The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media: Similar Framing Patterns in the News Coverage of Women in Politics and in Terrorism

Abstract

Although women have been among the leaders and followers of terrorist organizations throughout the history of modern terrorism, the mass media typically depict women terrorists as interlopers in an utterly male domain. A comparison of the framing patterns in the news about women in politics and the entrenched stereotypes in the coverage of female terrorists demonstrates similarities in the depiction of these legitimate (women in politics) and illegitimate political actors (women in terrorism). Just like the managers of election campaigns are cognizant of the electorate's stereotypical gender perceptions, terrorist organizations know about and exploit cultural gender clichés that are reinforced by the media. The argument here is that the implementation of anti- and counterterrorist policies must not be influenced by the mass-mediated images of female terrorists because they do not reflect reality.     

Terrorism,Crime, and Transformation

This article argues that some of today's terrorist groups have transformed into transnational criminal organization (TCO) who are more interested in profits than politics. This dynamic has important implications for policymakers as some traditional, politically motivated terrorist groups further profit-minded agencies under a political banner. The author argues that there are different degrees of transformation; some terrorists commit criminal acts to support political operations, while others view profit-driven criminal acts as their end game. The articles further argues that unlike some observers suggest, TCOs and terrorist groups will not cooperate with each other to advance aims and interests, instead utilizing their "in-house" capabilities to undertake criminal or political acts.     

Organizational perspectives on the formation and disintegration of terrorist groups

Abstract

This article treats terrorist organizations as political interest groups. Starting from the assumption that terrorists are rational political actors, it follows that organizational considerations will play a role in the formation and decline of terrorist groups, just as is the case in other political organizations. The effects of several factors, including recruitment, ability to provide selective and purposive incentives, the need for entrepreneurial political leadership, competition from other organizations, the ability to attract outside support, and the ability to form coalitions with other groups, are considered.     

What Terrorist Leaders Want: A Content Analysis of Terrorist Propaganda Videos

In recent years, a growing body of empirical research suggests that indiscriminate violence against civilian targets tends to carry substantial political risks compared to more selective violence against military targets. To better understand why terrorist groups sometimes attack politically suboptimal targets, scholars are increasingly adopting a principal-agent framework where the leaders of terrorist groups are understood as principals and lower level members as agents. According to this framework, terrorist leaders are thought to behave as essentially rational political actors, whereas lower level members are believed to harbor stronger non-political incentives for harming civilians, often in defiance of leadership preferences. We test this proposition with an original content analysis of terrorist propaganda videos. Consistent with the principal–agent framework, our analysis demonstrates statistically that terrorist leaders tend to favor significantly less indiscriminate violence than their operatives actually commit, providing unprecedented insight into the incentive structure of terrorist leaders relative to the rank-and-file.     

The Female Jihad: Al Qaeda's Women

When women carry out a suicide attack they undermine the idea of who and what a terrorist is. What is generally not realized is the extent to which women are involved in terrorism. The purpose of this article is to explore and to analyze the multifaceted roles of the women in the movement of Al Qaeda. The argument is that the role of the women the world audience perceives is the one of a suicide bomber but the role of an ideological supporter and operational facilitator is more important for the maintenance of the operational capabilities and the ideological motivation for a terrorist organization. This article argues that the women follow a gender-specific interpretation of the radical ideology, the female Jihad. The concept of the female Jihad means that the women carry out a political act by supporting their male relatives, educating their children in the ideology and facilitating terrorist operations. The female Jihad is defective when the women follow the male Jihad interpretation of the Jihad by carrying out attacks. For the survival of a terrorists organization women are more important when they follow the female version of the ideology. Because the men could get arrested, die in an attack, or could get shot by the security forces, the women continue to take care about the financial issues of the organization and continue to educate the children in the “right” belief. To verify these arguments the article is divided into three parts. The first part will look at the motivation of women participation at a terrorism organization and the motivation of a terrorism organization to use women for its purposes. The second part tries to throw some light on the female suicide bombers who acted under the umbrella of the movement of Al Qaeda. In this part the female terrorist attacks will be analyzed. In the third part Sisterhoods will be explained and the concept of the female Jihad will be analyzed. The findings of this article about the involvement of women in the movement of Al Qaeda will bring us to conclusion that women do play an essential role in these organizations and groups. Following the argument that successful counterterrorism should address both the motivation and the operational capabilities of a terrorist organization there is an essential need for the national security forces to expand their capabilities to look more carefully at women.     

