations International Law Commission.     

A Poisson model of incidents of international terrorism in the United States

Abstract

Various haphazard, and often uncoordinated, efforts have been devoted to discouraging and combatting terrorism. Unfortunately, there has been a noticeable lack of quantitative studies of the problem of terrorism. Nevertheless, it can be expected that the problem of international terrorism will eventually be a focus for operations researchers. A factor fundamental to any OR study is an understanding of the underlying generating process for incidents of terrorism. Based on incidents of terrorism from 1968 to 1974, this paper notes that the Poisson is a good model for the occurrence of incidents of international terrorism in the United States. Results of both chi‐square and Kolmogorov‐Smirnov tests are presented. Finally, an unusual result, inconsistent with popular beliefs, is noted.     

The European Union and Post-9/11 Counterterrorism: A Reappraisal

In spite of the hectic activity subsequent to the so-called month of transformation in the wake of 9/11, it is not to be taken for granted that the European Union is the right vehicle in Europe for the combating of terrorism. The lack of the EU's executive powers with respect to regulating the behavior of member states relative to a common threat such as terrorism, raises the fundamental question of whether the Union itself, as opposed to its constituent members, or an alternative multilateral forum, is an appropriate body for effectively confronting terrorism in Europe.