Engaging Insurgency: The Impact of the 2016 Colombian Peace Agreement on FARC's Political Participation

The 2016 Peace Agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army (the FARC-EP or FARC) commits to reforming political participation, especially of traditionally marginalized sectors throughout the country to consolidate Colombian democracy. While the Peace Agreement provides implementation mechanisms that support the insurgency's transition from armed group to political party, it also complements the FARC's political strategy that has traditionally maintained consistency. This article argues that the 2016 Peace Agreement has the potential to enhance democratic, political, and societal participation by engaging with FARC in two key ways—by attempting to reconcile key FARC grievances and containing specific mechanisms that increase participation of traditionally marginalized groups in Colombia. This article argues that the Agreement has impacted positively on FARC's political participation and given it incentives to pursue its political strategy democratically. Likewise, the Agreement has provided a positive-sum outcome for the Colombian government to strengthen its democratic legitimacy by placing emphasis on structural reform.     

Brokers and Key Players in the Internationalization of the FARC

The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—FARC) was originally founded to protect Colombian peasants from harsh landowner policies in exchange for food and supplies. Over time, it has evolved into an internationally connected, narco-trafficking organization that displays little concern for the peasants it once vowed to protect. In recent years, Colombian authorities have become more adept at countering the FARC, forcing it to operate increasingly outside of Colombia. The FARC's transformation from a local insurgency into an internationally connected one is the focus of this article. Using social network analysis it identifies key leaders who are tied to this transformation and discusses implications concerning the FARC's future.     

It's Easier to Decapitate a Snake than It Is a Hydra: An Analysis of Colombia's Targeted Killing Program

While the use of targeted killings by the United States and Israel has received the most press coverage, Colombia has also utilized targeted killings in its conflict with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Utilizing an original dataset, this study quantitatively gauges the effectiveness of Colombia's targeted killing program, by examining the influence of FARC leadership deaths upon the number and severity of FARC attacks during the years 2004 to 2011. The results suggest that the Colombian government's killing of FARC leaders has been effective in decreasing the number of attacks, but not the severity of attacks     

Networks and Armies: Structuring Rebellion in Colombia and Afghanistan

Until recently, the importance of organizational factors in the understanding of the variance of the behavior of state challengers had not been recognized. New studies and theories have underscored its crucial character. This article contends that challengers can be placed in a continuum constituted by two opposed polar types, army like and network associations, and compare the Afghan Taliban's and the Colombian Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—FARC)'s organizational principles from this point of view. The main claim is that organizationally inspired explanations behave much better than resource inspired ones when accounting for the differences between the Taliban and the FARC.     

The Colombia–Ecuador Armed Crisis of March 2008: The Practice of Targeted Killing and Incursions against Non-State Actors Harbored at Terrorist Safe Havens in a Third Party State

This article analyzes the 2008 Colombia–Ecuador armed crisis in the light of the practice of targeted killings and incursions against non-state actors harbored at terrorist safe havens in a third party state. The Colombian use of force against Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—FARC) is discussed in the context of use of force in International Law regarding the right of self-defense against non-states actors and third state parties’ obligation to deny passive support. It is argued that the Colombia situation is similar to the situation faced by Israel and Turkey.     

Capital punishment: The fragmentation of Colombia and the crisis of the nation-state

The Colombian nation-state is in its worst period of crisis since the infamous Violencia of the late 1940s and 1950s. State power is being contested by a number of groups: paramilitaries, the revolutionary Left, drug cartels and corrupt high-level officials. But these latest challenges must be set in a wider historical context: a 200-year history of failed attempts by the oligarchy to forge a stable modern nation-state without undermining their dominant position in the Colombian polity. The writing of a new constitution in 1991, the first since 1886, was an attempt to address many of the above problems, including the granting of special powers to the executive to deal with civil unrest, the need for a decentralised and pluralised political landscape and constitutional guarantees for minority and indigenous representation and rights. However, constitutional change has also taken place in the context of the consolidation of the globalisation project and the practical effects of the new constitution have been its provision of legal and administrative measures to facilitate the neoliberal restructuring of the economy, a process which, over the past 10 years, has been a devastating form of 'capital punishment' for the Colombian underclasses and has contributed to the further fragmentation of the nation.     

Narcotization as Security Dilemma: The FARC and Drug Trade in Colombia

This article addresses the relationship between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the cocaine trade in Colombia, and implications for the FARC's complete demobilization under the 2016 peace agreement. The article identifies two phases of FARC interaction with drug markets. During the regulation phase (1982–1991), the FARC regulated the coca economy and charged protection rents. During vertical integration (1991–present), the FARC directly participated in drug markets. Contrary to conventional approaches, the article adopts the concept of the security dilemma to argue that FARC integration in drug markets was a strategic response to threats from paramilitaries and narcotics traffickers.     

