Die and Let Die: Exploring Links between Suicide Terrorism and Terrorist Use of Chemical,Biological, Radiological,and Nuclear Weapons

The use of suicide bombings by some organizations is often presented as evidence of eroding constraints among terrorists to use chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Besides a possibly more reckless approach to violence resulting from the weakened instinct of self-preservation, it is clear that suicide delivery of such weapons would have great tactical advantages over other forms of delivery. This article explores the often neglected nuances of contemporary suicide terrorism to explain why this practice does not necessarily make a mass-casualty chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack by a terrorist group more likely.     

International cooperation in locating and recovering stolen nuclear materials

Abstract

With the expansion of terrorist activities in the last fifteen years there has been increasing concern that groups might be able to steal nuclear materials and use nuclear weapons for terrorist purposes. The last fifteen years have also seen growing criminal activity in the nuclear domain including thefts of nuclear material, attacks on nuclear facilities, and threats against American cities, although these latter threats turned out to be hoaxes. Nuclear experts have stated that a relatively few technicians could fabricate a nuclear bomb. The principal impediment is access to nuclear material. Although terrorists usually would not be able to further their aims by threats of mass destruction, it is increasingly conceivable that some group might go for the nuclear jackpot. Congress has recently passed legislation designed to protect nuclear materials and to make nuclear thefts and threats subject to severe penalties. This legislation is geared into a recent U.N. convention providing for international cooperation on protecting nuclear materials for peaceful purposes and prosecuting nuclear crimes. Action still needs to be taken, however, to implement a 1982 Nunn Amendment to the Defense Appropriations Bill which calls for the Secretary of Defense to make a study of the feasibility of a nuclear crisis control center for sharing information and monitoring nuclear incidents. The center would help contain such incidents and prevent them from escalating into an international crisis.     

Terrorists and Laser Weapons Use: An Emergent Threat

The trends leading to the emergent threat of terrorist laser weapons use are that a military weaponry transition from conventional to Directed Energy Weapons is taking place; that laser weapons offer clear tactical and operational advantages over conventional weapons; that laser prices are dropping while laser performance is increasing; that criminals, criminal-soldiers, and foreign militaries have all utilized laser devices and weapons for counteroptical purposes; and that criminal-soldiers are evolving and getting more sophisticated from both an organizational and weaponry use perspective. This article will look at the aforementioned trends, analyze them, and then offer some concluding thoughts concerning terrorist laser weapons use futures.     

White Paper Prepared for The Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management: Tradeoffs and Paradoxes: Terrorism,Deterrence and Nuclear Weapons

This article was written at the request of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management. While this analysis suggests that certain types of terrorists can be deterred from certain types of attacks, it is less optimistic about the use of nuclear weapons in a terrorist deterrent strategy. A broad approach to deterrence may be effective against certain types of terrorist groups and attacks, making it crucially important to disaggregate the terrorist threat when setting policy. The article goes on to address two types of terrorist groups with a “global reach” that pose a serious threat to the United States: non-state actors driven by doctrines permitting catastrophic attacks and state-sponsored groups capable of carrying out catastrophic attacks. The analysis reveals a number of previously unappreciated tradeoffs and paradoxes associated with the deterrence of terrorists.     

The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime,A Case Study

Scholars have long recognized that terrorist groups have engaged in transnational organized crime activities. But the question that comes up is, “When does a criminal enterprise become a terrorist group or vice versa?” Terrorist groups have used physical violence, participated in weapons and drug trafficking networks, immigrant smuggling, and money laundering. More recently a number of terrorist groups have established what Jonathan White has referred to as “illegal multinational criminal organizations.” This article will examine the convergence of terrorism and organized crime through the prism of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK).     

Rifling Through the Terrorists’ Arsenal: Exploring Groups’ Weapon Choices and Technology Strategies

In terrorist operations, weapons technologies are the tools groups use to pursue their violent ends. Because of differences in what they can do, different weapons are useful for different types of operations. Using a random sample of terrorist incidents from the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database, this article explores (1) how terrorists in general used particular weapons technologies and (2) the variation in the technology choices of individual terrorist groups. The results demonstrate significant differences in the ways different weapons are used, in the versatility of individual technologies, and among the technology strategies of different terrorist organizations.     

