Does the Ideological Proximity Between Candidates and Voters Affect Voting in U.S. House Elections?

Do citizens hold congressional candidates accountable for their policy positions? Recent studies reach different conclusions on this important question. In line with the predictions of spatial voting theory, a number of recent survey-based studies have found reassuring evidence that voters choose the candidate with the most spatially proximate policy positions. In contrast, most electoral studies find that candidates’ ideological moderation has only a small association with vote margins, especially in the modern, polarized Congress. We bring clarity to these discordant findings using the largest dataset to date of voting behavior in congressional elections. We find that the ideological positions of congressional candidates have only a small association with citizens’ voting behavior. Instead, citizens cast their votes “as if” based on proximity to parties rather than individual candidates. The modest degree of candidate-centered spatial voting in recent Congressional elections may help explain the polarization and lack of responsiveness in the contemporary Congress.     

Do parties matter in delegation? Partisan preferences and the creation of regulatory agencies in Europe

The ideological orientation of parties in government has not been prominently featured in explaining the rise of regulatory agencies. This paper argues that theories based on political uncertainty and credible commitment can yield meaningful predictions regarding the relationship between government preferences and the establishment of regulatory agencies, when ideological orientation is linked with notions of party competence and issue ownership. The empirical section tests three such hypotheses with data on the establishment of 110 regulatory agencies in 20 European democracies between 1980 and 2009, thus providing one of the most comprehensive cross‐national analyses of agency creation to date. The results show that ideologically extreme cabinets are more likely to establish regulatory agencies and that right‐wing governments create more agencies in the economic than in the social domain. These findings partly qualify the view on the scarce relevance of government preferences in explaining the rise of the agency model in regulation and that the emulation mechanism of the diffusion process is the dominant force behind agencification.     

Critical Election in the Wake of an Economic and Political Crisis: Realignment of Icelandic Party Voters?

A critical election is generally defined as one in which the decisive results of voting reveal a sharp alternation of pre‐existing cleavage(s) and voting patterns, and the dealignment or realignment made between parties is lasting. A critical election can be caused by various factors and in this article the authors analyse whether the global credit crunch in 2008 set things in motion in Iceland, resulting in the 2009 election as a critical election. In that election, the electoral relevance of voters’ psychological attachment to parties and of ideological distances to them weakened, whereas party competence perceptions increased in importance for vote choices. Attachment to parties and ideological distances are factors that are generally stable and change slowly over time, while party competence is influenced by which issues are of importance at the time of the election. This indicates that, in 2009, a restructuring of the determinants of the vote occurred; a pattern of changes that is typical for a critical election. Evidence is found that the importance of party sympathy increases again in the 2013 election, indicating a realignment, rather than a dealignment, occurring in the wake of the 2009 election.     

Partisan Political Business Cycles in the German Labour Market? Empirical Tests in the Light of the Lucas-Critique

This paper focuses on alternative specifications ofpartisan political business cycles (Partisan Theory,Rational Partisan Theory and hysteresis-augmentedRPT). It elaborates on analogies of the natural ratehypothesis underlying all specifications and thecointegration concept. Accordingly, problems of thespecification of hypotheses, estimation and inferencein a cointegrating framework with politicalinterventions are treated. Super-exogeneity tests areshown to be equivalent to tests of the Lucas-critiqueand the RPT. Therefore, the concept ofsuper-exogeneity is transferred to empirical tests ofpartisan cycles. By this, a new testing framework ofpartisan cycles is developed and applied to Germanlabour market data.     

Ideological change and the economics of voting behavior in the US, 1920–2008

This paper tests the proposition that voters advance a more liberal agenda in prosperous times and turn more conservative in dire economic times. A reference-dependent utility model suggests that, with income growth, the relative demand for public goods increases and the median voter is more likely to vote Democrat. With slowing income growth, the median voter derives increased marginal utility from personal income—making taxation more painful—and is more likely to vote Republican. Ordinary and instrumented analyses of a new time series for the US median voter are encouraging of this income growth model. This work links voting behavior to economic business cycles and shows that ideological change is endogenous to income growth rates.     

