Analyzing the Multidirectional Relationships Between the President,News Media,and the Public: Who Affects Whom?

In order to study presidential leadership and responsiveness, this research focuses on the role of the news media and examines the multidirectional relationships between the president, the news media, and the public. One of the purposes of this study is to examine competing theoretical expectations about the causal direction between the three actors by focusing on their issue stances. The potentially reciprocal influences between the three actors are estimated by using vector autoregression and moving average representation simulations. According to the statistical results, the news media significantly interact with the public and the president. In contrast, the direct relationship between the president and the public is weak or insignificant.     

Evaluating Claims of Social Connection to International Conflict Casualties

Recent studies examining the political impact of individuals' connections to the victims of international violence find these ties have a powerful effect on people's attitudes and feelings. How reliable, however, are self-reported claims of ties to a conflict's casualties? Using data from 9/11 and the Iraq War, I examine these claims, analyzing: 1) their influence on both public assessments of foreign policy and voting behavior, 2) whether critical demographic and political factors predict the likelihood of individuals reporting a tie to a conflict casualty, 3) the predicted, aggregate likelihood of survey respondents having connections to conflict victims, and 4) the theoretical distinction between actual vs. perceived casualty connections. The results strongly support the use of casualty connection data for understanding individuals' responses to international violence, and encourage future applications of social network approaches to the study of war and politics.     

Quiet diplomacy in a television era: The media and U.S. policy toward the republic of Korea

This study examines the role of television coverage in U.S. policy toward South Korea, focusing on the May 1980 Kwangji incident and the subsequent visit of South Korean president Chun Doo Hwan to the White House in February of 1981. It explores these two episodes in the context of major dimensions of U.S. policy toward Korea and the themes developed through sporadic, low‐level coverage of Korea by mainstream American media over the years. The analysis underscores the political impact of television's dramatic visual focus, its use of consistent visual images, its expansion of the geopolitical scope of the policy process, and its personalization of policy. The dramatically different public interpretations of the Kwangju incident and Chun visit in Korea versus the United States suggests that President Reagan's first major state visit, during which he declared that his administration would pursue “quiet diplomacy” on human rights in Korea, while successful within the United States and in the short term, was damaging over the long term.     

The Future of Political Communication Research: Reflections on the Occasion of Steve Chaffee's Retirement from Stanford University

Based on the psychological model of media priming, we examine the potentially strong link between news content and public opinion about Governor Patten's democratization plan for Hong Kong. Similar to previous priming studies, we hypothesized that an increase in the amount of media coverage of Patten's political reform plan would cause the public to assign more weight to the issue when evaluating the governor's overall performance. To validate the priming hypothesis in a nonexperimental setting, this study uses time‐series data obtained from 52 weekly public opinion polls, coupled with content analysis of three leading newspapers in Hong Kong between October 1992 and October 1993. The findings provide strong evidence supporting the media priming theory on an aggregate data level. Newspaper coverage of Patten's reform plan greatly inflated the relative importance of his proposal in the public's evaluation of his overall performance, with a 1‐week delay. The priming hypothesis survived a stringent test of several rival factors, including autocorrelation, the influence of the economy, and other important real‐world events.     

Public opinion as a dependent variable: A framework for analysis

This paper outlines an approach to examining how public opinion is taken into consideration by political and governmental leaders and reviews recent studies that have followed this approach to evaluate the extent to which public opinion is subject to manipulation by political elites in diverse circumstances. The central idea of this approach is to treat public opinion as a “dependent variable” and to examine the role of the mass media in linking elite initiatives and the public. Instead of starting with polls that presume public opinion is an independent force, we start with elites and presume that they try to manipulate public opinion through the mass media and by other means. First, we look at why the emphasis on the independent nature of public opinion has become so prominent in political science. We argue here that viewing public opinion as a dependent variable is a more promising perspective. Next, we review and evaluate a number of studies that attempt to demonstrate the fruitfulness of our suggested approach. Each of the studies analyzed focuses on the initiatives of political elites and monitors the success of their efforts with targeted groups. These studies demonstrate the conditions that favor elite control as well as the opportunities for citizens to limit such control. In our conclusion, we outline a theory of the role of public opinion in modern mass democracies.     

Following the Party in Time of War? The Implications of Elite Consensus

Prominent perspectives in the study of conflict point to two factors that exert substantial influence on public opinion about foreign intervention: (1) news about casualties and (2) signals from partisan elites. Past work is limited, however, in what it can say about how these two factors interact. We present an experiment designed to understand the surprisingly common scenario where elites send competing messages about whether the public should support war or oppose it—and these messages do not coincide with party divisions. We find that partisans are generally insensitive to news about casualties, but they become noticeably more sensitive when they perceive within-party disputes over support for the war. Independents, however, respond to news of casualties irrespective of what messages elites send. These findings shed light on when and how the public responds to competing and unclear cues and speak to the role of public opinion in determining conflict outcomes and democratic foreign policy-making more broadly.