The Radical Group in Context: 1. An Integrated Framework for the Analysis of Group Risk for Terrorism

On the basis of a systematic expert knowledge acquisition process, a framework has been developed that takes into account critical variables--internal and external, as well as interactions between them and the group under examination--that are understood to increase risk for escalation toward political violence. The indicators identified are grouped within four conceptual categories: (1) External factors, including historical, cultural, and contextual features; (2) Key actors affecting the group, including the regime and other opponents, as well as Constituents and Supporters; (3) The Group/Organization: Characteristics, Processes, and Structures, including an examination of such factors as leadership style and decision making, group experience with violence, and group ideology and goals; and (4) Characteristics of the Immediate Situation, including Triggering Events. A total of 32 variables were identified within the 4 categories to establish the overall integrated framework. This framework provides the basis for the rigorous analysis of a radical group's risk for terrorism.     

Quantifying and Qualifying Charisma: A Theoretical Framework for Measuring the Presence of Charismatic Authority in Terrorist Groups

In the past four decades, there has been increased multidisciplinary scholarly interest in the study of charismatic authority. However, there has yet to be any systematic examination of charismatic authority in the context of terrorism, despite widespread acknowledgment of the importance of charismatic leaders in the recruitment, radicalization, and operation of terrorist groups. This article seeks to contribute to future empirical research by presenting a theoretical framework for measuring the presence of charismatic authority in terrorist groups that is based on Max Weber's seminal work on legitimate domination (herrschaft) and on theoretical insights drawn from the study of charismatic authority in new religious movements. The framework is then applied to an illustrative case study of the relationship between charismatic authority and the radicalization process within the far-right terrorist group “the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord.” The article concludes with a discussion of findings and suggestions for future research.     

Terrorist Group Rivalries and Alliances: Testing Competing Explanations

ABSTRACT

Terrorist group rivalries and alliances have important consequences, but the sources of these relationships are debated. This article offers a side-by-side examination of correlates of terrorist rivalries and alliances. Global analyses of hundreds of terrorist groups find violent rivalry is associated with drug trafficking, state sponsorship, ethnic motivation, and operating in a civil conflict country. Alliances are associated with territorial control, intermediate membership size, and religious motivation. The idea that alliances are an indicator of weakness does not find much support. When relationships are disaggregated into theoretically relevant categories (inter-field and intra-field rivalries, and domestic and international alliances), further distinctions appear.     

Rewarding Fire with Fire: Effects of Retaliation on Terrorist Group Dynamics

Abstract

Comparative studies of the psychology of terrorism indicate that there is no one terrorist mindset, A theme in common among the disparate groups is the strong need of marginal alienated individuals to join a group of like‐minded individuals with a similar world view that “it's us against them, and they are the cause of our problems.” This strong need to belong gives particular force to the power of group dynamics. While the ideology is the glue that holds the group together and serves as the rationale for its actions, terrorists do not commit acts of terrorism for ideological reasons. The amelioration of the societal injustice which they indicate incites and justifies their terrorism does not reduce the lure of terrorism, because of the powerful hold of the group on its members.

Paradoxically, a policy of reactive retaliation with the goal of deterring terrorist acts may have the opposite effect and reinforce the mind set of the terrorist. For the group under threat, the external danger has the consequence of reducing external divisiveness and uniting the group against the outside enemy. The survival of the group is paramount because of the sense of group identity it provides.

Identifying the locus of control is of crucial significance in estimating the effects of counter‐terrorist policies upon a terrorist group. For the autonomous terrorist cell, active retaliation may reinforce the cohesion of the group; for the corporate terrorist organization, issues of organizational survival may become paramount. Neither the terrorist group nor the terrorist organization can be forced to give up terrorism, for to do so would be to lose their reason for being. For state‐supported and directed terrorist groups on the other hand, the terrorist group in effect serves as a paramilitary group under central government control. In this situation, group and organizational considerations are less relevant, for the object of the counter‐terrorist policy is the government of the sponsoring state. Since the survival of the state and national interests are the primary values, retaliatiatory policies, can, in the short run, have a deterring effect. In the long run, the most effective anti‐terrorist policy is one which renders the terrorist career less attractive to potential members, facilitates terrorists leaving the group, and reduces external support.     

