需要何种法律信任

"法律信任"对"法律信仰"概念的修正,实质走向了一个韦伯式概念,其理论本身在很大程度上也是韦伯命题的理论映照。这一韦伯式的"法律信任"概念,无论是在理论上还是在现实上都面临着巨大的困难,这种双重困难指向同一问题:"法律信任"如何可能?由此,立基于韦伯式的形式法律理论之上,不可能产生真正的"法律信任"。"法律信任"概念要想有意义,就必须建立在一种更具实质性的法律理论之上。     

The State of Nature and Laws of Seinfeld: Not That There’s Anything Wrong With That

Seinfeld (1989–1998) and it’s co-creator’s Curb Your Enthusiasm (2000–present), are each considered groundbreaking television. Critics regard their humor and intellectual comedy as Twain-like and creative. While both shows have been criticized for their character’s indifference and apolitical attitude, the programs resonate with those in society who more subtly consider law and politics. This project argues that Seinfeld and Curb present a unique theory of justice. These two shows constitute a common and current image of what is just in society. While critics have argued that Seinfeld and Curb are not shows about nothing, I argue that these comedians offer us a legal philosophy. For those who view these characters as merely “self-absorbed, superficial, and immature,” I posit that they represent the obscure area between what John Locke termed “the state of nature” and what legal scholars call “legal culture.” I propose that these sitcoms demonstrate a way of speaking about law that provides a constitutive theory of law and justice.     

国家治理现代化视阈下的法律、道德与组织规范关系

国家治理现代化须以系统完备、科学规范、运行有效的规范体系为基础。而法律、道德和"组织规范"共同构成现代社会的规范体系。因而,高度重视"组织规范"并正确处理好它与法律道德的关系,就显得十分重要。"组织规范"具有民间性、自主和自治性,有权制定并实施"组织规范",约束组织本身及其成员的相关行为。这些"组织规范"上承法律下接道德,但又不是照抄照搬,而是依"法无禁止即可为"原则独立存在。在中国继续深化改革和努力实现国家治理现代化的背景下,有必要重新认识三大基础规范的关系,从而有效发挥"组织规范"的作用,构建良好社会秩序。     

假劣疫苗刑法规制的回应性与整全性

长春长生疫苗事件导致出现社会信任危机与社会恐慌,有鉴于此,国家提出“完善疫苗药品刑事法律制度”。法律与社会之间存在着互动关系,社会复杂性的增长需要并促进法律结构的变迁,法律的变化又导致重大社会变化。因此假劣疫苗的刑法规制,不只是满足一种专业需要,更要满足社会需要,承担社会整合功能。作为整全性的法律,要求保持协调一致性及价值的融贯性。假劣疫苗的刑法规制,既要与假劣药犯罪相协调,又要与刑法典相协调,还要在整个法律体系中与《疫苗管理法》《药品管理法》相协调。疫苗刑法制度的修改完善,承担着回应社会和价值融贯的追求,既是法律问题,也是道德问题。     

Epistemological Perspectives in Legal Theory

Abstract The authors deal with several important epistemological problems in legal theory. The Nineteenth century background is analyzed from the emergence of legal science freed from the constraints of natural law and built on the model of the empirical sciences. The authors show how this science of law has been influenced by the social sciences and trends in ideological criticism throughout the Twentieth century. The epistemological question central to legal science is tackled, i.e., what kind of “epistemological break” should there be with regard to the object studied? To answer this question, the authors plead for the adoption of a “moderate external point of view” which bears in mind lawyers' “internal point of view.”     

融贯论、道德实在与法律——一个基于内在实在主义的整合

不同的真理理论导致不同的法律方法论。符合论实在主义的哲学会导致哲学的和自然主义的法律发现,而融贯论则是规范分析和法律解释的基础。不少哲学家认为没有脱离融贯论的符合论(如普特南)。但同时,从真理的客观性维度讲,融贯论只能保障认知的客观性,而不能获得形而上的客观性。融贯论的结果必然是相对主义。因此,法律哲学的认识论选择必然是折中的,这个折中的认识论可以由普特南的内在实在主义来承担,而内在实在主义将最终引向包容的法律实证主义。     