Setting the Agenda or Responding to Voters? Political Parties,Voters and Issue Attention

Why do political parties prioritise some policy issues over others? While the issue ownership theory suggests that parties emphasise policy issues on which they have an advantage in order to increase the salience of these issues among voters, the riding the wave theory argues instead that parties respond to voters by highlighting policy issues that are salient in the minds of citizens. This study sheds new light on the selective issue emphasis of political parties by analysing issue attention throughout the entire electoral cycle. On the basis of a quantitative text analysis of more than 40,000 press releases published by German parties from 2000 until 2010, this article provides empirical support for the riding the wave theory. It shows that political parties take their cues from voters by responding to the issue priorities of their electorate. The results have important implications for political representation and the role that parties play in democracies.     

What Types of School Capital Projects are Voters Willing to Support?

In many states, investments in school capital must be approved by bond referenda. Consequently, voter preferences can directly impact the quality of school facilities and their infrastructure. Researchers have often analyzed the causal mechanisms of referendum passage, but they have not examined whether the type of capital project affects the outcome of the referendum itself. In this paper, we use data from the state of Michigan to examine whether voters are willing to provide more or less support for specific types of capital investments. We focus on the relationship between voter support for maintenance versus the construction of a new building or additions to existing buildings. Our analysis suggests there is a higher approval rate for maintenance of existing facilities than the construction of new school buildings or additions.     

Affective Polarization in Multiparty Systems? Comparing Affective Polarization Towards Voters and Parties in Norway and the United States

A growing body of comparative studies on partisan hostility – a phenomenon known as affective polarization – is providing evidence that partisan affective polarization is generally no greater in the United States than it is in many European multiparty systems. This article takes the comparative literature on affective polarization one step further by presenting the first comparative study on affective polarization that simultaneously uses, compares and combines a direct measure of affective polarization towards voters (using the inter‐party marriage measure) and an indirect measure of affective polarization towards parties (using the like/dislike of party measure) while accounting for the fact that multiparty systems have numerous political parties. This is done by comparing the levels of affective polarization in the United States and Norway. The results show greater affective polarization in the United States relating to parties, but the differences between these two countries are indistinguishable from chance when focusing on the affect relating to voters. This provides empirical evidence that comparative evidence of negative affect towards parties cannot necessarily be generalized to suggest that there is comparative evidence of negative affect towards voters. Yet the results also suggest that negative feelings towards out‐parties move to some extent to the personal level in terms of negative feelings towards voters of these out‐parties.     

Do Moderate Voters Weigh Candidates’ Ideologies? Voters’ Decision Rules in the 2010 Congressional Elections

Models of voting behavior typically specify that all voters employ identical criteria to evaluate candidates. We argue that moderate voters weigh candidates’ policy/ideological positions far less than non-moderate voters, and we report analyses of survey data from the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study that substantiate these arguments. Across a wide range of models and measurement strategies, we find consistent evidence that liberal and conservative voters are substantially more responsive to candidate ideology than more centrist voters. Simply put, moderate voters appear qualitatively different from liberals and conservatives, a finding that has important implications for candidate strategies and for political representation.     

An Invidious Position? The Public Dance of the Promiscuous Partisan

Public service mandarins were once largely anonymous, diligently wielding their great power behind the scenes while their political masters performed on the front stage. Things have changed. Today, civil service leaders are appearing publicly more often, in more places and to a wider range of audiences than ever before. This article examines the extent to which this decline in anonymity impacts on traditions of civil service impartiality within the Westminster system. It draws on the late Peter Aucoin's concept of ‘promiscuous partisanship’ to examine how contemporary mandarins in the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia face accusations of having compromised their impartiality by advocating for the policy agenda of the government of the day. The article argues that what has changed is not that civil service leaders have suddenly become partisan, but rather that they have become more ‘public’, allowing for perceptions of partisanship to emerge.     

