Notable Literature on Germany's Red Army Faction within the Context of Die RAF und der linke Terrorismus

The world is urbanizing rapidly, yet Western military forces have yet to come to terms with the peculiar demands of urban warfare. The harsh urban environment, particularly in the developing world, is an ideal arena for “asymmetrical” adversaries seeking to neutralize the technological, logistical, and organizational advantages currently enjoyed by modern military forces.

After examining some of the security implications of urbanization, this article explores three recent representative examples of urban warfare: Beirut (1982), Mogadishu (1993), and Grozny (1994–1995). In each case study, the organization, equipment, and training of the forces involved are examined, and conclusions are drawn about what types of military systems, munitions, and force structure were effective, and why.

The final section of the article draws together lessons from these case studies and from other accounts of urban battles in an effort to understand what is needed to improve military performance in this environment. The author concludes that greater effectiveness will require changes in organization and equipment; more important, it will also require a change in a military organizational culture that has largely ignored the challenge of fighting an asymmetrical adversary on urban terrain.     

In the matter of the extradition of Mahmoud Abed Atta,a/k/a “Mahmoud El‐Abed Ahmad,” Defendant

Academics and military analysts regularly attempt to distinguish terrorists from insurgents through focusing on the extent to which these adversaries (a) adopt nonviolent methods, (b) apply uncompromising forms of violence, (c) generate local support, (d) recruit and maintain manpower, and (e) control territory. In contrast, this article argues that attempts to distinguish between these adversaries inevitably fail, firstly, as they arbitrarily impose binary distinctions upon continuous variables (e.g., in levels of support, manpower figures), and secondly as there is a lack of agreement across these supposedly identifying characteristics. Thus, contrary to common wisdom, it is concluded that there is no contradiction in simultaneously labeling groups such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda as both terrorists and insurgents. Indeed, a complete understanding of these groups requires an assessment of their activities at both the tactical (as terrorists) and strategic (as insurgents) levels.     

Culture-centric pre-emptive counterinsurgency and US Africa Command: assessing the role of the US social sciences in US military engagements in Africa

The twenty-first century has seen a continued evolution of the US military’s strategic interest in socio-cultural knowledge of (potential) adversaries for counterinsurgency strategies. This paper explores the implications of the reinvigorated and expanding (post-9/11) relationship between social science research and US military strategy, assessing the implications of US Africa Command strategies for preventive counterinsurgency. Preventative counterinsurgency measures are ‘Phase Zero’ or ‘contingency’ operations that seek to prevent possible outcomes, namely threats to ‘security’ in Africa. The research initiatives of US Africa Command illustrate a culture-centric approach to this strategy, which seeks to draw from detailed socio-cultural knowledge in the prevention of possible populist or popular uprisings. Recent such uprisings, resistance actions and strikes in the continent illustrate a problematic tendency to interpret various forms of populist resistance as ‘terrorist’ actions, thereby condoning the bolstering of African national military capacity. The article considers the implications of these culture-centric counterinsurgency strategies as a means of anticipating and repressing the variety of mobilisations encapsulated within the ‘terrorism’ catchall. We conclude by urging social scientists to reject and disconnect from US Africa Command’s missions and knowledge acquisition efforts in Africa.     

A Palestinian Woman's Place in Terrorism: Organized Perpetrators or Individual Actors?

This article analyzes a novel comprehensive database of attacks by Palestinian women between 1965 and 1995. During this period, women's participation in terrorism evolved and their participation can be divided into two distinct eras, before and after 1986. The article argues that the entrance of religious terrorist organizations into politics and the First Intifada changed Palestinian terrorism. While more attacks by women occurred after 1986, they were mostly low intensity attacks, aimed at military targets, with low success rates. Despite women's participation, the patriarchal structure of society is also reflected in Palestinian terrorist organizations. However, as women's roles in society expanded, so too did their roles within terrorist organizations.     

