No,prime minister: explaining the House of Commons’ vote on intervention in Syria

On 29 August 2013, the UK House of Commons inflicted the first defeat on a Prime Minister over a matter of war and peace since 1782. Recalled to debate and vote on UK intervention in Syria, the Commons humbled the government and crucially impacted the development of UK foreign policy. This article places that vote, and the developments leading to it, in the context of the role of parliaments in security policy and explores the relationships between parliamentary influence, leadership, intra-party and intra-coalition politics, and public opinion. From an in-depth analysis of leaders’ statements and parliamentary debate, we find a combination of intra-party politics and party leadership were most significant. An additional factor – the role of historical precedent – was also important. Our analysis explores the fluidity and interconnectedness of the various factors for parliamentary influence in foreign policy and offers directions for future theoretical development and empirical research.     

Parliamentary control of CSDP: the case of the EU's fight against piracy off the Somali coast

Parliamentary involvement remains a key tool for the democratic control of executive policies. This article explores the web of parliamentary involvement in decision-making on European Union (EU) military operations, using insights gained in an in-depth case study on the EU's anti-piracy mission Atalanta. We find that parliaments at all levels became involved only after key political decisions had already been made. At the member state level, we find highly uneven involvement with only some parliaments being very well informed and closely monitoring, if not influencing government policy. The European Parliament became active only after the launch of the mission but then scrutinised it intensely, profiting (in contrast to national parliaments) from its access to top military officials and key decision-makers. Finally, transnational parliamentary assemblies as well as more informal networks provided opportunities to transmit information across the boundaries of individual parliaments and party-groups thus potentially enhancing the ability of parliamentarians to scrutinise government policies.     

EU Foreign Policy in the Italian Parliament: The Debates on China and Iran

Governments have always been more reluctant to accept parliamentary oversight in foreign policy than in any other domestic policy field. This examination of the recent performance of the Italian Parliament in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) scrutiny and control in the two case studies of the EU's arms embargo against China and negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program shows that institutional arrangements concerning parliamentary control in this field have significant shortcomings. Although limited, the reforms under discussion in the new intergovernmental conference could contribute to improving the performance of parliaments and to creating a common awareness of the problem of democratic deficit in CFSP among the parliamentarians of EU member states.     

Changing Turkish foreign policy towards Iraq: new tools of engagement

This article proposes that Turkey's foreign policy towards Iraq changed radically after 2007, in response to external challenges and domestic developments. The article analyses how Turkey's role in Iraq has changed on two different levels: firstly, in terms of increased activism and diplomatic engagement, and secondly, in terms of its increased economic involvement, using trade and foreign direct investment as foreign policy tools. These two different modes of engagement have transformed Turkey into a visible player in Iraq.     

Foreign Policy Making Under Koizumi: Norms and Japan's Role in the 2003 Iraq War

Japan's policy toward the 2003 Iraq War is a test of the constructivist argument about the weight of norms as opposed to material systemic factors in foreign policy making. Constructions of external threats and interests were contested between a largely realist-minded elite around prime minister Koizumi bent on Japan's remilitarization and those still holding to antimilitarist norms. This contest is traced in an analysis of the policy-making process, including the role of bureaucratic and political institutions, the opposition parties and the public. Indicative of the power of norms, Koizumi was forced to compromise his ambition to use the Iraq crisis to help make Japan a "normal" great power.     

South Korea's Faustian Attitude: The Republic of Korea's Decision to Send Troops to Iraq Revisited

South Korea sent troops to Iraq not because of any perceived threat from an Iraqi nuclear programme, but to seek influence over American foreign policy towards North Korea. At no point did the general public support the American invasion and war in Iraq; most South Koreans also opposed sending troops to Iraq. However, the government chose to send first non-combat and later combat troops to Iraq, and the public approved of the former choice and support was growing for the latter. The liberal President Roh Moo-Hyun had to persuade the public on this issue, even in opposition to his core supporters, risking political isolation. What the public and the President aimed at was a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and business opportunities. The national interest that South Korea pursued in sending troops to Iraq was policy influence over the US guarantee not to use military power against North Korea.     

