Connecting a Thousand Points of Hatred 1

The relationship between Al Qaeda and Iran has been one of continuing controversy even prior to 9/11 and is more relevant today as U.S. forces find themselves on battlefields where both have vital interests and roles. It's clear that Al Qaeda and Iran have longstanding issues with the United States, but despite the wild allegations, these two parties remain far apart based on religious differences and differing geopolitical aims. Still, the signs of cooperation between extremists in pursuit of a common aim remains clear and must be taken into account as the United States works to restore stability across the Middle East.     

Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 1994–2007: Planned,Prepared, and Executed Terrorist Attacks

Considering Europe's long history of terrorist violence by separatist, leftist and rightwing groups, terrorism by militant Sunni Islamists has until recently been a marginal phenomenon. However, empirical data presented in this chronology suggests it constitutes a growing and increasingly lethal threat, and a worrisome trend in the context of increased tensions between the Muslim world and the West in the wake of 9/11 and the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, which needs to be dealt with on many levels—socially, politically, and economically. The current chronology is meant to serve as a tool for conducting academic research on the scope of the threat, and for mapping incidents that might be surveyed in more depth to create a better understanding of its organizational, operational, and motivational patterns.     

Islam and the United States: streams of convergence,strands of divergence

This article identifies four historical phases of relations between Islam and the Western world, as led by the United States. The first phase was a convergence of values coinciding with a divergence of empathy. The second phase reversed the order – Islamic and Western values diverged, but intercommunal relations became closer. The third phase is after September 11 when intercommunal relations once again diverged while differences between Western and Islamic values were greater than ever. The futuristic fourth phase of Islam's relations with the U.S.‐led Western world is when the power of the new American Empire is circumscribed, Western values become less libertarian, and Islam reconciles itself to modernity.     

Countering the Islamic State: U.S. Counterterrorism Measures

This research note discusses the tactics and strategies of the United States to counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) from the onset of Operation Inherent Resolve beginning on 8 August 2014 and continuing into early 2015. Through both kinetic and non-kinetic actions, the United States and its coalition has sought to degrade and defeat ISIL. But how effective have these measures been with regard to the group's ability to maintain control over parts of the Iraqi population and territory? ISIL's fast growing affiliate network poses a unique challenge and this study suggests that the kinetic measures of Operation Inherent Resolve have weakened ISIL's tactical capabilities but U.S. efforts to stem the group's recruitment have not been as successful.     

Disaggregating and Defeating Terrorist Safe Havens

Terrorist organizations’ physical safe havens continue to shape the terrorist threat to the United States by extending the groups’ longevity and increasing the threat they pose. As a result, eliminating terrorist safe havens has been a key component of U.S. counterterrorism policy since at least 2001. However, some scholars challenged the post-9/11 policy consensus that terrorists find sanctuary in weak states and so-called ungoverned spaces. This article seeks to bridge this gap between scholarship and policy by offering a typology for disaggregating different kinds of terrorist safe havens. Our typology operates on two axes based on host government will (i.e., the host government's posture toward each group with haven inside its borders), as well as government capability, (specifically whether the host government possesses the specific capabilities needed to oust each group). This intersection of will and capability produces three types of havens. We briefly illustrate each type of haven using the exemplar case study of Pakistan—a location often described as an overarching safe haven, but which is actually home to several sanctuaries—and offer policy recommendations for addressing them. A need exists to disaggregate and identify how the United States can approach haven elimination. This typology and the analysis that stems from it offer a starting point for devising such strategies.     

Trends in Transnational Terrorism and Implications for U.S. National Security and U.S. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act

The unprecedented losses brought about by the attacks of 11 September 2001 have cast the issue of terrorism risk insurance into sharp relief. In particular, it has raised questions as to whether attacks on this scale are an insurable risk and the extent to which the private insurance industry is able and/or willing to price such risks independent of a Federal safety net. Although the Bush administration has committed to renew the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) to offset the human and materiel costs that might result from future cataclysmic terrorist strikes taking place on U.S. soil, it is not apparent that this legislative framework is relevant to the type of extremist contingencies that the United States is likely to face over the short-to-medium term. Any long-term solution to providing insurance in America will necessarily need to go beyond TRIA's existing framework by dropping the “foreign interest” designation for certified attacks; including some sort of supplemental program that includes mandatory coverage for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) assaults; and investigating ways to increase the take-up rates of terrorism insurance by lowering its cost to the customer. An oversight board mandated to evaluate the Act's performance and relevance to evolving terrorist trends would also be useful.     

