The Strategic Hub Concept: Plan C for Iraq?

This article will apply what shall be termed a “strategic hub” concept of counterinsurgency to the war in Iraq. This concept posits that the development of insurgent and militia nodes or “hubs” of activity could provide a more relevant way to address the key dilemmas of the Iraq equation in light of the Coalition and Iraq government's inability to secure Iraq. The article will argue that ceding the insurgency and militias ground on a temporary basis may be required to maintain both military and political momentum in the post “surge” Iraq given the draw down of U.S. forces, the immaturity of the Iraqi Security Forces, and the present state of American and Iraqi politics.     

The debate over the U.S. government's role in health care financing:"deja vu,all over again"

Yogi Berra's famous quote captures the continuing debate over the legitimate role of the U.S. government in health care financing. The issues of individual choice, equity of access, and concern about income security are just as unresolved today as they were in the early twentieth century. Until we engage in an explicit national debate on these issues and come to a national consensus on the human and political values underlying our current health care situation, a “solution” to the health care financing problems will never be found. This article discusses the history of the issue of government's involvement in health care financing, American ambivalence about government regulation, and the role of American business as a major health care insurer.     

What Does the “Terrorist” Label Really Do? Measuring and Explaining the Effects of the “Terrorist” and “Islamist” Categories

Many scholars and practitioners claim that labeling groups or individuals as “terrorists” does not simply describe them but also shapes public attitudes, due to the label's important normative and political charge. Yet is there such a “terrorist label effect”? In view of surprisingly scant evidence, the present article evaluates whether or not the terrorist label—as well as the “Islamist” one—really impacts both the audience's perception of the security environment and its security policy preferences, and if yes, how and why. To do so, the article implements a randomized-controlled vignette experiment where participants (N = 481) first read one out of three press articles, each depicting a street shooting in the exact same way but labeling the author of the violence with a different category (“terrorist”/“shooter”/“Islamist”). Participants were then asked to report on both their perceptions and their policy preferences. This design reveals very strong effects of both the “terrorist” and “Islamist” categories on each dimension. These effects are analyzed through the lenses of social and cognitive psychology, in a way that interrogates the use of the terrorist category in society, the conflation of Islamism with terrorism, and the press and policymakers' lexical choices when reporting on political violence.     

In search of an anti‐terrorism policy: Lessons from the reagan era

Abstract

During the 1980s, terrorist activities became a real threat to Americans at home and abroad. The Reagan administration's policy response to this threat was encumbered by several factors, both of commission and omission. Dominant anti‐communist ideological perceptions in the administration at times blurred the disparate causes of international terrorism and the varied motives of terrorist groups. The administration was unable to back up its words with consistent, resolute policy action. And U.S. intelligence operations were not able to detect or prevent several terrorist strikes against U.S. facilities, especially in the Middle East.

The U.S. air raid on Libya served notice that the United States would strike militarily at state sponsors of terrorism. It also called into the question the Reagan administration's willingness to adhere strictly to international law in its efforts to prosecute certain governments who aid and abet terrorist groups. There is no policy panacea for terrorism; terrorism can only be countered by a resolute policy which combines protection, prevention, and prosecution, including military retaliation if it is necessary and can be carried out proportionate to the aggrieved terrorist offense. The lessons gleaned from the Reagan administration's anti‐terrorist experience are both constructive and instructive. However, only if more deliberate efforts are made to integrate these lessons into policy considerations will they become utilitarian assets to counter terrorist activities, at home and abroad.     

The Terror Speaks: Inside Pakistan's Terrorism Discourse and National Action Plan

This article, employing a poststructuralist Critical Discourse Analysis, reveals cracks, discrepancies, and inconsistencies in Pakistan's discourse on terrorism and practice. I argue that Pakistan continuously constructs a “monstrous enemy” and magnifies it in a way that conceals alternative representations of reality that could show that the state, by presenting itself as a victim of terrorism, is using phenomena of political violence to serve its political objectives inside and outside the boundaries of the state. The article argues that after a militant attack on a school in northwest Pakistan, critical, liberal, and dissenting narratives mingled with the dominant state discourse in a fashion that strengthen illiberal practices in the country, thus undermining the ideals of democracy.     

Al Qaeda's Sharia Crisis: Sayyid Imam and the Jurisprudence of Lawful Military Jihad

Militant Islamist Sayyid Imam's legal critique of Al Qaeda's anti-U.S. mass casualty terrorism holds great potential utility for counterterrorist messaging strategy. In this article, a jihad–realist Islamist theological–jurisprudential methodology is first defended as the means most productive for delegitimizing Al Qaeda among high value, religiously motivated recruits. Second, Sayyid Imam's specific allegations and detailed Sharia proofs against Al Qaeda are presented. Finally, implications are drawn for U.S. counterterrorist messaging focusing especially on the utility of wielding this theological–juridical approach as compared to other “counternarrative” approaches, and the vital need to accurately characterize Islamism and its relation to terrorism.     

