Why Do Terrorists Stop? Analyzing Why ETA Members Abandon or Continue with Terrorism

This article analyzes the factors that have motivated members of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) to abandon terrorism and the factors that have motivated other members of the terrorist organization to maintain their activism. The article examines the process of disengagement of an important faction of ETA and that of other terrorists throughout the group's protracted campaign in order to explain the reasons behind the decision to give up violence. The article concludes with an analysis of the variables that should be considered in order to encourage the collective disengagement of the group that has become the most enduring terrorist organization in Europe.     

What Role Have Former ETA Terrorists Played in Counterterrorism and Counterradicalization Initiatives in Spain?

This article responds to the following research question: what role have former Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) members played in counterterrorism and counterradicalization initiatives vis-à-vis the terror group in Spain? Our analysis of the role played by former ETA members so far demonstrates that only a minority of former ETA terrorists have disengaged from the terrorist organization and at the same time voiced some criticism of their past violent activities. Such a step, although a positive one, is part of a process that in most of the cases analyzed has to be deemed as incomplete due to deficits, some of them very significant, which considerably limit their effectiveness in countering terrorism and radicalization.     

Terrorism: The Dark Side of Social Entrepreneurship

The view of terrorists as entrepreneurs is not new. Yet, unlike traditional entrepreneurs, they are not motivated by profits. This article argues that terrorists are social entrepreneurs. They are motivated primarily by social returns. Furthermore, their main output is a public good due to its non-rival and non-excludable properties. Using social entrepreneurship theories, this article presents an alternative view of the incentives behind the formation of terrorist organizations. It concludes with a discussion of policy implications of this framework for combating terrorism.     

White Paper Prepared for The Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management: Tradeoffs and Paradoxes: Terrorism,Deterrence and Nuclear Weapons

This article was written at the request of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management. While this analysis suggests that certain types of terrorists can be deterred from certain types of attacks, it is less optimistic about the use of nuclear weapons in a terrorist deterrent strategy. A broad approach to deterrence may be effective against certain types of terrorist groups and attacks, making it crucially important to disaggregate the terrorist threat when setting policy. The article goes on to address two types of terrorist groups with a “global reach” that pose a serious threat to the United States: non-state actors driven by doctrines permitting catastrophic attacks and state-sponsored groups capable of carrying out catastrophic attacks. The analysis reveals a number of previously unappreciated tradeoffs and paradoxes associated with the deterrence of terrorists.     

A Historical Analysis of Mass Casualty Bombers

Over the past two decades repeated attempts have been made to identify the next "new" form of terrorism, but all have come up short. Modern terrorism is not about the next trend, but is--and long has been--characterized by mass casualty bombers (defined as those terrorist groups that have killed 25 or more people in a bombing attack). When compared to other "new" terrorists, mass casualty bombers are more prolific than state-sponsored terrorists, more deadly than suicide terrorists, more identifiable than religious terrorists, and more plausible than CBRN terrorists. Mass casualty bombers have long presented the greatest terrorist threat to international peace and security and will likely continue to do so in the future.     

The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media: Similar Framing Patterns in the News Coverage of Women in Politics and in Terrorism

Abstract

Although women have been among the leaders and followers of terrorist organizations throughout the history of modern terrorism, the mass media typically depict women terrorists as interlopers in an utterly male domain. A comparison of the framing patterns in the news about women in politics and the entrenched stereotypes in the coverage of female terrorists demonstrates similarities in the depiction of these legitimate (women in politics) and illegitimate political actors (women in terrorism). Just like the managers of election campaigns are cognizant of the electorate's stereotypical gender perceptions, terrorist organizations know about and exploit cultural gender clichés that are reinforced by the media. The argument here is that the implementation of anti- and counterterrorist policies must not be influenced by the mass-mediated images of female terrorists because they do not reflect reality.     

A Survey of Terrorism of the Left in Italy: 1970–78

Abstract

The terrorists who have ravaged Italy over the past several years are not totally faceless. The names and backgrounds of many are well known, as are their habitual modes of operations and the ideologies by which they are moved. After a brief catalog of the terrorists’ actions, the article outlines the physiognomy of Italy's major terrorist groups. A substantial part of this consists of a list of each group's victims, since any assessment of the terrorist groups’ effects must begin with an awareness of which sectors of Italian society have been struck. The backgrounds of the terrorists, the political language they speak, and the list of their victims point unambiguously to the conclusion that terrorism in Italy is overwhelmingly a phenomenon of the Left and that it conceives of itself as a means of bringing about a Communist regime. The terrorists regard themselves as the competitors and reformers of the Italian Communist party. But at the same time they have made good their claim as the mortal enemies of the enemies of the Communist party. The question regarding the Italian terrorists’ international connections cannot be answered definitively. Such evidence as exists, however, suggests that today's self‐declared Communist terrorists may be acting in ways similar to their predecessors of the 1940s and early 1950s, who found safe haven in the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe.     