T2 Transfer of high technology from the united states to the soviet bloc: A public policy issue

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Soviet-bloc states are engaged in an extensive effort in the legal as well as illegal acquisition of United States high technology. This study examines the importance to the U. S. of such losses; the manner in which the Soviets acquire our high technology; benefits of such acquisitions to the Soviet Union; steps being taken by the U. S. to reduce its loss of high technology; and the author's recommended course of action to reduce high-technology transfer.

The transfer of U. S. high technology to the Soviet Union is recognized as one of our most serious national security problems. This problem is complicated, however, when considering our free enterprise system and the need to promote free trade. On the one hand high technology represents a substantial share of our current exports, while on the other, the United States has relied on technological superiority to offset the Soviet-bloc edge in military might. An equilibrium must be established to ensure protection of both economic and national defense interests of the United States.

The Soviet effort to acquire U. S. high technology is broad based, supported by the Military-Industrial Commission and State Committee for Science and Technology (in legal acquisitions), as well as the Soviet Intelligence Service (in illegal acquisitions). Such techniques as review of U. S. publications, U. S.-Soviet exchange programs, as well as extensive clandestine intelligence operations, are utilized by the Soviets in obtaining our high technology.

The Soviet acquisition of U. S. high technology has greatly benefited the USSR. This is clearly seen in U. S. Government estimates that the Soviets may have saved as much as $100 million in research and development of advanced microcircuitry. Several examples of savings to the Soviet defense industry as a result of high-technology transfer are elucidated in this work. In short, the Soviets have been able to save billions of defense dollars by utilizing proven U. S. designs with none of the risks experienced in the research and development of this technology.

Because of the paradoxical nature of this question of high-technology transfer, U. S. Congressional reaction to renewal of the Export Administration Act of 1979 has been mixed. On one side of the aisle, there has been support of looser controls on high-technology exports to promote free trade. On the other side of the aisle, tighter controls on such exports have been supported to protect critical U. S. high technology. At the same time, the U. S. Government has undertaken steps to strengthen its agreement with the COCOM nations. Another effort undertaken by the U. S. and other Western governments is the expulsion of accused Soviet spies from various Soviet diplomatic establishments (at least 67 Soviets from January to May, 1983). Additionally, the U. S. Department of State, Defense, Commerce, and Customs, as well as the American Intelligence Community, have undertaken efforts to reduce high-technology transfer to the Soviet Union. U. S. industry has attempted to increase security of high-technology; however, because of the Defense Investigative Service's workload, the quality of background investigations on individuals, working in firms handling defense contracts, has suffered.

The author recommends establishment of an ad-hoc matrix organization to integrate the resources and efforts of all of the federal agencies, as well as industry, in controlling the transfer of U. S. high technology to the Soviet Union and Soviet-bloc states. The author also includes recommendations as contained in various Congressional bills. The author's suggestions are made with a view toward creating a balance necessary to the protection of our free market system and protection of the national defense of the United States.     

Fighting Cosmic Warriors: Lessons from the First Seven Years of the Global War on Terror

This article argues that a successful strategy for fighting the Global War on Terror (GWOT) requires actions aimed not only at defeating the Al Qaeda network and denying its operatives sanctuary, but also efforts to delegitimize Al Qaeda's ideology; the United States has focused on the former at the expense of the latter. The GWOT requires a new strategy, one that continues to target Al Qaeda operatives and their assets, while undermining Al Qaeda's message. This requires a better understanding of Al Qaeda's ideology, how U.S. foreign policy may fuel that ideology, and a strategy for undermining militant Islam's worldview.     