Instrumentalizing Counterterrorism for Regime Consolidation in Putin's Russia

Since the late 1990s, Russia has been among the countries most painfully affected by terrorism and President Putin has shown little doubt and even much enthusiasm in joining the U.S.-led "war" against terrorism. Intertwined as they are, counterterrorism and Chechnya are still significantly different matters in Russian security policy, and this article aims at examining how the struggle against terrorism shapes essential features of Russia's foreign and domestic policies during Putin's first presidency. Internally, the struggle against terrorism provides for a sufficient mobilization of the dysfunctional society around the "mutant" regime that has consolidated its control over mid-term political agenda. Internationally, high-profile counterterrorism strategy has helped Russia to secure for itself a more prominent role than the sheer size of its "assets" would justify. This war is fundamentally not about victory; it is about many "collateral" benefits for the regime that Putin is presiding over.‐     

Persuasion and Predation: The Effects of U.S. Military Aid and International Development Aid on Civilian Killings

ABSTRACT

Powerful states frequently employ foreign aid to pursue international security objectives. Yet aid's effectiveness will be undermined if it exacerbates the effects of conflict on civilians within recipient states. This article investigates how international development aid and U.S. military aid influence recipient governments' incentives and ability to target civilians. U.S. military aid has a persuasion effect on state actors, which decreases a recipient state's incentives and necessity to target civilians. Development aid flows, however, trigger a predation effect in some environments, exacerbating civilian targeting. An analysis of aid flows in 135 countries on civilian killings between 1989–2011 provides support for both the persuasion and predation effects associated with aid.     

The Evolution of the U.S. Government's Annual Report on Terrorism: A Personal Commentary

This article examines the evolution of a key U.S. Government annual publication on terrorism. From its inception in 1977 to the present, the U.S. Government's annual terrorism report has been the primary statistical compiler of international terrorist incidents. Given the magnitude of this task and the inherent difficulty in defining the term “terrorism,” this report has been controversial and criticized. Love it or hate it, for many decades, this report was the sole source of statistics on international terrorism. The author argues that despite its flaws, this unclassified annual report does provide value and usually paints a fairly accurate picture of the international terrorism landscape. Over the last two years however, there have been claims that this report has become politicized and tailored to fit the views of the administration on the terrorist threat. The author rejects this charge and claims that this publication has been objective and that it has evolved over time into a more credible and useful report.     

The Tribes that Bind: Yemen and the Paradox of Political Violence

Beset by multiple security challenges, not least the emergence of a powerful Al Qaeda franchise, Yemen appears the antithesis of the “Weberian” state model. But while these challenges are acute, they should be seen as part of a wider “political field,” dominated by powerful tribes and conditioned by patrimonial networks that have long framed the modes of political exchange between the center and periphery. This remains crucial to understanding the wider eddies of tribal politics in Yemen, and in turn, the limits of a purely military response by Washington as it seeks to confront Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.     

Terrorism and the Kenyan Public

Since 11 September 2001, terrorism has been a global security threat. One of the partners in the war on terrorism is Kenya. Considering Kenya"s recent experience with terrorist acts, their effects on its public psyche, and Kenya"s reactions to them in domestic and foreign policies, this study presents perceptions on terrorism from an exploratory survey in Kenya. Respondents feel most threatened not by terrorism but by AIDS and local criminals. Among terrorist acts, the most threatening include suicide terrorism, a plane crash, and stabbing attacks. Media reports on terrorism not only intensify feelings of anxiety and helplessness but also strengthen feelings for both peaceful and revengeful reactions. In order to prevent terrorist attacks, routine security checks, recognizing a Palestinian right to statehood, and intelligence collaboration with the CIA and Mosad are considered the most effective measures. Kenya"s commitment to the war on terrorism may be less a response to Kenyans" perceptions of terrorist threats than a policy to support the United States against terrorists in exchange for U.S. support against AIDS and for political stability, democracy, pluralism, and economic development.     

Strategy of tension: The Belgian terrorist crisis 1982–1986

Abstract

Between 1982 and 1986, Belgium suffered a series of terrorist attacks that claimed more than 30 lives, making this campaign one of the most destructive in the recent history of western Europe. Two major groups were involved: one was purportedly a leftist radical sect, the other an anonymous cell popularly known as the “mad killers,” whom subsequent investigation has shown to be connected to neo‐Nazi organizations. Both groups were apparently seeking to destabilize the Belgian state at a time of intense political conflict, and it was widely suggested that the apparently opposed political extremes were actually allied in a common cause. In addition, official enquiries established connections between the terrorist groups and agents of Belgian state security. This paper discusses the use of terrorism in a political “strategy of tension” modeled on that developed in Italy in the late 1960s. It also suggests that the contemporary structure of European terrorist groups readily lends itself to manipulation in the cause of provocateur activity.     

