Trends in Transnational Terrorism and Implications for U.S. National Security and U.S. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act

The unprecedented losses brought about by the attacks of 11 September 2001 have cast the issue of terrorism risk insurance into sharp relief. In particular, it has raised questions as to whether attacks on this scale are an insurable risk and the extent to which the private insurance industry is able and/or willing to price such risks independent of a Federal safety net. Although the Bush administration has committed to renew the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) to offset the human and materiel costs that might result from future cataclysmic terrorist strikes taking place on U.S. soil, it is not apparent that this legislative framework is relevant to the type of extremist contingencies that the United States is likely to face over the short-to-medium term. Any long-term solution to providing insurance in America will necessarily need to go beyond TRIA's existing framework by dropping the “foreign interest” designation for certified attacks; including some sort of supplemental program that includes mandatory coverage for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) assaults; and investigating ways to increase the take-up rates of terrorism insurance by lowering its cost to the customer. An oversight board mandated to evaluate the Act's performance and relevance to evolving terrorist trends would also be useful.     

U.S. Policy on Terrorism: In Search of an Answer

An analysis of three years of suicide bombing data in Israel reveals an increase in such attacks through March 2002 followed by a steep decline through the end of 2003. The authors propose a terror-stock model that treats the suicide bombing attack rate as a function of the number of terrorists available to plan and execute suicide bombings. The intent of Israeli tactics such as targeted killings and preemptive arrests is to reduce the capacity of terror organizations to commit attacks. When fit to the data, this model suggests that the targeted killing of terror suspects sparks estimated recruitment to the terror stock that increases rather than decreases the rate of suicide bombings. Surprisingly, only the deaths of suspected terrorists, and not Palestinian civilians, are associated with such estimated recruitment. Although Israeli actions have reduced the rate of suicide bombings over time, it is preventive arrests rather than targeted killings that seem more responsible for this outcome.     

Terrorism Targeting Industrial Chemical Facilities: Strategic Motivations and the Implications for U.S. Security

Policy to reduce the threat of a terrorist attack against industrial chemical facilities—critical infrastructure with potential to cause mass casualties—is being driven by incomplete and, in some cases, incorrect assumptions. This article chronicles incidents by non-state actors directed at the chemical industry and explores the strategic considerations prompting groups to target the industry. By incorporating motivations for targeting infrastructure a more robust, comprehensive risk assessment is realized. Analysis challenging the “insider” threat paradigm and recommendations to ameliorate the potential effects are also presented. These are found to differ substantially from the leading policy measures currently advocated.     

The Evolution of the U.S. Government's Annual Report on Terrorism: A Personal Commentary

This article examines the evolution of a key U.S. Government annual publication on terrorism. From its inception in 1977 to the present, the U.S. Government's annual terrorism report has been the primary statistical compiler of international terrorist incidents. Given the magnitude of this task and the inherent difficulty in defining the term “terrorism,” this report has been controversial and criticized. Love it or hate it, for many decades, this report was the sole source of statistics on international terrorism. The author argues that despite its flaws, this unclassified annual report does provide value and usually paints a fairly accurate picture of the international terrorism landscape. Over the last two years however, there have been claims that this report has become politicized and tailored to fit the views of the administration on the terrorist threat. The author rejects this charge and claims that this publication has been objective and that it has evolved over time into a more credible and useful report.     

Democracy,Al Qaeda,and the Causes of Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of U.S. Policy

How will the strategy of spreading democracy affect the threat of terrorism from Al Qaeda and likeminded Islamic extremist groups? This article analyzes how spreading democracy would impact four different sets of underlying motivations that lead to this kind of terrorism. It will show that the widespread belief in the power of democracy is likely misplaced because democracy will be unlikely to change perceptions of occupation, will itself threaten Islamic identity and culture, will be unlikely to mitigate economic grievances, and will be unlikely to provide a more legitimate government than one based on religious law.     

The threat to the U.S.

The Vietnam War had a major impact on the civil rights movement of the 1960s. The war helped to split the struggle for social justice at the very time that it was achieving its greatest successes. The factionalism over whether or not to support the war decimated the crusade for human equality.     

Semi-Proxy Wars and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy

On 4 February 2014, Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan (aka Al Qaeda Central) repudiated Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that al-Baghdadi and his newly formed Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) were no longer part of Al Qaeda's organization and Al Qaeda Central could not be held responsible for ISIL's behavior. It represents the first time that Al Qaeda Central has renounced an affiliate publicly. The announcement was driven by months of fighting between ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra, another Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria. In fact, in Syria, Al Qaeda fighters are competing against each other for influence, as well as against other opposition groups, the Syrian regime, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iraqi militiamen, and Lebanese Hezbollah. This chaotic, semi-proxy war is unlike any previous problem encountered, made even more challenging by the limited U.S. presence on-the-ground. More worrisome, this semi-proxy war also has spread beyond Syria. Similar dynamics have emerged in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon to a certain extent. This article argues that these dynamics necessitate a twist in U.S. counterterrorism strategy.     

Asylum Seekers Along the U.S.-Canada Border

Abstract

Given the large numbers of people fleeing their homelands, social workers are likely to encounter refugees from all over the world. Although the social work profession has a mandate to work with disenfranchised populations, limited attention has been paid to providing services to refugees. Residents of the largest refugee shelter in the U.S. were interviewed about their claims. These findings can help social workers understand the situations refugees come from as well as processes they go through in applying for legal status. With this information, it is possible to identify roles social workers can play with this vulnerable population.