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq

The United States has long been frustrated in fighting insurgencies. An almost unbroken string of mostly ill-fated experiences in effectively prosecuting this unique blend of political-military operations can be traced backward over nearly half a century from the situation in Iraq today to the early 1960s when the U.S. became heavily engaged in Indochina's wars. Vietnam and Iraq thus form two legs of a historically fraught triangle—with America's experiences in El Salvador in the 1980s providing the connecting leg. The aim of this article is not to rake over old coals or rehash now familiar criticism. Rather, its purpose is to use the present as prologue in order to understand in counterinsurgency terms where we have gone wrong in Iraq; what unique challenges the current conflict in Iraq presents to the U.S. and other coalition military forces deployed there; and what light both shed on future counterinsurgency planning, operations and requirements.     

Counterterrorism Effectiveness to Jihadists in Western Europe and the United States: We Are Losing the War on Terror

A comparative analysis of Islamic extremism post-9/11 to 2015 and the effectiveness of the counterterrorism (CT) authorities to counter it in both Western Europe and the United States was conducted. Four measures of effectiveness revealed that 2010–2015 saw a gradual increase in jihadi attacks and in casualties emanating from these attacks, and more jihadists, foreign fighters, and material supporters. Additionally, 2013–2015 saw a 22 percent reduction both in Western Europe and the U.S. CT agencies' ability to counter Islamic extremism. We are losing the War on Terror and our citizens are less safe than they were six years ago. Further analysis revealed that singleton jihadists: (1) were much harder than group-based jihadists to uncover, (2) have been increasing since 2009, and (3) have generated over 70 percent of all jihadi violence. Finally, numerous similarities exist between Western Europe and the United States with respect to jihadism in their homelands and their respective CT effectiveness, indicating close cross-Atlantic CT collaboration since 9/11. This in-depth analysis provides essential threat/hazard information to security, law enforcement, intelligence, and policymaking personnel and the greater homeland security communities.     

Financial investment via ADRs in Mexico and South America

American depository receipts (ADRs) are dollar-denominated, negotiable instruments issued by a depository bank to represent ownership of a foreign security in the bank's possession. They are the primary method employed by Latin American corporations to raise equity capital in the United States. One flequently overlooked aspect about ADRs is that their investment performance provides a gauge not only on management's performance but also a measure of the foreign government's ability to provide a political, legal, economic and social climate that is conducive to international investment. This paper investigates the returns and risks associated with foreign investment in Mexico and South America. First, we show that the weekly returns to Latin American stocks are weakly correlated with the U.S. stock market which suggests that they can reduce the risk of a portfolio that is fully diversified within the U.S. market. Second, we find that ADRs from this region are more risky than U.S. common stocks. However, we find little evidence that foreign exchange rate risk should be a major factor in the investment decision. Third, we examine the effects of the devaluation of the Mexican peso and show that political factors can significantly increase the risk and reduce the return to foreign investment. Finally, the results show that investors do not pay a significantly larger relative transaction cost premium for investing in Mexican and South American equity vis-à-vis U.S. common stock. We conclude that ADRs provide the ability for the U.S. investor to realize potentially superior gains from companies located in these emerging economies. However, the willingness by the U.S. investor to disinvest means that politicians and managers have a powerful incentive to continue reforms that lead to improved standards of living for their citizens and employees.     

Russia and the Iraq War: was Putin's policy a failure?

