Terrorism and Terrorist Leaders: Insights from Developmental and Ecological Psychology

A recent increase in terrorist actions where the terrorist's death is planned and intentional has raised interest in the psychological functioning, motivation, and reasoning of those who engage in terrorism and those who support it. No consensus exists among Western ¹ 1. That is, American or European. psychologists regarding terrorists who plan to die in their attack, and no Western psychological perspective has thus far contributed substantively to explaining or predicting it. Although most agree that groups engaging in such actions typically have a wider network of support, the psychology of supporters is also unexplained. This article proposes a developmental psychological model of the conditions that favor focused terrorist actions that have publicly discernible goals ascribed to a political or religious cause. The article describes a common pattern of cognitive complexity among terrorist leaders, using Osama bin Laden as a model, where entrenched cognitive simplicity in one key ideological domain (religious or political) is coupled with behavior reflecting the capacity for far greater complexity in other domains (organizational skills, planning, problem-solving.) This pattern, in specifiable historical and ecological context, makes terrorist tactics, including those in which the attacker intentionally dies, more likely, and increases the challenges associated with attempts at diplomacy or negotiated peace.     

Terrorism: The view from Taiwan

Abstract

Pointing out that the circumstances as regards terrorism in Taiwan are far different from those prevailing in, say, Israel or Italy, the authors describe the conditions that have faced the ROC since 1949, the beleaguered fortress mentality, the emergency legislation, and the anti‐terrorist measures, including restrictions on political and civil rights, taken in what may be called a period of protracted crisis. In the authors’ view, the goal of a fundamentally democratic political system will depend to a great extent on outside forces and influences.     

Social Media and (Counter) Terrorist Finance: A Fund-Raising and Disruption Tool

Abstract

The proliferation of social media has created a terrorist finance vulnerability due to the ease with which propaganda can be spread, promoting fund-raising for a certain cause. Social media companies recognize the importance of preventing violent extremist and terrorist content, but less attention is paid to their fund-raising role. As well as presenting a threat, the movement of terrorist fund-raising activities online creates a disruption opportunity. This article argues that social media companies need to display greater awareness of their vulnerability to supporting terrorist financing and greater collaboration with law enforcement and financial institutions to strengthen the integrity of the system against abuse.     

The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology

Terrorism costs money. Although the costs of specific operations may be relatively inexpensive, terrorist organizations require much larger budgets in order to function. But how do terrorist groups acquire funding? What explains the variation in the particular sources used by different groups? This article develops a theory of terrorist financing that identifies criteria by which we can evaluate the different sources of terrorist funding, particularly in terms of their advantages and disadvantages to the terrorist group. These criteria are then applied across a typology of four primary types of terrorist financing: state sponsorship, illegal activity, legal activity, and popular support.     

Iran and Terrorism: The Transatlantic Responses

Since 1979 the United States and several European countries have accused the Islamic Republic of Iran of supporting terrorism. This article does not seek to examine the validity of these accusations. Rather, it analyzes how Washington and Brussels have sought to change Tehran's policy. Special attention is given to organizations such as Hizbollah, Hamas, Jihad, and Mujahideen-e Khalq. In addition, Ayatollah Khomeini's Fatwa against Salman Rushdie, the Mykonos trial, and the Flatow Amendment are discussed. The article highlights the differences between the American and European approaches toward Iran and suggests that more cooperation between the two sides of the Atlantic is needed.     

Unpacking the Social Origins of Terrorism: The Role of Women's Empowerment in Reducing Terrorism

The author's prior cross-national research found a negative relationship between the percent of the workforce that is female and terrorism. One explanation of this finding suggests that women are violence-averse and work to mitigate acts of political violence. Alternatively, women in the workforce may simply proxy for an economy with robust employment with fewer grievances or proxy for modernizing forces (e.g., democracy, secularism) that moderate traditionalism. The author examines the relationship between women in the workforce and terrorism and finds that while modernization factors are important, terrorism is nonetheless explained by the unique nonviolent influences of women in public society.     

Terrorism: The Dark Side of Social Entrepreneurship

The view of terrorists as entrepreneurs is not new. Yet, unlike traditional entrepreneurs, they are not motivated by profits. This article argues that terrorists are social entrepreneurs. They are motivated primarily by social returns. Furthermore, their main output is a public good due to its non-rival and non-excludable properties. Using social entrepreneurship theories, this article presents an alternative view of the incentives behind the formation of terrorist organizations. It concludes with a discussion of policy implications of this framework for combating terrorism.     

What Terrorist Leaders Want: A Content Analysis of Terrorist Propaganda Videos

In recent years, a growing body of empirical research suggests that indiscriminate violence against civilian targets tends to carry substantial political risks compared to more selective violence against military targets. To better understand why terrorist groups sometimes attack politically suboptimal targets, scholars are increasingly adopting a principal-agent framework where the leaders of terrorist groups are understood as principals and lower level members as agents. According to this framework, terrorist leaders are thought to behave as essentially rational political actors, whereas lower level members are believed to harbor stronger non-political incentives for harming civilians, often in defiance of leadership preferences. We test this proposition with an original content analysis of terrorist propaganda videos. Consistent with the principal–agent framework, our analysis demonstrates statistically that terrorist leaders tend to favor significantly less indiscriminate violence than their operatives actually commit, providing unprecedented insight into the incentive structure of terrorist leaders relative to the rank-and-file.     

