The Strategy of Exclusion in American Counterterrorism

ABSTRACT

While garnering heightened attention following the Trump administration's travel restrictions, exclusionary tactics in counterterrorism have a much lengthier history. Given that some terrorism studies scholars identify social and political exclusion as an explanation for the resort to terrorist violence, the selection of a strategy of exclusion is significant. In this article, I identify the elements of a strategy of exclusion and the logic behind this strategy. In particular, I examine the origins and persistence of this strategy in the U.S. context. Rather than a contemporary anomaly, exclusion was among the first strategies the United States added to its counterterrorist tool-kit, and has remained among the most consistent strategies relied on. I trace the history of this strategy from its origins in immigration restrictions passed following the assassination of President McKinley by an anarchist through the contemporary War on Terror. Controversy surrounding this strategy, its negative effects on nonviolent immigrant populations, and its failure to prevent further acts of terrorism suggest it was historically ineffective and may also be so today.     

The Lebanese Hizballah and Israeli Counterterrorism

This article examines Israel's attempts to weaken and defeat the Lebanese Hizballah. It reviews Hizballah's rise after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Hizballah's successful effort to force Israeli forces to withdraw from Lebanon in 2000, the 2006 war, and Israeli attempts to deter Hizballah. The article argues that Israel has largely failed to defeat Hizballah militarily and politically. Israel's experience offers lessons for how terrorist groups learn, the effectiveness of terrorist attrition strategies against casualty-sensitivity states, the difficulties in coercing terrorist groups, and the importance of an information strategy. Finally, Israel's clash with Hizballah indicates the importance of thinking of groups that are large and multi-faceted from a counterinsurgency paradigm.     

Counterterrorism Strategy in the Sahel

The GSPC—more recently titled Al Qaeda in the Maghreb—has maintained a small but significant level of terrorist unrest in the countries of the Sahel for a number of years. Although GSPC activities have been rather small-scale, they have added to the host of other security failures plaguing the region. The United State has begun devoting more attention to the regional security gaps and has started to implement an overall strategy in response. The more broadly-based approaches to dealing with security, economic, and political problems show promise, but only if the United States and regional countries maintain their focus on the long term.     

Counterterrorism as War: Identifying the Dangers,Risks, and Opportunity Costs of U.S. Strategy Toward Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates

The U.S. war on Al Qaeda is well into its second decade—why has this particular conflict been so difficult to end? This article argues it is not due to the strategic acumen of Al Qaeda, but because of the problems intrinsic to relying on war as the framework for U.S. counterterrorism policy. The normal means of ending wars are complicated with a terrorist enemy and at odds with strategies that have historically had success at the end stages of counterterror campaigns. Continuing along the current path risks an ongoing war the United States will likely neither win nor fully end.     

Instrumentalizing Counterterrorism for Regime Consolidation in Putin's Russia

Since the late 1990s, Russia has been among the countries most painfully affected by terrorism and President Putin has shown little doubt and even much enthusiasm in joining the U.S.-led "war" against terrorism. Intertwined as they are, counterterrorism and Chechnya are still significantly different matters in Russian security policy, and this article aims at examining how the struggle against terrorism shapes essential features of Russia's foreign and domestic policies during Putin's first presidency. Internally, the struggle against terrorism provides for a sufficient mobilization of the dysfunctional society around the "mutant" regime that has consolidated its control over mid-term political agenda. Internationally, high-profile counterterrorism strategy has helped Russia to secure for itself a more prominent role than the sheer size of its "assets" would justify. This war is fundamentally not about victory; it is about many "collateral" benefits for the regime that Putin is presiding over.‐     

The Dynamics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the Domestic Security Dilemma

This article argues that the concept of the “domestic security dilemma” can help us to better understand public opposition to government counterterrorism policies. It examines the concept of the “security dilemma” in international relations theory and argues that this concept can also be applied to the analysis of domestic security politics. The article explains that when the government takes actions intended to make people safer from terrorist threats, it often has the unintended consequence of heightening concerns about government oppression. Thus, counterterrorism represents a “domestic security dilemma”—a situation where security tradeoffs have consistently undermined anticipated security gains.     

The European Union and Post-9/11 Counterterrorism: A Reappraisal

In spite of the hectic activity subsequent to the so-called month of transformation in the wake of 9/11, it is not to be taken for granted that the European Union is the right vehicle in Europe for the combating of terrorism. The lack of the EU's executive powers with respect to regulating the behavior of member states relative to a common threat such as terrorism, raises the fundamental question of whether the Union itself, as opposed to its constituent members, or an alternative multilateral forum, is an appropriate body for effectively confronting terrorism in Europe.     

