The Four P-Words of Militant Islamist Radicalization and Recruitment: Persecution,Precedent, Piety,and Perseverance

This article suggests that a single interpretative framework can be used to understand Islamist militant rhetoric, and to compare it to supposedly more orthodox campaigns such as Irish Republican militancy, differences of culture, scale, and lethality. Both refer to histories of persecution; cite exemplars of their just cause drawn from historical precedent; maintain utopian ideals and justifications of violence that drawn from culturally relevant versions of piety; and use examples of perseverance against overwhelming odds drawn from their respective histories. This framework of “4Ps”— persecution, precedent, piety, and perseverance—is apparent even on the Internet, where rhetoric is necessarily atomized.     

Ethnicity,Islam, and Pakistani Public Opinion toward the Pakistani Taliban

This article argues that an Islamist militant group with a relatively homogenous ethnic make-up is more likely to be supported by those of the same ethnicity even if the group makes no reference to and even downplays the importance of ethnicity. Using survey data from an original survey carried out in Pakistan in 2013, with 7,656 respondents, this hypothesis is tested in a multiple regression analysis of support for the Pakistani Taliban. The results demonstrate that co-ethnicity between the respondent and the Islamist militant group is the most important predictor of support for the militant group.     

The Perils of Weak Organization: Explaining Loyalty and Defection of Militant Organizations Toward Pakistan

Why do some militant groups defect against their sponsors, while others remain loyal? Pakistan's sponsorship of Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba offers a controlled case comparison as the former turned its guns against Islamabad, while the latter remained obedient despite a similar strength, ethnic ties to the regime, and the presence of alternative supporters. What explains Jaish's defection and Lashkar's loyalty? Drawing on organizational and principal-agent theory, I argue that militant organizations that are more decentralized and factionalized are more likely to turn on their sponsors, because their weak command and control as well as dispersed decision making limit the militant leaders' ability to follow through on their commitments to the sponsors and makes it more difficult for the sponsors to discipline the militant organization. When a sponsor attempts to coerce such organizations into submission by detaining militant leaders, freezing or confiscating their material assets the rank-and-file is likely to turn guns against the sponsor.     

Stalin's Genocides

In this essay I explore the ways in which the internal Albanian politics of memory in Kosovo rely on a longer, lived history of militant self-organisation than the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) war period alone. On the basis of recent ethnographic research, I argue that the memory of prewar militant activism is symbolically codified, ritually formalized, and put on the public stage in Kosovo today. Not only has this process effectively rehabilitated and consolidated the personal, social, and political status of specific former activists, it also has produced a hegemonic morality against which the actions of those in power are judged internally. On the one hand, this process reproduces shared cultural references which idealise ethno-national solidarity, unity and pride and which have served militant mobilisation already before the 1990s. On the other, it provides the arguments through which rival representatives of the former militant underground groups (known as Ilegalja) compete both socially and politically still today. Although this process demarcates some lines of social and political friction within society, it also suggests that international efforts to introduce an identity which breaks with Kosovo's past and some of its associated values, face a local system of signification that is historically even deeper entrenched than is usually assumed.     

Homegrown Terrorism in Canada: Local Patterns,Global Trends

The article examines how global trends related to militant Islamism have influenced patterns of homegrown terrorism in Canada. It seeks to understand how an evolving movement has shaped three case studies, two cases of homegrown terrorism, the case of Momin Khawaja, the “Toronto 18” plot, and the emerging trend of extremist travelers. Recognizing the notable gap in the literature, a growing number of cases of homegrown terrorism and extremism in Canada suggest that further study is required. The article asks why Canadians choose to participate in this movement and why militant Islamist movements are actively recruiting them.     

The Rise of Militant Islam and the Security State in the Era of the ‘Long War’

This paper distinguishes between political and militant Islam and analyses the latter's current ability to confront empire and to become a social force in Muslim-majority states. This analysis is within the dialectic of collaboration and resistance, starting with client postcolonial states' pivotal role in bringing to fruition the collaboration between political Islam and US imperialism during the cold war era. The post-cold war period signals the imperialist putsch to confront militant Islam in the ‘Long War’ by employing the cold war strategy of ‘permanent war’ and universalising the idea of the security state. Militant Islam's resistance to the Long War and the security state makes this two-pronged imperial strategy a losing proposition for the USA. Paradoxically this strategy has also become the prime mover for militant Islam's ascendancy. The paper addresses the paradox of the USA's continuation with its losing Long War strategy and securitisation agenda which, although providing succour to militant Islam, is also achieving its larger objectives to buttress capitalist globalism; fuel the military–industrial and security–industrial complexes; and support ‘big oil’.     