Defining Religious Terrorism: A Causal and Anthological Profile

This research is geared toward theory building by alleviating some of the lacunae in three areas of study. First, it redefines what terrorism is by refocusing the definition away from politics and the mens rea of terror to its criminal actus reus. In this endeavor, it proposes a unifying definition that is viable for global assessment and under standing, while being conducive to international military and law enforcement cooperation. The definition is proposed to accommodate the international laws of reciprocity, community, and political framework, without compromising terrorism's criminal liabilities. Second, it defines what a religious terrorist is by using a convergence of psychometric measures from 356 suicide-bombers, taped self-immolations of 15 terrorists and 918 zealots, and triangulated anthologies. Among the outcomes of this mixed-method design is an empowering 32-trait profile of a religious terrorist that is ethno-religious specific and user friendly. Third, it introduces the concept of International Islamization Terrorism (IIT) and calls on future research to assess the propensity of IIT to global calamity, and the viability of a universal religious terrorist profile.     

Imaging terror: logos,pathos and ethos

As verb, code and historical method, terrorism has consistently been understood as an act of symbolically intimidating and, if deemed necessary, violently eradicating a personal, political, social, ethnic, religious, ideological or otherwise radically differentiated foe. Yet, as noun, message and catch-all political signifier, the meaning of terrorism has proven more elusive. After the Cold War terror mutated from a logic of deterrence based on a nuclear balance of terror into a new imbalance of terror based on a mimetic fear and an asymmetrical willingness and capacity to destroy the other without the formalities of war. This imbalance is furthered by the multiple media, which transmit powerful images as well as triggering pathological responses to the terrorist event. Thanks to the immediacy of television, the internet and other networked information technology, we see terrorism everywhere in real time, all the time. In turn, terrorism has taken on an iconic, fetishised and, most significantly, highly optical character.     

Globalization and Religious Organizations: Rethinking the Relationship Between Church, Culture, and Market

This article explores the organizational complexities that occur when religions attempt to operate globally. Based on the author's research on one of the new Japanese religions—Sekai Kyusei-kyo—it focuses on two aspects of transnational religious coordination. First, it shows how culture shapes religions' reception in each locality. Second, it shows the superiority of heterarchical over hierarchical organization: like successful transnational corporations, heterarchical religions move decision-making to the periphery, leaving the center with the task of normative integration. Local culture can, however, trump even such organizational flexibility. The article explores the theoretical implications of this for market-oriented sociologies of religion.     

Logiques transnationales et stratégies locales: les étapes de l'implantation des religions afro-brésiliennes au Portugal

The transnationalisation of Afro-Brazilian religions to Portugal is marked by the opening in 1974 of the first terreiro (house of worship) in the city of Lisbon and today there are around 40 terreiros throughout the country. This article will attempt to elucidate the stages in the implantation of Afro-Brazilian religions in Portugal at the level of individual religious observance as well as at the more global level of Portuguese society. In order to understand these stages, it is necessary on the one hand to consider the purely local strategies enabling a progressive adaptation of Afro-Brazilian religions in Portugal. On the other hand, this study must be situated within comparative research on the transnationalisation of Afro-American religions, which facilitates an understanding of their common processes of legitimisation in new contexts.     

Know thy enemy: Hizbullah, ‘terrorism’ and the politics of perception

The labelling career of the Lebanese armed group and political party Hizbullah is an interesting case with which to investigate the epistemological consequences of the politics of naming. Having found itself since its inception in the mid-1980s on the receiving end of mainly US and Israeli policy makers' and analysts' scorn for being an archetypical terrorist organisation, Hizbullah has been surprisingly successful in achieving its stated aims and in enduring the verbal and military onslaught against it. Although it is not the intention here to reduce explanations for Hizbullah's durability to discursive politics, this article suggests that both the labelling of Hizbullah as terrorist and, conversely, its identification as a ‘lebanonised’ political force that is about to make its conversion into an unarmed political party are misleading and incapable of grasping this organisation's complexities. In fact, both ‘terrorist’ and ‘lebanonised’ labels produce a quality of knowledge inferior to that produced by Hizbullah's own conceptualisation of its enemies. But most importantly, the debate on Hizbullah's alleged terrorist nature has obscured several of its traits that many should register before passing judgement on it. Our analysis shows that the variety of institutions Hizbullah has been carefully elaborating and readapting over the past two decades in Lebanon operate today as a holistic and integrated network which produce sets of values and meanings embedded in an interrelated religious and political framework—that of the wilayat al-faqih. These meanings are disseminated on a daily basis among Shi'a constituencies through the party's institutionalised networks and serve to mobilise them into ‘the society of the Resistance’ (mujtamaa’ al-muqawama), which is the foundation of the hala al-islamiyya (Islamic sphere) in Lebanon. Accordingly, any prospect of Hizbullah's transformation away from armed ‘resistance’ should be firmly placed in an analysis of its hegemony among the Shi'a of Lebanon and of the tools it uses to acquire and sustain this status.     

