Fighting Networked Terrorist Groups: Lessons from Israel

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States faced “networked” adversaries: insurgent groups that communicated and coordinated their political and military campaigns without a central command. The rise of networked groups is a direct result of the preponderance of U.S. military power. Consequently, this article asks: What strategies have been most effective in defeating networked groups? To answer this question, the article examines Israeli operations against Palestinian groups during Operation Defense Shield in 2002. It argues that the most effective strategy to defeat networked adversaries is to use networked strategies. In Israel, this meant establishing multiple units to penetrate Palestinian urban areas, swarm together from several directions, and kill or capture militants.     

Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption

Because of the importance of technology to the operations of modern terrorist groups, the factors that affect the technological sophistication of extreme organizations are of great interest. In this article, the process through which terrorist groups seek out and deploy new technology is examined by bringing to bear the deep literature that exists on technology adoption by commercial organizations. A framework is described that delineates not only the factors that influence a group's decision-making processes surrounding new technology but also the obstacles that stand in the way of the successful absorption and use of unfamiliar technologies by a terrorist organization. This framework, by taking a holistic view of the entire technology adoption process, sets out a methodology to both more reasonably predict the outcome of a group's technology-seeking efforts and to speculate about its future innovation efforts. Such a technology focused viewpoint provides a route to more fully inform risk assessment, especially with regard to the low probabilityhigh consequence technologies that have served as the focus of much recent counterterrorist deliberation. The lessons provided by the framework with respect to weapons of mass destruction terrorism and to novel counterterrorist routes are discussed.     

The Plots that Failed: Intelligence Lessons Learned from Unsuccessful Terrorist Attacks Against the United States

While much of the focus of terrorism research is on successful terrorist attacks, the most significant lessons for terrorism prevention may come from examination of terrorist plots and attacks that do not succeed. This article analyzes 176 terrorist plots against American targets that have been thwarted or otherwise failed during the past 25 years. It considers what kinds of intelligence and security measures are most useful in counterterrorism, and argues that the conventional wisdom about why intelligence fails—because analysts and agencies are unable to “connect the dots”—is wrong. Most plots, especially domestic terrorist plots, are not foiled through imaginative analysis, but through conventional law enforcement efforts and aggressive domestic intelligence collection that reveal to authorities just what the plotters are up to.     

Strategic management and public organizations: Lessons from the past and prescriptions for the future

The 1990s have become a decade of reflection and rethinking of foundational concepts in the field of public administration. Public adminstrationists are attempting to bring the best of management approaches to bear on the problems facing public organizations. Strategic management has been widely used in the private sector since the 1960s, and has gained increased acceptance in the public sector since the 1980s. It is a management approach that synthesizes much of what management theorists have long recognized as essential to effective management practice. This article traces the development of strategic management and examines what has been learned from the past that will improve future implementation efforts in public organizations.     

Challenging the Received View: De-demonizing Hamas

Abstract

Violence against abortion clinics and other activities directed toward patients and staff of abortion facilities have been termed terrorism by the pro‐choice movement. However, the Federal Bureau of Investigation denies that these actions are terrorism. Instances of abortion clinic violence for 1982–1987 were examined in order to determine whether there is a correspondence between these incidents and definitions or models of terrorism. It appears that these incidents do fit the classification of “limited political” or ‘subrevolutionary” terrorism. Reasons why the FBI has made the decision not to include these acts as forms of terrorism are entertained. One is that current international tensions have resulted in a preoccupation with only certain types of events which for administrative, i.e., juris‐dictional, reasons have come to essentialize terrorism. Another explanation, posited by pro‐choice activists, is that the FBI's decision is a consequence of political influence: the current administration is openly anti‐choice.     

Groups,Networks, or Movements: A Command-and-Control-Driven Approach to Classifying Terrorist Organizations and Its Application to Al Qaeda

Appropriately describing the properties and defining the boundaries of terrorist groups is frequently challenging. Public and policy discussion of Al Qaeda as a group, network, or broad social movement is described as an example of this problem, with an emphasis on the consequences of placing a terrorist organization in each of these different categories. To resolve the confusion that such uncertainties can introduce into discussion, an approach is described focusing on the strength of command-and-control linkages within an organization for laying out the differences between groups, networks, and movements and defining the boundaries between them.     

Terrorist sympathizers in The Netherlands

Abstract

The following remarks are excerpted from the 1987 Annual Conference on Domestic and International Terrorism sponsored by the Anti‐Defamation League of B'nai B'rith and the Leon and Marilyn Klinghoffer Foundation of the Anti‐Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, in cooperation with the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism at the State University of New York (SUNY) and the U.S. Global Strategy Council. The meeting was held on December 14, 1987 in Washington, D.C., and chaired by Professor Yonah Alexander of State University of New York and The George Washington University.     

Influence in Terrorist Networks: From Undirected to Directed Graphs

A methodology for converting terrorist networks from undirected graphs to simplified directed graphs (or digraphs), and mapping the flow of influence in them, is described. It is based on an “influence assumption”—that important persons with more links influence less important persons with fewer links. This methodology, which was previously used to analyze the structure of influence relationships in Communist-bloc countries and the international system, is illustrated by its application to two terrorist networks constructed after 9/11. In the second more complex network, the hierarchy sheds light on the leadership and likely terrorist cells embedded in the network. Refined data and alternative assumptions about influence could provide additional insights into the structure of terrorist networks.     

Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon: Anatomy of a Terrorist Organization

The objective of this study is to provide through an in-depth investigation of the Fatah Al-Islam organization, emergence, programs, and external links, and the inner operation of this underground Salafi-jihadi group. By divulging secret confession statements to the public, it has uncovered many of the mysteries that surrounded the evolution and goals of the group. On the other hand, and more important, it has examined the application of certain conventional approaches to the study of terrorist behavior. The findings, based on the biographies of FI terrorists, seem to negate much of the advanced explanation about political violence. Economic destitution, poverty, lack of education, young age, and marital disruption for instances do not determine adherence to the group. Members of the jihadi group of FI stem from a diversified occupational background, not lacking in education, mature, married, and influenced by various motivations, specifically religious dogma.     

Terrorist Sanctuaries and Bosnia-Herzegovina: Challenging Conventional Assumptions

This article argues that a model of terrorism and terrorist sanctuaries rooted in post-9/11 strategic thought and the Global War on Terror is inadequate to the study of terrorism in Bosnia and the Balkans. It addresses a series of conventional assumptions regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina's status as a putative terrorist sanctuary, based on a reading of post-war ethnic politics and political architecture. This assessment turns on the basic notion that terrorism in Bosnia is a complex phenomenon linked to multiple domestic and foreign communities, defined along competing national trajectories and intersecting foreign interests, and subject to evolving political circumstances and priorities.     

The Health Action Zone Initiative: Lessons from Plymouth

The article considers the impact of the Health Action Zone (HAZ) in Plymouth through a theory-based evaluation that combines theories of change and realistic evaluation. The study assesses the impact of 37 projects sponsored by this HAZ. The extent to which these projects used a realistic evaluation/theories of change framework and achieved their objectives are evaluated. The impact of these projects on the three main objectives of Plymouth HAZ – developing partnership working; modernising the care system; and tackling health inequalities – is assessed and explanations for the success or failure of specific projects are identified.     

智利反腐倡廉的经验及其启示

20世纪90年代以来,拉美地区发生了多起腐败大案要案,在拉美地区和国际社会都引起了强烈震动.然而,智利却是拉美地区少数几块净土之一.自1995年透明国际设立"腐败印象排行榜"以来,智利是拉美地区惟一进入相对清廉前20位的国家(1996年、1997年和2005年曾列第23位和第21位).     

The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology

Terrorism costs money. Although the costs of specific operations may be relatively inexpensive, terrorist organizations require much larger budgets in order to function. But how do terrorist groups acquire funding? What explains the variation in the particular sources used by different groups? This article develops a theory of terrorist financing that identifies criteria by which we can evaluate the different sources of terrorist funding, particularly in terms of their advantages and disadvantages to the terrorist group. These criteria are then applied across a typology of four primary types of terrorist financing: state sponsorship, illegal activity, legal activity, and popular support.     

Terrorist Victimization: Prevention,Control, and Recovery

The Muslim Brotherhood poses a unique challenge to efforts to combat Al Qaeda and like-minded groups. It is one of the key sources of Islamist thought and political activism, and plays a significant role in shaping the political and cultural environment in an Islamist direction. At the same time, it opposes Al Qaeda for ideological, organizational, and political reasons and represents one of the major challenges to the salafi-jihadist movement globally. This dual nature of the Muslim Brotherhood has long posed a difficult challenge to efforts to combat violent extremism. Does its non-violent Islamism represent a solution, by capturing Islamists within a relatively moderate organization and stopping their further radicalization (a “firewall”), or is it part of the problem, a “conveyor belt” towards extremism? This article surveys the differences between the two approaches, including their views of an Islamic state, democracy, violence, and takfir, and the significant escalation of those tensions in recent years. It concludes that the MB should be allowed to wage its battles against extremist challengers, but should not be misunderstood as a liberal organization or supported in a short-term convergence of interests.