The Political Consequences of External Economic Shocks: Evidence from Poland

How do external economic shocks influence domestic politics? We argue that those materially exposed to the shock will display systematic differences in policy preferences and voting behavior compared to the unexposed, and political parties can exploit these circumstances. Empirically, we take advantage of the 2015 surprise revaluation of the Swiss franc to identify the Polish citizens with direct economic exposure to this exogenous event. Using an original survey fielded prior to the 2015 elections and an embedded survey experiment, we show that exposed individuals were more likely to demand government support and more likely to desert the government and vote for the largest opposition party, which was able to use the shock to expand its electoral coalition without alienating its core voters. Our article clarifies the connection between international shocks, voters’ policy preferences, partisan policy responses, and, ultimately, voting decisions.     

Election Timing,Electorate Composition,and Policy Outcomes: Evidence from School Districts

There is considerable debate about how election timing shapes who votes, election outcomes, and, ultimately, public policy. We examine these matters by combining information on more than 10,000 school tax referenda with detailed micro‐targeting data on voters participating in each election. The analysis confirms that timing influences voter composition in terms of partisanship, ideology, and the numerical strength of powerful interest groups. But, in contrast to prominent theories of election timing, these effects are modest in terms of their likely impact on election outcomes. Instead, timing has the most significant impact on voter age, with the elderly being the most overrepresented group in low‐turnout special elections. The electoral (and policy) implications of this effect vary between states, and we offer one explanation for this variation.     

Economic Performance and Political Outcomes: An Analysis of the Turkish Parliamentary and Local Election Results Between 1950 and 2004

The results of twenty-five Turkish elections for parliament and local administrations between 1950 and 2004 are studied. Turkish voters are found to take government's economic performance into account but not look back beyond one year. Furthermore, they are found to hold the major incumbent party responsible for both growth and inflation but minor incumbent parties, only for inflation. Also, they appear to vote strategically, especially in local and parliamentary by elections, to diffuse power. Finally, all parties exhibit a steady depreciation in their political capital while in office. These conclusions are essentially in conformity with the literature on other countries.     

The Effect of Administrative Burden on Bureaucratic Perception of Policies: Evidence from Election Administration

This article argues that administrative burden—that is, an individual's experience of policy implementation as onerous—is an important consideration for administrators and influences their views on policy and governance options. The authors test this proposition in the policy area of election administration using a mixed‐method assessment of local election officials. They find that the perceived administrative burden of policies is associated with a preference to shift responsibilities to others, perceptions of greater flaws and lesser merit in policies that have created the burden (to the point that such judgments are demonstrably wrong), and opposition to related policy innovations.     

Welfare State Issues in the Norwegian 1985 Election: Evidence from Aggregate and Survey Data1

In this article we investigate the impact of welfare state issues on the outcome of the Norwegian parliamentary election of 1985. With data from the NSD Commune Data Base we demonstrate that the gains of Labour were positively correlated with the peripheral location of the commune, the level of unemployment. the proportion of disabled pensioners, and a weak supply of health services. The results from a multivariate analysis of survey panel data show that the increase in Labour vote was strongest among those who said that the health issue was most decisive for their choice of party. Despite strong statistical controls some regional effects remain, and we speculate that regions also may carry a symbolic significance that is not captured by traditional aggregate indicators. Finally, we combine the two data sets to see if aggregate variables exhibit a direct contextual impact on individual behaviour. The results of this effort are mostly negative, a finding that invokes a renewed discussion of incompatibilities of micro and macro analysis.     

Local Labor Demand and Program Participation Dynamics: Evidence from New York SNAP Administrative Records

This study estimates the effect of local labor demand on the likelihood that Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) beneficiaries are able to transition out of the program. Our data include SNAP administrative records from New York (2007 to 2012), linked at the person‐level to the 2010 Census, and linked at the county‐month‐level to industry‐specific labor market conditions. We find that local labor markets matter for the length of time spent on SNAP, but there is substantial heterogeneity in estimated effects across local industries. Using Bartik‐style instruments to isolate the effect of labor demand and controlling for the changing composition of entrants and program rules brought on by the Great Recession, we find that fluctuations in labor demand in industries with high shares of SNAP participants—especially food service and retail—change the likelihood of exiting the program. Notably, estimated industry effects vary across race and parental status, with black participants being most sensitive to changes in local labor market conditions and mothers benefiting less from growth in local labor demand than fathers and non‐parents. We confirm that our results are not driven by endogenous inter‐county mobility or New York City labor markets and are robust to multiple specifications.     