Are Terrorists Courageous? Micro-Sociology of Extreme Left Terrorism

This article contests the affirmation—based on common sense—according to which terrorists simply need courage. The typical terrorist act can be considered part of the sociological category known as “vile violence” that is the act of striking out at a victim after having placed him or her in a desperate situation that does not allow for any escape. This article is based on primary and secondary sources, such as the analysis of thirty-five homicides committed in Italy by six terrorist units of the extreme left; interviews with extreme left terrorists; interviews with victims of extreme left terrorists; autobiographies of extreme left terrorists; autobiographies of victims of extreme left terrorists; video interviews of extreme left terrorists; and written statements of the investigating magistrates.     

The Effect of Female Suicide Attacks on Foreign Media Framing of Conflicts: The Case of the Palestinian–Israeli Conflict

The study examines the effect of female suicide attacks on foreign media framing of conflicts. Examining the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, 2,731 articles were sampled that covered terrorist events (American, British, and Indian press); 625 appeared in the week following a female's suicide attack, 97 reported an attack by a female perpetrator. The findings suggest that foreign media discourse around female suicide bombers promotes more messages about the society within which the terrorists are embedded. Since the coverage of female terrorists tends to provide more detailed information about the perpetrator, it focuses more on the terror organizations’ side of the conflict's story.     

Global Jihadist Recidivism: A Red Flag

This commentary examines the issue of global jihadist recidivism and identifies it as a potential long-term international counterterrorism concern. Although there are no comprehensive and accurate statistics on global jihadist recidivism, there is sufficient anecdotal evidence that suggests that the tendency for released imprisoned global jihadist terrorists is to return to terrorist activity. It is important to understand that arresting, indicting, and sentencing a captured global jihadist terrorist is not the end of the counterterrorism skirmish. In fact, the next stages of incarceration and reformation are more crucial to the endgame. The problem of global jihadist recidivism is at the core a manpower issue. Prisons have always been an important front for all types of terrorist groups. Recidivism or the failure of prison rehabilitation programs is simply one component of this front. Terrorist groups do not want their imprisoned members to reform and resign from the organization. Further research needs to be conducted on the recidivism rate for terrorists and whether religious terrorists would have a higher rate than secular ones. The academic, think tank, and U.S. government communities need to examine this issue to determine if it is a long-term international counterterrorism problem. The author believes it will be.     

Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe

Abstract

This article investigates the importance of the invasion and occupation of Iraq as motivation for recent acts of jihadist terrorism in Western Europe. It analyses the mass casualty terrorist attack attributed to a group of Islamist militants in Madrid on 11 March 2004, and the killing of a Dutch filmmaker on the streets of Amsterdam by an Al Qaeda–inspired terrorist network. The first case has been assumed to be mainly motivated by the Iraq war, whereas the other case has been perceived as an act by an individual, motivated by domestic factors in Holland. The article situates these acts of terrorism within the theory of so-called spillover effects from armed conflicts to international terrorism. It argues that the Iraq war was a significant motivational factor for the terrorists in both cases, but that the terrorists linked the Iraq issue with perceived injustices against Muslims in Europe and globally.     

Rifling Through the Terrorists’ Arsenal: Exploring Groups’ Weapon Choices and Technology Strategies

In terrorist operations, weapons technologies are the tools groups use to pursue their violent ends. Because of differences in what they can do, different weapons are useful for different types of operations. Using a random sample of terrorist incidents from the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database, this article explores (1) how terrorists in general used particular weapons technologies and (2) the variation in the technology choices of individual terrorist groups. The results demonstrate significant differences in the ways different weapons are used, in the versatility of individual technologies, and among the technology strategies of different terrorist organizations.     

www.terrorism.com: Terror on the Internet

The nature of the Internet--the ease of access, the chaotic structure, the anonymity, and the international character--all furnish terrorist organizations with an easy and effective arena for action. The present research focuses on the use of the Internet by modern terrorist organizations and attempts to describe the uses terrorist organizations make of this new communication technology. Is the use of the Internet by terrorists different from that of other, "conventional" means of communication? How can governments respond to this new challenge? The population examined in this study is defined as the Internet sites of terrorist movements as found by a systematic search of the Internet, using various search engines. The sites were subjected to a qualitative content analysis, focusing on their rhetorical structures, symbols, persuasive appeals, and communication tactics. The study reveals differences and similarities between terrorist rhetoric online and in the conventional media.     

