A Poisson model of incidents of international terrorism in the United States

Abstract

Various haphazard, and often uncoordinated, efforts have been devoted to discouraging and combatting terrorism. Unfortunately, there has been a noticeable lack of quantitative studies of the problem of terrorism. Nevertheless, it can be expected that the problem of international terrorism will eventually be a focus for operations researchers. A factor fundamental to any OR study is an understanding of the underlying generating process for incidents of terrorism. Based on incidents of terrorism from 1968 to 1974, this paper notes that the Poisson is a good model for the occurrence of incidents of international terrorism in the United States. Results of both chi‐square and Kolmogorov‐Smirnov tests are presented. Finally, an unusual result, inconsistent with popular beliefs, is noted.     

The U.S. Navy's role in countering maritime terrorism

Abstract

There have been few spectacular acts of maritime terrorism. About ninety‐five percent of all incidents of what would be classified as transnational maritime terrorism involved bombings, hijackings, and “other” attacks. Nearly all of these took place when ships were in port, and the victims were predominantly merchant ships. Only a small number of terrorist attacks have been reported against men‐of‐war–none against U.S. Navy ships. Bombing, including various forms of mining, comprises the major threat to merchant ships, while the dangers of U.S. Navy ships would be aggravated by the presence of nuclear weapons or nuclear propulsion plants.

Counter terrorism as carried out by the U.S. Navy involves actions to deter or defeat direct terrorist activity (against the ship itself) and indirect activity (against other U.S. interests). U.S Navy ships are especially well organized, constructed, and equipped to deal with the former, but they would be virtually powerless to assist U.S. merchant ships against the most probable threats (bombing, hijacking, and attacks) in the most probable location (overseas ports).     

Terrorism and Beyond: a 21st Century Perspective

Abstract

This study examines trends in the incidence of international hostage‐barricade terrorism (HBT) since the late 1960s, the concurrent development of elite hostage rescue units (HRUs), and the relative effectiveness of American, Soviet, West European, Israeli, and other Third World responses—using dialogue or force—to HBT actions. Although HRUs have scored some dramatic rescues, three major hostage massacres in Third World countries in 1985–1986 and other bloody HBT incidents in 1988 demonstrated the high cost of using force prematurely and ineptly to resolve HBT crises. Focusing on these and other HRU failures, this study questions the American and Israeli “no‐ransom, no‐negotiation” policies in HBT situations and concludes that a more flexible approach of patiently “talking down” and “wearing down” the hostage‐takers through basic hostage‐negotiation techniques—even if only as a delaying tactic—is vital for maximizing the chances for rescuing hostages safely, whether through dialogue or force. Conversely, if authorities quickly resort to military action, hostages are far more likely to suffer casualties than to be rescued safely.     

Ethno‐political activity and the psychology of terrorism

Abstract

Studies of terrorist psychology have typically focused either on single individuals or group dynamics within the organizations that these individuals have joined. Less attention has been paid to the background conditions which give rise to these individuals and organizations, even for environments in which generalization appears to be feasible. This paper focuses on one such environment. Its principal goal is to highlight the theoretical connections between a society's ethnic cleavages; the development of ethno‐political activity, especially organized violence and terrorism; and the implications of this activity for the functioning of institutions in “democratic” and “non‐democratic” societies. A related objective is the identification of policy responses to latent or manifest ethno‐political activity and an assessment of their potential efficacy. These points are illustrated by examining a small ethnic group, the South Moluccans in Holland, which would appear to have had little motivation to engage in violence or terrorism, but some of whose members nevertheless did.     

The Evolution of the U.S. Government's Annual Report on Terrorism: A Personal Commentary

This article examines the evolution of a key U.S. Government annual publication on terrorism. From its inception in 1977 to the present, the U.S. Government's annual terrorism report has been the primary statistical compiler of international terrorist incidents. Given the magnitude of this task and the inherent difficulty in defining the term “terrorism,” this report has been controversial and criticized. Love it or hate it, for many decades, this report was the sole source of statistics on international terrorism. The author argues that despite its flaws, this unclassified annual report does provide value and usually paints a fairly accurate picture of the international terrorism landscape. Over the last two years however, there have been claims that this report has become politicized and tailored to fit the views of the administration on the terrorist threat. The author rejects this charge and claims that this publication has been objective and that it has evolved over time into a more credible and useful report.     