Security dilemmas of nuclear-armed Pakistan

Pakistan's security environment has deteriorated through its adoption of a declared nuclear weapons posture in May 1998. Internal fissures have widened along regional and sectarian lines as the Pakistani economy falters, unable to sustain even limited external sanctions following decades of internal mismanagement. Tensions with India have also increased as Pakistan's security managers adopt interventionist policies, based on a misplaced belief in the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. The international community, in particular, the USA's failure to reverse South Asian nuclear proliferation, has emboldened Indian advocates of nuclear deployment. If India deploys nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, Pakistan will follow suit. Operation-ready nuclear weapons will increase the prospects of an India - Pakistan conflict that could assume a nuclear dimension. Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability will not prevent an Indian conventional attack nor will the presence of nuclear weapons deter an Indian accidental, unauthorised or preventive nuclear attack. Changed domestic and external priorities alone can buttress Pakistani security.     

Saddam Hussein: Political Psychological Profiling Results Relevant to His Possession,Use, and Possible Transfer of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to Terrorist Groups

This article applies psychological profiling data from the speeches and interviews of Saddam Hussein during the 1990 Gulf Crisis to many of the recent questions about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) policies and intentions that were pivotal to the decision to wage war in Iraq. Content analysis of Hussein's verbal comments prior to the invasion of Kuwait and after the introduction of coalition forces into Saudi Arabia were used to assess his psychological state, political attitudes, and decision-making processes under stress. The findings were then applied to the recent issues of Iraqi WMD possession, use, and possible transfer to terrorist groups. The results of this political psychological assessment of Hussein indicated that prior to his removal by coalition forces it was extremely unlikely that he had significantly reduced what he perceived to be Iraq's WMD capabilities. Analysis of Hussein's political psychology, sensitivity to threats, propensity for violent reactions, and tendency to miscalculate indicated that he had a very low threshold for WMD use and may not have waited to be attacked before using these weapons. The results also indicated that the same characteristics that made Hussein an extremely likely candidate for WMD use made it unlikely that he would transfer WMD assets to a terrorist group not under his direct control. Although examination of Hussein's decision making under stress indicated that the invasion would increase the likelihood of Iraqi WMD use, it was not seen as increasing the odds of Iraqi transfer of WMD to terrorist groups. However, the results also indicated the potential for Hussein to suffer from a significant series of cognitive biases with direct impact on his decision making regarding WMD, as well as his ability to use these weapons. Support was also noted for his potential to experience gaps in reality testing and immobilizing anxiety should the military struggle turn desperate for Iraq and for him personally. The implications for the characterization of leaders likely to use WMD were also examined.­     

Colby college conference report

In March 1995 the Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo conducted a well-timed and coordinated nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system. This represented the first use of such a weapon by a nonstate group and sent shock waves around the world. The shock came not least because the attack had been completely unexpected despite years of theorizing and literature discussing just such a possibility. The purpose of this article is to address the broad issue of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction as it applies to Aum Shinrikyo, and within this context to critically analyze the three books listed above. Each offers a different look at Aum in terms of the group itself and of what lessons might be drawn from this new and frightening development in "terrorist" violence.     

The U.S. Navy's role in countering maritime terrorism

Abstract

There have been few spectacular acts of maritime terrorism. About ninety‐five percent of all incidents of what would be classified as transnational maritime terrorism involved bombings, hijackings, and “other” attacks. Nearly all of these took place when ships were in port, and the victims were predominantly merchant ships. Only a small number of terrorist attacks have been reported against men‐of‐war–none against U.S. Navy ships. Bombing, including various forms of mining, comprises the major threat to merchant ships, while the dangers of U.S. Navy ships would be aggravated by the presence of nuclear weapons or nuclear propulsion plants.

Counter terrorism as carried out by the U.S. Navy involves actions to deter or defeat direct terrorist activity (against the ship itself) and indirect activity (against other U.S. interests). U.S Navy ships are especially well organized, constructed, and equipped to deal with the former, but they would be virtually powerless to assist U.S. merchant ships against the most probable threats (bombing, hijacking, and attacks) in the most probable location (overseas ports).     

Organizational Versus Individual Attribution: A Case Study of Jemaah Islamiyah and the Anthrax Plot

Recent studies have taken an important first step in examining which terrorist groups, based on their organizational characteristics and the characteristics of the environment in which they operate, are more likely to pursue chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. This approach, however, assumes that individuals who perpetrate events act on behalf of the organization to which they primarily belong. Using the case of Jemaah Islamiyah's alleged attempt to develop the pathogenic bacterium Bacillus anthracis, or anthrax, the authors demonstrate the importance of including individual-level variables to the analysis. In particular, the attendance by several key Jemaah Islamiyah members at an Al Qaeda-affiliated training camp is argued to set a chain of events into motion that ended in their involvement in the anthrax cultivation program.     

Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption

Because of the importance of technology to the operations of modern terrorist groups, the factors that affect the technological sophistication of extreme organizations are of great interest. In this article, the process through which terrorist groups seek out and deploy new technology is examined by bringing to bear the deep literature that exists on technology adoption by commercial organizations. A framework is described that delineates not only the factors that influence a group's decision-making processes surrounding new technology but also the obstacles that stand in the way of the successful absorption and use of unfamiliar technologies by a terrorist organization. This framework, by taking a holistic view of the entire technology adoption process, sets out a methodology to both more reasonably predict the outcome of a group's technology-seeking efforts and to speculate about its future innovation efforts. Such a technology focused viewpoint provides a route to more fully inform risk assessment, especially with regard to the low probabilityhigh consequence technologies that have served as the focus of much recent counterterrorist deliberation. The lessons provided by the framework with respect to weapons of mass destruction terrorism and to novel counterterrorist routes are discussed.     

Something Must be Done-Military Intervention

In the late twentieth century, the United States' federal government responded to the threat of terrorism by passing a wide range of counterterrorist laws. The vigor that accompanied these initiatives echoed at a state level where, virtually unnoticed, states passed similar legislation. This article examines state measures in three areas: the funding of foreign terrorist organizations, the use or threatened use of weapons of mass destruction, and definitions of terrorist activity. While these statutes, as a legal matter, may not violate any specific federal provisions or constitutional prohibitions, they raise important questions about federal supremacy in foreign affairs and the constitutional protections afforded citizens. More significantly, as a policy concern, these provisions threaten America's ability to speak in one voice, introducing divisions into the domestic realm and diminishing the ability of the federal government to negotiate with foreign states and organizations. They also mask an appropriate role for the states in fighting terrorism. Both the policy implications and legal considerations suggest that such measures may ultimately undermine America's ability to counter the terrorist threat.     

Terrorism,Crime, and Transformation

This article argues that some of today's terrorist groups have transformed into transnational criminal organization (TCO) who are more interested in profits than politics. This dynamic has important implications for policymakers as some traditional, politically motivated terrorist groups further profit-minded agencies under a political banner. The author argues that there are different degrees of transformation; some terrorists commit criminal acts to support political operations, while others view profit-driven criminal acts as their end game. The articles further argues that unlike some observers suggest, TCOs and terrorist groups will not cooperate with each other to advance aims and interests, instead utilizing their "in-house" capabilities to undertake criminal or political acts.     

Rewarding Fire with Fire: Effects of Retaliation on Terrorist Group Dynamics

Abstract

Comparative studies of the psychology of terrorism indicate that there is no one terrorist mindset, A theme in common among the disparate groups is the strong need of marginal alienated individuals to join a group of like‐minded individuals with a similar world view that “it's us against them, and they are the cause of our problems.” This strong need to belong gives particular force to the power of group dynamics. While the ideology is the glue that holds the group together and serves as the rationale for its actions, terrorists do not commit acts of terrorism for ideological reasons. The amelioration of the societal injustice which they indicate incites and justifies their terrorism does not reduce the lure of terrorism, because of the powerful hold of the group on its members.

Paradoxically, a policy of reactive retaliation with the goal of deterring terrorist acts may have the opposite effect and reinforce the mind set of the terrorist. For the group under threat, the external danger has the consequence of reducing external divisiveness and uniting the group against the outside enemy. The survival of the group is paramount because of the sense of group identity it provides.

Identifying the locus of control is of crucial significance in estimating the effects of counter‐terrorist policies upon a terrorist group. For the autonomous terrorist cell, active retaliation may reinforce the cohesion of the group; for the corporate terrorist organization, issues of organizational survival may become paramount. Neither the terrorist group nor the terrorist organization can be forced to give up terrorism, for to do so would be to lose their reason for being. For state‐supported and directed terrorist groups on the other hand, the terrorist group in effect serves as a paramilitary group under central government control. In this situation, group and organizational considerations are less relevant, for the object of the counter‐terrorist policy is the government of the sponsoring state. Since the survival of the state and national interests are the primary values, retaliatiatory policies, can, in the short run, have a deterring effect. In the long run, the most effective anti‐terrorist policy is one which renders the terrorist career less attractive to potential members, facilitates terrorists leaving the group, and reduces external support.     