Die and Let Die: Exploring Links between Suicide Terrorism and Terrorist Use of Chemical,Biological, Radiological,and Nuclear Weapons

The use of suicide bombings by some organizations is often presented as evidence of eroding constraints among terrorists to use chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Besides a possibly more reckless approach to violence resulting from the weakened instinct of self-preservation, it is clear that suicide delivery of such weapons would have great tactical advantages over other forms of delivery. This article explores the often neglected nuances of contemporary suicide terrorism to explain why this practice does not necessarily make a mass-casualty chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack by a terrorist group more likely.     

The Hofstad Group: The New Face of Terrorist Networks in Europe

Between 2003 and 2006, members of the so-called Hofstad group planned various terrorist attacks inside the Netherlands, including the assassination of controversial filmmaker Theo van Gogh. Amateurish in its modus operandi and composed mostly of second-generation Muslim immigrants, Hofstad perfectly exemplifies the new terrorist networks that are growing in most European countries. Its perception of Europe as a battlefield of jihad, no less critical than Iraq or Afghanistan, signifies the break from the networks that operated in the continent in the 1990s. Its amorphous structure and lack of ties with international networks make Hofstad the quintessential example of the homegrown terrorism that is worrying European intelligence agencies.     

How Terrorism Ceases: The Tupamaros in Uruguay

In order to understand how the Tupamaros ended it is necessary to give an overview of Uruguay's situation in the 1950s and 1960s and explain why in this relatively rich South American country an urban guerilla group developed. The first section presents the topographical, historical, socio-political and ideological context in which the Tupamaros emerged. The following sections describe the violent organization's “career” and point out some of its structural traits such as ideology, strategy and tactics, support milieu and interaction dynamics. As to the end of the guerilla group, first the question is discussed whether a pacific outcome of the conflict by negotiations would have been possible. Then the reasons for the rapid and total military defeat of the insurgents are analyzed as well as the long-term consequences of their organization's destruction.     

The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment

Lone wolf terrorism remains an ambiguous and enigmatic phenomenon. The boundaries of lone wolf terrorism are fuzzy and arbitrary. This article aims to define and analyze the main features and patterns of lone wolf terrorism in fifteen countries. Lone wolf terrorism is shown to be more prevalent in the United States than in the other countries under study. The cross-national analysis suggests that in the United States lone wolf terrorism has increased markedly during the past three decades; a similar increase does not appear to have occurred in the other countries under study. The numbers of casualties resulting from lone wolf terrorism have been relatively limited, and there is no evidence that the lethality of lone wolf terrorism is on the increase. The rates of psychological disturbance and social ineptitude are found to be relatively high among lone wolf terrorists. Lone wolf terrorists tend to create their own ideologies that combine personal frustrations and aversion with broader political, social, or religious aims. In this process, many lone wolf terrorists draw on the communities of belief and ideologies of validation generated and transmitted by extremist movements.     

The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism

Beginning in June of 2000 Chechen terrorists have carried out twenty-eight acts of suicide terrorism acts including two mass hostage taking operations combined with suicide terrorism (Beslan and Nord Ost). This paper reports the findings from psychological autopsies (interviews with close family members and friends) of thirty-four (out of 112 total) of these human bombers as well as augmenting them with material from hostage interviews from Beslan and Nord-Ost. The authors analyze the phenomena on the levels of the organization, individual, society and in terms of ideology and compare findings from other arenas also involving suicide terrorism. The main findings are that a lethal mix occurs when individuals in Chechnya are vulnerable to self recruitment into suicide terrorism due to traumatic experiences and feeling a duty to revenge and this vulnerability is combined with exposure to groups that recruit and equip suicide terrorists with both an ideology and the means to explode themselves. The ideology supporting Chechen suicide terrorism is very similar to the global jihadist ideology but remains more nationalist in its goals. It functions for the bombers much like short lived psychological first aid—answering their posttraumatic concerns in a way that shortly leads to their deaths. Unlike the Palestinian case, there is little social support for suicide terrorism in Chechnya.     

The Dark Matter of Terrorism

The consequences of states’ reactions to terrorist attacks can far outweigh the effects of the attacks themselves. Yet risk analysis, widely accepted as the proper analytical basis for assessing terrorist threats, largely ignores the consequences from potential reactions to attacks. It also generally fails to consider how the anticipation of these reactions may influence terrorists’ attack preferences. Policymakers should therefore be wary of the limitations of risk analysis as currently practiced. Further, states should strive to avoid reactions to attacks that unwittingly further their adversaries’ agendas, a goal that may be aided by strengthening public resilience to terrorism.     

The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study

Since 1982, Hezbollah has evolved from a “revolutionary vanguard” terrorist organization bent on violently overthrowing the Lebanese government to a hybrid terrorist organization that uses legitimate political tools to the same end. Today Hezbollah operates on the civilian plane of da’wa, social welfare, and religious education; the military–Resistance plane (jihad); and the political plane. In its drive to dominate Shi’ite society, Hezbollah overcame its chief rival, Amal, and now plays a decisive role in Lebanon's political system and the Middle East. Understanding Hezbollah's emergence as a prototypical hybrid terrorist organization is key to understanding global and local jihad movements.     

The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime,A Case Study

Scholars have long recognized that terrorist groups have engaged in transnational organized crime activities. But the question that comes up is, “When does a criminal enterprise become a terrorist group or vice versa?” Terrorist groups have used physical violence, participated in weapons and drug trafficking networks, immigrant smuggling, and money laundering. More recently a number of terrorist groups have established what Jonathan White has referred to as “illegal multinational criminal organizations.” This article will examine the convergence of terrorism and organized crime through the prism of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK).