Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda's Financial Network Is Likely to Withstand the Current War on Terrorist Financing

On 24 September 2001, President Bush announced the first stage of the War on Terrorism with an attack against the terrorist financial infrastructure. Since then, the impact of this attack on Al Qaeda's ability to operate has been minimal, for three reasons. First, Al Qaeda has built a strong network of financiers and operatives who are both frugally minded and business savvy. As a result, terrorist finances are often hidden in legitimate and illegitimate businesses and disguised as commodities and cash. Second, Al Qaeda has learned to effectively leverage the global financial system of capital markets. Small financial transfers, underregulated Islamic banking networks and informal transfer systems throughout the world make it almost impossible to stop Al Qaeda from moving money. Third, Al Qaeda has built a significant base of Islamic charities in Saudi Arabia with international divisions that have not been scrutinized or controlled by the regime. As a result, Al Qaeda's sophisticated financial network may be able to sustain international efforts to disrupt it. Financial regulations imposed to reduce terrorist financing must be applied more broadly and be supported by significant resources. An improvement in the war on terrorist financing requires better international coordination, more effective use of financial regulations, and regulating the Saudi Arabian charity structure.‐     

The Tottenham Ayatollah and The Hook-Handed Cleric: An Examination of All Their Jihadi Children

Omar Bakri Mohammed (the Tottenham Ayatollah) and Abu Hamza al-Masri (the hook-handed cleric) are two of the more infamous figures to emerge from what critics called “Londonistan.” However, they should be remembered not only for their rhetoric and appearance, but also for the fact that their respective organizations, Bakri's Al Muhajiroun, and Hamza's Supporters of Shariah based at the Finsbury Park Mosque, have been the connective thread through most Islamist terrorist plots that have emanated from the United Kingdom. This article maps out the network of terrorist plots in the United Kingdom and abroad that appears to have emanated from the networks around these two men with a view to understanding better how the connections remained unclear for so long and how understanding of the networks evolved over time.     

Networks in the Policy Process: An International Perspective

Abstract

This article (and more broadly this special issue) indicate that various types of policy networks, including governance networks, social networks, proto‐networks, and issue networks are defining the way that policy processes take place in various parts of the world. By focusing on network behavior in Africa, eastern Europe, and Denmark, it is clear that interorganizational cohesion, accesibility, trust generation, and “framing” issues are central to understanding network policy outcomes. Important implications regarding links between network characteristics and democracy are also suggested.     

Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption

Because of the importance of technology to the operations of modern terrorist groups, the factors that affect the technological sophistication of extreme organizations are of great interest. In this article, the process through which terrorist groups seek out and deploy new technology is examined by bringing to bear the deep literature that exists on technology adoption by commercial organizations. A framework is described that delineates not only the factors that influence a group's decision-making processes surrounding new technology but also the obstacles that stand in the way of the successful absorption and use of unfamiliar technologies by a terrorist organization. This framework, by taking a holistic view of the entire technology adoption process, sets out a methodology to both more reasonably predict the outcome of a group's technology-seeking efforts and to speculate about its future innovation efforts. Such a technology focused viewpoint provides a route to more fully inform risk assessment, especially with regard to the low probabilityhigh consequence technologies that have served as the focus of much recent counterterrorist deliberation. The lessons provided by the framework with respect to weapons of mass destruction terrorism and to novel counterterrorist routes are discussed.     

Measuring Network Structure

Networks have been a research issue in public administration for many years. Because of the difficulty of measuring networks, they have often been treated as a metaphor, a conceptual scheme, or a management technique (networking). The work on networks in public administration is almost all of the case study and rarely of the comparative case variety. This article presents the results of two studies of networks using social network analysis as a technique for studying structural relationships between organizations. This technique is utilized to show both the research and practical potential of network analysis as an evaluation methodology for organizations that jointly produce a service. In the first study, the network provides mental health services to seriously mentally ill adults. In the second study, the network attempts to prevent young people from abusing drugs and alcohol. The two studies were undertaken for different reasons. The first was an elaborate comparative study of four mental health networks and the relationship between network design and performance. The second was a much simpler consulting effort to help a local prevention partnership create linkages to other community organizations. However, in both of the studies the goal was to measure the structural ties in the network based on various types of relationships that exist in a given field of practice. These linkages are ties that bind the network together and become data that can be used to compare networks on their degree and type of integration. The article makes the argument that links in a network are one way that scholars can compare networks in similar or different policy domains. At the same time, the article argues that analysing linkages in an organization's network is an effective and practical means of determining how well integrated any given organization is in a network.     

Groups,Networks, or Movements: A Command-and-Control-Driven Approach to Classifying Terrorist Organizations and Its Application to Al Qaeda

Appropriately describing the properties and defining the boundaries of terrorist groups is frequently challenging. Public and policy discussion of Al Qaeda as a group, network, or broad social movement is described as an example of this problem, with an emphasis on the consequences of placing a terrorist organization in each of these different categories. To resolve the confusion that such uncertainties can introduce into discussion, an approach is described focusing on the strength of command-and-control linkages within an organization for laying out the differences between groups, networks, and movements and defining the boundaries between them.     