Playing the Diversity Card: Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy under the Salmans

ABSTRACT

Since the 2003 regime change in Iraq and the 2011 Arab uprisings, the political map of the Middle East has been in flux. Regional actors have taken advantage of emerging windows of opportunity, which have affected the outcome of this process. Saudi Arabia’s role as an aspiring regional hegemon in the region is salient: the country’s assertive course in shaping its neighbourhood coincides with a more independent foreign policy that goes beyond the traditional US alliance and seeks to diversify its international partners. This diversification of Saudi foreign policy since the ascension to the throne of King Salman in 2015 is explained by using the IR concept of hedging.     

Seeking CSDP Accountability Through Interparliamentary Scrutiny

The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) requires parliamentary accountability. At present, as CSDP-related decisions are increasingly taken in the framework of the UN or the EU, neither the European Parliament (EP) nor national parliaments are able to hold decision-makers accountable. Interparliamentary cooperation can provide added value in bringing about parliamentary scrutiny of CSDP. Nevertheless, despite an official agreement, the EP and national parliaments have different views on what such interparliamentary cooperation entails. There are five conditions – cooperation and complementarity among parliaments, conferential dialogues, coordinated agendas, and comprehensive and comparative scrutiny – that have to be fulfilled to create added value for interparliamentary cooperation on CSDP matters.     

The Road to Baghdad: Ideas and Intellectuals in Explanations of the Iraq War

Why did the Bush administration take the United States to war with Iraq in the aftermath of September 11, 2001? The constructivist approach used in this article to answer this question argues that the ideas of a handful of policy intellectuals affected political outcomes in remarkably consequential ways. These ideas shaped administration assessments of every major aspect of the Iraq war, beginning with its necessity and justification. Although the administration's ideational commitments were complex and evolving, four sets of ideas were central to its risk-filled gambit in the Middle East: a belief in the necessity and benevolence of American hegemony, a Manichaean conception of politics, a conviction that regime type is the principal determinant of foreign policy, and great confidence in the efficacy of military force. Taken together, these ideas defined the social purpose of American power, framed threats to the United States, and determined appropriate solutions to core problems. Ideas are not the sole factors setting the course of u.s. foreign policy, but they are essential to explaining an otherwise puzzling administration decision.     

Misreading Islam in Iraq: Secular Misconceptions and British Foreign Policy

Though British foreign policy toward Iraq was officially separate from counterterrorism strategy, ideas about the “global war on terror” circulated in both policy milieus. This article deploys the concept of the security imaginary, adding insights from Pierre Bourdieu's notion of the habitus, to explore why this was the case. The British security imaginary, as structured by a secular social landscape coming to terms with “radical Islamism,” was beholden to a series of problematic assumptions about religio-politics. This article focuses on British perceptions of the Islamist Jaish al-Mehdi militia between 2003 and 2004. Beyond the Iraq example, this historical incident suggests intimate connections between the experience of domestic secularity and warfare.     

Centralizing Advisory Systems: Presidential Influence and the U.S. Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process

This study is motivated by a simple yet vitally important question for an understanding of U.S. foreign policy. Quite simply, how does a president's choice of management style influence the U.S. foreign policy decision-making process and decision outcomes? Presidents play a critical role in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy; however, the presidential studies literature and foreign policy analysis literature arrive at very different conclusions regarding how presidents influence the policy process and both are often inaccurate. This study develops an Advisory Systems Typology to address how presidents influence the decision-making process. In addressing this question, this study overcomes the deficiencies of both the presidential studies and foreign policy analysis literature. Four different types of decision-making processes are produced by a president's choice of advisory structure and level of centralization. In addition, the study identifies "unstructured solutions" that indicate how the presidential advisers and president choose to resolve policy disagreements, thereby providing an indication of the decision outcome. The identified decision-making processes and their associated decision outcomes are explored using four cases of decision making on security policy drawn from the Nixon (Vietnam War), Carter (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II), Reagan (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks I), and Clinton (Bosnia conflict) administrations. The case studies are constructed using the method of structured–focused comparisons, whereby a set of theoretically based questions and anticipated observations to those questions are made in order to guide the research and allow for comparison of decision making within and between cases.     