Failure and Disengagement in the Red Army Faction

This article examines the factors that have contributed to the end of the Red Army Faction (RAF), and places particular emphasis on the causes and characteristics of individual disengagement of RAF members from the armed struggle. It discusses the evolution, ideology, and decline of each of the three generations of the RAF. The article's contribution is twofold. First, by assessing both contextual- and individual-level factors that led to the group's demise, the article bridges two approaches to analyzing the demise of terrorist organizations—the literature on how terrorism ends and why individuals disengage from terrorism. Second, the article helps build a growing empirical body of work on the demise of terrorist groups that can be used to confirm, challenge, or refine existing hypotheses on how terrorism ends, while formulating new ones. The article concludes that different factors contributed to the decline of each subsequent generation of the RAF. Successful German police efforts played a critical role in thwarting the RAF's first generation. Lack of public support and recruits, due in large part to an escalation of terrorist violence, hastened the decline of the second generation of the group. The third generation suffered from serious interorganizational strife, exacerbated by a government initiative that offered to release those RAF members from prison who renounced terrorism.     

Automatic Gait Recognition and its Potential Role in Counterterrorism

ABSTRACT

Closed-circuit television footage can be used to assemble an often-complex picture of an incident and aid in the identification of suspects after a crime or terrorist attack has occurred. For example, such footage allowed the police to not only identify the 7/7 London bombers but also to piece together the details of the bombers' movements prior to the attack. In the case of the London bombers little attempt was made to disguise their identities but where such identities are concealed it is possible to identify suspects based on other unique biometric characteristics such as the style of walk, referred to as gait. Gait feature–based individual identification has received increased attention from biometrics researchers. In this article, we propose a novel gait biometric methodology that could contribute to the counterterrorism effort and the identification of individuals involved in crime.     

An Explicit Consideration of Unintended Consequences from Counterterrorism Policy: The Case of Radical Eco-Groups

Criminologists and terrorism specialists alike have conducted research on the deterrent effect of policies; however, to date, only criminologists have thoroughly examined the associated displacement of crime and diffusion of benefits. Using data from the Eco-Incidents Database, this study first examines the deterrent effect of government efforts targeting animal rights and environmental terrorism over several years. Next, it extends this application by examining nonterrorist actions by both terrorist groups and nonterrorist groups to see if deterrent actions have any unintended consequences. Results show no evidence of displacement, but rather that several government actions evidenced a diffusion of benefits.     

The Logic of Constitutional Engineering: Institutional Design and Counterterrorism from Aristotle to Arend Lijphart

ABSTRACT

Originally conceived by Aristotle and Thomas Hobbes, comparative constitutional engineering in its modern form is a relatively new field of political science. It is based on the premise that political behavior and policy outcomes can be affected and shaped by institutional design such as, above all, electoral systems. The article provides an overview of the empirical literature underlying this branch of institutional counterterrorism. The article presents the logic of constitutional engineering from its classical origins and especially through the work of Arend Lijphart. It is suggested that Lijphart provides a new paradigm in the sense employed by Thomas Kuhn. The article provides original research in support of this showing that the presence of consensus institutions has better explanatory value than most social factors.     

A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Applications to Counterterrorism and Intelligence

This article attempts to contribute to and advance the growing literature on social network analysis and terrorism studies, through a social network analysis of the Jemaah Islamiyah cell that was responsible for the Bali bombings in 2002. In doing so, the article endeavors to provide a potential framework for the intelligence analysis of terrorist cells. Such a framework will assist in (1) understanding the communication and structure of such cells and (2) assist in predicting the likely outcomes of terrorist cells when employed in real-time intelligence analysis.     

外交信使秘闻

信使是一个古老的职业,而在信息流通技术发达的今天,各国间的大部分机密信件和物品仍然是通过外交信使传送,他们是特殊的邮递员,在他们来回传送的邮件中埋藏着数不清的故事。最近,俄罗斯《总结》周刊载文披露了这个特殊的邮递职业许多鲜为人知的秘密。     

Constructions of Effectiveness and the Rationalization of Counterterrorism Policy: The Case of Biometric Passports

This article argues that counterterrorism effectiveness is a distinct, discursive construction that politicians use to offer a rationalization of measures adopted under conditions of inherent uncertainty. Even in the face of multiple limits of knowability, decision makers need to offer “rational” justifications complying with persisting expectations of “evidence-based” policy and sound deliberation in modern societies. This article develops a new perspective on the political role of counterterrorism effectiveness highlighting the symbolic importance of knowledge claims and prevailing standards of modern rationality. It illustrates its arguments through a case study on the justification of biometric passports as an effective counterterrorist tool.