Fiscal Decentralization,Flat Administrative Structure,and Local Government Size: Evidence and Lessons from China

This paper examines the effects of fiscal decentralization and flat administrative structure on local budget size and program outlays. We test three related theoretical hypotheses in China's adoption of province‐over‐county scheme of financial administration. We provide evidence that both decentralization of expenditure and decentralization of revenue increase the size of local budgets; that the impact of the former far outweighs that of the latter with local budgets on a rising trajectory; and that discretion grants localities more means to increase their budget. These results show that as China's reform deepens the proportion of local outlay on administration declines because of more local discretion from eliminating the prefecture bypass between the province and counties. But neither decentralization nor increased local discretion has allocated more local resources for education, and both contribute to increasing outlay on economic development. The paper formulates tentative policy recommendations that carry potential application for other countries. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Election closeness and voter turnout: Evidence from California ballot propositions

This paper uses a new data set of 885 California ballot propositions from 1912 through 1990 to test the hypothesis that voter turnout increases as an election becomes closer. Various measures of voter participation are regressed on various measures of election closeness. The main finding is that there is not a systematic relation between closeness and turnout. Two conclusions are drawn: (1) voters are not sensitive to the probability their votes are decisive, and (2) other studies which found higher turnout for close elections probably detected an increased mobilization of party elites in tight races.     

The Impacts of Paid Family Leave Benefits: Regression Kink Evidence from California Administrative Data

We use 10 years of California administrative data with a regression kink design to estimate the causal impacts of benefits in the first state-level paid family leave program for women with earnings near the maximum benefit threshold. We find no evidence that a higher weekly benefit amount (WBA) increases leave duration or leads to adverse future labor market outcomes for this group. In contrast, we document that a rise in the WBA leads to an increased likelihood of returning to the pre-leave firm (conditional on any employment) and of making a subsequent paid family leave claim.     

Election type and the logic of pre-election violence: Evidence from Zimbabwe

Election violence is often conceptualized as a form of coercive campaigning, but the literature has not fully explored how electoral institutions shape incentives for competition and violence. We argue that the logic of subnational electoral competition – and with it incentives for violence – differs in presidential and legislative elections. In presidential elections, national-level considerations dominate incentives for violence. Presidential elections are usually decided by winning a majority of votes in a single, national district, incentivizing parties to demobilize voters with violence in strongholds. In contrast, election violence is subject to district-level incentives in legislative elections. District-level incentives imply that parties focus on winning the majority of districts, and therefore center violent campaigning on the most competitive districts. We test our argument with georeferenced, constituency-level data from Zimbabwe, a case that fits our scope conditions of holding competitive elections, violence by the incumbent, and majoritarian electoral rule. We find that most violence takes place in strongholds in presidential elections, especially in opposition strongholds. In contrast, competitive constituencies are targeted in legislative contests.     

Partisan Differences in Economic Outcomes and Corresponding Voting Behavior: Evidence from the U.S.

The present empirical work examines the differences ineconomic outcomes delivered by partisan governments, and theway in which voters take this into account. Autoregressivemodels of output growth, unemployment and inflation, augmentedwith political variables; and probit binary choice models ofvoting decisions, incorporating expectations about inflationand unemployment, are estimated for U.S. post-war data. Theanalysis confirms that partisan differences in economic outcomes are actually observed in the data. U.S. unemployment rate exhibits adistinct partisan cycle, behavior of output growth andinflation rate partly supports the partisan differenceshypothesis. Thus suggesting that each party can be``instrumental'' in solving particular economic problems. Inline with this logic, U.S. voters seem to believe in theasymmetric abilities of parties to fight inflation andunemployment. Most interesting empirical findings includeevidence that U.S. citizens tend to vote for the left party(Democrats) when high unemployment is expected, and for theright party (Republicans) when high inflation is expected.This relation is especially robust for Presidential elections.There is also evidence pointing to the presence of electoralinertia and absence of ``midterm'' electoral cycle in the U.S.     

National Competitive Advantage and the Roles of Economic and Political Freedom: Evidence from Hong Kong

The equivocal interrelationships betweeneconomic performance and the institutionsof, respectively, economic and politicalfreedom are examined using data from firmsoperating in Hong Kong, an economy whereboth an erstwhile paramount internationalbusiness reputation for competitiveness andthe institutional basis on which it waspredicated have come into question inrecent years. It is hypothesized that (i)both economic and political freedomdeclines will be associated with a proxyfor future economic performance,competitiveness decline, but that (ii) thecorrelation of economic freedom declineswith competitiveness decline will bemediated by political freedom declines. Hierarchical regression analyses tend tosupport these hypotheses, although resultsvary by firm origin.     