Nationalists without a nation: South Moluccan terrorism in the Netherlands

Abstract

This article focuses on the phenomenon of South Moluccan terrorism in the Netherlands. Beginning with a historical examination of the colonial relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia, attention is then given to the circumstances in which some 21,000 South Moluccans came to the Netherlands in the early 1950s, and the social, economic, and political conditions of the South Moluccan community in Holland since then. Then follows a detailed examination of the main incidents of South Moluccan terrorism in the Netherlands which climaxed in a series of violent incidents against Dutch and Indonesian targets in the mid‐1970s. Special attention is placed on the ways in which successive Dutch governments have responded to the various outbreaks of terrorism, as well as to the effects of this terrorism on public opinion. The article then shows what effects South Moluccan terrorism has had on the policies of Dutch and Indonesian governments; on national and international public opinion; on the South Moluccans in the Moluccas; and on the international terrorist community. The paper concludes that the focus of South Moluccan terrorism in the Netherlands is likely to shift from attempts to secure an independent homeland for their people to closer contacts with other terrorist groups espousing anti‐colonial, anti‐imperialist, and nationalist ideals.     

Islamic Terrorism and the Question of National Liberation,or Problems of Contemporary Chechen Terrorism

Scholars have analyzed various causes of contemporary Chechen terrorism in Russia and have offered multiple explanations as to why this terrorism persists. Most commonly, these scholars accuse Russia of suppressing a Muslim struggle for national liberation in Chechnya because of Russia's own interests in Chechen territory or its lucrative oil resources. This work analyzes various instances of Chechen terrorism, 1991–2002, to conclude that the dynamics of terrorism do not support the claims of various scholars, journalists, and Chechen terrorists that Chechen rebels are fighting a war of independence and that the Russian government's failure “to let Chechnya go” instigates future acts of terrorism.     

The Non-Random Nature of Terrorism: An Exploration of Where and How Global Trends of Terrorism Have Developed Over 40 Years

We examined the geographic concentration and persistence of terrorism using the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD logs all terrorist incidents worldwide using open-source media, and, for 1970–2013, includes over 125,000 incidents from over 200 countries and territories. We examined regional and country-level data; different terrorism forms, severity levels, and timeframes (entire period, five-year periods, and annual); and multiple definitions of “elevated” terrorism. The findings reveal that terrorism is concentrated geographically and temporally. Most countries experience peace or very low levels of terrorism; only a few experience substantial outbreaks; very few experience prolonged terrorism; and even fewer, prolonged severe terrorism.     

The analytical foundations of extortionate terrorism

Extortionate terrorism is the threatened use of terrorist acts to gain concessions from the victim. In this article, game theory is used to seek answers to the following questions: (a) When will people resort to extortionate terrorism? (b) When will extortionate terrorism succeed and when will it fail? (c) What constitutes an “optimal” threat, i.e., what bribes, extortion, ransom, or payoff should be asked in exchange for which hostages or property? (d) When should unsuccessful threats be carried out and when should they be abandoned? (e) How should a victim choose among potential responses to specific terrorist threats and to the general problem of terrorism? Two different game theoretic models of terrorism are examined— one using ordinal preferences, the other von Neumann‐Mor‐genstern utilities. Terrorism is considered not simply as isolated incidents; institutions are potential victims of repeated terrorism. The terrorist and the victim, in formulating a response to each incident, are guided not only by present gains and losses, but by the effect their response has on others’ perception of their credibility and resolve—two long‐run variables.     

Exploring the “Root Causes” of Terrorism

This article attempts to clarify what is meant by “root causes” and considers if their analysis helps to explain and describe how, where, and why terrorism occurs. In attempting to explore—but not definitively resolve—these challenges, the article will attempt to delineate “root causes” into qualitative and quantitative variables that can be empirically tested in relation to contemporary terrorist activity. In so doing, it considers the relative merits of different methodologies for approaching “root causes.” The article concludes that indirect and underlying sources of conflict are significant to understanding specific incidents of terrorism and certain categories of terrorism; that “root causes” are less helpful in describing and explaining terrorism as a general phenomenon; and that root causes are of analytical use only in conjunction with precipitant factors.     

