Social rights,child rights,discrimination and devolution: untangling the web

Abstract

This article examines judicial reviews of two areas of social security policy and practice in the UK – the household benefit cap and the restriction of bereavement benefits to bereaved spouses and civil partners. While each case ostensibly concerned discrimination against claimants, in practice much of the legal argument centred on the impact on claimants’ children. The judiciary is revealed to be deeply divided on the lawfulness of the acknowledged discrimination. The article considers what lessons can be drawn about the relative weight that ought to be afforded to claimants’ property rights, the best interests of affected children, anti-discrimination provisions and the state’s stated policy imperatives of cost control and administrative convenience. Insights are also sought into whether devolutionary differences can be identified between the approaches of courts in London and Belfast.     

HIV,AIDS and human rights

Solicitor, Lecturer in Law. This research has been undertaken with the support of the University of Sussex, Arts Area Research Fund. Special thanks to Neil Duxbury, Zdenek Kavan, Professor Arthur S. Leonard, William B. Rubenstein, Tom Stoddard and the staff of the Aids Discrimination Unit of the New York City Human Rights Commission especially Catherine Franke.     

HIV,prisons and prisoners' rights

Senior Project Officer, HIV/AIDS and Drug Misusing Offenders Project, at the Standing Conference on Drug Abuse.     

Deregulation,property rights,and legal system

During regulation the regulator carries out an intermediary role between shareholders and managers, consequently affecting property rights and the agency relation between the two. Deregulation implies that this intermediary role ceases to exist. This article analyses how government deregulation changes property rights, differentiating between firms of network and non-network structures. Changes in property rights affect the agency relation between shareholders and managers, increasing information asymmetry and agency costs. I argue that the way to reduce agency costs depend to a great extent on the country’s legal system classified as of common or civil law tradition.

The third way in mental health policy: negative rights, positive rights, and the Convention

Mentally disordered patients may be said to have rights in two senses: negative rights to freedom from arbitrary detention or interference with their person; and positive rights to expect a certain minimum standard of service, be that in terms of treatment as an in-patient, or as a patient in the community. The Labour government has appointed a 'scoping group' to carry out a root-and-branch review of the Mental Health Act 1983. The 1983 Act was mainly concerned with in-patient treatment. The group is to look at the scope for introducing further compulsory powers in the community, enhancing the rights of carers and relatives, and is to take account of recent British and Strasbourg case law. The primary impact of the Convention on psychiatric patients has been in relation to protection against arbitrary detention under Article 5, unsoundness of mind being one of the permitted grounds of deprivation of liberty under Article 5(1)(e). This article explores the potential impact of Convention rights in developing what Gostin referred to in the early 1980s as a 'new legalism'. The new legalism linked concern for traditional rights to due process and review by the courts or other external bodies with the 'ideology of entitlement' to adequate treatment and services. The article outlines the current policy context of mental health services and looks at the development by the European Court of Human Rights of positive Convention rights to services out of Article 5, whose purpose seems at first sight to be the protection of due process rights. It examines the relevance of Convention rights to community powers.     

Human rights and trade mark rights

Legal context. For some time the UK Trade Marks Registry hasrefused to register trade marks which consists of the name ofa well-known individual. This article examines whether the practiceis permissible, not in the terms of intellectual property lawbut whether it is in contravention of the applicant's humanrights. Key points. Looking at the application of the Human Rights Actin the United Kingdom, the article asks how it could apply toan intellectual property case, concluding that the Trade MarkRegistry is clearly a ‘public authority’ and thatthere are a number of ways in which current practice in respectof well-known individuals could be said to infringe their humanrights. Practical significance. It remains to be seen what the Registry'sresponse will be to such arguments and whether it might in thefuture be possible to obtain protection for the name of a celebrity.     

Personhood,property rights,and the permissibility of abortion

The purpose of this paper is to argue that the tactic of granting a fetus the legal status of a person will not, contrary to the expectations of opponents of abortion, provide grounds for a general prohibition on abortions. I begin by examining two arguments, one moral (J. J. Thomson's ‘A Defense of Abortion’) and the other legal (D. Regan's ‘Rewriting Roe v. Wade’), which grant the assumption that a fetus is a person and yet argue to the conclusion that abortion is permissible. However, both Thomson and Regan rely on the so-called bad samaritan principle. This principle states that a person has a right to refuse to give aid. Their reliance on this principle creates problems, both in the moral and the legal contexts, since the bad samaritan principle is intended to apply to passive refusals to aid; abortion, however, does not look like any such passive denial of aid, and so it does not seem like the sort of action covered by the bad samaritan principle. In defense of the positions outlined by Thomson and Regan, I argue that the apparent asymmetry between abortion and the usual type of case covered by the bad samaritan principle is only apparent and not a genuine problem for their analyses. I conclude with a defense of the morality of the bad samaritan principle.     

调解权的价值、性质与实现

本文以纠纷当事人的调解权为核心和基础,以调解权与相关国家权力的关系为视角,分析了调解权的被动性、调解权的差异性以及调解权的受支配性等特征。认为当事人之间的调解权利意识,是社会公众所昭示的公共性政策在法律领域的延伸,强调在需求多样化与多元化的今天,调解权的实现有利于维护公民的利益。     

Facial recognition technology,democracy and human rights

On 4 July 2023, the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered the first judgment on the compatibility of facial recognition technology with human rights in Glukhin v. Russia. The case concerned the use of facial recognition technology (FRT) against Mr Glukhin following his solo demonstration in the Moscow underground. The Court unanimously found a violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private life) and Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Regarding FRT, the Court concluded that the use of highly intrusive technology is incompatible with the ideals and values of a democratic society governed by the rule of law. This case note analyses the judgment and shows its relevance in the current regulatory debate on Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems in Europe. Notwithstanding the importance of this decision, we argue that the Court has left crucial questions unanswered.