Promiscuously Partisan? Public Service Impartiality and Responsiveness in Westminster Systems

Public servants in Westminster countries are being drawn into the limelight by demands from their political masters that they publicly defend policies. Critics suggest these conditions undermine the capacity and willingness of senior public servants to manage the enduring Westminster tension between serving elected governments and remaining nonpartisan. Interviews with senior officials from Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom challenge this pessimistic view, showing that officials consistently stress the importance of not “crossing the line” when dealing with their elected masters. Two exploratory case studies are presented—one of an Australian ministerial department (Treasury) and another of a Canadian quasi‐autonomous agency (Statistics Canada)—in which public servants faced pressure to defend controversial government policies. These cases show how contemporary public servants actively interpret, establish, and defend the line between appropriate responsiveness and inappropriate partisanship in Westminster systems.     

Partisan conflicts and parliamentary dominance: the?Norwegian political business?cycle

The arcticle explores the political business cycle in Norway from the early 1980s onwards. It is shown that unemployment growth is related to uncertainty about likely parliamentary majorities, and to the level of political conflict between such majorities. Data indicate that voter expectations are formed on the basis of likely majority winners in votes, not in seats. Unemployment growth is unrelated to sudden and unpredictable changes in the composition of government. This suggests that the instruments influencing unemployment growth are within the domain of the legislative, not the executive, power.     

EU Democracy Assistance in the Mediterranean: What Relationship with the Arab Uprisings?

This article analyzes the European Union (EU) policy for democracy assistance toward the Southern Mediterranean countries and tracks changes in the last decade, with a special emphasis on the most recent period. It shows that the EU policy, which goes under the acronym of EIDHR, has evolved, but predominantly in response to internal dynamics rather than to developments in Arab countries. The EU has increasingly provided assistance to local actors on the ground in non-member countries and has differentiated its action in authoritarian countries from countries in transition. When it comes to implementing its own policy, however, the EU is less able to promote democracy than human rights, and most of the funds go to support projects centered on relatively uncontroversial rights such as women's and children's.     

Turning Out Unlikely Voters? A Field Experiment in the Top-Two Primary

Those who turn out in American primary elections are a small and unrepresentative subset of the population. Why do citizens forgo participation in nominating contests yet vote in general elections? We argue that limited contact lowers participation in primary elections. We present results from a randomized field experiment with near 150,000 letters in California’s 2014 primary. Each letter went to one of the four million Californians who had participated in recent general elections but not in primaries. We find that a single letter increased turnout by 0.5 points from a base rate of 9.3 percent. This increase is more than twice the average effect calculated in a recent meta-analysis and represents a proportional increase of 5.4 percent. Our experiment shows that registrants who typically abstain from primaries—and who are thus often ignored by campaigns—can be effectively mobilized.     

Knowing your sources: Partisan media and voters’ perceptions of the economy

This paper explains how media systems influence the extent to which partisanship colors voters’ perceptions of the economy (i.e., the strength of the partisan screen). It builds upon research on individual-level biases in economic perceptions, seeking to extend existing work by considering how the availability of partisan media for a given party affect such biases. The implication of this is that the greater the availability of media sources favorable to a party, the stronger the partisan screen for its partisans. This follows from several mechanisms including selective acceptance of messages, selective exposure to partisan sources, and incidental exposure to partisan sources. Each of these suggests that differences in the availability of partisan media across parties leads to corresponding differences in the extent of partisan bias for partisans of these parties. I test this Hypothesis in 14 European countries over four time-periods using data built from expert surveys on media characteristics.     

What is the cost of voting?

Despite a wealth of literature on the determinants of electoral turnout, little is known about the cost of voting. Some studies suggest that facilitating voting slightly increases turnout, but what ultimately matters is people's subjective perceptions of how costly voting is. This paper offers a first comprehensive analysis of the subjective cost of voting and its impact on voter turnout. We use data from an original survey conducted in Canada and data from the Making Electoral Democracy Work project which covers 23 elections among 5 different countries. We distinguish direct and information/decision voting costs. That is, the direct costs that are related to the act of voting and the costs that are related to the efforts to make (an informed) choice. We find that the cost of voting is generally perceived to be very small but that those who find voting more difficult are indeed less prone to vote, controlling for a host of other considerations. That impact, however, is relatively small, and the direct cost matters more than the information/decision cost.