Normative Support for Terrorism: The Attitudes and Beliefs of Immediate Relatives of Jema’ah Islamiyah Members

Families might be an important source of norms that legitimize terrorism, an assumption that has yet to be tested empirically. To investigate this, surveys were administered to 20 immediate relatives of 16 Jema’ah Islamiyah (JI) members in Indonesia. Family members were found to agree with their kin's involvement in the violent activities of JI, and perceived their community as being supportive. Agreement with their relative's involvement in JI was predicted by anti-Western sentiment, not support for violent jihad. Kinship to a suicide bomber predicted less support for their family member's involvement in JI. Implications for deradicalization strategies are discussed.     

Islamic State Nasheeds As Messaging Tools

Although jihadi nasheeds play an important role in the Islamic State's propaganda, there is scant literature on the topic. This article is an exploratory study on seventeen Islamic State nasheeds released between December 2013 and March 2015. The main argument is that Islamic State nasheeds are effective messaging tools because they focus on a limited number of themes that have broad appeal among Muslims. The nasheeds differ from other Islamic State propaganda in their almost exclusive focus on war and fighting, rather than on the softer sides of life in the Islamic State.     

Iran's Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism: A view from the pulpit

Abstract

This paper examines the Friday prayer sermons delivered by Iran's new leadership to answer the question of whether Iran's Islamic fundamentalism has crested with the death of its spiritual leader Ayatollah Khomeini in June 1989. The analysis shows that an attempt is underway to articulate the Islamic identity of post‐Khomeini Iran in economic, political, and social relations. The study concludes that although President Rafsanjani is willing to reevaluate Iran's domestic and foreign relations, the totalitarian, Islamic, and revolutionary structure that Khomeini helped build is still intact. As such, the regime's tendencies toward radicalism and export of the Islamic revolution remain unchanged. In this scenario, resort to terrorism by the Islamic Republic in order to maintain its structure and tendencies cannot be ruled out.     

Islamic Fundamentalism and Women's Economic Role: The Case of Iran

It is commonly believed that Islamic fundamentalism is responsible for the low female employment rate in the Middle East and North Africa. I earlier presented evidence from Indonesia indicating that the deteriorating conditions of women's economic role in the 1990s was related to the economic circumstances of the Asian Crisis, not to the rise of political Islam (Bahranitash, 2002). In fact, in Indonesia, increasing support for the Islamic movement was itself spurred by the Asian Crisis. As a contrasting case, I here examine Iran, a country where political Islam has been in power for over two decades. If commonly held views about the impact of the Islamic religion on female employment were true, one would expect a steady or sharp decline of the female employment rate in postrevolutionary Iran. The empirical data show the reverse. Women's formal employment rates increased in the 1990s and did so much faster than they had during the 1960s and 1970s, when a pro-Western secular regime was in power. This sharp increase in women's employment seriously challenges the view that religion explains women's economic status in Muslim countries. The evidence from Iran indicates that the situation of women's employment there has followed a common pattern of elsewhere in the South—an overall increase in female employment. This fact then suggests that the forces of international political economy, rather than religion, appear to be a determining factor in the state of women's economic role in Iran.     

Crescent and Sword: The Hamas enigma

This article analyses the popular support for Hamas, the most important of the Palestinian Islamist movements today and charts the movement's historical ascendancy from a fringe Gaza-based group to a mainstream Islamist movement and mouthpiece for dispossessed Palestinians. Since 2001 Hamas's leadership has come under increasing attack from Israel, which has killed a number of the movement's leaders and senior members, most prominently Sheikh Yasin, the movement's founder and spiritual leader, and his successor as Hamas leader, Abd al-Aziz Rantissi. Nonetheless, Hamas's duality as ‘worshippers’ and ‘warmongers’ has made the organisation extraordinarily popular among dispossessed Palestinians and has created a mounting political challenge to the secular nationalism of the plo. At present two-thirds of the Palestinians live below the ‘poverty line’ and it is likely that it is in this disenfranchised segment of the population that Hamas finds its core support. About one in every six Palestinians in the Occupied Territories benefits from support from Islamic charities. Hamas, for its part, allocates almost all its revenues to its social services, but there is no evidence that Hamas or the other Islamic charities provide assistance conditional upon political support.     