DEVELOPMENT AND FRACTURE OF A DISCIPLINE: LEGACIES OF THE SCHOOL OF CRIMINOLOGY AT BERKELEY

In the early twentieth century, the University of California—Berkeley opened its doors to police professionals for instruction in “police science.” This program ultimately developed into the full‐fledged School of Criminology, whose graduates helped shape American criminology and criminal justice until well into the 1970s. Scholarship at the School of Criminology eventually fractured into three distinct traditions: “Administrative criminology” applied scientific methods in pursuit of refining law enforcement practices, “law and society” coupled legal scholarship with social scientific methods, and “radical criminology” combined Marxist critiques of the state with community activism. Those scientific traditions relied on competing epistemic premises and normative aspirations, and they drew legitimacy from different sources. Drawing on oral histories and archival data permits a neo‐institutional analysis of how each of these criminological traditions emerged, acquired stability, and subsided. The Berkeley School of Criminology provides fertile ground to examine trends in the development of criminal justice as a profession, criminology as a discipline and its place in elite universities, the uncoupling of criminology from law and society scholarship, and criminal justice policy's disenchantment with the academy. These legacies highlight how the development of modern criminology and the professionalization of American law enforcement find precedent in events that originate at Berkeley.     

One size fits all? Multiple intelligences and legal education

This article argues that teaching and learning methodologies used in undergraduate law degrees are gradually shifting. The traditional model relied on a largely standardised, “one size fits all” approach which assumed that developing legal reasoning through attendance at lectures and participation in tutorials and seminars would produce a successful lawyer. However, today’s law schools are adapting to a large and diverse body of law students, many of whom will move on to careers outside the legal profession. This is being recognised by an increasingly pluralistic approach within undergraduate legal education, aided in no small measure by a greater focus on skills. This article will discuss the theory of multiple intelligences, which rejects the idea of a single measure of intelligence and instead identifies a number of different intelligences with both biological and cultural underpinnings. It is argued that acknowledging these multiple intelligences and using them as an organising concept to vary and diversify teaching and learning methodologies could help to further avoid the “one size fits all” approach and enhance the student experience.     

拉伦茨裁判方法之系统分析

拉伦茨方法论体系的基础是欧洲传统的“名判”逻辑技术,其目标是达到个案的公平判决。当作为裁判依据的总体法与条法不足时,法官可“续造法”。所续造的“法”不是条法,而仅是为达到公判而对诸条法的自主运用,它应该有“现行法”的拘束力。为使体系内自主运用条法成为可能,本来不足的体系内“条法库”由审判员以诸种技术补足。介于法律准则之间的或宪法内条法的不谐则依赖“法益衡量”技术解决。因片面突出法官的自主地位,拉伦茨方法论在本质上是现代法治社会一种尚需调制的折衷系统。     

论作为民法法源的“法理”

我国《民法典》第10条未将“法理”规定为第三位阶的法源。在理论上,除少数学者反对设立第三顺位法源外,多数学者赞同规定第三顺位法源,惟对其原因基本未详尽展开。无论是从法源条款的性质、使法源条款真正具有实益、为法律“续造”提供合法性基础的角度来看,还是从《民法典》已赋予法官较广泛司法权、我国民事法官依“法理”填补法律漏洞成为较为普遍的现实来看,抑或从发挥法理的“学科沟通功能”来看,确立第三顺位法源均有其必要性。从立法技术来看,将第三顺位法源表述为“民法基本原则”并非最优,仍以“法理”的表述为宜,因为“法理”的内涵与外延比“(民法)基本原则”更为丰富。除民法基本原则外,“法理”可能是非属民法基本原则范畴的民法基本原理、未明定的民法原则;此外,“法理”也可能是制定法乃至习惯法上的法律原则。     

约翰·奥斯丁法哲学再探

约翰·奥斯丁是现代西方法理学中的重要人物,分析法学的创始人,以提出"法律命令说"而著名,他的法哲学长期以来一直受到人们的批判,这些批判主要来自于两大阵营:一是形形色色的自然法学家;另一是一些后起的法律实证主义者。这些批判影响巨大,以致遮蔽了奥斯丁法哲学的本来面目。其实,"法律命令说"并非奥斯丁法哲学的核心与标志,纵使人们批驳倒了"法律命令说",对奥斯丁的法哲学整体来说损害也并不大。奥斯丁的代表性思想是:倡导对法律进行分析性研究,主张建构起一般法理学与法律教义学,最终使法学成为一门科学。在众多的批判之下,奥斯丁的上述代表性思想不仅没有失去生命力,反而保持着旺盛的生命力,以致在现代西方法理学中,奥斯丁仍然是一个人们无法绕过的思想家。     

From Public Sociology to Public Philosophy: Lessons for Law and Society

The late Philip Selznick's final book, A Humanist Science, examines the role of values and ideals in the social sciences, including the study of law and society. Throughout his academic career, Selznick was committed to what he called “legal naturalism,” a sociological version of the natural-law perspective, while his critics continue to adhere to various forms of positivism. But the age-old opposition between natural law and legal positivism today may be giving way to the quest for public sociology—a sociology that promotes public reflection on significant social issues and thus functions as a moral and political force. A Humanist Science ends with a strong plea for public philosophy. Public philosophy overlaps with public sociology but is a much stronger concept. Selznick's message of public philosophy may be another of his enduring contributions to the field of law and society.     