Al Qaeda Confronts Hamas: Divisions in the Sunni Jihadist Movement and its Implications for U.S. Policy

Almost eight years after the September 2001 attacks, U.S. counterterrorism strategy would benefit from a clearer definition of its adversaries. Some have suggested that U.S. counterterrorism policy focus primarily on Sunni jihadists. This term would account for groups such as Al Qaeda and the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, but not Shi'ite militias in Iraq or Hizbullah. Although any attempt to narrow the scope of U.S. counterterrorism strategy has merit, it is worth noting that important distinctions exist between the various groups. To explore these distinctions, this article examines the different historical trajectories and current arguments between two of the most well-known Sunni jihadists: Al Qaeda and Hamas.     

The tension between despotic and infrastructural power: The military and the political class in Nigeria, 1985–1993

In his extended study,The Sources of Social Power, Michael Mann suggests a distinction between despotic and infrastuctural power. Despotic power refers to the repressive capacities of a state, while infrastructural power refers to its ability to penetrate society and actually implement its decisions. This article uses the example of relations between the military and politicians in Nigeria from 1985 to 1993 to argue that weak states experience a conflict between despotic and infrastructural power. Whereas leaders cultivate alliances with powerful social groups to realize their infrastructural power, the exercise of despotic power can undermine such patterns of collaboration. In Nigeria, the military relied on a number of despotic strategies to extend their control over the political class as part of a promised transition to democracy: a large number of politicians were banned, two government created political parties were imposed, and elections that yielded outcomes threatening to military interests were annulled. While the military was successful in repressing the politicians, they were unable to restructure them in ways that would further the institutional power of the state. This persistent reliance on despotic strategies led to a long-term decline in the integrity and infrastructural capacity of the state. John Lucas is a Visiting Assistant Professor at Bucknell University. John Peeler and Mark Jendrysik provided helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. Nigerian Periodicals Cited Sentinel Newswatch Citizen     

Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organizations

Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups offer the analyst a highly complex challenge. The current literature classifies Islamic terrorist organizations as either networked or hierarchical. Yet, this classification fails to account for the appearance on the international stage of a new type of global terrorism. Most notably, it does not capture the structure and mode of operation of Al Qaeda as it emerged after the 2001 U.S.-led assault on Afghanistan. This article therefore introduces a new conceptthe Dune organizationthat is distinct from other organizational modes of thinking. This conceptualization leads to a new typology of Islamic terrorist organizations. This typology concentrates on organizational behavior patterns and provides a framework for a comparative analysis of terrorist movements, which is applied to a study of Al Qaeda, Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.     

Militarizing peace: why did the Israeli military spearhead the Oslo Accords?

This article deals with the question of why the Israeli military played a major role in the design and implementation of the Oslo Accords in the years 1993–2000 even though this process was originally initiated as a diplomatic move. It is argued that the explanation lies in the army's role in politically mobilizing the anti-Oslo front comprised of religious and peripheral groups, most of whom had a nationalist agenda, as a strategy to counter their resistance to the Accords. The ‘people's army’, through which many of these groups attained social mobility and which they had traditionally trusted, was inherently the most effective mechanism for achieving this goal. This role was further intensified in light of the government's social policies that made these groups ‘peace losers’. Political recruitment took the form of the army's role in designing the Oslo arrangements as military ones.     

Crony capitalism in the Palestinian Authority: a deal among friends

Abstract

This article interrogates the multifaceted political–economic networks entrenched within the multiple structures of the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority (PA). The main argument of this article is that crony capitalism is a defining feature of the PA’s relations with a handful of capitalists and business groups. The demonstration of this argument is exhibited through the large-scale public and private monopolistic practices in strategic sectors of the Palestinian economy, which function within the framework of Israel’s settler-colonial reality and the persistent patterns of international aid to the occupied West Bank. While acknowledging the existence of cronyism as a feature of the capitalist system in its diverse typologies, crony capitalism may be more pronounced in situations characterised by political uncertainty, whereby political–business collusion strategizes the expansion of neo-patrimonial networks and rent-seeking opportunities as a meta-mechanism for social control and political stabilisation. In the Occupied Palestinian Territories, crony capitalism was developed as part of the political allegiances and economic alliances that underpin the structures created by the Oslo process, which are fostered by Israeli policies and the international donor community to maintain the cohesiveness of the PA regime.     