Service-Seeking Behavior,Perceptions of Armed Actors,and Preferences Regarding Governance: Evidence from the Palestinian Territories

Armed non-state actors, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, are visibly engaged in providing social welfare in addition to participating in violence. A number of scholars have suggested that there is a relationship between service provision by terrorist organizations and support from service recipients, and have indicated that terrorist organizations use service provision strategically for this purpose. However, few studies have examined the experiences and opinions of service recipients themselves to understand if services do indeed influence populations' political loyalties and opinions regarding violent activities. Using data from more than 1,000 low to moderate income individuals in Palestine, this study seeks to understand if and how receiving services from a specific organization engenders loyalty to the organization, passive acceptance and/or favorable approval of the organizations' violent activities, and the likelihood of participation in the organization's violent activities. This paper explores if and how provision of aid and “governance” services by armed non-state actors is correlated with various aspects of individuals' experiences of conflict, such as their opinions about the use of violence and various strategies for attaining peace, their fellow community members' likelihood to join armed groups and engage in fighting, and their preferences regarding state structure and legal system.     

Terrorism and Terrorist Leaders: Insights from Developmental and Ecological Psychology

A recent increase in terrorist actions where the terrorist's death is planned and intentional has raised interest in the psychological functioning, motivation, and reasoning of those who engage in terrorism and those who support it. No consensus exists among Western ¹ 1. That is, American or European. psychologists regarding terrorists who plan to die in their attack, and no Western psychological perspective has thus far contributed substantively to explaining or predicting it. Although most agree that groups engaging in such actions typically have a wider network of support, the psychology of supporters is also unexplained. This article proposes a developmental psychological model of the conditions that favor focused terrorist actions that have publicly discernible goals ascribed to a political or religious cause. The article describes a common pattern of cognitive complexity among terrorist leaders, using Osama bin Laden as a model, where entrenched cognitive simplicity in one key ideological domain (religious or political) is coupled with behavior reflecting the capacity for far greater complexity in other domains (organizational skills, planning, problem-solving.) This pattern, in specifiable historical and ecological context, makes terrorist tactics, including those in which the attacker intentionally dies, more likely, and increases the challenges associated with attempts at diplomacy or negotiated peace.     

A Crime–Terror Nexus? Thinking on Some of the Links between Terrorism and Criminality 1

Decreasing state sponsorship for terrorism in the post-9/11 environment has pressed terrorist groups to find alternative sources of financial support. Some groups have created their own “in-house” criminal capabilities, for example FARC, the LTTE, and Al Qaeda. Several analysts have argued that this “mutation” in organizational form may lead terrorist groups to ally with organized crime, whereas others have suggested that distinct organizational and ideological differences between the two will preclude cooperation. Drawing on both accounts, it is argued in this article that the degree of a terrorist group's organizational capacity and need are key predictors of the types of crime they will engage in, while ideological (political) distinctiveness will preclude fully symbiotic cooperation between terrorists and organized crime groups.     

Does the International Trafficking of Cultural Heritage Really Fuel Military Conflicts?

General media outlets are increasingly arguing that the looting of cultural heritage artifacts contributes to the funding of terrorist groups such as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This article reexamines this claim in light of the political science literature on internal conflicts duration. While we do know that armed conflicts contribute to an increase of looting activities in the territories at war, it is still too early to generalize the ISIS case and conclude that these activities contribute to significantly funding armed non-state actors and to prolonging internal armed conflicts. However, establishing this link may add political weight to archeologists' and art historians' efforts to curb the international trafficking of looted objects.     

In the Name of the Father? Christian Militantism in Tripura,Northern Uganda,and Ambon

Although armed groups and political violence referring to Islam have attracted increasing attention since the start of the global war against terror, one particular religion can hardly be described as the main source of inspiration of what is commonly referred to as “terrorist acts of violence.” Faith-based violence occurs in different parts of the world and its perpetrators adhere to all major world faiths including Christianity. As such, this article treats three cases of non-state armed actors that explain their actions as being motivated by Christian beliefs and aimed at the creation of a new local society that is guided by religion: the National Liberation Front of Tripura, the Lord's Resistance Army, and the Ambonese Christian militias. It analyzes the way by which they instrumentalized religion against respective backgrounds of conflict rooted in social change, the erosion of traditional identities, imbalances of power, and widening communautarian faultlines.     