Although Russian President Vladimir Putin has been faced with numerous crises since coming to office in 2000, most importantly the war in Chechnya, the Iraq War was the first major international crisis with which his administration was confronted. As in the case of Kosovo for Yeltsin, and the Gulf War for Gorbachev, the Russian President had to deal with conflicting domestic pressures and apparently still more conflicting Russian national and international interests. Indeed, one result of such a situation was a post-war accusation that Putin actually had no policy or at least no consistent policy with regard to the Iraq crisis [Golan, G., 1992. Gorbachev's difficult time in the Gulf. Political Science Quarterly 107 (2), 213–230]. One may remember similar accusations of Gorbachev's “zigzaging” in the Gulf War and claims that the Yeltsin government failed to forge a Kosovo policy altogether [Levitin, O., 2000. Inside Moscow's Kosovo muddle. Survival 42 (1), 130]. Yet, a certain pattern did appear to repeat itself in the Iraqi crisis, namely, pre-war efforts to prevent a military conflict from breaking out, then gradual escalation of rhetoric if not actual involvement, and finally gradual but relatively rapid retreat to conciliatory posture toward the United States (in all three crises). Moreover, Putin was indeed consistent throughout the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods in his opposition to the Americans' use of force against Iraq and in the need to remain within a United Nations framework. Actually, one might ask (and we shall below) why Putin did not abandon the first part of this policy, in order to maintain the second component, when it became certain that the U.S. was going to attack with or without UN Security Council approval.     

Managing the Global and Local: The Dual Agendas of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

On 29 October 2010, authorities in the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates intercepted explosive packages that had been placed on U.S.-bound planes. Less than a year earlier, Umar Farouq Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate explosives aboard Northwest Flight 253. These attacks originated and were organized in Yemen under the supervision of a local Al Qaeda affiliate known as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. These attacks are a manifestation of the group's growing international ambitions, yet little scholarship on Al Qaeda explores how affiliates with robust ties to Al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan balance their dedication to global and local jihad(s). This article contends that despite its strong ties to Al Qaeda Central and international posture, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula still must maintain local relevance and support. Its ability to do so carries implications for counterterrorism policymakers and the broader Al Qaeda movement.     

The united states naval blockade of Iraq: A foreign policy and international law analysis

The current Persian Gulf crisis may signal a new period in human history in which the United Nations is viewed as the forum of first resort for the resolution of international harms and disputes. This is particularly striking since the Security Council, because of east-west divisions, has been unable to act in a collective manner to addresses serious international breaches of the peace. This two part essay deals with the events leading up to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the step-by-step reaction by the U.S. Government, the imposition of the U.S. Navy blockade of Kuwaiti shipping, and the legal justification for the introduction of forces. The reader is left to decide whether the Rule of Law and Charter ideals of collective security, are the real victors in the current conflict.

Part 1 of the essay examines the detailed economic and political causes for the Iraqi invasion. Even though some commentators have characterized Saddam Hussein's entry into Kuwait as “naked aggression” which was driven by Saddam Hussein's hamartia to become the new Nasser, OPEC production disputes, allegations of excessive Kuwaiti pumping of the Rumalia oil field (straddles both countries), the need for an Iraqi coastline, and large Iraqi debt to Kuwait are seen as “rational” reasons for the invasion. A historical examination of the Iran-Iraq conflict is grafted into part one to assist the reader in appreciating the fact that belligerent conduct is viewed in Iraq as a normative mode of conflict resolution and that in the context of all current and future military and diplomatic interchanges, the proven bellicosity of Iraq should figure prominently in the approaches which are taken.

The U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf must be viewed in the context of the U.S.'s diplomatic and economic interests in the region. The essay concludes that the actions of the United States in the first forty days after the Iraqi invasion were masterful because of the skilled use of the U.N. security council (to build a broad political base) as well as the introduction of limited force (imposition of a naval blockade) to signal to Saddam Hussein that the international community was serious in its resolve. The shooting which is taking place is most unfortunate; but U.S. efforts were properly tailored to keep the world coalition intact and prevent a shooting war. Until approximately 3 weeks into the actual conflict, the level of anti-U.S. rhetoric was noticeably small- a triumph for U.S. foreign policy makers in forming a world-wide consensus and maintaining it and a triumph for international respect for law.