Religious Basis for Islamic Terrorism: The Quran and Its Interpretations

Extreme religious interpretations of the Quran and the movement of Islamic Revivalism influence the emergence and progression of violent Jihad in contemporary times. Islamic “terrorists” are able to legitimize their movement as an act of violent Jihad permitted by the Quran essentially because of religious sanctions that permit the use of violence as an act of defense and to preserve the will of God in Islamic communities. The Quran systematizes this use and relates it to other aspects of the Shariat through its discourse on revivalism. Based on the Quranic principle of ijtihad, terrorists emphasize the Quran's tenets on violence and revivalism in their religious interpretations and present it as a legitimate premise for the use of excessive aggression. According to ijtihad Muslims can interpret and determine the extent of their Islamic practices individually as long as these are directed toward ensuring the will of God in an Islamic community. Thus terrorists use ijtihad to emphasize Quranic clauses that sanction the use of violent Jihad as a method ordained by God to preserve the Shariat in an Islamic community. The manner in which terrorists use ijtihad to contextualize geopolitical factors as a cause for violent Jihad is determined by their extreme interpretations of the Quran. These interpretations also determine the extent of violence used in a Jihad for religious amelioration. The religious legitimacy of this violence prevails until the cause and course of violent Jihad correlates with the Quran's discourse on violence and revivalism. In contemporary times an extreme interpretation of the movement of Revivalism ¹ 1. Refers to the contemporary movement of Islamic Revivalism. that is inspired by “revivalism” also provides an organized premise for Islamic terrorism. When implemented, this causes variations within specific geopolitical conditions and in different Jihadi groups. However a common understanding of religious doctrines determines the extent of Revivalism in Islamic communities because this movement relies heavily on the Quranic discourse for its existence. Thus, the religious basis for Islamic terrorism is primarily found when extreme interpretations of the Quran's tenets on violence and revivalism are directed toward obtaining an equally radical version of Revivalism in specific geopolitical conditions. In this manner, extreme Quranic and Revivalist interpretations ensure the ideological persistence of Islamic terrorism as a religious effort to preserve the will of God in an Islamic community. The aim of this article is to show the manner in which religion can cause the emergence of Islamic violence as it is known today. The discourse on Islamic violence and counterterrorism needs to be urgently studied given the numerous instances of violent Jihad in contemporary times. Many writings on Islamic violence and statements released after an act of Islamic violence allude to the impact of religion on violent Jihad, but they rarely explore it or present a premise for its existence. This exploration will be conducted based on research of the author's on the Kashmir crisis and the insurgency in it. Thus, examples from insurgency in Kashmir will be used on occasion to illustratively develop this argument. In his book The Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington states that a theory must be causal and simple. Using the words of Thomas Kuhn, he explains that “to be accepted as a paradigm [it] must seem better than its competitors but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted.” ² 2. Samuel Huntington, Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 1996), p. 30. Furthering such simplicity and exploration, will be the central effort of this discourse. The sources for this exploration will be mainly derived from theoretical and practical understandings of terrorism, Islamic religion and theology, and the movement of Islamic Revivalism. A comparison between Islam and other religions will not be presented when evaluating the impact of Islam on violent Jihad. It will essentially present religious premises for violent Jihad from a Muslim rather than non-Muslim or “Western” perspective; although it is accepted that parallels in the understanding of “violence” do exist in the Muslim and non-Muslim world. Non-Muslim perspectives on violence and terrorism are relevant and known to the author. However a perpetual emphasis on these factors or a failure to acknowledge them limits the scope of the study of Islamic terrorism itself. The aim will be to present an Islamic perspective on violent Jihad. Then, it is accepted that a complex interplay between religious understandings and geopolitical events influence the emergence of Islamic violence in contemporary times. Thereafter, it must be stated that extreme psychological and sociological factors intrinsic to the Jihadis influence the religious choices that cause violent Jihad. An analysis of these factors is outside the realm of this discourse, which remains political in its scope. Further, on occasion a lack of empirical data and non-circumstantial evidence is encountered to substantiate some contentions mentioned ahead. As it has been suggested previously ³ 3. Nancy C. Biggo, The Rationality of the Use of Terrorism by Secular and Religious Groups available at (http://www.dissertations.com), 2002. this is mainly because there is a dearth of such data and reliable evidence pertaining to religious terrorism. At certain points, it becomes difficult to validate external opinions mainly because of the right to individual interpretations vested by the Quran in all Muslims. The validity of these opinions is vested in the fact that they are taken from informed Muslims who practice moderate and radical interpretations of Islam. Any reader may be expected to believe that any kind of terrorism is unjustifiable. However, in order to address these movements effectively, they must be studied from all possible dimensions and especially from the cultural contexts from which they arise.     