Assessing the High Representative’s Role in Egypt during the Arab Spring

The 2009 Lisbon Treaty institutionalised an intergovernmental constitution for managing policies traditionally a matter of national sovereignty, such as foreign and defence policies. However, important innovations were introduced in the foreign policymaking structure to limit its intergovernmental logic, in particular, with regard to the role of the High Representative (HR). It was generally assumed that those innovations would have made development of a coherent EU foreign policy possible. Yet, in one of the most significant tests for the EU’s foreign and defence policies in the post-Lisbon era, namely the Egyptian crisis (2011-14), those reforms did not work as expected. Notwithstanding the innovations, the HR’s role was diminished by the European Council’s strict control over foreign policy toward Egypt. The lack of clear policy guidelines towards the issue of democratisation in the Arab world in the 2003 European Security Strategy, although partially mitigated by the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Barcelona Process/Union for the Mediterranean, made it even more difficult for the HR to bring a European perspective into the largely intergovernmental setting.     

Using Process Tracing to Improve Policy Making: The (Negative) Case of the 2003 Intervention in Iraq

This article argues that applying the Bayesian logic of process tracing can improve intelligence estimates, appraisals of alternative policy options, and reassessments of whether policies are working as planned. It illustrates these points by demonstrating how more systematic use of this logic could have improved each of these three elements of policymaking regarding the 2003 US military intervention in Iraq.     

When governments ignore public opinion in foreign policy: Poland and the Iraq invasion

This article asks why the Government of Poland participated in the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 when a large majority of the Polish public was opposed to national involvement in Iraq. The aim is to further an understanding of the circumstances under which democratic governments ignore public opinion in their foreign policy decision-making. The article argues that a combination of three circumstances increased the willingness of the government to ignore the public. First, the Iraq issue had relatively low salience among the Polish voters, which decreased the domestic political risks of pursuing the policy. Second, the government's Iraq policy was supported by a considerable consensus among the political elite. Third, the political elites were unified in their perceptions that participating in the invasion would yield essential international gains for Poland.     

Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony,Coercion, and the Road to War in Iraq

As the costs of the invasion and occupation of Iraq mount, scholars have sought to explain how the United States came to launch this war in the first place. Many have focused on the “inflation” of the Iraq threat, and indeed the Bush administration did frame the national dialogue on Iraq. We maintain, however, that the failure of most leading Democrats to challenge the administration's case for war in 2002–2003 cannot be explained fully by the bully pulpit, Democrats' reputation for dovishness, or administration misrepresentations. Rather, we argue that leading Democrats were relatively silent in the run-up to war because they had been “rhetorically coerced”, unable to advance a politically sustainable set of arguments with which to oppose the war. The effective fixing of the meaning of the September 11 attacks in terms of the “War on Terror” substantially circumscribed political debate, and we explain why this discourse became dominant. The Bush administration then capitalized on the existing portrait of Saddam Hussein to bind Iraq tightly into the War on Terror and thereby silence leading Democrats and legitimate the war. The story of the road to war in Iraq is not only one of neoconservative hubris and manipulated intelligence. It is also the story of how political actors strove effectively after 9/11 to shape the nation's discourse of foreign affairs and of how the resulting dominant narratives structured foreign policy debate. Behind the seemingly natural War on Terror lurk political processes of meaning-making that narrowed the space for contestation over Iraq.     

Origins of Regime Change: “Ideapolitik” on the Long Road to Baghdad, 1993–2000

How was the ouster of Saddam Hussein defined as the solution to America's Iraq problem? Current scholarship on the U.S. invasion of Iraq tends to focus on the post-9/11 road to war, promoting models of policy capture, intelligence manipulation, threat-inflation, or rhetorical coercion of Bush administration opponents. In this essay, I trace the “Ideapolitik” of regime change in the 1990s and show that Bush's post-9/11 rhetoric was firmly embedded in a preexisting foreign policy consensus defining Saddam Hussein as the “problem” and his overthrow as its “solution.” Drawing upon recent research in international relations and public policy, I show how the idea of regime change prevailed in redefining American strategy for Iraq. While the September 11, 2001 attacks had important effects on the Bush administration's willingness to use force, the basic idea that ousting Saddam Hussein would solve the Iraq problem was already embedded in elite discourse. Saddam Hussein's ouster was not simply the result of idiosyncratic or nefarious decision-making processes within the Bush administration, but was instead the realization of a social choice made by U.S. foreign policy elites well before George W. Bush came to power.     