The Hofstad Group: The New Face of Terrorist Networks in Europe

Between 2003 and 2006, members of the so-called Hofstad group planned various terrorist attacks inside the Netherlands, including the assassination of controversial filmmaker Theo van Gogh. Amateurish in its modus operandi and composed mostly of second-generation Muslim immigrants, Hofstad perfectly exemplifies the new terrorist networks that are growing in most European countries. Its perception of Europe as a battlefield of jihad, no less critical than Iraq or Afghanistan, signifies the break from the networks that operated in the continent in the 1990s. Its amorphous structure and lack of ties with international networks make Hofstad the quintessential example of the homegrown terrorism that is worrying European intelligence agencies.     

A Community-Level Comparison of Terrorism Movements in the United States

The aim of this article is to identify characteristics of communities where persons indicted under terrorism charges lived, planned, and prepared prior to carrying out a terrorist act. Guided by a model of community deterioration and using data from the Terrorism and Extremist Violence in the United States database, findings indicate: (1) half of all census tracts where terrorists planned and prepared for attacks were located in the western United States; nearly one fourth were in the Northeast; (2) nationally, terrorist pre-incident activity is more likely to occur in census tracts with lower percentages of high school graduates for Al Qaeda and associated movements (AQAM) terrorism but not for far-right terrorism, higher percentages of households living below the poverty level, more urban places, and more unemployed; and (3) communities with terrorist pre-incident activity are different types of places compared to those where there was no pre-incident activity, generally between different regions of the country, and specifically in terms of differences across far-right and AQAM terrorist movements.     

Failed States and the Spread of Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa

Plagued by systematic state failure, sub-Saharan Africa's failed states have helped facilitate internationally sponsored terrorist networks and operations. However, until recently, this type of activity was primarily relegated to North Africa and the Horn. But that has begun to change. Now, what was once a seemingly benign terrorist presence in sub-Saharan Africa is starting to transform into a movement, with states such as Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) now lending arms, financial support, and radical militants to the extremist jihadist movement of internationally sponsored terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda. Further, with the recent bombings in Kenya and Somalia, and the failed bombing attempt on a U.S. airliner by a Nigerian national, it is becoming increasingly evident that internationally sponsored terrorist networks have found a permanent home in sub-Saharan Africa and within the hearts and minds of its people, which poses significant challenges for the international community, given the region's patchwork of failed states, where terrorists can easily hide and thrive. Consequently, this study discusses how the conditions of state failure have fostered support for internationally sponsored terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa. Terrorist groups are now actively recruiting more militants from within the region and popular support for extremist acts is on the rise in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the article argues sub-Saharan Africa will soon become the site for the next generation of terrorists, and the next wave of terrorist activity.     

暗网环境下恐怖主义信息挖掘与分析

随着互联网和人工智能的快速发展,恐怖主义活动方式变得更为隐秘。网络恐怖主义活动空间从表网的在线社区与视频分享平台转向暗网黑市交易和暗网论坛。针对暗网节点通信和交易信息高度匿名等特点,相应的反恐工作需要采取新的技术手段,以深度切入恐怖分子用于扩大影响的暗网空间。为此,可以设计和优化专门适用于暗网的聚焦爬虫工具,挖掘恐怖主义活动信息;可以搭建涉恐事件数据模型,分析恐怖组织可能的线下攻击手段;可以利用社会网络分析和超链接分析方法,定位暗网内恐怖主义隐蔽社区和危险用户集群。通过准确把握暗网中的匿名恐怖主义活动规律,抓住安全监控与防范的重点、难点,综合施策,以及适时制定和精准实施反恐网络安全策略,能够最大限度遏制暗网恐怖主义的危害,保护国家安全和人民利益。     

Archetypal Terrorist Events in the United States

This research presents a typology of terrorist events rather than the more common typologies of terrorist groups and ideologies. Archetypal analysis, a quantitative methodology to identify pure types, was used with data in START's Global Terrorism Database to identify archetypal attacks in the United States. A set of seven archetypal events was identified including abortion bombings, poisonings, Aryan hate, hostage-taking, fire/bomb for damage, assassination, and the catastrophic Big Bad. These archetypes may be useful for training and exercising for events with additional potential value for developing theory of terrorist events.     

Building the Human Bomb: The Case of the 16 May 2003 Attacks in Casablanca

The terrorist attacks that took place on 16 May 2003 in Casablanca were a result of internal factors. These factors include the terrorists" view of their faith, poverty, and under-education. The links between the terrorists in Morocco and the Al Qaeda network, despite their ideological similarities, are not of a “command and control” nature. The relationship can be described as a franchise operation. The attacks resulted in the alienation of the population from movements attempting to use Islam in politics. Consequently, the attacks backfired on the Moroccan Islamist movement.     