Internal organizational problems and the sources of tensions of terrorist movements as catalysts of violence∗

The internal organizational problems of terrorist groups are analyzed. The purpose is to investigate how violent action by members of such organizations can be triggered by internal organizational problems rather than by external factors exclusively. Two kinds of problems are studied: command problems and political problems. Command problems include the following: reconciliation of security with efficient communication, the clustering of ethnic groups under stress, the role of women, and the quality of the membership. The political problems include the following: the self‐destructive potential in each terrorist organization (especially in case of its victory), the problem of inflated membership, and the role of terrorist leaders as the givers of moral dispensation.     

Nagorny Karabakh conflict: prospects for conflict transformation

The article explores the current stalemate in the Nagorny Karabakh conflict, and perspectives for conflict transformation. As the conflict has remained dormant for more than 20 years, the political systems of the countries engaged in the conflict have adjusted to the conflict situation. The conflict is often used by the political elites in order to legitimize their power, consolidate support, marginalize opponents, and neutralize democratizing pressures. Since the status quo serves the interests of the authorities, the ruling regimes do not have strong incentives to seek conflict resolution. In these conditions, conflict transformation approaches are considered a necessary means to deal with the conflict. Given that political elites have little incentive to implement such transformation, civil society actors come increasingly to the fore. Only through multitrack initiatives supported by civil society actors, we argue, can conflict transformation practices advance and subsequently bring peace to the region.     

Endgame? Sports Events as Symbolic Targets in Lone Wolf Terrorism

This article explores how terrorists acting alone or in small groups have used sports events as symbolic targets in their performance of terrorism. Drawing on a comparative analysis of the attacks on the 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games and the 2013 Boston Marathon, it is argued that terrorist target selection of major sports events should be understood in relation to the grievances and desires of the perpetrators. The article finds that rather than being the primary target of their attacks, sports events are among a broader range of densely crowded spaces that terrorist actors may seek to target as part of their violent struggle against their adversaries. The findings are contextualized in relation to broader patterns and trends in lone wolf terrorism, including the significance of a copycat phenomenon and inspiration effect.     

Draining the Swamp: Democracy Promotion,State Failure,and Terrorism in 19 Middle Eastern Countries

This study empirically evaluates the question of whether or not the promotion of democracy in the Middle East will reduce terrorism, both in terms of terrorist attacks sustained by Middle Eastern countries and in terms of attacks perpetrated by terrorist groups based in Middle Eastern countries. Using a series of pooled, time-series negative binomial statistical regression models on 19 countries from 1972 to 2003 the analysis demonstrates that the more politically liberal Middle Eastern states—measured both in terms of democratic processes and in terms of civil liberties protections—are actually more prone to terrorist activity than are Middle Eastern dictatorships. The study demonstrates, furthermore, that an even more significant predictor of Middle Eastern terrorist attacks is the intensity of state failures, or episodes of severe political instability that limit central government projection of domestic authority, suffered by states in the region. States that are unable to respond to fundamental challenges to political stability posed by internal political strife, ethnic conflict or the phenomenon of “stateless areas,” geographic or political spaces within states that eschew central government authority, are significantly more likely to host or sustain attacks from terrorist groups. The findings have implications for current United States antiterrorism policy toward the Middle East and provide a statistical/empirical foundation to previous studies on the relationship between terrorism and state failure.     

Like Red Tulips at Springtime: Understanding the Absence of Female Martyrs in Afghanistan

In an era where female suicide terrorism is on the rise in conflict regions such as the Middle East, the North Caucasus, and South Asia, why has Afghanistan been largely immune to this trend? Why do some violent groups use female suicide terrorism and others avoid it? This is a critical question for policy makers and analysts attempting to understand a dangerous terrorist phenomenon and how it may evolve in Afghanistan. During the anti-Soviet jihad, narratives were woven of men and women marching through the mountains of Nuristan to “offer their blood for the Islamic revolution like red tulips at springtime.” But today, women are wholly absent from the Taliban and their jihad in Afghanistan. This article analyzes, in particular, the absence of women in Taliban martyrdom operations. There are three primary findings from this study that explain the low propensity for female suicide bombers in Afghanistan. First, a permissive social and geographic environment in Afghanistan gives insurgents freedom of mobility and a resistance capacity characterized by a reduced necessity for female suicide bombers; second, the capacity of a fiercely conservative culture restricts female participation in both Afghan society and within insurgent organizations; and third, the pronounced absence of a female culture of martyrdom limits women from participation in insurgent actions and narratives.     

