The denial syndrome and its consequences: Serbian political culture since 2000

Since the outbreak of the War of Yugoslav Succession in 1991 and the subsequent atrocities, a significant portion of Serbian society, including the upper echelons of the government, has displayed symptoms of the denial syndrome, in which guilt is transposed onto the Croats, Bosniaks, and Kosovar Albanians. This syndrome is also associated with a veneration for the victimized hero, with sinister attribution error, and with tendencies toward dysphoric rumination. In the Serbian case, it has also been associated with efforts to whitewash the role played by Serbs such as Milan Nedić and Draža Mihailović during World War Two and has reinforced feelings of self-righteousness in Belgrade's insisting on its sovereignty over the disputed province of Kosovo.     

Ending the impasse in Kosovo: partition,decentralization, or consociationalism?

This paper argues that current Western-backed approaches to conflict resolution in Kosovo have failed to alter Serbia's policy toward the region and have contributed to the exacerbation of political tensions between Belgrade and Brussels, while deepening ethnic cleavages between Serb and Albanian communities. While there is no possibility of Kosovo returning to Serbia's control, there is an equal unlikelihood that Serbian-populated regions of Kosovo, especially the north, will submit to Pristina's authority. Most importantly, there is little hope that Kosovo can gain full international recognition and membership in international organizations without a compromise settlement with Serbia. While territorial partition has long been a suggested option, I conclude that the best possible solution for Kosovo, given the positions of all parties involved, is a process of significant decentralization beyond the internationally supported measures in the Ahtisaari Plan. A model of consociational power sharing is one in which Serbian and Albanian municipalities are granted high levels of autonomy similar to arrangements made for Bosnia. While this solution may not be ideal and further weakens central authority, I argue that consociationalism reduces the problems of ethnic conflict, encourages local self-government, and preserves the overall territorial integrity of Kosovo.     

Kosovo: Where It All Began

Kosovo, a largely ethnically Albanian province of the Serbian republic, played an important role in Yugoslavia's troubles in the last two decades of the twentieth century. Shortly after Tito's death in 1980, disturbances in Kosovo set the Albanians and the Serbs on a collision course and also polarized the country politically. Ironically, when Yugoslavia began to disintegrate in 1991, and as it fell into four years of warfare, Kosovo remained relatively calm. Only after the Dayton peace, in late 1995, did Kosovo's Albanians opt for a militant policy toward the Serbs. Meanwhile Serbs escalated their oppression of the local population. International diplomatic intervention failed to defuse tensions, and ultimately, NATO initiated military action to stop Serbia. NATO prevailed in the seventy-eight day engagement in 1999, while Kosovo acquired greater autonomy and was put under UN protection.     

When Enlargement Meets Common Foreign and Security Policy: Serbia's Europeanisation,Visa Liberalisation and the Kosovo Policy

During the process of visa liberalisation Serbia made significant and unexpected adjustments in its Kosovo policy, which demonstrate the European Union's leverage. Serbia's compliance on Kosovo cannot be explained either by rational institutionalism, which accounts for domestic change based on cost–benefit calculations, or sociological institutionalism, which predicts domestic adaptation based on convergence of norms and identities. Applying discursive institutionalism, this empirical study of Serbia's Europeanisation identifies discursive denial as a strategy of the Serbian elite in pursuing costly policy implementation. It contributes a novel perspective on ‘shallow’ Europeanisation by highlighting a lack of discursive reinforcement of adopted rules.     

Kosovo's Gordian knot: the contested north and the search for a solution

Until 1999, Kosovo was a little-known province of Serbia. NATO's intervention, however, changed this. Suddenly, everyone was talking about Kosovo and the plight of the Kosovo Albanians. Today, Kosovo is no longer a major talking point; few authors are now writing about post-independence Kosovo and the many challenges that confront the young state. Particularly striking is the relative absence of scholarly writings that discuss the Gordian knot of northern Kosovo. Seeking to rectify this neglect, this article has three core aims: to provide new empirical insights into the situation on the ground in northern Kosovo, to explore Serb and Albanian viewpoints regarding the status of the north (and in particular to examine Serb fears and concerns) and to discuss possible solutions. It argues that granting the north a special, autonomous status within Kosovo is the ultimate way to resolve the “northern problem,” and indeed this now seems the most likely solution following the recent conclusion of the First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations. This research is based on five weeks of fieldwork in Kosovo in July and August 2012. During this time, the author conducted 56 semi-structured interviews, 29 of which took place in northern Kosovo.     

