Terrorism and overkill

The purpose of this paper is to review the international terrorist activities of the last half century of this millennium and to make a case for needed changes in U.S. efforts to curb the growth of terrorism. Unless we can muster a unified front against global terrorism and organized crime, we are in danger of carrying these burdens with us into the new millennium. Whereas most discussions are focused on how to respond during or after a terrorist event, this paper explores measures for averting international terrorism disasters before they occur. With the growing availability of weapons of mass destruction and computer technology to terrorist and organized crime groups, there is a growing potential for disasters of proportions never before experienced. Consequently the risks are becoming too great to continue with a reactive approach to terrorism. The paper begins with a discussion of how the basis for international terrorism has changed since its modern form began in the 1960s. It then extrapolates the evolutionary trends of terrorism to make projections for what we can expect in the future. Finally, it presents a number of practical ideas for preventing terrorist actions before they occur, beginning with an argument for redefining terrorism in terms that enable us to organize more effectively against it.     

Rewarding Fire with Fire: Effects of Retaliation on Terrorist Group Dynamics

Abstract

Comparative studies of the psychology of terrorism indicate that there is no one terrorist mindset, A theme in common among the disparate groups is the strong need of marginal alienated individuals to join a group of like‐minded individuals with a similar world view that “it's us against them, and they are the cause of our problems.” This strong need to belong gives particular force to the power of group dynamics. While the ideology is the glue that holds the group together and serves as the rationale for its actions, terrorists do not commit acts of terrorism for ideological reasons. The amelioration of the societal injustice which they indicate incites and justifies their terrorism does not reduce the lure of terrorism, because of the powerful hold of the group on its members.

Paradoxically, a policy of reactive retaliation with the goal of deterring terrorist acts may have the opposite effect and reinforce the mind set of the terrorist. For the group under threat, the external danger has the consequence of reducing external divisiveness and uniting the group against the outside enemy. The survival of the group is paramount because of the sense of group identity it provides.

Identifying the locus of control is of crucial significance in estimating the effects of counter‐terrorist policies upon a terrorist group. For the autonomous terrorist cell, active retaliation may reinforce the cohesion of the group; for the corporate terrorist organization, issues of organizational survival may become paramount. Neither the terrorist group nor the terrorist organization can be forced to give up terrorism, for to do so would be to lose their reason for being. For state‐supported and directed terrorist groups on the other hand, the terrorist group in effect serves as a paramilitary group under central government control. In this situation, group and organizational considerations are less relevant, for the object of the counter‐terrorist policy is the government of the sponsoring state. Since the survival of the state and national interests are the primary values, retaliatiatory policies, can, in the short run, have a deterring effect. In the long run, the most effective anti‐terrorist policy is one which renders the terrorist career less attractive to potential members, facilitates terrorists leaving the group, and reduces external support.     

The Evolution of the U.S. Government's Annual Report on Terrorism: A Personal Commentary

This article examines the evolution of a key U.S. Government annual publication on terrorism. From its inception in 1977 to the present, the U.S. Government's annual terrorism report has been the primary statistical compiler of international terrorist incidents. Given the magnitude of this task and the inherent difficulty in defining the term “terrorism,” this report has been controversial and criticized. Love it or hate it, for many decades, this report was the sole source of statistics on international terrorism. The author argues that despite its flaws, this unclassified annual report does provide value and usually paints a fairly accurate picture of the international terrorism landscape. Over the last two years however, there have been claims that this report has become politicized and tailored to fit the views of the administration on the terrorist threat. The author rejects this charge and claims that this publication has been objective and that it has evolved over time into a more credible and useful report.     

