Strategy of tension: The Belgian terrorist crisis 1982–1986

Abstract

Between 1982 and 1986, Belgium suffered a series of terrorist attacks that claimed more than 30 lives, making this campaign one of the most destructive in the recent history of western Europe. Two major groups were involved: one was purportedly a leftist radical sect, the other an anonymous cell popularly known as the “mad killers,” whom subsequent investigation has shown to be connected to neo‐Nazi organizations. Both groups were apparently seeking to destabilize the Belgian state at a time of intense political conflict, and it was widely suggested that the apparently opposed political extremes were actually allied in a common cause. In addition, official enquiries established connections between the terrorist groups and agents of Belgian state security. This paper discusses the use of terrorism in a political “strategy of tension” modeled on that developed in Italy in the late 1960s. It also suggests that the contemporary structure of European terrorist groups readily lends itself to manipulation in the cause of provocateur activity.     

European terrorism: A German perspective

Abstract

Concentrating on terrorism in West Germany, Italy, and the Basque provinces of Spain, the author presents a detailed picture of the motivations, the strategies, and the ‘'achievements” of a number of the best known groups which for alleged political purposes take the law into their own hands. The Red Armee Faction, perhaps the best known West German terrorist group, and the 2nd of June Movement as well as such organizations as the Revolutionary Cells and the Guerilla Diffusa are described and their aims and activities are scrutinized. German right‐wing terrorism is also shown to wield great power, its contacts with terrorists in Lebanon and Algeria rivaling those of leftist organizations. Italian terrorism is also fully covered in this paper, with the activities of the Red Brigades, the best‐known of the leftist organizations, and its international connections, as well as other groups and the individuals involved being dealt with in some detail. The events in Spain, past and present, due especially to Basque terrorism, are considered, and the Soviet influence, represented by terrorist organizations in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Cuba, is discussed as is also the outlook for the future.     

Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organizations

Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups offer the analyst a highly complex challenge. The current literature classifies Islamic terrorist organizations as either networked or hierarchical. Yet, this classification fails to account for the appearance on the international stage of a new type of global terrorism. Most notably, it does not capture the structure and mode of operation of Al Qaeda as it emerged after the 2001 U.S.-led assault on Afghanistan. This article therefore introduces a new conceptthe Dune organizationthat is distinct from other organizational modes of thinking. This conceptualization leads to a new typology of Islamic terrorist organizations. This typology concentrates on organizational behavior patterns and provides a framework for a comparative analysis of terrorist movements, which is applied to a study of Al Qaeda, Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.     

The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media: Similar Framing Patterns in the News Coverage of Women in Politics and in Terrorism

Abstract

Although women have been among the leaders and followers of terrorist organizations throughout the history of modern terrorism, the mass media typically depict women terrorists as interlopers in an utterly male domain. A comparison of the framing patterns in the news about women in politics and the entrenched stereotypes in the coverage of female terrorists demonstrates similarities in the depiction of these legitimate (women in politics) and illegitimate political actors (women in terrorism). Just like the managers of election campaigns are cognizant of the electorate's stereotypical gender perceptions, terrorist organizations know about and exploit cultural gender clichés that are reinforced by the media. The argument here is that the implementation of anti- and counterterrorist policies must not be influenced by the mass-mediated images of female terrorists because they do not reflect reality.     

Middle Eastern terrorism in Europe: Trends and prospects

Abstract

Europe has been the preferred operational area for Middle Eastern terrorist groups—some 418 attacks from 1980–1989. Unlike European Marxist revolutionary or separatist terrorist groups, the Middle Eastern groups present Europe with a regional security problem. The most dangerous element in this Middle Eastern terrorist threat is the state‐sponsored activities of Iran, Libya, Syria, and Iraq. These countries provided the fuel for a decade of Middle Eastern terrorist bloodshed in Europe. Given the problems of solving the various political conflicts and feuds in the Middle East and the continuing attractiveness of Europe as a substitute battlefield for Middle Eastern terrorist elements, the threat of Middle Eastern terrorist activity in Europe should continue into the 1990s.     