The Impossible Challenge of Deterring “Nuclear Terrorism” by Al Qaeda

Deterring Al Qaeda from using a nuclear weapon, should it acquire one, is a harder challenge than analysts have argued. Suggestions for “deterrence based on punishment” have severe limitations. Al Qaeda is not a state, has no clear command authority, and has no clear nuclear weapons–employment doctrine. Most analysts also ignore the dynamic of “crisis instability” (“use it or lose it”): should the West believe Al Qaeda has an improvised nuclear devise, it is unlikely (regardless of whether Al Qaeda leadership claimed the weapon would be held as a deterrent only) that the West would accept a mutually-assured-destruction relationship with the group. The West would hunt the weapon down, forcing Al Qaeda's hand. The best counter–Weapons of Mass Destruction–Nuclear Terrorism defense, therefore, is good counterinsurgency policy to starve it of recruits until the group dies.     

African agency and global orders: the demanding case of nuclear arms control

Abstract

How much agency do African states have to shape global orders? This study puts the global nuclear order under scrutiny to answer this question. It amounts to a demanding case. Arms control is something that global great powers take very seriously, and there is no weapons category that they take more seriously than nuclear weapons. My findings provide a nuanced picture. Although often outflanked and frustrated by nuclear weapon states, the nuclear order would look different without African actors exerting their agency. They successfully shaped background and foreground institutions constituting the global nuclear order by building advocacies for new institutions upon already existing ones, reaching out to state and non-state actors outside of Africa, and channelling communication through African states with authority in global fora. This study makes three contributions: First, it underlines the key finding of recent literature on African agency that African actors are more to be reckoned with than often assumed. Second, it provides novel evidence about the diplomatic mechanisms through which they come to make a difference. Third, it adds to our grasp of the constitution of global orders as well as the processes through which they come to be made, re-made and unmade more generally.     

Terrorism and overkill

The purpose of this paper is to review the international terrorist activities of the last half century of this millennium and to make a case for needed changes in U.S. efforts to curb the growth of terrorism. Unless we can muster a unified front against global terrorism and organized crime, we are in danger of carrying these burdens with us into the new millennium. Whereas most discussions are focused on how to respond during or after a terrorist event, this paper explores measures for averting international terrorism disasters before they occur. With the growing availability of weapons of mass destruction and computer technology to terrorist and organized crime groups, there is a growing potential for disasters of proportions never before experienced. Consequently the risks are becoming too great to continue with a reactive approach to terrorism. The paper begins with a discussion of how the basis for international terrorism has changed since its modern form began in the 1960s. It then extrapolates the evolutionary trends of terrorism to make projections for what we can expect in the future. Finally, it presents a number of practical ideas for preventing terrorist actions before they occur, beginning with an argument for redefining terrorism in terms that enable us to organize more effectively against it.     

Terrorist Group Rivalries and Alliances: Testing Competing Explanations

ABSTRACT

Terrorist group rivalries and alliances have important consequences, but the sources of these relationships are debated. This article offers a side-by-side examination of correlates of terrorist rivalries and alliances. Global analyses of hundreds of terrorist groups find violent rivalry is associated with drug trafficking, state sponsorship, ethnic motivation, and operating in a civil conflict country. Alliances are associated with territorial control, intermediate membership size, and religious motivation. The idea that alliances are an indicator of weakness does not find much support. When relationships are disaggregated into theoretically relevant categories (inter-field and intra-field rivalries, and domestic and international alliances), further distinctions appear.     

The Threat and Management of Terrorism in Cyprus

This article aims to challenge the dominant view that the expressions of terrorism since the last decade of the twentieth century are fundamentally new. It questions the new aspects of terrorism, such as the transnational nature of the perpetrators and their organizations, their religious inspiration and fanaticism, their use of weapons of mass destruction, and their indiscriminate targeting. It points out essential continuities with previous expressions of terrorist violence, such as the national and territorial focus of the new terrorists, their political motivations, their use of conventional‐ weaponry, and the symbolic targeting that is still aimed at achieving a surprise effect. The article calls for more thorough historical investigations in order to appreciate truly new aspects of terrorism.‐