Terrorism and the Kenyan Public

Since 11 September 2001, terrorism has been a global security threat. One of the partners in the war on terrorism is Kenya. Considering Kenya"s recent experience with terrorist acts, their effects on its public psyche, and Kenya"s reactions to them in domestic and foreign policies, this study presents perceptions on terrorism from an exploratory survey in Kenya. Respondents feel most threatened not by terrorism but by AIDS and local criminals. Among terrorist acts, the most threatening include suicide terrorism, a plane crash, and stabbing attacks. Media reports on terrorism not only intensify feelings of anxiety and helplessness but also strengthen feelings for both peaceful and revengeful reactions. In order to prevent terrorist attacks, routine security checks, recognizing a Palestinian right to statehood, and intelligence collaboration with the CIA and Mosad are considered the most effective measures. Kenya"s commitment to the war on terrorism may be less a response to Kenyans" perceptions of terrorist threats than a policy to support the United States against terrorists in exchange for U.S. support against AIDS and for political stability, democracy, pluralism, and economic development.     

The analytical foundations of extortionate terrorism

Extortionate terrorism is the threatened use of terrorist acts to gain concessions from the victim. In this article, game theory is used to seek answers to the following questions: (a) When will people resort to extortionate terrorism? (b) When will extortionate terrorism succeed and when will it fail? (c) What constitutes an “optimal” threat, i.e., what bribes, extortion, ransom, or payoff should be asked in exchange for which hostages or property? (d) When should unsuccessful threats be carried out and when should they be abandoned? (e) How should a victim choose among potential responses to specific terrorist threats and to the general problem of terrorism? Two different game theoretic models of terrorism are examined— one using ordinal preferences, the other von Neumann‐Mor‐genstern utilities. Terrorism is considered not simply as isolated incidents; institutions are potential victims of repeated terrorism. The terrorist and the victim, in formulating a response to each incident, are guided not only by present gains and losses, but by the effect their response has on others’ perception of their credibility and resolve—two long‐run variables.     

The threat of international terrorism in the united states: The police response

Abstract

As the 1990–1991 Gulf crisis unfolded, leaders of the UN coalition against Iraq became increasingly concerned about the possibility of terrorism accompanying the initiation of hostilities with Baghdad. Such concerns were reinforced by Iraqi warnings and by Baghdad's long association with international terrorist movements. Ultimately, however, the Iraqis proved unable to make effective use of terrorism to support their war effort. This failure resulted for a variety of reasons including effective counterterrorism measures by the allies. Additionally, a number of other nations with terrorist linkages pressured their terrorist clients to refrain from helping Saddam Hussein. They did this for reasons of their own that nevertheless supported allied strategy. Finally, the Iraqis’ lack of any precrisis preparation for terrorist action meant that they were simply unable to mount more than a few ineffective operations.     

France faced with terrorism

Abstract

France is an interesting laboratory for studying terrorism, or antiterrorism, not because extreme violence has been committed on a large scale as in Lebanon, but because, faced with diverse terrorist actions over a short period, France has worked out and considerably modified a policy for dealing with terrorism. The subject herein is not terrorism but the official response to it, namely counterterrorist policy and actions.     

Trends in Transnational Terrorism and Implications for U.S. National Security and U.S. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act

The unprecedented losses brought about by the attacks of 11 September 2001 have cast the issue of terrorism risk insurance into sharp relief. In particular, it has raised questions as to whether attacks on this scale are an insurable risk and the extent to which the private insurance industry is able and/or willing to price such risks independent of a Federal safety net. Although the Bush administration has committed to renew the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) to offset the human and materiel costs that might result from future cataclysmic terrorist strikes taking place on U.S. soil, it is not apparent that this legislative framework is relevant to the type of extremist contingencies that the United States is likely to face over the short-to-medium term. Any long-term solution to providing insurance in America will necessarily need to go beyond TRIA's existing framework by dropping the “foreign interest” designation for certified attacks; including some sort of supplemental program that includes mandatory coverage for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) assaults; and investigating ways to increase the take-up rates of terrorism insurance by lowering its cost to the customer. An oversight board mandated to evaluate the Act's performance and relevance to evolving terrorist trends would also be useful.     

Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe

Abstract

This article investigates the importance of the invasion and occupation of Iraq as motivation for recent acts of jihadist terrorism in Western Europe. It analyses the mass casualty terrorist attack attributed to a group of Islamist militants in Madrid on 11 March 2004, and the killing of a Dutch filmmaker on the streets of Amsterdam by an Al Qaeda–inspired terrorist network. The first case has been assumed to be mainly motivated by the Iraq war, whereas the other case has been perceived as an act by an individual, motivated by domestic factors in Holland. The article situates these acts of terrorism within the theory of so-called spillover effects from armed conflicts to international terrorism. It argues that the Iraq war was a significant motivational factor for the terrorists in both cases, but that the terrorists linked the Iraq issue with perceived injustices against Muslims in Europe and globally.     