The final portion of Part 1 deals with the history of blockades before and after the 1945 U.N. Charter. Blockade actions have been used since the Middle Ages but the 1856 Pact of Paris and the 1909 Declaration of London are the modern sources for the Law of Blockade. Becuase of the sheer intensity of conflict in the First and Second World Wars, the normative rules contained in the two written sources of law fell into disuse. Even so, most of the substantive provisions from the 19th and early 20th century doctrines are incorporated into contemporary law and policy. Commander Rosen argues strenuously for a modernization of the international conventions to codify the rules of blockade since, given the utter destructiveness of modern warfare, blockades remain a relatively benign use of force in those situations in which use of force is legally justified. But, however laudable the U.N. Charter ideals are to sharply restrict the use of force to exceptionally limited circumstances and make state aggression illegal, situations will arise in which use of force will be necessary to respond to illegal aggression. Resurrection of the old concept of pacific blockade (similar to the naval action taken in connection with the Cuban Missile Crisis) is urged because unanimity in the U.N. is transitory and nations, particularly superpowers, need the legal flexibility to react to illegal aggression with limited uses of force--below the threshold uses of force authorized by the U.N. Charter.     

The United States naval blockade of Iraq: a foreign policy and international law analysis

This is the second of a two part essay by Commander Rosen into the causes of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the modern law of blockade, the political wisdom and the lawfulness of imposing a limited blockade of Iraq. Defects in the current regime of blockade were explored.

In part II, Commander Rosen closely explores the legal justification for the U.S. use of force in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It is frequently overlooked that the U.S. naval blockade (it was called a “naval interdiction”) was a U.S.-only operation from August 12th until August 25, 1990. As a pedagogical exercise, this period is extremely important because the U.S. use of force (by its naval units), in response to a written request by deposed Emir of Kuwait, must be justified under the U.N. Charter to be proper under international law. Once the U.N. Security Council authorized the use of force on August 25, 1990 to enforce the U.N. embargo, then the operation became one in which the U.N., as a corporate body, was acting. Since most low intensity conflicts since 1945, have involved lawful use of force issues outside of Security Council purview, the U.S. unilateral military action (blockade) against Iraqi shipping must be analyzed. It is reasonable to anticipate that future controversies of this sort will occur because of philosophic divisions among the U.N. Security Council permanent members or because there is anaequate time for the U.N. “Security Council to meet and obtain the forces required to insert into a region of conflict. Resurrection of the moribund U.N. Military Staff Committee might be one of the lessons learned from this particular episode.

The United States had the benefit of a U.N. resolution on August 25, 1990 to justify its naval action. Before that date, the legal issue arises whether, in the early stages, national self-defense grounds permitted the use of force against Iraq (blockade) since deprivation of assured access to critical materials (oil) can be considered an act of aggression under some theories of international law. Commander Rosen concludes that the low intensity blockade was probably not authorized, under a theory of national self-defense, because the U.S. had no hard evidence on August 12, 1990 (the day the blockade commenced) that Saddam Hussein would deprive the U.S. of access to Gulf Oil supplies. But, because of the pervasive interdepencies of world economies, world food supplies, and petroleum access, the case was extremely close.

The customary international law of intervention (protection of nationals or humanitarian) and the law of collective self-defense was explored relative to the U.S. imposition of a limited naval blockade. Commander Rosen concludes that intervention theory will not support the limited naval blockade since there was insufficient evidence that U.S. citizens were in imminent danger (as in Grenada) and the blockade operation was too limited and indirect in scope to produce the type of rapid results which have come to be associated with a humanitarian intervention (as in the Congo). But, since Kuwait’s territorial sovereignty had been grossly violated as a result of illegal aggression, Kuwait was privileged under the U.N. Charter to request and receive defense assistance from the United States under Article 51 to recover lost territory. Arguments that the right to act in collective self-defense under Article 51 is limited to the nation which itself is attacked (or a nation closely aligned with the victim) are rejected as contrary to the U.N. norms of promoting community resistance to illegal aggression.

While the Persian Gulf dispute has resulted in open hostilities, international law issues existed whether, in the early stages, the blockade was militarily necessary and whether the blockade could be extended to the Jordanian port of Aqaba, because of conflicting reports as to Jordan’s adherence with the U.N. embargo, were explored. International law would probably not support an extension of the blockade to Aqaba because it would be seen an improper interference with Jordan’s neutrality. Similarly, forbidding the passage of U.N. medical and food convoys into Iraq was seen as a breach of international law provided such shipments were specifically authorized and supervised by the U.N. security council (to ensure that the food was only distributed to civilians).     