A Crime–Terror Nexus? Thinking on Some of the Links between Terrorism and Criminality 1

Decreasing state sponsorship for terrorism in the post-9/11 environment has pressed terrorist groups to find alternative sources of financial support. Some groups have created their own “in-house” criminal capabilities, for example FARC, the LTTE, and Al Qaeda. Several analysts have argued that this “mutation” in organizational form may lead terrorist groups to ally with organized crime, whereas others have suggested that distinct organizational and ideological differences between the two will preclude cooperation. Drawing on both accounts, it is argued in this article that the degree of a terrorist group's organizational capacity and need are key predictors of the types of crime they will engage in, while ideological (political) distinctiveness will preclude fully symbiotic cooperation between terrorists and organized crime groups.     

The birth of a bill market

In the economic literature concerning the money and capital markets of less developed countries, one half‐truth has persisted, namely that L.D.C. governments face a long and difficult task if they attempt to create bill markets. This paper presents a startling bit of counterevidence from Colombian experience, where a functioning government bill market arose almost before the government was aware that it was issuing bills. The implication is clear: it is only difficult to establish bill markets when the effort consists of the attempted creation of an artificial demand for bills at unrealistic interest yields. Finally, it is argued that L.D.C. governments may not have been foolish in so long ignoring the virtues of functioning bill markets.     

Political violence in Ecuador and the AVC

Abstract

Since its return in 1979 Ecuador's civilian constitutional government has been marred by continuous political violence. The newest and most dangerous challenge to regime stability has surfaced over the past few years in the domestic terrorist organization, the ¡Alfaro Vive, Carajo! (AVC). Beginning as a small, student‐led subversive group in 1983, the AVC now appears in coordination with the neighboring Colombian M‐19 and Peruvian Sendero Luminoso guerrillas and in cooperation with regional narcotraficantes. Determined government efforts, supported by the United States, have failed decisively to uproot and destroy the AVC.     

Uprooting or Sowing Violence?: Coca Eradication and Guerrilla Violence in Colombia

Belligerent nonstate actors including terrorist organizations often exploit illicit economies to fund their activities. In Colombia numerous belligerent groups are involved in illegal narcotics markets. For more than 20 years, the Colombian government has responded with targeted eradication of illicit crops, intending to undermine the groups' sources of revenue while simultaneously disrupting the illicit drug economy. Despite its duration, this policy's effect on guerrilla violence remains unclear. Examining the potential for violent backlash to these tactics, this research note assesses the impact of aerial coca crop eradication in Colombia from 2004–2005 on domestic Colombian guerrilla kidnappings, assassinations, and terrorism.     

Colombia at War: The Search for a Peace Diplomacy

This essay analyzes Colombian foreign policy over the last three decades with specific emphasis on Bogota's peace diplomacy from 1978 up to 2000 in the context of an ongoing and degrading internal war. Initially, it assumes a modified realist perspective that links international relations with domestic structures. Then, the text defines three models of Colombian peaceful diplomacy according to the purposes, the means, and the rationales employed by the administrations that covered the above-mentioned period. After empirically evaluating the governments of Presidents Turbay, Betancur, Barco, Gaviria, and Samper and the first two years of the presidency of Pastrana, the article concludes with an assessment of the country's peace diplomacy and its impact on internal violence and instability. The foreign policies of the six different mandates show that Colombia never developed an overall, consensual state strategy towards peace, that the multiple peaceful diplomacies were partially successful in terms of sustaining the political regime and that, notwithstanding the latter, the successive governments failed to achieve a genuine resolution to domestic war. Finally, the article calls for a serious, active, and simultaneous state foreign policy and citizen's diplomacy in favor of peace.     

Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy in Colombia: Effects on the Real Exchange Rate in the 1990s

This article examines the causes and effects of the real exchange rate appreciation in Colombia during the 1990s. The substantial appreciation of the real exchange rate during the 1990s was an important factor contributing to the economic crisis of 1998-2000. While a number of Colombian economists have argued that the real appreciation was an equilibrating response to real shocks, such as rising fiscal deficits, petroleum discoveries, and increased productivity, this paper argues that nominal variables (including the nominal exchange rate, monetary policy and capital flows) also played an important role. These transitory shocks caused the real exchange rate to overshoot its long-run equilibrium, contributing to the recent economic crisis and the necessity for the large nominal depreciation of the peso in 1998-99.     