The Changing Security Agenda in Southeast Asia: Globalization,New Terror,and the Delusions of Regionalism

One of the distinguishing features of international terrorism the past fifteen years has been the resurgence and proliferation of terrorist groups motivated by a religious imperative. Such groups are far more lethal than their secular counterparts, regarding violence as a divine duty or sacramental act conveyed by sacred text and imparted by clerical authority. Moreover, religious terrorism is not restricted to Islamic terrorist groups exclusively in the Middle East. The same characteristics—the legitimization of violence based on religious precepts, the sense of profound alienation and isolation, and the attendant preoccupation with the elimination of a broadly defined category of “enemies”—are also apparent among American Christian white supremacists, among some radical Jewish messianic terrorist movements in Israel, and among radical Sikh movements in India. Finally, as many of these groups embrace strong millennialist or apocalyptic beliefs, we may be on the cusp of a new and potentially more dangerous era of terrorism as the year 2000—the literal millennium—approaches.     

The Hofstad Group: The New Face of Terrorist Networks in Europe

Between 2003 and 2006, members of the so-called Hofstad group planned various terrorist attacks inside the Netherlands, including the assassination of controversial filmmaker Theo van Gogh. Amateurish in its modus operandi and composed mostly of second-generation Muslim immigrants, Hofstad perfectly exemplifies the new terrorist networks that are growing in most European countries. Its perception of Europe as a battlefield of jihad, no less critical than Iraq or Afghanistan, signifies the break from the networks that operated in the continent in the 1990s. Its amorphous structure and lack of ties with international networks make Hofstad the quintessential example of the homegrown terrorism that is worrying European intelligence agencies.     

Is It Ideology or Desperation: Why Do Organizations Deploy Women in Violent Terrorist Attacks?

Why do some terrorist organizations deploy women on the front lines and in violent attacks? This study explores the social conditions, economic factors, and organizational characteristics that might explain women's participation in violent terrorist activity. With a new data set of 395 terrorist organizations, women's participation in terrorist attacks was quantified and coded. The logistic regression analysis results suggest that women's educational attainment, social rights, terrorist organization's age and size, and the level of a country's economic development are important predictors of the deployment of women in terrorist violence while a terrorist group's ideological or religious orientation and the level of democracy do not significantly influence the likelihood of women's participation.     

The muslim slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina (with reference to the Sandzak of Novi Pazar): Islam as national identity

Using results from a 2010 survey conducted in the Republic of Buryatia, this paper compares the responses of Russians and Buryats on questions of religious practice and belief, as well as the role of religion and religious organizations in the political sphere of contemporary Russia. Buryats more commonly identify with a religion and more frequently attend religious services in comparison to Russians living in the republic. There is greater consonance between the two groups on the public role of religion, with both Russians and Buryats generally supportive of the recent extension of religious education into schools and the creation of national holidays for all traditional religions, among other issues.     

Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon: Anatomy of a Terrorist Organization

The objective of this study is to provide through an in-depth investigation of the Fatah Al-Islam organization, emergence, programs, and external links, and the inner operation of this underground Salafi-jihadi group. By divulging secret confession statements to the public, it has uncovered many of the mysteries that surrounded the evolution and goals of the group. On the other hand, and more important, it has examined the application of certain conventional approaches to the study of terrorist behavior. The findings, based on the biographies of FI terrorists, seem to negate much of the advanced explanation about political violence. Economic destitution, poverty, lack of education, young age, and marital disruption for instances do not determine adherence to the group. Members of the jihadi group of FI stem from a diversified occupational background, not lacking in education, mature, married, and influenced by various motivations, specifically religious dogma.     

Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organizations

Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups offer the analyst a highly complex challenge. The current literature classifies Islamic terrorist organizations as either networked or hierarchical. Yet, this classification fails to account for the appearance on the international stage of a new type of global terrorism. Most notably, it does not capture the structure and mode of operation of Al Qaeda as it emerged after the 2001 U.S.-led assault on Afghanistan. This article therefore introduces a new conceptthe Dune organizationthat is distinct from other organizational modes of thinking. This conceptualization leads to a new typology of Islamic terrorist organizations. This typology concentrates on organizational behavior patterns and provides a framework for a comparative analysis of terrorist movements, which is applied to a study of Al Qaeda, Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.     