Book reviews

Paulin Kola, The Search for Greater Albania (London: Hurst, 2003), xiv, 416 pp. + maps. Few are the monographs available in English and written by Albanian scholars that deal with the contemporary history of the Balkans. The Search for Greater Albania is therefore a welcome contribution to the study of Albanian nationalism. The author endorses a definition of nationalism as an ideology “whose proponents advocate the indispensable congruence of the political and the national unit, i.e. the state and the nation” (p. xii) and endeavors to demonstrate that no one among Albanian leaders from King Zog to the present, including Hoxha, ever worked to achieve a “Greater Albania.” The intent of the book is then to explain why state-builders in Tirana from the very beginning disregarded their irredenta despite the fact that a substantial part of the ethnic population had remained outside the borders because of international treaties. After a summary of the historical developments in the first part of the twentieth century, Kola pays particular attention to the space for ethnopolitics among Albanian communist and post-communist elites in Albania proper, in Kosovo and marginally in Macedonia. The author is keen to question the nationalist credentials attributed to Enver Hoxha by most scholars of Albania. Kola describes the key historical events in the region after the Second World War by looking for references to Kosovo and the preservation of national independence and shows that these references were all just instrumental to elites' power politics. What the communist regime instead managed to do, observes Kola, is to impoverish its own citizens and to alienate Albanian communities from one another. Kola concludes that political leaders in Tirana have all been prone to “a comfortable parochialism vis-à-vis the national question“ (p. 233). Exceptions to the rule are considered, such as the attempt to internationalize the Kosovo crisis by the first post-communist governments. However, the 1997 descent into anarchy of Albania proper compromised the cause of nationalism in the “motherland.” The idea of “Greater Albania,” according to Kola, never existed in Albania proper but was rather rooted outside the nation-state borders. In Kosovo, where “real Albanian nationalism” instead resided, the discovery of the poverty of the “motherland” in the 1990s toned ambitions down (p. 394). The same Macedonian Albanians did not expect help from Tirana when they initiated the armed confrontation in 2000 and did not show any intention to seek national unification with Tirana. Therefore, Kola observes, foreign observers should be reassured that national unification is not the ambition of Albanian politics today and no one will press for it in the foreseeable future.     

The last Byzantines: perceptions of identity,culture, and heritage in Serbia

Focusing on material culture, this article considers a range of issues concerning the cultural policies, ideologies, and identities that have underlain Serbian development since the Middle Ages, and tests some widely held yet previously uncontested views. In particular it questions the Serbs' perceived affiliation with the Byzantine Empire and challenges the view that this affiliation was so pervasive that it influenced Serbian development and national formation in the modern age. It is argued that Byzantium had little if any role in the Serbs' cultural development – neither in historical memories nor in surviving traditions. Serbia's Byzantine culture is largely a myth developed in the 1930s by the Serbian clergy as a corollary of the Russian-inspired Svetosavlje ideology. This myth was meant to dislocate Serbia's cultural identity from its secular European sources and reposition it closer to Orthodox Russia.     

Kosovo,Self-Determination and the International Order

Yugoslavia's wars provide a rich example of the range of challenges posed to international stability and fundamental principles of international relations since 1989. Within this context, Kosovo's independence has now become a cause celebre of the use of the principle of self-determination in state-creation. In addition, the case of Kosovo is an important development in the practice of humanitarian intervention and by implication the evolution of the concept of the Responsibility to Protect. To better understand the effects of Kosovar claims to self-determination on international order, a clearer understanding is required of the factors shaping that order and how self-determination (as it emerges from the road to Kosovo's independence) relates to those factors. The issue of ‘self-determination after Kosovo’, is placed here into both the context of Yugoslavia's collapse and a number of broader key features which could be said to have played a dominant role in shaping international order post-1989.     