Impact of the 1996 Welfare Reform and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Acts on Caribbean Immigrants

SUMMARY

This paper examines the impact of the 1996 Welfare Reform and Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Acts on Caribbean immigrants in the United States. Drawing from the conceptual framework posited by Dye's (1984) Elite Preference Modelof policy analysis, the author argues that the three laws have created enormous economic and psychological difficulties among families in the United States. Developing countries in the Caribbean region have been severely impacted by the law since they have had to accommodate returning citizens when they are deported under provisions of immigration policies. The question for consideration by this paper is how may the legal and human rights of deportees be balanced against the rights of the U.S. government to secure its borders and ensure the security of its citizens? The paper also addresses issues of immigration, and international relations particularly the north-south dialogue between powerful developed countries such as the United States and small developing states of the Caribbean.     

The changing nature of the transatlantic link: U.S. approaches and implications for Central and Eastern Europe

This article examines the changing security, economic and diplomatic components of the transatlantic link, with a particular focus on Washington's approach and implications for Central and Eastern Europe. The United States continues to play an essential role as security underwriter in the region, but the military dimension of the transatlantic relationship is transforming and will result in greater burdens on Europeans. Economic links between the U.S. and Central Europe are developing more strongly than generally understood, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is likely to drive both political and economic ties. Unconventional gas developments are enhancing U.S. engagement in European energy markets. Finally, the U.S. remains keen to engage its European partners on a broad agenda of global and regional issues and retains its own interests in working particularly with Central and Eastern European countries to lend stability to ‘wider Europe’.     

On the Age Against the Poor

Abstract

This article focuses on Dominican migration to the United States (U.S.) after 1965. Dominicans left their homeland pressured by economic needs, the desire to improve their lives, and encouraged by a de facto immigration policy that facilitated their exodus. Once in the U.S., most Dominicans encounter an economy that increasingly demands skills and levels of schooling they do not possess. Rather than a prosperous life, in the new land, Dominicans face high unemployment levels and an alarming state of poverty. Paradoxically, while the needs of Dominicans continue to be unmet in the new society, the social policies and the conditions that push them out of their country remain in effect. On its part, the U.S. has responded by adopting a number of immigration laws to control the entrance of unwanted and unneeded job-seekers. As a result, the number of Dominicans coming to the U.S. has begun to decline as the number of Dominicans deported to the Dominican Republic has increased. In the end, poor Dominicans are pushed back and forth by both societies whose immigration policies mask their unwillingness to respond to the needs of the group. The article also discusses the impact on the Dominican community of 9/11 and the crashing of the AA flight 587, on November 12, 2001.     

Winning the Battle of Ideas: Propaganda,Ideology, and Terror

Propaganda is at the heart of the struggle between Al Qaeda's strain of militant Islamism and the governments of the United States and United Kingdom. In an ideological struggle, propaganda is critical in shaping outcomes. Both Al Qaeda and the U.S. and U.K. governments recognize this, and have devised propaganda strategies to construct and disseminate messages for key audiences. This article considers the key elements in the Al Qaeda propaganda narrative, and the means through which it is disseminated. On the other side, it assesses the U.S. and U.K. governments’ response, focusing particularly on the British effort to define and propagate a narrative centered on British values.     

Al Qaeda's Scorecard: A Progress Report on Al Qaeda's Objectives

Terrorism scholars are divided over whether terrorism is an effective tactic. Disagreement derives from the fact that the objectives of terrorist groups are often highly contested. Nowhere is this clearer than in contemporary statements on Al Qaeda. This article explores the most common interpretations for why Al Qaeda attacked the United States on 11 September 2001, and then analyzes their empirical support. After determining the most compelling interpretation of Al Qaeda's objectives, the article evaluates Al Qaeda's success in achieving them since perpetrating this watershed attack. The following analysis provides a timely case study in the classic debate over whether terrorism is strategically rational behavior.