Reform and regulation of electricity in colombia -uk experiences taken across the atlantic

The Colombian reform of its electricity industry was inspired in the British experience. The theoretical support and the actual application of the reform in the UK and Colombia are examined in this paper. Both theory and the British experience show the importance of designing an appropriate institutional framework for the sector that takes into account its specific features. The main challenges presented by the reform in Colombia are the control of the concentration of property, the introduction of antitrust and anticorruption mechanisms, as well as the development of new managerial skills that are required to confront the complex dynamics of the new environment.     

The geopolitical economy of social policy in the Philippines: securitisation,emerging powers and multilateral policies

Recent geopolitical and economic changes have altered global social policy formation. The Bretton Woods multilateral development agencies (MDAs) have selectively incorporated ideas emerging from developing country states and decision makers, with a recent increased acceptance of social transfers as part of renewed efforts at poverty alleviation based on social risk management. There has been an instance in the use and promotion of conditional cash transfer (CCT) policies by MDAs. CCTs were a product of the emergence of a neo-structuralist welfare regime (understood as an ideal type) in Latin America – an attempt to reconcile neoliberal strategies of development with aspirations for guaranteed minimum incomes. The Bretton Woods and regional development bank MDAs have facilitated the adoption of CCTs in other developing countries, including the Phillipines. Here, a combination of actions by national political actors and MDAs has resulted in the implementation of a securitised and compliance-focused version of CCTs derived from the Colombian security state. Although poor Philippine households welcome income assistance, CCTs have acted to enforce further state monitoring without altering the national-based political and economic processes that replicate poverty.     

Conflict-Induced Displacement and Violence in Colombia

Recent work in the refugee literature finds that both insurgents hiding in camps and aid to refugees may increase violence. This article assesses whether this theory applies to Conflict Induced Displaced People (IDPs). Specifically, it asks if the arrival of IDPs increases leftist violence in Colombia. Colombia has high numbers of IDPs, significant insurgent violence, and available sub-national data to enable an examination of IDP flows on leftist violence. In the Colombian case, the arrival of conflict induced displaced people is not associated with increased leftist violence.     

Criminality and Armed Groups: A Comparative Study of FARC and Paramilitary Groups in Colombia

Terrorist groups and armed insurgents regularly exploit illicit markets to launder money, traffic illegal goods, and purchase arms. In such an environment, the line between armed political organizations and criminal groups appears to break down. However, through a comparative study of paramilitary groups and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—FARC) in Colombia, this article finds that group goals, the political environment, and membership strongly influence the types of criminal activities a given armed groups undertakes. Thus, the membership and political agenda of sub-state armed groups not only distinguishes them from criminal groups—organized for and motivated by economic gain—but also shapes their criminal behavior.     

Demobilization of Paramilitaries in Colombia: Transformation or Transition?

Historically, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reinsertion (DDR) has provided a useful means to terminate conflicts. Since being catapulted to office in August 2002 with 53 percent of the vote of 46.45 percent of the voters, ¹ 1. IFES Election Guide, available at (http://www.electionguide.org/results.php?ID=1011). Colombian President Álvaro Uribe has vigorously pursued a demobilization program, both individual and collective. However, despite the fact that over 40,000 combatants have demobilized under these programs, evidence is growing that this latest round of Colombian DDR is merely transitioning, rather than terminating, violence in that Andean country.     

Pardon,punishment, and amnesia: three African post‐conflict methods

This article examines the thesis that A´lvaro Uribe, the new president of Colombia (2002–06) is a neopopulist. Such a thesis holds that Uribe can be classified as a neopopulist given his election to the presidency after breaking ranks with the Liberal Party, his massive support from largely unorganised citizens, his government under a state-of-siege decree, his promotion of a national referendum, and his frequent public meetings with citizens throughout Colombia. I reject this thesis, arguing that Uribe's method of winning the presidency did not constitute a significant departure from previous practice in Colombia's system of fragmented political parties. His personality lacks a strong charismatic aura. More significantly, Uribe made no concerted effort to cultivate political support among the masses. In office Uribe's state-of-siege powers have been curtailed by decisions of the Constitutional Court, which he has, significantly, been careful to respect. His proposed referendum had to be negotiated with—and was significantly transformed by—the Colombian Congress. And Uribe's public meetings consist largely in his listening to citizen complaints, rather than giving electrifying public orations. A close examination of Uribe's history and governing style shows him to be a talented politician but not a populist.