NATO: The View from the East

Abstract

Relations between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus and NATO have placed more emphasis on cooperation than confrontation since the Cold War, and Ukraine has begun to move towards membership. At the popular level, on the evidence of national surveys in 2004 and 2005, NATO continues to be perceived as a significant threat, but in Russia and Ukraine it comes behind the United States (in Belarus the numbers are similar). There are few socioeconomic predictors of support for NATO membership that are significant across all three countries, but there are wide differences by region, and by attitudinal variables such as support for a market economy and for EU membership. The relationship between popular attitudes and foreign policy is normally a distant one; but in Ukraine NATO membership will require public support in a referendum, and in all three cases public attitudes on foreign policy issues can influence foreign policy in other ways, including the composition of parliamentary committees. In newly independent states whose international allegiances are still evolving, the associations between public opinion and foreign and security policy may often be closer than in the established democracies.     

What does New Delhi’s engagement with the war in Syria (and Iraq) reveal about India as an International Actor?

This article examines whether New Delhi’s engagement with the ongoing conflict in Syria (and Iraq) demonstrates that India is leaving behind its traditionally cautious and risk-averse foreign policy stance and becoming a more proactive international actor. India has not engaged actively with and has not tried to wield substantial influence over the course of this conflict; instead, after a moderate burst of diplomatic activity in the second half of 2011 India has largely tried to avoid involvement. There are some indications that India is trying to become more proactive in its region, in trade diplomacy, and toward a rising China; yet, results sometimes fail to meet ambitions. Accordingly, the article concludes that, on balance, India’s foreign policy orientation has not yet changed significantly; it remains a cautious, reactive international actor unwilling to engage with and actively shape the outcome of crucial crises or conflicts.     

Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not: An Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Its Effects on Latin America's Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations

Why do some states deploy troops to support UN missions while others do not? Although short from war, peacekeeping entails a military dimension of foreign policy in which uniformed personnel is deployed to accomplish diplomatic and political means. As such, decisions to commit troops to UN operations must have the implicit support of the armed forces in order to take place. Yet, military backing for peacekeeping participation is not universal; some military institutions are more willing to join such missions than others. This article accounts for variations in terms of peacekeeping commitments by focusing on security doctrines and the degree of integration between military and foreign policy roles. It hypothesizes that countries with externally oriented doctrines and integrated foreign and defense policies are more likely to commit troops to the UN than countries with national security doctrines and segregated military and foreign policy roles. Using evidence from the Latin American region, the paper suggests that the decision to engage in UN operations is the result of doctrinal policies and bureaucratic infighting.     

Setting a Course: Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs In Post-World War II U.S. Foreign Policy

"Congressional foreign policy entrepreneurs" are those legislators who initiate their own foreign policy agendas. These individuals seek to frame policy discussions and mobilize public and interest group interest; to direct congressional agendas toward specific foreign policy issues; to structure and influence the formulation of foreign policies by the executive branch; to revise, refocus, or reformulate foreign policies; to generate alternative and replacement foreign policies; and to fill policy vacuums with their own preferred foreign policies. This paper examines the evolution and impact of such entrepreneurs across the periods of the Cold War Consensus (1946–1967), the Cold War Dissensus (1968–1989), and the Post-Cold War (1990–2000). The paper first provides an overview of the concept of foreign policy entrepreneurs. It then turns to case studies of entrepreneurial initiatives from three prolific entrepreneurs whose careers span the post-World War II era: Senators Jacob Javits, Edward Kennedy, and Christopher Dodd. Together, the overview and cases shed light on the different avenues and activities that entrepreneurs use to address their preferred issues and the impact entrepreneurs have on policy, as well as highlight changes in both over time.