Al-Qaida, ‘war on terror’ and Turkey

The new wave of international terrorism gained strength in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, threatening not only the USA and its allies but also, as seen in the latest incidents, a significant part of the world. Continuing al-Qaida attacks signify the vulnerability and weakness of defence, security and intelligence systems in the face of the new international terror. The terror network has created an image of a postmodern virtual state. We argue that it has been shaped by a common ideology rather than in physical terms. Thus it is necessary to develop novel approaches. In this article we discuss Turkey's struggle against the new terror, underlining the fact that it is a Muslim majority state and has lively and dynamic Islamic traditions and different shades of Islamic belief. This situation makes the discussion more interesting, focusing on the position, perception, difficulties and struggle of a Muslim state with a democratic and secular mode of government vis-à-vis an allegedly Islam-inspired international terror network. There is an urgent need to develop an international terror strategy to counter terror attacks against Turkey, Britain, Egypt and others. We underscore the vital requirement of reconciling the macro-schemes and priorities of the global ‘war on terror’ with the national conditions and needs of the other countries involved in the struggle against the terror network.     

Jihadist Highway to Jihadist Haven: Turkey's Jihadi Policies and Western Security

Turkish support to jihadists is not merely a tactic aimed at removing Assad from power. It stems from a strategic decision on the part of Turkish authorities to influence Middle East affairs through non-state actors, much as Iran has been doing for some time. Turkey's support of jihadists transiting into Syria and its establishment of close ties with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood are joint aspects of this strategy. Turkish authorities have permitted Al Qaeda sympathizers to use pro-government media to promote their beliefs. The authorities have adopted a new political language that fuels anti-American and anti-Western sentiments. Prosecutors who have attempted to prevent shipments of weapons to Al Qaeda–affiliated groups in Syria have been fired and in some cases incarcerated. Indeed, by now Turkish prosecutors and the Turkish National Police are thoroughly intimidated. Not a single counterterror operation has been launched to disrupt Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)’s networks or recruitment activities. The Turkish National Intelligence Organization has been given full responsibility to deal with jihadist activities, without any active oversight, and the police are loath to venture into their territory. As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Turkey's jihadi policies have direct and indirect impact on Western security. This article examines Turkey's jihadi policies by examining official statements, media reports, interviews, and fieldwork.     

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Russia: Contending Paradigms and Current Perspectives

The most outstanding trend in contemporary conflicts has been the fusion of the threats from terrorism and insurgency. Insurgent threats in many places on the globe today are mistaken as terrorist threats, and counterterrorism (CT) is deployed as the local insurgents come increasingly to resemble their transnational terrorist partners. Such an emphasis on the role of terrorism in insurgencies and the undue focus on CT risks strengthening, rather than severing, the connection between local insurgents and transnational terrorists. Russia's counterterrorist strategy inadvertently transformed the conflict from a contained, nationalist rebellion to a sprawling jihadi insurgency and perversely encouraged the group to resort even more to terrorist tactics. The Russian counterinsurgency has been unsuccessful, as the insurgents are neither demolished as a force nor are they isolated by society. Losing the hearts and minds among the Chechen people is a key reason behind why the Russian operation in Chechnya suffered failures. Too little attention was paid to winning over the “hearts and minds” of the people.     