Bandits and blanket thieves,communists and terrorists: the politics of naming Sandinistas in Nicaragua, 1927 – 36 and 1979 – 90

This article examines the politics of naming Sandinistas in Nicaragua during two periods of intense political and military struggle: the era of the Sandinista Revolution and Contra War (1979?–?90) and the era of the Sandino rebellion against the US Marines and Nicaraguan National Guard (1927?–?36). Focusing principally on the rhetorical and narrative strategies used by the USA and its Nicaraguan allies, the article explores the delegitimising master narratives concocted by these dominant groups and the efforts of two generations of Sandinistas and their allies to challenge these narratives. It argues that the politics of naming was embedded within a larger politics of storytelling, and that effective challenges to dominant groups' epithets must be grounded in historically informed challenges to the larger narratives from which they spring.     

Measuring Success in Coping with Terrorism: The Israeli Case

This article examines the degree of efficacy of Israel's antiterror policies and ability to cope with terrorism using seven parameters that fall into seven parameters: reduction in civilian casualties among Israelis and Palestinians, Israel's ability to cope economically, Israeli social cohesion, the status of international and domestic support for the Israeli government and the extent of weakening of international and domestic support for the Palestinian leadership. The article concludes that based on most of these parameters, Israel has been successful in coping with terrorism, although greater security must be attained through a change in Palestinian policies.     

Harsh State Repression as a Cause of Suicide Bombing: The Case of the Palestinian–Israeli Conflict

Although students of social movements have established that state repression strongly affects protesters’ choice of tactics, this finding has been ignored by most analysts of suicide bombing. Based on data collected from various sources, including 88 interviews the author conducted in 2006 with senior leaders of six Palestinian political organizations and close relatives and friends of Palestinian suicide bombers, this article argues that harsh state repression is a major cause of suicide bombing. It shows that understanding the effect of state repression is crucial to clarifying many of the unsolved puzzles concerning the rationales of organizations that employ suicide bombing, the motivations of individual suicide bombers, and the reasons why this tactic has become popular in some societies. The article concludes that there are three types of organizational rationales underlying the use of suicide bombing. Suicide bombing may be an extreme reaction to extreme state repression, a combined reactive and strategic action, or a purely strategic action. Different contexts and organizations typify these organizational rationales.     

Do Targeted Assassinations Work? A Multivariate Analysis of Israel's Controversial Tactic during Al-Aqsa Uprising 1

We assess the impact of Israel's targeted assassinations policy on rates of Palestinian violence from September 2000, the beginning of Al-Aqsa uprising, through June 2004. Literature concerning the relationship between repression and rebellion suggests four plausible effects of targeted assassinations on insurgents: deterrence, backlash, disruption, and incapacitation. Using differenced and lagged time-series analysis, this article utilizes multiple and logistic regression to evaluate the effect of targeted assassinations on Palestinian violence. It is concluded that targeted assassinations have no significant impact on rates of Palestinian attacks. Targeted assassinations do not decrease rates of Palestinian violence, nor do they increase them, whether in the short or long run. Targeted assassinations may be useful as a political tool to signal a state's determination to punish terrorists and placate an angry public, but there is little evidence that they actually impact the course of an insurgency.     

The Role of International Clientelism in the National Factionalism of Palestine

In this article I investigate the role of the international community's policy in the national factionalism in Palestine. I attempt to illuminate how international policy has contributed to the sustaining of internecine Palestinian violence as Fatah, which lost the elections in 2005 and 2006, has been motivated not to hand over power. In the process of selecting allies in the fight against Islamist terrorism, the epitomic undemocratic feature of Arab political culture, clientelism, has been promoted over democracy. Hamas seizing power in Gaza in 2007 probably resulted from the need to tame unruly militant groups which were sponsored by leaders of the Palestinian Fatah party, which again were supported by Western powers. To understand the national splitting in Palestine there is a need to analyse the interconnection between warlords, local clientelism and international clientelism.     