Policy Relations and Policy Subsystems: Financial Policy in Hong Kong and Singapore

Existing studies of Hong Kong’s and Singapore’s success as leading Asian international financial centers (IFCs) have largely focused on economic structural factors at the neglect of political economic contextual variables. Taking a policy subsystems approach and based on extensive field research, this article attempts to address this shortcoming by conceptualizing the “policy relations” that exist between state, industry, and other non-state actors in the two IFCs and delineating the “division of policy roles” among these actors. In the process, this article contributes toward the existing IFC literature and conceptualizes the sociopolitical relations that exist among financial sector actors.     

Investing in the Market of Violence: Toward a Micro-Theory of Terrorist Financing

Terrorist financing is the dedicated pursuit of adequate capitalization within a market of violence, wherein terrorist organizations seek to extract resources and funding from the social, political, and economic environment in which they operate. At the same time, the effectiveness of a terrorist group in this pursuit is highly dependent on their organizational type and design, its leadership capabilities, and its capacity for organizational learning—factors that shape the ability of terrorist groups to identify and exploit a limited set of investment and rent-seeking opportunities.     

Middle Eastern terrorism in Europe: Trends and prospects

Abstract

Europe has been the preferred operational area for Middle Eastern terrorist groups—some 418 attacks from 1980–1989. Unlike European Marxist revolutionary or separatist terrorist groups, the Middle Eastern groups present Europe with a regional security problem. The most dangerous element in this Middle Eastern terrorist threat is the state‐sponsored activities of Iran, Libya, Syria, and Iraq. These countries provided the fuel for a decade of Middle Eastern terrorist bloodshed in Europe. Given the problems of solving the various political conflicts and feuds in the Middle East and the continuing attractiveness of Europe as a substitute battlefield for Middle Eastern terrorist elements, the threat of Middle Eastern terrorist activity in Europe should continue into the 1990s.     

What Does the “Terrorist” Label Really Do? Measuring and Explaining the Effects of the “Terrorist” and “Islamist” Categories

Many scholars and practitioners claim that labeling groups or individuals as “terrorists” does not simply describe them but also shapes public attitudes, due to the label's important normative and political charge. Yet is there such a “terrorist label effect”? In view of surprisingly scant evidence, the present article evaluates whether or not the terrorist label—as well as the “Islamist” one—really impacts both the audience's perception of the security environment and its security policy preferences, and if yes, how and why. To do so, the article implements a randomized-controlled vignette experiment where participants (N = 481) first read one out of three press articles, each depicting a street shooting in the exact same way but labeling the author of the violence with a different category (“terrorist”/“shooter”/“Islamist”). Participants were then asked to report on both their perceptions and their policy preferences. This design reveals very strong effects of both the “terrorist” and “Islamist” categories on each dimension. These effects are analyzed through the lenses of social and cognitive psychology, in a way that interrogates the use of the terrorist category in society, the conflation of Islamism with terrorism, and the press and policymakers' lexical choices when reporting on political violence.     

A classic debate revisited: The policy/administration dichotomy in tax polittcs

One of the oldest debates in political science is over the separation of policymaking from administration. The primary purpose of this paper is to resurrect the distinction as both a guide to empirical theory describing the political process and as an element in the normative debate over how that political process should ideally work. I first discuss the classic dichotomy and arguments for and against it. I then argue that tax politics can best be described as a trichotomy, in which there resides a “middle” set of actors, labelled professional policy managers, who have very important policymaking roles, but who also have many characteristics of administrators. In making these distinctions, I also outline a distinctive form of accountability that resides with each set of actors. Based on these forms of accountability, I reiterate the importance of separating and distancing “pure” administration from policymaking and political pressures. I also argue that effective policy is best insured by balancing the roles of policymakers, policy managers and administrators.