United nations resolutions against international terrorism

Abstract

Nine years after the Munich Massacre of 11 Israeli athletes and after a request by the Secretary‐General for the General Assembly to act on the problem, the General Assembly reached a general consensus on a terrorism resolution. The resolution endorses a UN committee's recommendations to refrain from assisting terrorism in any way and to cooperate in the final elimination of terrorism. Negotiation of the resolution was difficult because third world countries did not want to weaken opposition to “colonial, racist, and alien regimes,” and they have held back from approving an international convention that would require trying or extraditing those accused of terrorist crimes. Problems of constitutional protection to individuals in democracies and of political asylum also stand in the way of an overall convention. Nevertheless, the General Assembly resolution has been useful in promoting cooperation among states to eliminate terrorism and in encouraging support for conventions against specific types of terrorism such as hijacking, taking of hostages, attacking diplomatic targets, and supporting nuclear terrorism.     

On learning terrorism

Abstract

The complex phenomenon of terrorism has been explained in a variety of ways, ranging from the narrowly psychological to the broadly political. Many of these hypotheses appear to have merit, although, standing alone, each tends to be inadequate or incomplete. Focusing on the psychological explanations of root cause, the instant discussion proposes that the hitherto neglected or taken‐for‐granted principles of human learning, particularly those of cognitive‐behavioral conditioning, can provide a useful and significant component to these explanations. The competence and commitment to the ways and means of terror are in large measure produced, intensified, and sustained through learning. Evidence, chiefly from psychological studies, is adduced to support this hypothesis. A few formal, sometimes state‐sponsored training programs based more or less on conditioning are briefly described. Some of the doctrines, particularly those that underpin Middle East terrorism and provide the justification and substantiation of what is taught, are also mentioned. It is suggested that the same procedures by which terrorism is indoctrinated may, in conjunction with other procedures, be employed to prevent and combat it. Although this strategy, in the present uncongenial socio‐cultural and geopolitical environments, will doubtless be difficult if not impossible to implement, it deserves to be explored as another potentially effective tool in the developing armamentarium of counter‐terrorism.     

The ambiguities of political terrorism in Central America

Abstract

Over the last ten years left‐wing terrorism in Central America has spawned a number of related and opposed phenomena. Right‐wing terrorism has become very active but has degenerated into pseudo‐left‐wing terrorism and finally into gangsterism. Examples of this are the alleged Chacon group in El Salvador and the related activities of the Zimeri gang in Guatemala. Non‐Central American factors have also come into play, such as connections with the PLO and the activities of Cuban exile groups. This situation has made it extremely difficult to label any individual act of terrorism as being related to the Right or to the Left.     

The British police and terrorism

Abstract

The police response to terrorism in England, Wales, and Scotland is considered with special emphasis on the necessity for good police‐public relations in a democratic state. Legal and organizational developments related to preventing terrorism are evaluated by reference to the traditional view of the police and the police functions in Britain. The idea of a “third force” and the role of the Army in support of the police are also considered. The conclusions lay stress on the complexities of countering terrorism in a democracy.     

American opinion toward terrorism: The Reagan years

Abstract

Using a variety of public opinion sources, this article explores American attitudes during the two Reagan administrations toward terrorism. It establishes the salience of terrorism in the public's mind, the perceived causes of terrorism, opinion about preventing future terrorist incidents, and attitudes on negotiating with terrorists. The paper also examines sentiments about military retaliation options and reviews beliefs about media coverage of terrorism. In this overall attitudinal context, the study touches on the theoretical relationship between public opinion and foreign policymaking, contending that the American public is responsible and sensible enough to comprehend the general nuances and basic complexities of an issue such as terrorism. Public opinion is judged to be a capable and logical determinant in foreign policy formation. The paper also concludes that there must be some symmetry between U.S. policy and public opinion on the issue for the policy to be effective.     

Fighting World War III: A suggested strategy

Abstract

Utilizing a rational‐actor policymaker model, this paper presents the necessary and sufficient conditions that must be satisfied for the formation of a transnational antiterrorist institution. Such an institution would tie together nations in their struggle against international terrorism. In particular, these institutions could provide crisis management, preemptive strikes, and retaliatory strikes. After analyzing the obstacles to the formation of such institutions, we present a specific proposal for a transnational commando unit. We chose the parameters of the proposed institution so as to maximize the likelihood of initial formation. In addition, we discuss how the transnational commando unit could, if properly designed, surmount the obstacles to formation. As terrorist groups increase their cooperation and stage incidents of a transnational kind, nations will have to turn to such institutions to increase the effectiveness of commando units, eliminate safe havens, and share intelligence. Although our proposal is more modest than those often put forth, once formed, our institution could evolve over time.     