Ethno‐political activity and the psychology of terrorism

Abstract

Studies of terrorist psychology have typically focused either on single individuals or group dynamics within the organizations that these individuals have joined. Less attention has been paid to the background conditions which give rise to these individuals and organizations, even for environments in which generalization appears to be feasible. This paper focuses on one such environment. Its principal goal is to highlight the theoretical connections between a society's ethnic cleavages; the development of ethno‐political activity, especially organized violence and terrorism; and the implications of this activity for the functioning of institutions in “democratic” and “non‐democratic” societies. A related objective is the identification of policy responses to latent or manifest ethno‐political activity and an assessment of their potential efficacy. These points are illustrated by examining a small ethnic group, the South Moluccans in Holland, which would appear to have had little motivation to engage in violence or terrorism, but some of whose members nevertheless did.     

Islamic Terrorism and the Question of National Liberation,or Problems of Contemporary Chechen Terrorism

Scholars have analyzed various causes of contemporary Chechen terrorism in Russia and have offered multiple explanations as to why this terrorism persists. Most commonly, these scholars accuse Russia of suppressing a Muslim struggle for national liberation in Chechnya because of Russia's own interests in Chechen territory or its lucrative oil resources. This work analyzes various instances of Chechen terrorism, 1991–2002, to conclude that the dynamics of terrorism do not support the claims of various scholars, journalists, and Chechen terrorists that Chechen rebels are fighting a war of independence and that the Russian government's failure “to let Chechnya go” instigates future acts of terrorism.     

The united states naval blockade of Iraq: A foreign policy and international law analysis

The current Persian Gulf crisis may signal a new period in human history in which the United Nations is viewed as the forum of first resort for the resolution of international harms and disputes. This is particularly striking since the Security Council, because of east-west divisions, has been unable to act in a collective manner to addresses serious international breaches of the peace. This two part essay deals with the events leading up to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the step-by-step reaction by the U.S. Government, the imposition of the U.S. Navy blockade of Kuwaiti shipping, and the legal justification for the introduction of forces. The reader is left to decide whether the Rule of Law and Charter ideals of collective security, are the real victors in the current conflict.

Part 1 of the essay examines the detailed economic and political causes for the Iraqi invasion. Even though some commentators have characterized Saddam Hussein's entry into Kuwait as “naked aggression” which was driven by Saddam Hussein's hamartia to become the new Nasser, OPEC production disputes, allegations of excessive Kuwaiti pumping of the Rumalia oil field (straddles both countries), the need for an Iraqi coastline, and large Iraqi debt to Kuwait are seen as “rational” reasons for the invasion. A historical examination of the Iran-Iraq conflict is grafted into part one to assist the reader in appreciating the fact that belligerent conduct is viewed in Iraq as a normative mode of conflict resolution and that in the context of all current and future military and diplomatic interchanges, the proven bellicosity of Iraq should figure prominently in the approaches which are taken.

The U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf must be viewed in the context of the U.S.'s diplomatic and economic interests in the region. The essay concludes that the actions of the United States in the first forty days after the Iraqi invasion were masterful because of the skilled use of the U.N. security council (to build a broad political base) as well as the introduction of limited force (imposition of a naval blockade) to signal to Saddam Hussein that the international community was serious in its resolve. The shooting which is taking place is most unfortunate; but U.S. efforts were properly tailored to keep the world coalition intact and prevent a shooting war. Until approximately 3 weeks into the actual conflict, the level of anti-U.S. rhetoric was noticeably small- a triumph for U.S. foreign policy makers in forming a world-wide consensus and maintaining it and a triumph for international respect for law.

The final portion of Part 1 deals with the history of blockades before and after the 1945 U.N. Charter. Blockade actions have been used since the Middle Ages but the 1856 Pact of Paris and the 1909 Declaration of London are the modern sources for the Law of Blockade. Becuase of the sheer intensity of conflict in the First and Second World Wars, the normative rules contained in the two written sources of law fell into disuse. Even so, most of the substantive provisions from the 19th and early 20th century doctrines are incorporated into contemporary law and policy. Commander Rosen argues strenuously for a modernization of the international conventions to codify the rules of blockade since, given the utter destructiveness of modern warfare, blockades remain a relatively benign use of force in those situations in which use of force is legally justified. But, however laudable the U.N. Charter ideals are to sharply restrict the use of force to exceptionally limited circumstances and make state aggression illegal, situations will arise in which use of force will be necessary to respond to illegal aggression. Resurrection of the old concept of pacific blockade (similar to the naval action taken in connection with the Cuban Missile Crisis) is urged because unanimity in the U.N. is transitory and nations, particularly superpowers, need the legal flexibility to react to illegal aggression with limited uses of force--below the threshold uses of force authorized by the U.N. Charter.     