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Russia: Contending Paradigms and Current Perspectives

The most outstanding trend in contemporary conflicts has been the fusion of the threats from terrorism and insurgency. Insurgent threats in many places on the globe today are mistaken as terrorist threats, and counterterrorism (CT) is deployed as the local insurgents come increasingly to resemble their transnational terrorist partners. Such an emphasis on the role of terrorism in insurgencies and the undue focus on CT risks strengthening, rather than severing, the connection between local insurgents and transnational terrorists. Russia's counterterrorist strategy inadvertently transformed the conflict from a contained, nationalist rebellion to a sprawling jihadi insurgency and perversely encouraged the group to resort even more to terrorist tactics. The Russian counterinsurgency has been unsuccessful, as the insurgents are neither demolished as a force nor are they isolated by society. Losing the hearts and minds among the Chechen people is a key reason behind why the Russian operation in Chechnya suffered failures. Too little attention was paid to winning over the “hearts and minds” of the people.     

Misuse of Passports: Identity Fraud,the Propensity to Travel,and International Terrorism

The misuse of passports is intrinsically connected with international terrorism. Terrorist groups and their operatives demonstrate a propensity to travel in order to meet, organize, train, plan, reconnoiter targets, and deploy for attacks. To travel surreptitiously, terrorist activists and operatives typically make use of improperly obtained, altered, or counterfeit passports and visas. The present study addresses three key issues relating to the terrorist misuse of passports: (a) the role of passport misuse in the operational activities of international terrorist networks; (b) the ways in which terrorist elements acquire seemingly genuine passports; and (c) the various international covenants, agreements, and related action plans intended to constrain terrorists’ ability to move surreptitiously across borders. The analysis describes a terrorism cycle, a complex array of key activities that together serve as enablers for international terrorism. The role of passports and surreptitious travel is examined for each stage of this terrorism cycle.     

The predictability of international terrorism: A time‐series analysis

Abstract

The study examines the predictability of international terrorism in terms of the existence of trends, seasonality, and periodicity of terrorist events. The data base used was the RAND Corporation's Chronology of International Terrorism. It contains the attributes of every case of international terrorism from 1968 to 1986 (n = 5,589). The authors applied Box‐Jenkins models for a time‐series analysis of the occurrence of terrorist events as well as their victimization rates. The analysis revealed that occurrence of terrorist events is far from being random: There is a clear trend and an almost constant periodicity of one month that can be best described by a first‐order moving average model. The fit of this model was tested both by statistical diagnostics and the accuracy of predictions based on this model compared to actual occurrence. However, the series of victimization rates did not reveal any predictability aside from the overall trend of an increasing level of victimization. The findings of the study are discussed by two approaches: the contagiousness of terrorism and the concept of media‐oriented terrorism. These two concepts, separately or combined, may explain some of the patterns revealed in the occurrence of terrorist events. However, they both highlight the part played by the mass media, either as a target for publicity‐seeking terrorists or as an influential factor in the process of contagion.     

The Changing Security Agenda in Southeast Asia: Globalization,New Terror,and the Delusions of Regionalism

One of the distinguishing features of international terrorism the past fifteen years has been the resurgence and proliferation of terrorist groups motivated by a religious imperative. Such groups are far more lethal than their secular counterparts, regarding violence as a divine duty or sacramental act conveyed by sacred text and imparted by clerical authority. Moreover, religious terrorism is not restricted to Islamic terrorist groups exclusively in the Middle East. The same characteristics—the legitimization of violence based on religious precepts, the sense of profound alienation and isolation, and the attendant preoccupation with the elimination of a broadly defined category of “enemies”—are also apparent among American Christian white supremacists, among some radical Jewish messianic terrorist movements in Israel, and among radical Sikh movements in India. Finally, as many of these groups embrace strong millennialist or apocalyptic beliefs, we may be on the cusp of a new and potentially more dangerous era of terrorism as the year 2000—the literal millennium—approaches.     