Investing in the Market of Violence: Toward a Micro-Theory of Terrorist Financing

Terrorist financing is the dedicated pursuit of adequate capitalization within a market of violence, wherein terrorist organizations seek to extract resources and funding from the social, political, and economic environment in which they operate. At the same time, the effectiveness of a terrorist group in this pursuit is highly dependent on their organizational type and design, its leadership capabilities, and its capacity for organizational learning—factors that shape the ability of terrorist groups to identify and exploit a limited set of investment and rent-seeking opportunities.     

Ethno‐political activity and the psychology of terrorism

Abstract

Studies of terrorist psychology have typically focused either on single individuals or group dynamics within the organizations that these individuals have joined. Less attention has been paid to the background conditions which give rise to these individuals and organizations, even for environments in which generalization appears to be feasible. This paper focuses on one such environment. Its principal goal is to highlight the theoretical connections between a society's ethnic cleavages; the development of ethno‐political activity, especially organized violence and terrorism; and the implications of this activity for the functioning of institutions in “democratic” and “non‐democratic” societies. A related objective is the identification of policy responses to latent or manifest ethno‐political activity and an assessment of their potential efficacy. These points are illustrated by examining a small ethnic group, the South Moluccans in Holland, which would appear to have had little motivation to engage in violence or terrorism, but some of whose members nevertheless did.     

Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism

Worldwide, women have historically participated in terrorist groups but their low numbers and seemingly passive roles have undermined their credibility as terrorist actors for many observers. This analysis contends that female involvement with terrorist activity is widening ideologically, logistically, and regionally for several reasons: increasing contextual pressures (e.g., domestic/international enforcement, conflict, social dislocation) creates a mutually reinforcing process driving terrorist organizations to recruit women at the same time women's motivations to join these groups increases; contextual pressures impact societal controls over women that may facilitate, if not necessitate, more overt political participation up to, and including, political violence; and operational imperatives often make female members highly effective actors for their organizations, inducing leaders toward "actor innovation" to gain strategic advantage against their adversary.     

The Enemy Within? The Connection between Insider Threat and Terrorism

ABSTRACT

While the threat from terrorism has gained widespread acknowledgment over the last decade, the infiltration of organizations by “terrorist” insiders has not, and the potential dangers these individuals present has not been fully explored. There is a need to understand the wider aspects of insider threats, including motivations and attack methodologies, and to be able to demonstrate the potential devastation that could be caused. Organizations can attempt to mitigate the potential for insider infiltration by both terrorist and other hostile actors, and if such individuals were within an organization, there are procedures and strategies that can be employed to prevent exploitation of existing organizational vulnerabilities and detection of insiders. This article provides an informed and new approach to the connection between insider threat and terrorism.     

The ugly face of the state: Nigerian security forces,human rights and the search for Boko Haram

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that the aggressive and gratuitously violent insurgency in northeastern Nigeria – Boko Haram – is the entirely understandable consequence of more than a half-century of misrule by what I call the parasitic and predatory Nigerian political class. Evidence of widespread human rights abuses including extortion, rape and theft comes from investigations by various international human rights organizations, international non-governmental organizations, church groups, press reports and interviews. I focus primarily on incidents and practices in the northeast but examples are adduced from other parts of the country as well. I discuss the policy of coercion and brutality embedded in the very nature of the colonial and post-colonial state using Crawford Young’s concept of bula matari (the state as rock crusher).     

A “quest” for using information

Abstract

After several unsuccessful attempts to take power by force, the German Communist Party (KPD), from 1923 on, concentrated its efforts on electoral politics, trade union activity, and the struggle against Social Democratic reformism. However, the Communists had not relinquished their goal of a forcible seizure of power, as shown by the existence throughout the Weimar period of a secret Communist apparatus (Apparat) whose goals were to undermine the German armed services and police, train party cadres for insurrectionary combat, and carry out other subversive activities. Developed with Soviet assistance and headed by German Communists who had been trained in Russia, the Apparat controlled a network of spies, agents, and informers that penetrated German army and police units, government offices, and hostile political organizations. The Apparat also distributed illegal propaganda, furnished “military‐political” training and literature to KPD members, performed espionage and counterespionage duties, and made preparations for the party's continued operation were Communist organizations to be outlawed. Occasional terrorist acts can be laid to the Apparat, which, although prosecuted vigorously by Weimar authorities, scarcely constituted a serious revolutionary threat. The most important function of the Apparat was to control the Communist rank and file itself through surveillance of party members, searches and interrogations, and denunciations and betrayals. Ironically, it was the very existence of the Apparat that provided the Nazis with further corroboration for their claims to have saved Germany from Bolshevism.     

