Documents on terrorism

Over the last two years, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has attempted to resolve the Liberian civil conflict peacefully.’ This effort has drawn valuable lessons from previous civil conflicts in the other African states. Importantly, the ECOWAS‐sponsored cease‐fire was observed by the various warring factions for two years; however, the ceasefire was shattered on October 15, 1992, when the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, the principal rebel organization, launched an armed attack on Monrovia, the capital city. In turn, this has recommenced the civil war and has drawn ECOMOG, the ECOWAS peacekeeping force, into the conflict.

Against this background, the purpose of the paper is to examine both the domestic and external factors that have impeded the peaceful resolution of the Liberian civil conflict.     

International terrorism

In this article, it is argued that the U.S. ICBM force has no strategic value and should be dismantled. The article outlines a post‐cold war U.S. strategic nuclear force and proposes how this dyad force fits a strategy rather than offering a strategy to fit within the force. Deterrence theory anchors the analysis here. Second, this article asserts that U.S. security will be enhanced in the next century with Russian‐American cooperation on nuclear issues. Moving to a dyad now is step one in that direction, which in turn changes the perception of U.S. strategic weapons.

As weapons proliferate, deterrence against renegade nations and groups must become the cornerstone of U.S. doctrine. A dyad force and Russian‐American cooperation, both steps that restructure U.S. doctrine, will begin a process that deters these nations or groups.

This article depicts how each leg of the U.S. triad that remains following the START II treaty is a continuation of START I logic and planning. In other words, the article attempts to show how the rationale for a START II treaty force does not mirror a changed world. The purpose of this evidence is not to be dogmatic or critical but to strengthen the argument that U.S. nuclear strategy is still reflective of a bygone era.     

On learning terrorism

Abstract

The complex phenomenon of terrorism has been explained in a variety of ways, ranging from the narrowly psychological to the broadly political. Many of these hypotheses appear to have merit, although, standing alone, each tends to be inadequate or incomplete. Focusing on the psychological explanations of root cause, the instant discussion proposes that the hitherto neglected or taken‐for‐granted principles of human learning, particularly those of cognitive‐behavioral conditioning, can provide a useful and significant component to these explanations. The competence and commitment to the ways and means of terror are in large measure produced, intensified, and sustained through learning. Evidence, chiefly from psychological studies, is adduced to support this hypothesis. A few formal, sometimes state‐sponsored training programs based more or less on conditioning are briefly described. Some of the doctrines, particularly those that underpin Middle East terrorism and provide the justification and substantiation of what is taught, are also mentioned. It is suggested that the same procedures by which terrorism is indoctrinated may, in conjunction with other procedures, be employed to prevent and combat it. Although this strategy, in the present uncongenial socio‐cultural and geopolitical environments, will doubtless be difficult if not impossible to implement, it deserves to be explored as another potentially effective tool in the developing armamentarium of counter‐terrorism.     

Research note: Rand's research on terrorism

Repeatedly, during the last few years, small groups of extremists have demonstrated that by using terrorist tactics they can achieve disproportionate effects. They attract worldwide attention to themselves and their causes; they arouse worldwide alarm, and can create international incidents that national governments are compelled to deal with, often before a worldwide audience. To protect against their attacks or to respond to crisis situations they create, they force governments to expend resources—manpower, money, the attention of senior officials—vastly out of scale with the magnitude of the actual threat they pose.¹     

Some reflections on the victimology of terrorism

Abstract

Literature on terrorists and terrorism is abundant, but very little is written on the victim. Whether the studies are published by psychologists or political scientists, by psychiatrists or sociologists, data on the victim are conspicuous by their absence. There is hardly any mention of how victims of terrorism are chosen, their characteristics, the role they play, if any, in preparing or triggering the terrorist acts, their behavior during the ordeal, and their postvictimization condition.¹ The dearth of the empirical data renders the systematic study of the victims of terrorism particularly difficult. This paper presents a series of reflections on some victimological aspects of terrorism and offers a number of suggestions for future research.     

France faced with terrorism

Abstract

France is an interesting laboratory for studying terrorism, or antiterrorism, not because extreme violence has been committed on a large scale as in Lebanon, but because, faced with diverse terrorist actions over a short period, France has worked out and considerably modified a policy for dealing with terrorism. The subject herein is not terrorism but the official response to it, namely counterterrorist policy and actions.     

The psychodynamics of terrorism

This article deals with some of the psychodynamics of terrorism. The act of terrorism, the use of force to produce a fearful state of mind, is discussed with the distinctions drawn between target and victim, demands and aims. Those involved in the terrorist act include the terrorist, the victim, the target, and the audience. Topics dealt with include terrorism as the pursuit of the absolute end, as a response to lack of self‐esteem, as a promotion of a renewed sense of masculinity, as a reaction‐formation to positive feelings toward the target, and as a kind of symbol‐magic or sacrament of violence. Recommendations for dealing with acts of terrorism are included. This article will appear in a forthcoming book.     

Aviation security and terrorism

Abstract

The author asserts that a sophisticated sabotage threat to U.S. international civil aviation has been well known to the U.S. government and air carriers since the early 1980s. He believes that both the U.S. government and air carriers have failed to do enough to counter this sabotage threat. He cites the findings of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism (May 1990), and the enactment of the Aviation Security Improvement Act (Nov. 1990) to support his beliefs. The author concludes by providing a recipe for corrective action.