Belgian and French Foreign Fighters in Iraq 2003–2005: A Comparative Case Study

Efforts to understand the distinction between foreign fighting and domestic terrorist acts have focused for the most part at the macro level. This study investigates if this difference is observed at the network level. The Iraq foreign fighter mobilization, which was significant, both numerically and, in terms of its visibility, is used for this analysis. The participation of Belgian and French foreign fighters is examined due to the perceived level of threat they posed in the period 2003–2005 and while absolute numbers are relatively low, these two countries may have provided just under a quarter of the all European foreign fighters in this period. Observations are generated and then compared to research on domestic attack networks in Europe and the United Kingdom. The article finds that the two networks were involved in foreign fighter activity and did not engage in domestic attack activity. Involvement in domestic attacks occurred at a later time via individuals who had left the network, individuals on the periphery of the original foreign fighter network or individuals who unsuccessfully attempted to engage in foreign fighter activity.     

Al Qaeda's London Branch: Patterns of Domestic and Transnational Network Integration

This article seeks to shed light on the ongoing debate about the extent of Al Qaeda's involvement in homegrown jihadist conspiracies in the West. Focusing on the London-based jihadist movement in the 1998–2008 decade, the article uses network analysis to test the domestic and transnational integration of Western networks. The evidence stems from an extensive database of individuals involved in jihadist terrorist conspiracies in the West compiled by the authors. Results show that Al Qaeda developed a branch organization in the United Kingdom during that period. A sociogram of U.S.-based networks is indicative of a dispersed topography, and a comparison shows the British model may not be representative of Western networks overall.     

Is It Ideology or Desperation: Why Do Organizations Deploy Women in Violent Terrorist Attacks?

Why do some terrorist organizations deploy women on the front lines and in violent attacks? This study explores the social conditions, economic factors, and organizational characteristics that might explain women's participation in violent terrorist activity. With a new data set of 395 terrorist organizations, women's participation in terrorist attacks was quantified and coded. The logistic regression analysis results suggest that women's educational attainment, social rights, terrorist organization's age and size, and the level of a country's economic development are important predictors of the deployment of women in terrorist violence while a terrorist group's ideological or religious orientation and the level of democracy do not significantly influence the likelihood of women's participation.     

Acting discursively: the development of UK organic food and farming policy networks

This paper documents the early evolution of UK organic food and farming policy networks and locates this empirical focus in a theoretical context concerned with understanding the contemporary policy-making process. While policy networks have emerged as a widely acknowledged empirical manifestation of governance, debate continues as to the concept's explanatory utility and usefulness in situations of network and policy transformation since, historically, policy networks have been applied to "static" circumstances. Recognizing this criticism, and in drawing on an interpretivist perspective, this paper sees policy networks as enacted by individual actors whose beliefs and actions construct the nature of the network. It seeks to make links between the characteristics of the policy network and the policy outcomes through the identification of discursively constructed "storylines" that form a tool for consensus building in networks. This study analyses the functioning of the organic policy networks through the discursive actions of policy-network actors.     

Terrorism as Transnational Advocacy: An Organizational and Tactical Examination

This article attempts to shed light on the dynamics and machinations within terrorist organizations by incorporating a heretofore overlooked literature which is directly applicable, that of transnational advocacy networks (TANs). Terror networks have been described using every possible analogy, from multinational corporations to organized crime to the anthropomorphic classic “cut off the head, and the body will die.” In reality, terrorist organizations function in much the same way, and using many of the same techniques, as transnational advocacy networks concerned with issues like the environment or human rights. By describing these characteristics, and comparing TANs and Terror TANs (TTANs), this article aims to offer insight into the tactics and motivations that define modern, as well as the much heralded post-modern, terrorism.     

Methodological Triangulation in the Analysis of Terrorist Networks

The conceptualization of terrorist groups as networks is increasingly common to terrorism studies, although methods of analysis vary widely. Contrary to common understandings, the integration of computational and qualitative methods is possible even with limited (small-n) data. The triangulation of different methods can produce insights overlooked by the use of any single method and validate findings across methods. This article demonstrates some of the possibilities for integrating qualitative and quantitative methods for network analysis using Raffaello Pantucci's recent article, “The Tottenham Ayatollah and The Hook-Handed Cleric: An Examination of All Their Jihadi Children.”     

STRATEGIC LINKS IN A CUT‐THROAT WORLD: RETHINKING THE ROLE AND RELATIONSHIPS OF AUSTRALIAN MINISTERIAL STAFF

Ministerial staff relationships form part of the networks within the core executive. This article uses data from a comprehensive empirical study of Australian ministerial staff to explore advisers' horizontal relationships with each other. It finds that the interactions between Australian ministerial advisers are a key part of their role, are highly valued by ministers and public servants, and are an important element of the cabinet system. The informal links and networks between partisan advisers are underpinned by commonly understood norms of behaviour and a clear power structure. This partisan arena of the core executive has become important to ministers and the collective functioning of government.