Rewarding Fire with Fire: Effects of Retaliation on Terrorist Group Dynamics

Abstract

Comparative studies of the psychology of terrorism indicate that there is no one terrorist mindset, A theme in common among the disparate groups is the strong need of marginal alienated individuals to join a group of like‐minded individuals with a similar world view that “it's us against them, and they are the cause of our problems.” This strong need to belong gives particular force to the power of group dynamics. While the ideology is the glue that holds the group together and serves as the rationale for its actions, terrorists do not commit acts of terrorism for ideological reasons. The amelioration of the societal injustice which they indicate incites and justifies their terrorism does not reduce the lure of terrorism, because of the powerful hold of the group on its members.

Paradoxically, a policy of reactive retaliation with the goal of deterring terrorist acts may have the opposite effect and reinforce the mind set of the terrorist. For the group under threat, the external danger has the consequence of reducing external divisiveness and uniting the group against the outside enemy. The survival of the group is paramount because of the sense of group identity it provides.

Identifying the locus of control is of crucial significance in estimating the effects of counter‐terrorist policies upon a terrorist group. For the autonomous terrorist cell, active retaliation may reinforce the cohesion of the group; for the corporate terrorist organization, issues of organizational survival may become paramount. Neither the terrorist group nor the terrorist organization can be forced to give up terrorism, for to do so would be to lose their reason for being. For state‐supported and directed terrorist groups on the other hand, the terrorist group in effect serves as a paramilitary group under central government control. In this situation, group and organizational considerations are less relevant, for the object of the counter‐terrorist policy is the government of the sponsoring state. Since the survival of the state and national interests are the primary values, retaliatiatory policies, can, in the short run, have a deterring effect. In the long run, the most effective anti‐terrorist policy is one which renders the terrorist career less attractive to potential members, facilitates terrorists leaving the group, and reduces external support.     

Terrorism Financing with Virtual Currencies: Can Regulatory Technology Solutions Combat This?

ABSTRACT

This article considers the terrorism financing risk associated with the growth of Financial Technology innovations and in particular, focuses on virtual currency products and services. The ease with which cross-border payments by virtual currencies are facilitated, the anonymity surrounding their usage, and their potential to be converted into the fiat financial system, make them ideal for terrorism financing and therefore calls for a coordinated global regulatory response. This article considers the extent of the risk of terrorism financing through virtual currencies in “high risk” States by focusing on countries that have been recently associated with terrorism activities. It assesses the robustness of their financial regulatory and law enforcement regimes in combating terrorism financing and considers the extent to which Regulatory Technology and its global standardization, can mitigate this risk.     

APPLICATIONS OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELS TO GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY DECISION MAKING

ABSTRACT

This paper surveys literature from Economics, Accounting, and Management to address theoretical issues in Public Administration regarding government provided services in order to contribute to a formal connection between principal-agent models in these disciplines and public policy administration decision-making. In particular, it addresses the question: What theoretical properties of the services themselves might guide (a) the choice of producer of the services (government or outsourcing firm/contractor), and (b) the accountability imposed for the work produced. It is found that a theoretical framework of principal-agent models that includes the decision of whether to contract out can be useful as a first step in systematically formulating the government's decision for a variety of goods/services. This provides an alterative to the identification of key decision properties “from the ground up” for each good or service the government provides.     

Contextualizing Political Terrorism: A Collective Action Perspective for Understanding the Tanzim

An attempt is made to embed the study of political terrorism within the larger phenomenon of Collective Action. It is suggested that the analysis of dynamics within and between components of Collective Action—structure of conflict, a social movement, authorities, and contention—can be beneficial for gaining additional insights into the study of group risk for political terrorism. Using the case of the Tanzim contention with Israeli forces it is demonstrated how processes within, between, and outside the conflictants affected Tanzim members' decision to employ political terrorism. Based on the analysis, several implications for counterterrorism are offered.