“Critical Legal Histories Revisited”: A Response

The author responds to comments reappraising “Critical Legal Histories” (CLH) (1984). CLH critiqued “evolutionary functionalism,” the idea that law is a functional response to a typical modernizing process. CLH argued that “society” was partly constituted of legal elements and that law was too indeterminate to have reliably regular functional effects. CLH has been misinterpreted as calling for a return to internal histories of “mandarin” doctrine: all it said was that some doctrinal histories were valuable, without privileging them. This response clarifies that the relations of law to society and social change, and of high‐level official law to everyday local law are distinct issues. CLH is mostly moot today, since social‐legal historians have incorporated its insight that legal concepts are embedded in everyday social practice. But other fields have revived deterministic Whiggish accounts of progressive development and of law functional to it—to which CLH's critique still seems relevant.     

人与人格分离技术的形成、发展与变迁——兼论德国民法中的权利能力

人格是特定社会的准入条件,因而生物人与法律人的分离,乃是法律人格制度的基本模式。这个模式中核心的要素,就是法律人格的“适格判断”的标准。在法律文明的早期,血缘、地域、财产等身份要素,充当着法律人格的判别标准,由此所引起的身份人格必然带有不平等的色彩。近代法律人格的基本特点,就是个人的伦理属性成为了法律人格的适格标准,由此奠定了近代法律人人平等的基础。《德国民法典》上的“权利能力”概念,是由实定法所界定的法律人格的适格条件,这一实定法上的概念,仍然是建立在关于人的伦理性判断的基础之上的。     

On Two Distinct and Opposing Versions of Natural Law: “Exclusive” versus “Inclusive”

Abstract. This paper takes the dichotomy between “exclusive” and “inclusive” positivism and applies it by analogy to natural‐law theories. With John Finnis, and with Beyleved and Brownsword, we have examples of “exclusive natural‐law theory,” on which approach the law is valid only if its content satisfies a normative monological moral theory. The discourse theories of Alexy and Habermas are seen instead as “inclusive natural‐law theories,” in which the positive law is a constitutive moment in that it identifies moral rules and specifies their meaning. The article argues that inclusive theories of natural law are better suited to expressing an authentic “republican” attitude. *

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Carl Schmitt on the Secularisation of Religious Texts as a Resacralisation of Jurisprudence?

Carl Schmitt, an increasingly influential German law professor, developed a provocative and historically oriented model of “political theology” with specific relevance to legal scholarship and the authorship of constitutional texts. His “political theology” is best understood neither as an expressly theological discourse within constitutional law, nor as a uniquely legal discourse shaped by a hidden theological agenda. Instead, it addresses the possibility of the continual resurfacing of theological ideas and beliefs within legal discourses of, for instance, sovereignty, the force of law and states of emergency (or “exception”) that present themselves as relentlessly secular, even—in the case of Kelsenian jurisprudence—”scientific”. This article illustrates and then critically evaluates Schmitt’s theory in terms of the authorship of constitutional texts in particular. It includes two case studies—genocidal colonial land appropriation and Kelsenian positivism in order to illustrate aspects of his political theology. Whilst Schmitt is defended against reductionist interpretations, I show that there remains considerable unfinished business before a Schmittian approach to legal theory merits full acceptance.     

Islamic Law,Women's Rights,and Popular Legal Consciousness in Malaysia

Drawing on original survey research, this study examines how lay Muslims in Malaysia understand foundational concepts in Islamic law. The survey finds a substantial disjuncture between popular legal consciousness and core epistemological commitments in Islamic legal theory. In its classic form, Islamic legal theory was marked by its commitment to pluralism and the centrality of human agency in Islamic jurisprudence. Yet in contemporary Malaysia, lay Muslims tend to understand Islamic law as being purely divine, with a single “correct” answer to any given question. The practical implications of these findings are demonstrated through examples of efforts by women's rights activists to reform family law provisions in Malaysia. The examples illustrate how popular misconceptions of Islamic law hinder the efforts of those working to reform family law codes while strengthening the hand of conservative actors wishing to maintain the status quo.