“Zdravljica” – toast to a cosmopolitan nation anthem quality in the Slovenian context

As with many states, in the case of Slovenia two songs principally contend for the position of national anthem. In this case an apparent ideological gulf masks perhaps a more essential temperamental divide: the bellicose army song versus the happy drinking “all together?…?” number. Vacillation between “Zdravljica” (“A Toast”) and “Naprej zastava slave,” (“Forward, Flag of Glory”) might be taken as reflecting the ambivalence with regard to potentially hostile others one reads attributed to Jesus Christ in the gospels of Matthew, Mark and Luke: who's not with me is against me/who's not against me is with me. The 1989 adoption of “Zdravljica” (lyrics courtesy of Slovenia's national poet France Pre?eren) is strongly suggestive of an outward looking state, one hoping for a place in a cosmopolitan Europe. “Naprej zastava slave” has remained the anthem of the Slovenian army and so is far from being discarded for the purpose of asserting Slovenian national aspirations. Perhaps retaining it in this minor role has been necessary because “Zdravljica” is a song which – at least as it is presently sung – de-emphasises national aspiration to a degree unusual for the anthem genre. In a crossroads of Europe dominated historically by the national (or imperial) aspirations of larger and more powerful political entities, “Zdravljica” is a song which tests the limits of what an anthem can be by holding out a hope of rising above the national.     

Islam in Tanzania and Kenya: Ally or Threat in the War on Terror?

This article explores the historical emergence of Islam in East Africa, details the political background of Tanzania and Kenya, the role of Islam in each country, and U.S. foreign policy in the region. The recent U.S. strategy of intelligence-sharing with Kenya, training and military support to both Kenya and Tanzania, and air strikes in Somalia are assessed. In addition to the current military emphasis, the United States should incorporate more “soft” options, such as the promotion of democratic governance in these nascent democracies through political assistance in constitutional, judicial, and law-enforcement reform, as well as encouraging greater inclusion of Muslims in the political system.     

The Ambiguous Host-Citizen Contract: An Evolving Notion of Duty in the U.S. Military Quest for Local Legitimacy

The article explores how the recent quest for local legitimacy in Iraq and Afghanistan has shaped the U.S. military notion of duty toward host citizens. It argues that military duty is conceptualized as a “host-citizen contract.” Based on a qualitative comparison of the 2006 and 2014 versions of FM3-24, the U.S. counterinsurgency field manual, it finds that U.S. forces are obligated to suppress insurgents, build host-nation agency, and protect the host population in exchange for legitimacy. The article's main finding is that the notion of legitimacy has changed in ways that fundamentally limit the scope of duty and justify a breach of contract should the host nation fail to comply.     

Fighting Al Qaeda in Yemen? Rethinking the Nature of the Islamist Threat and the Effectiveness of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy

This article evaluates U.S. perception of and response to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) operating in Yemen. It evaluates the empirical evidence on which the present understanding of the group is based, the implications of the sociopolitical context in which it operates, and the uneasy position of the Yemeni government in the War against Terror as it has been affected by U.S. policy from the early 1990s to the present. In the contested Yemeni state, AQAP is competing for political legitimacy and is increasingly dependent on public support. The U.S. kill-or-capture response, the “on–off” nature of its support that has made Yemen vulnerable to the influence of Al Qaeda in the past, and the actions of the Yemeni government itself, which depends on the continued existence of the threat to secure financial support vital for political survival, means that none of the measures being taken has the potential to defeat AQAP.     

The Drama of Media Coverage of Terrorism: Emotional and Attitudinal Impact on the Audience

The symbiotic relationship between terrorism and its media coverage is explored from the perspective of audience reactions. In an empirical study, effects of television broadcasts of terrorism on viewers’ emotional and attitudinal reactions are examined. Participants were 300 Israeli adults randomly allocated to terrorism or violent nonterrorism broadcasts. Anxiety, anger, stereotypes, and enemy perception were measured prior and subsequent to media exposure. Findings revealed higher levels of both emotional and attitudinal measures consequent to the terrorism versus nonterrorism media exposure. These findings reflect the significant emotional and attitudinal impact on the audience of terrorism's mechanism of self-empowerment via the media.