Local Governance Arrangements and Democratic Outcomes (with Some Evidence from the Italian Case)

This article carries a broad definition of public–private concertation as a flexible form of governance that is able to overcome the distinction between network governance and participatory governance. It creates a unified framework relying on a process‐related democratic approach in order to properly assess these practices in their democratic outcomes. This allows the article to fully depict how local governance arrangements affect local democracy, both positively and negatively. Drawing on four exemplary cases of urban policies developed in the Province of Milan, it highlights two variables that give account of the democratic implication of these practices: the role of the political leadership and the inclusive strategy that they adopt. Moreover, it underlines four additional factors that help more democratic outcomes: presence of cognitive justification, quality of participation, active opposition, and an outward communication.     

Local Context, Retrospective Economic Evaluations, and Voting: The 1997 General Election in England and Wales

Local context is widely believed to influence voting behavior with, for example, the voters' evaluation of the state of their local economy affecting whether they choose to reward or punish the incumbent government. Such reward-punish models apply in the United Kingdom at the national scale: those who believe that the government has delivered prosperity vote for its return, whereas those who believe that its policies have produced a worsening economic situation vote against it. This article shows that the operation of this calculus varies spatially, according to the level of unemployment in the voter's home area: the higher the local level of unemployment the lower the probability of someone who thought that government polices had delivered national prosperity voting for the incumbent government. It also shows that this is a consequence of cross-pressured situations. Those who thought that the government's policies had delivered both national and local prosperity were very likely to vote for it; those who thought that the policies had delivered national but not local prosperity were less likely to vote for it—especially in areas of high unemployment.     

Social Equity and Evidence: Insights from Local Government

This article examines the role of evidence‐based decision making in social equity, with a particular focus on local government. It offers an assessment of the past, present, and future of such efforts by engaging themes from Matias Valenzuela's article based on King County, Washington. King County is one of more than 70 local governments that are members of the Government Alliance on Race and Equity, a growing national network of governments using an evidence‐based approach to achieve racial equity. In general, previous social equity measures have focused largely on measuring the extent to which disparities exist. More recently, tools and resources have become available to assist local governments in designing and evaluating their approach and performance in reducing social inequities. Future evidence should include more standardized measures to benchmark success, provide comparative analysis, and better support the identification of best practices.     

Economic globalisation,the perceived room to manoeuvre of national governments,and electoral participation: Evidence from the 2001 British General Election

Recent macro-level research argues that economic globalisation negatively affects electoral turnout by constraining the leeway of national governments and thereby rendering elections less meaningful to voters. This article analyses the link between perceptions of the national government's room to manoeuvre and turnout on the individual level. Drawing on the 2001 British General Election, it is shown that citizens who believe that economic globalisation leaves the national government with less influence on the economy are less likely to report to have voted. Further findings also support the proposed theoretical model according to which room to manoeuvre perceptions affect turnout via views on the importance of elections and matter specifically for citizens that tend towards the left side of the left-right scale.     

The Accuracy of Recalled Previous Voting: Evidence from Norwegian Election Study Panels

Data on individual variations from one election to the next is fundamental in the study of political behaviour, and should, ideally, be collected through panel studies in which the same people are interviewed at two or more or elections. This method is, however, costly and time consuming, and most analyses of this type are therefore based on recall data, in which the voters report their choices in the current election and also in previous elections. The accuracy of recall data is discussed, based on data from the Norwegian Programme of Election Research in the period 1977–97. Analyses show that one must expect, using this type of data, that about one in four voters will give incorrect information about their voting behaviour at the previous election. Erroneous recall of previous voting can be explained by variations in the voters' affiliation to the parties. Whereas stable voters who remain with the same party normally report their voting correctly, erroneous recall varies around 40 percent for party changers and rises to 70 percent among previous non-voters. There is, however, no uniform underlying pattern in erroneous recall during different periods, which implies that it is difficult to predict exactly how erroneous recall will affect the accuracy of recall data in one particular election.     

Voter Turnout and the National Election Studies

Though the overreporting of voter turnout in the National ElectionStudy (NES) is widely known, this article shows that the problemhas become increasingly severe. The gap between NES and officialestimates of presidential election turnout has more than doubledin a nearly linear fashion, from 11 points in 1952 to 24 pointsin 1996. This occurred because official voter turnout fell steadilyfrom 1960 onward, while NES turnout did not. In contrast, thebias in House election turnout is always smaller and has increasedonly marginally. Using simple bivariate statistics, I find thatworsening presidential turnout estimates are the result mostlyof declining response rates rather than instrumentation, questionwording changes, or other factors. As more peripheral votershave eluded interviewers in recent years, the sample becamemore saturated with self-reported voters, thus inflating reportedturnout.