Medical technology in combatting terrorism

State‐sponsored terrorism is a form of coercion, backed up by the threat and use of violence, to achieve political ends. These terrorist tactics also involve signaling of intentions and responses between the terrorist sponsor and those whom it targets. Accordingly this study examines Iranian state sponsorship of anti‐U.S. terrorism in the period of 1980–1990 as an example of political communication aimed at manipulating U.S. policy through the threat and use of violence. Official Iranian media are quantitatively content‐analyzed to demonstrate their systematic use of threat‐projections as warnings and indications to the U.S. in this period.     

Terrorist Sanctuaries and Bosnia-Herzegovina: Challenging Conventional Assumptions

This article argues that a model of terrorism and terrorist sanctuaries rooted in post-9/11 strategic thought and the Global War on Terror is inadequate to the study of terrorism in Bosnia and the Balkans. It addresses a series of conventional assumptions regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina's status as a putative terrorist sanctuary, based on a reading of post-war ethnic politics and political architecture. This assessment turns on the basic notion that terrorism in Bosnia is a complex phenomenon linked to multiple domestic and foreign communities, defined along competing national trajectories and intersecting foreign interests, and subject to evolving political circumstances and priorities.     

Internal organizational problems and the sources of tensions of terrorist movements as catalysts of violence∗

The internal organizational problems of terrorist groups are analyzed. The purpose is to investigate how violent action by members of such organizations can be triggered by internal organizational problems rather than by external factors exclusively. Two kinds of problems are studied: command problems and political problems. Command problems include the following: reconciliation of security with efficient communication, the clustering of ethnic groups under stress, the role of women, and the quality of the membership. The political problems include the following: the self‐destructive potential in each terrorist organization (especially in case of its victory), the problem of inflated membership, and the role of terrorist leaders as the givers of moral dispensation.     

Terrorism,Crime, and Transformation

This article argues that some of today's terrorist groups have transformed into transnational criminal organization (TCO) who are more interested in profits than politics. This dynamic has important implications for policymakers as some traditional, politically motivated terrorist groups further profit-minded agencies under a political banner. The author argues that there are different degrees of transformation; some terrorists commit criminal acts to support political operations, while others view profit-driven criminal acts as their end game. The articles further argues that unlike some observers suggest, TCOs and terrorist groups will not cooperate with each other to advance aims and interests, instead utilizing their "in-house" capabilities to undertake criminal or political acts.     

Terrorism: The view from Taiwan

Abstract

Pointing out that the circumstances as regards terrorism in Taiwan are far different from those prevailing in, say, Israel or Italy, the authors describe the conditions that have faced the ROC since 1949, the beleaguered fortress mentality, the emergency legislation, and the anti‐terrorist measures, including restrictions on political and civil rights, taken in what may be called a period of protracted crisis. In the authors’ view, the goal of a fundamentally democratic political system will depend to a great extent on outside forces and influences.     

Nationalists without a nation: South Moluccan terrorism in the Netherlands

Abstract

This article focuses on the phenomenon of South Moluccan terrorism in the Netherlands. Beginning with a historical examination of the colonial relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia, attention is then given to the circumstances in which some 21,000 South Moluccans came to the Netherlands in the early 1950s, and the social, economic, and political conditions of the South Moluccan community in Holland since then. Then follows a detailed examination of the main incidents of South Moluccan terrorism in the Netherlands which climaxed in a series of violent incidents against Dutch and Indonesian targets in the mid‐1970s. Special attention is placed on the ways in which successive Dutch governments have responded to the various outbreaks of terrorism, as well as to the effects of this terrorism on public opinion. The article then shows what effects South Moluccan terrorism has had on the policies of Dutch and Indonesian governments; on national and international public opinion; on the South Moluccans in the Moluccas; and on the international terrorist community. The paper concludes that the focus of South Moluccan terrorism in the Netherlands is likely to shift from attempts to secure an independent homeland for their people to closer contacts with other terrorist groups espousing anti‐colonial, anti‐imperialist, and nationalist ideals.     