Ummah or tribe? Islamic practice,political ethnocentrism,and political attitudes in Indonesia

Existing research has uncovered a link between religious practice and political ethnocentrism. Religious individuals are relatively inclined to both support policies that benefit their own ethnic group and support political competitors seeking to represent them. These findings are broadly consistent with a large body of literature that examines the relationship between religion and ethnic prejudice. To date, empirical research has concentrated overwhelmingly on Western, Christian contexts. There is, however, reason to believe that Islamic practice may produce more universalistic beliefs and attitudes. This paper examines the relationship between religious participation and political ethnocentrism in Indonesia, this world’s largest Muslim-majority country. Using survey data collected during the lead-up to the 2009 national elections, this paper examines the relationship between religious practice and expressed preference for co-ethnic political leadership. It finds that a respondent’s self-reported level of religious activity strongly correlates with stated preference for co-ethnic leadership. These findings bolster confidence that the relationship between religious participation and ethnocentrism holds beyond Western Christian contexts. For Indonesia, deepening Islamic practice could thus predict a rise in ethnocentrism, threatening the country’s reputation for tolerance.     

Ethnofederalism and ethnonationalism in the separatist politics of chechnya and tatarstan: sources or resources?

Common explanations of the recent war in Chechnya add up to an astonishingly overdetermined picture. The conflict between Russia's central government and its separatist ethnic autonomy was blamed on several grand factors: oil interests, resurgent Islam, imperial collapse, international terrorism, organized crime. Superficially, Chechnya shares most of these features with Tatarstan — another defiant republic of the Russian Federation which has oil, notorious gangsters, and a native population of Islamic heritage. A more detailed account shows, however, that the two state entities have little in common except the Soviet-made institutional framework. Tatarstan is a rare example of an ethnically non-Russian republic within the very urban industrial core of the former USSR, while Chechnya was patently peripheral. Differences in historical legacies and present-day social compositions conditioned very different outcomes of multifaceted political struggles that accompanied the demise of Soviet empire. In Tatarstan, local ethnically-colored nomenklatura exploited the chaotic transition to claim property rights over the local economy. The new rhetoric of national revival which the nationally-minded wing of Tatar intelligentsia advanced during Gorbachev's relaxation of censorship, was used by the Tatar nomenklatura to justify its struggle for economic property rights and exclusive political jurisdiction in its territory. By contrast, the Communist patronage network which ruled Chechnya until 1991 was too dependent on the central government for subsidies and coercive resources to follow the Tatarstan example. In the aftermath of August 1991 hardliner coup, when the Chechen apparatchiks misplaced their bets in Moscow's politics and momentarily lost support of the central government, they were swept away by the social movement of rural masses and urban marginal intellectuals. In its turn revolution, the only such outcome among the republics of the Russian Federation (but not the USSR), created an inherently unstable regime in Chechnya which could legitimate itself only with the idea of national independence and, once Moscow attempted to destabilize it, through the patriotic war.     

Demilitarisation in Latin America

Since the mid 1970s relations between the USA and Libya have been antagonistic. The radical policies the regime of Muammar Qadaaffi has pursued have made Libya one of the USA's bêtes noires . The reasons for US antagonism derive from Libya's repression at home, its alleged support for terrorism and for radical movements opposed to US interests, its staunch opposition to Israel, and its anti-Western rhetoric. Libya's hostility towards the USA rests on a perception of the USA as a global power intent on maintaining its hegemony and control over the Arab and Islamic world. Libyans have been resentful of US support of Israel to the detriment of Arabs and Muslims. Libya's resolute opposition to the USA especially in the 1980s, resulted in a series of military confrontations. The USA has maintained sanctions despite the suspension of UN sanctions on Libya in 1999. The USA has retained Libya on its short list of 'rogue states' despite recognition that Libya has stopped sponsoring terrorism. The contention here is that Libya, like the other 'rogue states', provides justification for US domestic policies (eg National Missile Defense). Given the events of 11 September 2001 in the US, it is quite conceivable that Libya could become a target of the US antiterrorism campaign. The USA could at last find valid justification for the removal of the Qadaffi regime.     