The Rise and Transformation of the Radical Right Movement in Denmark, 1980–2015

This article examines the rise and subsequent development and transformation of the new radical right movement in Denmark from 1980–2015. The Danish radical right emerged from xenophobic subcultures as a reaction to increasing immigration during the 1980s and evolved into a social movement of nationalist associations, militant skinheads, and neo-Nazis that attempted to conquer the streets. This attempt was met by an antiracist countermovement, which built up a coalition of left-wing militants and moderate political organizations that put a temporary end to the radical right as a social movement during the second half of the 1990s. However, from 2001 national and international circumstances offered new opportunities for the Danish radical right both in the streets and as a parliamentary voice.     

Winning the Battle of Ideas: Propaganda,Ideology, and Terror

Propaganda is at the heart of the struggle between Al Qaeda's strain of militant Islamism and the governments of the United States and United Kingdom. In an ideological struggle, propaganda is critical in shaping outcomes. Both Al Qaeda and the U.S. and U.K. governments recognize this, and have devised propaganda strategies to construct and disseminate messages for key audiences. This article considers the key elements in the Al Qaeda propaganda narrative, and the means through which it is disseminated. On the other side, it assesses the U.S. and U.K. governments’ response, focusing particularly on the British effort to define and propagate a narrative centered on British values.     

The Role of International Clientelism in the National Factionalism of Palestine

In this article I investigate the role of the international community's policy in the national factionalism in Palestine. I attempt to illuminate how international policy has contributed to the sustaining of internecine Palestinian violence as Fatah, which lost the elections in 2005 and 2006, has been motivated not to hand over power. In the process of selecting allies in the fight against Islamist terrorism, the epitomic undemocratic feature of Arab political culture, clientelism, has been promoted over democracy. Hamas seizing power in Gaza in 2007 probably resulted from the need to tame unruly militant groups which were sponsored by leaders of the Palestinian Fatah party, which again were supported by Western powers. To understand the national splitting in Palestine there is a need to analyse the interconnection between warlords, local clientelism and international clientelism.     

Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand,Mindanao, and Aceh

Islamic insurgent movements in southern Thailand, the southern Philippines and Aceh represent, arguably, the most visible signs of armed separatism in Southeast Asia today. The roots of ethnoreligious unrest in each of these regions stem from the same basic factors: insensitivity to local concerns, regional neglect, military repression and the contemporary force of militant Islam. The longevity of the movements that have arisen in southern Thailand, the southern Philippines and Aceh has largely been determined by the degree of popular support each has been able to call on as well as operational considerations such as external support and access to weaponry.     

Terrorist Attacks on the Energy Sector: The Case of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State

The article focuses on the attitudes of two militant Islamist groups, Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, toward the issue of terrorist attacks in the energy sector. The main aim of the article is both to analyze the importance of attacks on energy infrastructure for the strategies of these two organizations, and to describe specific examples and manifestations of terrorist activities from the side of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State with regard to the energy sector in the Middle East and North Africa. The article is based on the concept of terrorist attacks on the energy sector.     

Live to Win Another Day: Why Many Militant Organizations Survive Yet Few Succeed

Militant organizations pursue two common aims: to survive and to achieve the goals that define their raison d’être. Yet, elements that sustain the life spans of militant organizations are not necessarily the same components that advance the accomplishment of their core, or “outcome,” goals. Further, some organizational practices, such as the use of suicide attacks, generate a tradeoff that bolsters survivability while detracting from the effective pursuit of outcome goals. This study demonstrates that three operating conditions explain variation in the duration and achievement of contemporary militant organizations: receptiveness to tradeoffs, levels of external support, and the nature of adversaries. As such, the unique effects of different operating conditions reveal why many militant organizations survive for long periods of time but only a few achieve the goals that justify their existence.     

Homegrown Violent Extremism in Trinidad and Tobago: Local Patterns,Global Trends

The article examines the subject of homegrown violent extremism related to militant Islamism in the dual-Island Caribbean state of Trinidad and Tobago (T & T). It employs original research drawn from a series of semi-structured interviews and focus groups conducted between November 2015 and January 2016. Tracing the evolution of endogenous forms of radicalism and extremism the article considers how globalized-exogenous forms of militant Islamism associated with Al Qaeda and its offshoots, such as the so-called Islamic State, have impacted local patterns of violent extremism. The case study draws attention to a state and a region that have received scant attention in terrorism studies. As demonstrated by the article, this oversight is imprudent. There are a number of noteworthy findings from this case study for terrorism studies scholars: the unique historical legacy of radicalism, extremism and insurrection among T & T's Islamists; the country's markedly high levels of extremist travelers on a per capita basis and the high rate of religious converts among those travelers; the inter-linkages between criminality and political violence; and the potential threat posed by Trinidadian and Tobagonian militancy regionally.     