Research Note: Former Extremist Interviews Current Extremist: Self-Disclosure and Emotional Engagement in Terrorism Studies

Abstract

In this article I describe how recognizing elements from my own extremist past made me emotional while interviewing a jailed terrorist about his motivations for joining Islamic State. I relate how this mood led me to an uncontrolled self-disclosure and recount how he agreed to elaborate on his motivations for joining IS, despite initial reluctance to talk about them. Then, I present some considerations on whether research in which emotional attachment is involved can produce critical scientific knowledge. The basic aim of the article is to develop methods, concepts and means to contribute to research on the motivations of terrorists.     

Building the Human Bomb: The Case of the 16 May 2003 Attacks in Casablanca

The terrorist attacks that took place on 16 May 2003 in Casablanca were a result of internal factors. These factors include the terrorists" view of their faith, poverty, and under-education. The links between the terrorists in Morocco and the Al Qaeda network, despite their ideological similarities, are not of a “command and control” nature. The relationship can be described as a franchise operation. The attacks resulted in the alienation of the population from movements attempting to use Islam in politics. Consequently, the attacks backfired on the Moroccan Islamist movement.     

After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects

It is just possible that a terrorist nuclear attack could catalyze an inter-state nuclear war. The likelihood of a terrorist group gaining access to nuclear weapons is lower than some fear, and terrorists might not use a nuclear weapon as soon as they had acquired one. But if a terrorist group was to explode a nuclear device in a country that was itself armed with nuclear weapons, and especially if that country was in a conflict-prone relationship with another nuclear-armed state, the broader consequences of even a single terrorist nuclear detonation could be much more serious than some assume.     

Failed States and the Spread of Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa

Plagued by systematic state failure, sub-Saharan Africa's failed states have helped facilitate internationally sponsored terrorist networks and operations. However, until recently, this type of activity was primarily relegated to North Africa and the Horn. But that has begun to change. Now, what was once a seemingly benign terrorist presence in sub-Saharan Africa is starting to transform into a movement, with states such as Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) now lending arms, financial support, and radical militants to the extremist jihadist movement of internationally sponsored terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda. Further, with the recent bombings in Kenya and Somalia, and the failed bombing attempt on a U.S. airliner by a Nigerian national, it is becoming increasingly evident that internationally sponsored terrorist networks have found a permanent home in sub-Saharan Africa and within the hearts and minds of its people, which poses significant challenges for the international community, given the region's patchwork of failed states, where terrorists can easily hide and thrive. Consequently, this study discusses how the conditions of state failure have fostered support for internationally sponsored terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa. Terrorist groups are now actively recruiting more militants from within the region and popular support for extremist acts is on the rise in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the article argues sub-Saharan Africa will soon become the site for the next generation of terrorists, and the next wave of terrorist activity.     

Organizational perspectives on the formation and disintegration of terrorist groups

Abstract

This article treats terrorist organizations as political interest groups. Starting from the assumption that terrorists are rational political actors, it follows that organizational considerations will play a role in the formation and decline of terrorist groups, just as is the case in other political organizations. The effects of several factors, including recruitment, ability to provide selective and purposive incentives, the need for entrepreneurial political leadership, competition from other organizations, the ability to attract outside support, and the ability to form coalitions with other groups, are considered.     

What Does the “Terrorist” Label Really Do? Measuring and Explaining the Effects of the “Terrorist” and “Islamist” Categories

Many scholars and practitioners claim that labeling groups or individuals as “terrorists” does not simply describe them but also shapes public attitudes, due to the label's important normative and political charge. Yet is there such a “terrorist label effect”? In view of surprisingly scant evidence, the present article evaluates whether or not the terrorist label—as well as the “Islamist” one—really impacts both the audience's perception of the security environment and its security policy preferences, and if yes, how and why. To do so, the article implements a randomized-controlled vignette experiment where participants (N = 481) first read one out of three press articles, each depicting a street shooting in the exact same way but labeling the author of the violence with a different category (“terrorist”/“shooter”/“Islamist”). Participants were then asked to report on both their perceptions and their policy preferences. This design reveals very strong effects of both the “terrorist” and “Islamist” categories on each dimension. These effects are analyzed through the lenses of social and cognitive psychology, in a way that interrogates the use of the terrorist category in society, the conflation of Islamism with terrorism, and the press and policymakers' lexical choices when reporting on political violence.