Mass Violence and the Recognition of Kosovo: Suffering and Recognition

In instances of international negotiations over state recognition, the way the violence sustained by a given group is categorised becomes a critical factor in the international community's decision to support independence or not. This essay argues that the recognition of Kosovo in February 2008 was made possible by the use of justifications based on Kosovo Albanians' collective status as victims of ethnic cleansing. The essay bridges the gap between two bodies of literature that have not been used in conjunction up to now, namely normative theories of ‘remedial’ secession and works on the logic of mass violence against ethnically defined groups. It finds that the international community has used the ‘remedial argument’ for Kosovo's recognition because it allowed it to minimise the risk of further unilateral declarations of independence in a volatile region.     

Russia and the Secession of Kosovo: Power,Norms and the Failure of Multilateralism

Theoretical debates about multilateralism positively juxtapose it to unilateralism or bilateralism, because it is seen as a natural ideational fit with the growth of global governance. The major schism on the concept is between normativists who emphasise shared values and the realists' concerns with strategic interactions and power asymmetries. The Kosovo crisis beginning in 1999 could be seen as the first major crisis of multilateralism in the international system after the end of the Cold War. It was a crisis about the role and interests of a hegemonic USA and a weakened Russia. As a case, Kosovo demonstrates the paradoxes and limitations of multilateralism in the field of international security, when there are different types and levels of multilateralism interacting. The US and EU leaderships saw Kosovo as essentially a regional problem which could be manipulated to rejuvenate and enhance Western multilateral cooperation in NATO. This view found support among an upper echelon of officials in the UN, surrounding Secretary-General Kofi Annan, which favoured a multilateral intervention in Kosovo as proof of commitment to the developing norm of ‘right to protect’. Russia, however, saw its multilateral engagement over Kosovo as a strategic interaction to counterbalance and compensate for its weakness vis-à-vis NATO. The multilateral interactions by these three parties appear to have deepened mistrust as the process failed to resolve the final status of Kosovo, leading to its unilateral declaration of independence in 2008. The case demonstrates the importance of shared interests for successful multilateral interactions.     

Russia and the Iraq War: was Putin's policy a failure?

Although Russian President Vladimir Putin has been faced with numerous crises since coming to office in 2000, most importantly the war in Chechnya, the Iraq War was the first major international crisis with which his administration was confronted. As in the case of Kosovo for Yeltsin, and the Gulf War for Gorbachev, the Russian President had to deal with conflicting domestic pressures and apparently still more conflicting Russian national and international interests. Indeed, one result of such a situation was a post-war accusation that Putin actually had no policy or at least no consistent policy with regard to the Iraq crisis [Golan, G., 1992. Gorbachev's difficult time in the Gulf. Political Science Quarterly 107 (2), 213–230]. One may remember similar accusations of Gorbachev's “zigzaging” in the Gulf War and claims that the Yeltsin government failed to forge a Kosovo policy altogether [Levitin, O., 2000. Inside Moscow's Kosovo muddle. Survival 42 (1), 130]. Yet, a certain pattern did appear to repeat itself in the Iraqi crisis, namely, pre-war efforts to prevent a military conflict from breaking out, then gradual escalation of rhetoric if not actual involvement, and finally gradual but relatively rapid retreat to conciliatory posture toward the United States (in all three crises). Moreover, Putin was indeed consistent throughout the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods in his opposition to the Americans' use of force against Iraq and in the need to remain within a United Nations framework. Actually, one might ask (and we shall below) why Putin did not abandon the first part of this policy, in order to maintain the second component, when it became certain that the U.S. was going to attack with or without UN Security Council approval.     