Torn Between God,Family, and Money: The Changing Profile of Lebanon's Religious Terrorists

Based upon this researcher's prior work and the conceptual denouement from geocultural immobility to religious terrorism, the author speculates that the reverse may be achieved and a zealot's motivation for religious terrorism might be purged once his or her basic Moslovian needs are fulfilled. Thus, this article attempts to empirically assess in some elements of Hizbullah, the effect of newly found wealth, money, and family exigencies on the Lebanese Shi'a's religious zealotry, his or her perceived religious commitments, and their acts of terrorism. This research concluded that Hizbullah in Lebanon, an organization originally established as a religious network with narrowly defined politico-socioeconomic goals, has eroded. Many of its individual cells now serve primarily their own self-interest instead of their perception of God's will. These cells are defying Hizbullah's main leadership wishes and committing criminal actions designed to serve cell or family interests. Its sophisticated network is already being used to transport and harbor criminals across the Mid-East and Europe. This research stress that the well-established Hizbullah cell organizations that protect each and every element and coordinate with other terrorist organizations are ripe to be exploited for international criminal activities. More importantly, this research attempts to explain and delineate the process by which nations may manage, control, reform, or even eliminate such international affliction.     

Disaggregating and Defeating Terrorist Safe Havens

Terrorist organizations’ physical safe havens continue to shape the terrorist threat to the United States by extending the groups’ longevity and increasing the threat they pose. As a result, eliminating terrorist safe havens has been a key component of U.S. counterterrorism policy since at least 2001. However, some scholars challenged the post-9/11 policy consensus that terrorists find sanctuary in weak states and so-called ungoverned spaces. This article seeks to bridge this gap between scholarship and policy by offering a typology for disaggregating different kinds of terrorist safe havens. Our typology operates on two axes based on host government will (i.e., the host government's posture toward each group with haven inside its borders), as well as government capability, (specifically whether the host government possesses the specific capabilities needed to oust each group). This intersection of will and capability produces three types of havens. We briefly illustrate each type of haven using the exemplar case study of Pakistan—a location often described as an overarching safe haven, but which is actually home to several sanctuaries—and offer policy recommendations for addressing them. A need exists to disaggregate and identify how the United States can approach haven elimination. This typology and the analysis that stems from it offer a starting point for devising such strategies.     

What Terrorist Leaders Want: A Content Analysis of Terrorist Propaganda Videos

In recent years, a growing body of empirical research suggests that indiscriminate violence against civilian targets tends to carry substantial political risks compared to more selective violence against military targets. To better understand why terrorist groups sometimes attack politically suboptimal targets, scholars are increasingly adopting a principal-agent framework where the leaders of terrorist groups are understood as principals and lower level members as agents. According to this framework, terrorist leaders are thought to behave as essentially rational political actors, whereas lower level members are believed to harbor stronger non-political incentives for harming civilians, often in defiance of leadership preferences. We test this proposition with an original content analysis of terrorist propaganda videos. Consistent with the principal–agent framework, our analysis demonstrates statistically that terrorist leaders tend to favor significantly less indiscriminate violence than their operatives actually commit, providing unprecedented insight into the incentive structure of terrorist leaders relative to the rank-and-file.     

Global Jihadist Recidivism: A Red Flag

This commentary examines the issue of global jihadist recidivism and identifies it as a potential long-term international counterterrorism concern. Although there are no comprehensive and accurate statistics on global jihadist recidivism, there is sufficient anecdotal evidence that suggests that the tendency for released imprisoned global jihadist terrorists is to return to terrorist activity. It is important to understand that arresting, indicting, and sentencing a captured global jihadist terrorist is not the end of the counterterrorism skirmish. In fact, the next stages of incarceration and reformation are more crucial to the endgame. The problem of global jihadist recidivism is at the core a manpower issue. Prisons have always been an important front for all types of terrorist groups. Recidivism or the failure of prison rehabilitation programs is simply one component of this front. Terrorist groups do not want their imprisoned members to reform and resign from the organization. Further research needs to be conducted on the recidivism rate for terrorists and whether religious terrorists would have a higher rate than secular ones. The academic, think tank, and U.S. government communities need to examine this issue to determine if it is a long-term international counterterrorism problem. The author believes it will be.     

The Threat and Management of Terrorism in Cyprus

This article aims to challenge the dominant view that the expressions of terrorism since the last decade of the twentieth century are fundamentally new. It questions the new aspects of terrorism, such as the transnational nature of the perpetrators and their organizations, their religious inspiration and fanaticism, their use of weapons of mass destruction, and their indiscriminate targeting. It points out essential continuities with previous expressions of terrorist violence, such as the national and territorial focus of the new terrorists, their political motivations, their use of conventional‐ weaponry, and the symbolic targeting that is still aimed at achieving a surprise effect. The article calls for more thorough historical investigations in order to appreciate truly new aspects of terrorism.‐