From Words to Action: Exploring the Relationship between a Group's Value References and Its Likelihood of Engaging in Terrorism

This study explored the dynamics of terrorism through a content analysis of terrorist and nonterrorist groups' documents. Thirteen terrorist groups were matched with nonterrorist controls, and their documents were coded for the values they attributed to their opponents and their own group. Relative to controls, terrorist groups attributed higher dominance values to their opponents and higher dominance, morality, and culture values to themselves in the full sample and in a predictive sample of documents issued before terrorism. These findings indicate that the values groups express in their documents--and particularly the values they attribute to themselves--may predict whether they will engage in terrorism.‐     

In search of an anti‐terrorism policy: Lessons from the reagan era

Abstract

During the 1980s, terrorist activities became a real threat to Americans at home and abroad. The Reagan administration's policy response to this threat was encumbered by several factors, both of commission and omission. Dominant anti‐communist ideological perceptions in the administration at times blurred the disparate causes of international terrorism and the varied motives of terrorist groups. The administration was unable to back up its words with consistent, resolute policy action. And U.S. intelligence operations were not able to detect or prevent several terrorist strikes against U.S. facilities, especially in the Middle East.

The U.S. air raid on Libya served notice that the United States would strike militarily at state sponsors of terrorism. It also called into the question the Reagan administration's willingness to adhere strictly to international law in its efforts to prosecute certain governments who aid and abet terrorist groups. There is no policy panacea for terrorism; terrorism can only be countered by a resolute policy which combines protection, prevention, and prosecution, including military retaliation if it is necessary and can be carried out proportionate to the aggrieved terrorist offense. The lessons gleaned from the Reagan administration's anti‐terrorist experience are both constructive and instructive. However, only if more deliberate efforts are made to integrate these lessons into policy considerations will they become utilitarian assets to counter terrorist activities, at home and abroad.     

Medical technology in combatting terrorism

State‐sponsored terrorism is a form of coercion, backed up by the threat and use of violence, to achieve political ends. These terrorist tactics also involve signaling of intentions and responses between the terrorist sponsor and those whom it targets. Accordingly this study examines Iranian state sponsorship of anti‐U.S. terrorism in the period of 1980–1990 as an example of political communication aimed at manipulating U.S. policy through the threat and use of violence. Official Iranian media are quantitatively content‐analyzed to demonstrate their systematic use of threat‐projections as warnings and indications to the U.S. in this period.     

Reluctant terrorists? Transcaucasian social-cemocracy, 1901 – 1909

This article discusses the development of Transcaucasian social-democratic terrorism from 1901 to 1909. For two reasons the ‘psychohistorical’ model emphasising the subjective and irrational aspects of terrorism has only limited value for the Transcaucasian case. First, the significance of the contextual factor is powerfully underscored by the phenomenon of workers' ‘economic terrorism’. It was not uncommon even, for workers to blackmail reluctant party organisations into supporting the killing of their enemies. Secondly, the social democrats were not driven by irrational urges but followed a rationally motivated and selective terrorist strategy. They attempted to limit or prevent workers' terrorism from below, the ‘anarchist’ potential of which they considered a threat to the organised mass struggle. They set their hopes on a division of labour, with a militant but mostly peaceful workers' movement and terrorism as the prerogative of the party.     

Fear,Anxiety and the State of Terror

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon marked the advent of an unprecedented preoccupation with terrorism. Although Australia's actual terrorist risk profile remains marginal in comparison with other mortality risks, in times of crisis, the reasoned negotiation of risk is marginalised. Drawing on the findings of qualitative research, this article offers an analysis of how Australians are responding to the threat of terrorism embodied in a developing discourse of the war on terror and how they construct their perceptions of terrorist risk. The findings implicate community fear as a factor that should be considered in the development of counter terrorism strategies that emphasize community engagement as a mechanism for challenging radicalisation in democratic states.