Ethnonational identity,security and the implosion of Yugoslavia: the case of Montenegro and the relationship with Serbia

For 60 years, the international community has limited the right of territories to gain independence without the permission of the “parent state.” Such limits were, however, challenged when Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia, in February 2008. As a result, Belgrade referred the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On 22 July 2010, it came back with its long-awaited decision. Taking a narrow view of the question, the majority argued that, in general, declarations of independence, as mere statements, do not violate international law unless stated otherwise by the Security Council. Thus, Kosovo's declaration of independence cannot be considered as being wholly “unique” – as those states that supported its statehood have claimed. On the key questions of whether Kosovo's secession is legal, or if it is even a state, they chose to avoid controversy. On these points, the international community is no clearer now than it was before the case.     

Yugoslavism between the world wars: indecisive nation building

This article examines Yugoslav national programs of ruling political elites and its concrete implementation in education policy in interwar Yugoslavia. It is argued that at the beginning of the period Yugoslavism was not inherently incompatible with or subordinate to Serbian, Croatian or to a lesser degree Slovenian national ideas. However, the concrete ways in which Yugoslavism was formulated and adopted by ruling elites discredited the Yugoslav national idea and resulted in increasing delineation and polarization in the continuum of national ideas available in Yugoslavia. Throughout the three consecutive periods of political rule under scrutiny, ruling elites failed to reach a wider consensus regarding the Yugoslav national idea or to create a framework within which a constructive elaboration of Yugoslav national identity could take place. By the end of the interwar period, the Yugoslav national idea had become linked exclusively to conservatism, centralism, authoritarianism and, for non-Serbian elites at least, Serbian hegemony. Other national ideas gained significance as ideas providing viable alternatives for the regime's Yugoslavism.     

Mediating international and domestic demands: mnemonic battles surrounding the monument to the fallen of the wars of the 1990s in Belgrade

In this article I present a decade-long affair over the erection of the Monument in Belgrade to those killed in the wars of the 1990s where the official Serbian policy was to manage its contested past through cover ups and cultural reframing rather than public acknowledgement. I demonstrate here that, though the open competitions to erect a monument dedicated to the fallen¹1. This was the most contested issue and was changed in every open competition formulation.View all notes of the wars of the 1990s were an opportunity to negotiate different mnemonic agendas, the ruling political elite, as the dominant actor, promoted Serbian victimhood as it meant to bridge gaps in the opposing domestic and international demands. I suggest here that the mnemonic battle in present-day Serbia proves to be an exemplary case of how a post-conflict nation state mediates its contested past when caught in the gap between the domestic demands and those of international relations.     

The Missing Democratic Revolution and Serbia's Anti-European Choice: 1989–2008

In 1989, as the countries of the Soviet bloc took a turn toward democracy and Europe, Yugoslavia and Serbia plunged into a bloody war and moved in the opposite direction. This article argues that the legacy of that era is still strongly felt in postwar and post-Milosevic Serbia. Now, like then, the choice is not simply for or against Europe. By holding on to the nationalism of the Kosovo myth, which territorializes both the Serbian ethnos and the opposition between Christianity and Islam, Serbia is tracing a tortuous path toward democratization and European integration. In the contemporary context, the Kosovo myth impedes Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo as an independent state; it continues to fuel the rhetoric of fractious elites that never cease to tap its capacity for rallying the public; and it provides room for “pro-European” leaders to negotiate EU integration, straddling the fence between Europe’s Atlantic propensities and the resurgent power of Russia. This nationalist myth thus plays a normative and an instrumental role, both domestically and internationally. Outside Serbia, it also engages with a narrow and “thick” notion of Europe, which gained traction within Europe itself in the post-9/11 climate of heightened fear of Islam, where cultural identity trumps the values of liberal democracy.     

Disputes over the 15-point agreement on normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia

This paper examines the 15-point agreement on normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Two mainstream discourses have prevailed since the agreement was ratified by both countries: on one hand, the Government of Kosovo has branded this agreement as historic, given the fact that in the last century no agreement has ever been reached between Kosovo and Serbia. On the other hand, Kosovo's political opposition has critiqued this agreement stressing that the 15-point agreement devastates Kosovo's statehood. Beyond both extreme stances, we argue that an enhanced autonomy for four northern Serb municipalities ought to be seen as a tool for integration, rather than disintegration of Kosovo statehood. This paper concludes that the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia as a top-down arrangement lacks transparency, and this might jeopardize the achievements reached through this process. Moreover, the EU position should be clearly articulated that redrawing and rearranging the borders of Kosovo and Serbia might overturn the EU's and USA's immense investments in stability, peace, and prosperity in the Western Balkans.     