Indian Jihadism: The Evolving Threat

India has been confronting jihadist violence for decades. Although expeditionary terrorism by Pakistani militants typically receives the most focus, indigenous actors, many benefitting from Pakistani support, are responsible for the majority of jihadist attacks in India. Yet the dynamics of Indian jihadism remain under-explored. This article examines the Indian Mujahideen (IM), which constitutes the primary indigenous jihadist threat. It argues the IM is best understood as a label for a network of modules, with a loose leadership, that is connected to smaller, self-organizing clusters of would-be militants as well as to foreign militant groups like the Pakistani Lashkar-e-Taiba.     

From Ocalan to Al Qaida: The Continuing Terrorist Threat in Turkey

The most recent terrorist attacks in Turkey suggest a new phase in the country's war against terrorist groups. Although the PKK has largely been neutralized as a major threat to internal stability, the continued existence of other militant organizations--particularly Islamist groups who appear to be cooperating with elements of al Qaida--suggests continued security problems for the government.‐     

Ideology and Disengagement: A Case Study of Nationalists and Islamists in Chechnya

Abstract

Disengagement from militant groups has often been explained in individual terms such as battle fatigue or the desire to rejoin family and friends. We seek to examine empirically which other factors, beyond individual-level determinants, have influenced disengagement processes among militants belonging to different types of Chechen militant organisations. Drawing empirical insights from unique in-depth interviews with former members of the Chechen insurgency, their relatives, eyewitnesses to the Chechen wars and experts with first-hand knowledge of the researched phenomena, this study examines disengagement among jihadist and nationalist Chechen militants. Focusing on group-level factors, such as the capacity to resist external pressures, the use of violence, in-group social bonds and group cohesion, this article demonstrates that disengagement has been a less viable course of action for Chechen jihadists than for nationalist militants.     

Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know

When, why, and how do people living in a democracy become radicalized to the point of being willing to use or directly support the use of terrorist violence against fellow citizens? This question has been at the center of academic and public debate over the past years as terrorist attacks and foiled plots inspired by militant Islamism have grabbed European and American headlines. This article identifies and discusses empirical studies of radicalization and points to the strengths as well as the weaknesses characterizing these studies. The aim is to take stock of the current state of research within this field and to answer the question: From an empirical point of view, what is known and what is not known about radicalization connected to militant Islamism in Europe?     

State Weakness and “Vacuum of Power” in Lebanon

The conventional wisdom is that weak and failed states are at great risk of becoming havens for transnational terrorist and guerilla groups. The assumption is that lack of enforcement capabilities enables militant organizations to infiltrate and fill the “vacuum of power” that is created in the absence of a strong state. This article argues, though, that this is only one of the ways in which weak states are attractive to militant groups. It explores the various mechanisms through which the vacuum of power translates into opportunities for such groups. These mechanisms include the easiness of acquiring support and recruitment within refugees or marginalized populations; the ability of the violent non-state transnational organization to establish a “surrogate state” in supplying institutions and services that enhance its public appeal; the relations between civil or communal conflict and the success of such groups; and the use of transnational violent groups as proxies for other states. Using the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hezbollah in Lebanon as the primary cases, as well as two mini-cases from Central America and Africa, the paper illustrates the working of these mechanisms and contributes to our understanding of the relations between state weakness and transnational violent non-state organizations.     

From the Cradle of the Nation to the Most Expensive Serbian Word: Changes in Serbian Public Language in the Last Decade of the Twentieth Century

Russian National Unity (Russkoe Natsionalnoe Edinstvo—RNE) is the largest militant fascist group in Russia today. The founder and leader of the RNE, Aleksandr P. Barkashov, speaks of himself as a national‐socialist, and praises Hitler's deeds for Germany. The RNE has pledged to establish a system of ethnic segregation in Russia were it to come to power.     

The Western Muhajirat of ISIS

An unprecedented number of Western women have recently joined the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The group has envisaged strictly non-combat roles for them, but violence is an essential part of their embraced ideology and several signs suggest that they could claim a more militant role. Their marginalization, however, is essential for the preservation of ISIS's power system and it is consequently unlikely that it would accommodate such aspiration, at least in the areas of the proclaimed caliphate. It could be different in the West, where women returning from conflict areas or those, even more numerous, anxious to join but unable to travel, could engage in violent acts.