Rewarding Fire with Fire: Effects of Retaliation on Terrorist Group Dynamics

Abstract

Comparative studies of the psychology of terrorism indicate that there is no one terrorist mindset, A theme in common among the disparate groups is the strong need of marginal alienated individuals to join a group of like‐minded individuals with a similar world view that “it's us against them, and they are the cause of our problems.” This strong need to belong gives particular force to the power of group dynamics. While the ideology is the glue that holds the group together and serves as the rationale for its actions, terrorists do not commit acts of terrorism for ideological reasons. The amelioration of the societal injustice which they indicate incites and justifies their terrorism does not reduce the lure of terrorism, because of the powerful hold of the group on its members.

Paradoxically, a policy of reactive retaliation with the goal of deterring terrorist acts may have the opposite effect and reinforce the mind set of the terrorist. For the group under threat, the external danger has the consequence of reducing external divisiveness and uniting the group against the outside enemy. The survival of the group is paramount because of the sense of group identity it provides.

Identifying the locus of control is of crucial significance in estimating the effects of counter‐terrorist policies upon a terrorist group. For the autonomous terrorist cell, active retaliation may reinforce the cohesion of the group; for the corporate terrorist organization, issues of organizational survival may become paramount. Neither the terrorist group nor the terrorist organization can be forced to give up terrorism, for to do so would be to lose their reason for being. For state‐supported and directed terrorist groups on the other hand, the terrorist group in effect serves as a paramilitary group under central government control. In this situation, group and organizational considerations are less relevant, for the object of the counter‐terrorist policy is the government of the sponsoring state. Since the survival of the state and national interests are the primary values, retaliatiatory policies, can, in the short run, have a deterring effect. In the long run, the most effective anti‐terrorist policy is one which renders the terrorist career less attractive to potential members, facilitates terrorists leaving the group, and reduces external support.     

Service-Seeking Behavior,Perceptions of Armed Actors,and Preferences Regarding Governance: Evidence from the Palestinian Territories

Armed non-state actors, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, are visibly engaged in providing social welfare in addition to participating in violence. A number of scholars have suggested that there is a relationship between service provision by terrorist organizations and support from service recipients, and have indicated that terrorist organizations use service provision strategically for this purpose. However, few studies have examined the experiences and opinions of service recipients themselves to understand if services do indeed influence populations' political loyalties and opinions regarding violent activities. Using data from more than 1,000 low to moderate income individuals in Palestine, this study seeks to understand if and how receiving services from a specific organization engenders loyalty to the organization, passive acceptance and/or favorable approval of the organizations' violent activities, and the likelihood of participation in the organization's violent activities. This paper explores if and how provision of aid and “governance” services by armed non-state actors is correlated with various aspects of individuals' experiences of conflict, such as their opinions about the use of violence and various strategies for attaining peace, their fellow community members' likelihood to join armed groups and engage in fighting, and their preferences regarding state structure and legal system.     

The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study

Since 1982, Hezbollah has evolved from a “revolutionary vanguard” terrorist organization bent on violently overthrowing the Lebanese government to a hybrid terrorist organization that uses legitimate political tools to the same end. Today Hezbollah operates on the civilian plane of da’wa, social welfare, and religious education; the military–Resistance plane (jihad); and the political plane. In its drive to dominate Shi’ite society, Hezbollah overcame its chief rival, Amal, and now plays a decisive role in Lebanon's political system and the Middle East. Understanding Hezbollah's emergence as a prototypical hybrid terrorist organization is key to understanding global and local jihad movements.