Socialist Serbia's Narratives: From Yugoslavia to a Greater Serbia

The essay surveys various attempts of Serbian intellectual and political elites to define Serbian national goals in relation to a socialist Yugoslavia. I suggest that even though rhetorical devices and policies applied throughout the entire socialist period have appeared to be the same (e.g., that all Serbs should live in one state), different contexts in each of the subperiods of socialist Serbia and Yugoslavia yielded entirely different results (e.g., in favor of Yugoslavia, or in favor of a Greater Serbia). In the paper, I identify four distinct, yet interrelated, Serbian national discourses: conservative–socialist, socialist–reformist, national–liberal, and xenophobic nationalist. They are evaluated in relation to official Yugoslavism in the early 1960s and Serbian reformist policy of civic nationalism in the late 1960s to early 1970s, debates over the 1974 Constitution, and, finally, Serbian intellectual and political responses to the Yugoslav political crisis in the late 1980s to early 1990s. These moments have been chosen because of their particular relevance for understanding the mutations of Serbian national discourse in the former Yugoslavia.     

In search of a democratic cultural “alternative”: Serbia's European heritage from Dositej Obradović to OTPOR

Developments in Serbia's democratic consolidation over the past six years have been both ongoing and progressive. Yet the establishment of a widely shared and collectively accepted political culture that has departed from the ethnocentric and euroskeptic narratives of the Milo?evi? era remains incomplete. Additionally, the failure by Serbian socio-political elites in appropriating alternative narratives of Serbian history and culture that demonstrate a tradition of shared values and identities with other European communities has stymied public acceptance of Serbia's European integration and public trust among its leaders. This paper argues that Serbian socio-political elites can appropriate narratives and symbols of Serbian collective identity that have been either sidelined or neglected by previously established ethnocentric narratives, and ascribe new systems of meaning and codes of behavior that qualify European liberal democratic values. I argue that a plentiful reservoir of democratic capital can be found in the histories of Serbian communities in Vojvodina over the past three centuries, and the urban cosmopolitanism of Belgrade from the late 1860s up to the present period.     

Stalin's Genocides

In this essay I explore the ways in which the internal Albanian politics of memory in Kosovo rely on a longer, lived history of militant self-organisation than the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) war period alone. On the basis of recent ethnographic research, I argue that the memory of prewar militant activism is symbolically codified, ritually formalized, and put on the public stage in Kosovo today. Not only has this process effectively rehabilitated and consolidated the personal, social, and political status of specific former activists, it also has produced a hegemonic morality against which the actions of those in power are judged internally. On the one hand, this process reproduces shared cultural references which idealise ethno-national solidarity, unity and pride and which have served militant mobilisation already before the 1990s. On the other, it provides the arguments through which rival representatives of the former militant underground groups (known as Ilegalja) compete both socially and politically still today. Although this process demarcates some lines of social and political friction within society, it also suggests that international efforts to introduce an identity which breaks with Kosovo's past and some of its associated values, face a local system of signification that is historically even deeper entrenched than is usually assumed.     

The EU's Response to the International Court of Justice's Judgment on Kosovo's Declaration of Independence

In this essay an evaluation of the content and determinants of the EU's response to the ICJ is provided. Two core questions are addressed: firstly, did the ICJ's judgment alter EU policy towards Kosovo and Serbia and, secondly, was EU policy towards Kosovo and Serbia effective? It is argued that the EU's response to the ICJ's judgment in 2010 has been consistent and effective, but that the underlying determinants of the policy have not changed since 2008. It is argued that the EU's response to the ICJ's judgment in 2010 has been consistent and effective and that the ICJ judgment has had a catalytic effect on the EU's influence over Serbia and the Serbia–Kosovo relationship. Overall, EU policy has been effective, despite being periodically ad hoc.