What Are You Prepared to Do? NATO and the Strategic Mismatch Between Ends,Ways, and Means in Afghanistan—and in the Future

This article examines ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) operations in Afghanistan as a way to get at the strategic disconnects in ends, ways, and means that the author believes are endemic to large-scale protracted stability and COIN (counterinsurgency) operations against adversaries who do not pose palpable existential threats to the members of an alliance. The article focuses mainly on the period that followed President Barack Obama's December 2009 announcement of a civilian and military “surge” in Afghanistan through the early stages of the ISAF offensive in Marjah, which began in February 2010. The article concludes that the fundamental strategic issue is that the Allies are not willing (or able) to devote enough resources to achieve their stated objectives. No matter how much the “Ways” might be improved, the “Means” are not sufficient to attain the “Ends.” Thus, what is needed is a more realistic understanding of what ISAF can accomplish in Afghanistan and what NATO might be expected to accomplish in future operations.     

Computer simulation of humanitarian scenarios: tools for training and field management in relief agencies

Computer simulation, a technology well advanced in military strategies and tactics, has been used for response to natural disasters. The authors argue that it should also be applied to the field of humanitarian action in armed conflict. Projected uses are: the management and planning of relief actions, public resource mobilization for humanitarian actions, and training personnel for violent work environments. How that can happen is shown with the example of a real relief management problem in the Sudan.

Simulation can be introduced in ways that are compatible with agencies’ needs, communication styles, and staff abilities. Several factors speak for it: many agencies routinely use computer applications that are flexible enough for simulation to be added seamlessly. Simulation will help agencies to add the power of analysis to the images that prompt humanitarian actions. And with violence and chaos continuing, simulation offers a technique around which to share expertise and training in new, networked partnerships.     

The geopolitics of ‘Enclavisation’and the demise of a two-stateSolution to the Israeli – Palestinian conflict

This paper argues that Israel's military strategy since the outbreak of the second Intifada, in September 2000, has been one not merely of ‘security’ or ‘counter-terror’ but part of a longer-term strategy of spatial demolition and strangulation. This strategy seems predicated on two aims: unilateral separation from the Palestinian population, and its concomitant territorial dismemberment. Withdrawal from a totally controlled and isolated Gaza, in effect the latter's enclavisation, is part of this strategy. Such an enclave will in effect be functionally and spatially sundered from another chain of Palestinian enclaves in the West Bank. From an Israeli perspective, driven by its own distinctive territorial imperative, such separation will ensure Israeli control of and sovereignty over the best land and water resources, and control of all borders and border areas. It is further argued that the policy of unilateral separation and strangulation, the destruction and planned enclavisation of Gaza, and covert and overt settlement expansion in the West Bank—its dismemberment through exclavization, has in effect shattered the spatial basis of a two-state solution.     

The Ascendance of Political Islam: Hamas and consolidation in the Gaza Strip

This article outlines the means by which the Palestinian Islamic movement Hamas has developed and implemented a consolidation of power strategy that is inexorably driving it to a state of increasingly authoritarian control in the Gaza Strip. It discusses the factors that have driven Hamas in terms of power seeking as primordial to all radical Islamist movements or as a result of or response to other factors outside its control. The article highlights the concurrent demise of the Fatah organisation in the Gaza Strip as the largest and most visible symbol of secularism. It then reflects on the role of external, including international, actors in accelerating consolidation tactics following the Hamas ‘takeover’ of power from the Fatah-dominated institutions of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in June 2007. The article aims to demonstrate that Hamas' control in Gaza is an important signpost in terms of developing Islamism in the Middle East region.     

Rationality,Culture, and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers: A Preliminary Theoretical Synthesis and Illustrative Case Study

Suicidal violence involves three levels of analysis: individual motivations, organizational strategies, and societal conflicts. Using rationalist, culturalist, and structuralist approaches to contentious politics, this article explores the intersection of rationality, norms, and conflict in the making of extreme violence. The case of Palestinian suicide bombers demonstrates the interdependence of the three approaches to explaining suicidal violence. For individuals, self-sacrifice is conceived as an act of personal redemption rooted in religious morality and national salvation. For organizations, human bombs provide strategic advantages in the context of asymmetrical warfare. For collectivities, martyrs are venerated when three conditions converge: (1) cultural norms encompass symbolic narratives that honor martyrdom; (2) legitimate authorities acquiesce to extreme violence; and (3) conflicts generate feelings of victimization and threat by external enemies.