Beyond ‘Terrorism’ and ‘State Hegemony’: assessing the Islamist mainstream in Egypt and Malaysia

International networks of Islamic ‘terrorism’ have served as the most popular explanation to describe the phenomenon of political Islam since the 11 September attacks. This paper argues that both the self-proclaimed doctrinal Islam of the militants and Western perceptions of a homogeneous Islamist threat need to be deconstructed in order to discover the often ambiguous manifestations of ‘official’ and ‘opposition’ Islam, of modernity and conservatism. As a comparison of two Islamic countries, Egypt and Malaysia, which both claim a leading role in their respective regions, shows, moderate Islamic groups have had a considerable impact on processes of democratisation and the emergence of civil society during the quarter century since the ‘Islamic resurgence’. Shared experiences like coalition building and active participation within the political system demonstrate the influence and importance of groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia (abim) or the Islamic Party of Malaysia (pas). These groups have shaped the political landscape to a much larger extent than the current pre-occupation with the ‘terrorist threat’ suggests. The gradual development of a ‘culture of dialogue’ has rather revealed new approaches towards political participation and democracy at the grassroots level.     

Instrumentalizing Counterterrorism for Regime Consolidation in Putin's Russia

Since the late 1990s, Russia has been among the countries most painfully affected by terrorism and President Putin has shown little doubt and even much enthusiasm in joining the U.S.-led "war" against terrorism. Intertwined as they are, counterterrorism and Chechnya are still significantly different matters in Russian security policy, and this article aims at examining how the struggle against terrorism shapes essential features of Russia's foreign and domestic policies during Putin's first presidency. Internally, the struggle against terrorism provides for a sufficient mobilization of the dysfunctional society around the "mutant" regime that has consolidated its control over mid-term political agenda. Internationally, high-profile counterterrorism strategy has helped Russia to secure for itself a more prominent role than the sheer size of its "assets" would justify. This war is fundamentally not about victory; it is about many "collateral" benefits for the regime that Putin is presiding over.‐     

“From Terrorists to Peacekeepers”: The IRA's Disengagement and the Role of Community Networks

Utilizing interviews with former Irish Republican Army (IRA) members, Loyalists, and community workers, the article looks at how militants in Northern Ireland have helped to prevent terrorism and political violence (TPV) by adopting roles in the community. By using mobile phones, a network of former combatants emerged around interface areas in the late 1990s to contain trigger causes of terrorism, providing a unique role that the state could not. The structure of the network encouraged militant groups to follow the IRA's example to disengage—thus creating a domino effect—and the co-operation between senior militants has limited the opportunities for other groups to mobilize a campaign of terrorism.     

Contextualized violence: politics and terror in Dagestan

Despite the escalating terrorist actions, there is no polarized constellation in the Islamic politics of Dagestan. Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) officers regard the corrupt Dagestan authorities to be significantly responsible for the massive conversion of youths to terrorism, and began to contact with moderate Salafis to isolate the “forest brothers” (armed Salafis) in 2010. Exploiting the FSB's soft strategy, secular intellectuals requested to reform the Muslim Spiritual Board of Dagestan by electing a legitimate mufti. Having seen the incompetence of intra-Sufi opposition (non-Avar sheikhs) in the War on Terror, the Spiritual Board jumped on the bandwagon of dialog strategy in 2012. The secular authorities of Dagestan, indifferent to intra-Muslim politics, limit their activities to the call for dialog between the secular authorities and the forest brothers. In this way, political actors hijack the master narrative of the “War on Terror” and these narratives are imported to local politics.     

Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda's Financial Network Is Likely to Withstand the Current War on Terrorist Financing

On 24 September 2001, President Bush announced the first stage of the War on Terrorism with an attack against the terrorist financial infrastructure. Since then, the impact of this attack on Al Qaeda's ability to operate has been minimal, for three reasons. First, Al Qaeda has built a strong network of financiers and operatives who are both frugally minded and business savvy. As a result, terrorist finances are often hidden in legitimate and illegitimate businesses and disguised as commodities and cash. Second, Al Qaeda has learned to effectively leverage the global financial system of capital markets. Small financial transfers, underregulated Islamic banking networks and informal transfer systems throughout the world make it almost impossible to stop Al Qaeda from moving money. Third, Al Qaeda has built a significant base of Islamic charities in Saudi Arabia with international divisions that have not been scrutinized or controlled by the regime. As a result, Al Qaeda's sophisticated financial network may be able to sustain international efforts to disrupt it. Financial regulations imposed to reduce terrorist financing must be applied more broadly and be supported by significant resources. An improvement in the war on terrorist financing requires better international coordination, more effective use of financial regulations, and regulating the Saudi Arabian charity structure.‐     

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of the Revolution

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has waged a secessionist campaign in the Southern Philippines since 1978, when they broke away from the secular Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Their avowed goal is to establish an independent Islamic state. Though initially armed and supported by the Libyan and Malaysian governments, by the early 1990s, the MILF had lost much of its state support and forged a tentative relationship with Al Qaeda, receiving money through Saudi charities, as well as limited military training. In exchange, they had to give some assistance to groups, such as Al Qaeda's regional affiliate, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Abu Sayyaf group (ASG); ties that they continue to maintain. Thus the ongoing peace talks between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF have regional security operations.     

Nationalists without a nation: South Moluccan terrorism in the Netherlands

Abstract

This article focuses on the phenomenon of South Moluccan terrorism in the Netherlands. Beginning with a historical examination of the colonial relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia, attention is then given to the circumstances in which some 21,000 South Moluccans came to the Netherlands in the early 1950s, and the social, economic, and political conditions of the South Moluccan community in Holland since then. Then follows a detailed examination of the main incidents of South Moluccan terrorism in the Netherlands which climaxed in a series of violent incidents against Dutch and Indonesian targets in the mid‐1970s. Special attention is placed on the ways in which successive Dutch governments have responded to the various outbreaks of terrorism, as well as to the effects of this terrorism on public opinion. The article then shows what effects South Moluccan terrorism has had on the policies of Dutch and Indonesian governments; on national and international public opinion; on the South Moluccans in the Moluccas; and on the international terrorist community. The paper concludes that the focus of South Moluccan terrorism in the Netherlands is likely to shift from attempts to secure an independent homeland for their people to closer contacts with other terrorist groups espousing anti‐colonial, anti‐imperialist, and nationalist ideals.     

The Kurds in Iran: balancing national and ethnic identity in a securitised environment

The Kurdish population in Iran feels disenfranchised and excluded from the political system. Based on an original survey of Iranian Kurds, it is revealed that Kurds lack trust and confidence in the central government and do not exhibit any emotional connection with Iranian identity or the Islamic Republic of Iran. Overwhelmingly, survey respondents put their Kurdish identity and affiliations as the primary point of reference. This emotional and political disconnect with Iran poses a serious challenge to the incumbent regime. It is an affront to the official rhetoric of ethnic unity and Iranian solidarity that is reinforced by Islamic principles under the Islamic Republic of Iran. This has led the incumbent regime to opt for a security response to a clearly political challenge. However, as the survey data in this research reveals, the securitisation of Iran’s response to its Kurdish population is only widening the gap, and aggravating the situation. The securitised approach to Kurdish aspirations for inclusion and acceptance is a counterproductive strategy with significant risks for the Islamic Republic of Iran.