Conspiracy Endorsement as Motivated Reasoning: The Moderating Roles of Political Knowledge and Trust

Given the potential political and social significance of conspiracy beliefs, a substantial and growing body of work examines the individual‐level correlates of belief in conspiracy theories and general conspiratorial predispositions. However, although we know much about the psychological antecedents of conspiracy endorsement, we know less about the individual‐level political causes of these prevalent and consequential beliefs. Our work draws from the extant literature to posit that endorsement of conspiracy theories is a motivated process that serves both ideological and psychological needs. In doing so, we develop a theory that identifies a particular type of person—one who is both highly knowledgeable about politics and lacking in trust—who is most susceptible to ideologically motivated conspiracy endorsement. Further, we demonstrate that the moderators of belief in conspiracy theories are strikingly different for conservatives and liberals.     

Exploring differences in affective polarization between the Nordic countries

After a period in which affective polarization—defined here as the difference between positive feelings toward in-parties and negative out-party animus—has mostly focused on the single US case, there has recently been an increase in large-N comparative analyses and single case studies in other countries, including in the Nordic region. This study adds to this by studying and comparing affective polarization in the Nordic countries. In line with what previous comparative and single case studies have already indicated, the results show that affective polarization has tended to be higher in Sweden and Denmark than in Norway, Iceland, and Finland. The article also tracks time trends for the association between ideological distance from parties and affective party evaluations. As expected, placing parties further from oneself on the left-right scale has been more strongly associated with party affect in Denmark and Sweden. Furthermore, the results show that there are some variations between the countries in terms of how distance from parties on other ideological dimensions than left-right placement is associated with out-party affect.     

Affective polarization in multiparty systems

Affective polarization captures the extent to which citizens feel sympathy towards partisan in-groups and antagonism towards partisan out-groups. This is comparatively easy to assess in two-party systems, but capturing the pattern of affect towards multiple parties is more complex in multiparty systems. This article first discusses these challenges and then presents different ways of measuring individual-level affective polarization using like-dislike scores, a widespread measure of party sympathy. Using data for 51 countries and 166 elections from five modules of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, I then show that affective polarization adds to existing concepts as a way of understanding political participation and democratic orientations. Studying affective polarization outside the US could therefore have important consequences for our understanding of citizen perceptions of politics as well as citizen behaviour, but we need the appropriate measures to do so.     

How partisan affect shapes citizens' perception of the political world

We explore how partisan affect shapes citizens' views of party ideology and political competition. We argue that voters' affective ties to parties (both positive and negative) lead them to perceive the ideological positions of those parties as more extreme. Further, when voters are "affectively polarized," i.e., they strongly like some parties and dislike others, they are more likely to view politics as high stakes competition, where ideological polarization is rampant, participation is crucial, and electoral outcomes are highly consequential. Using cross-national survey data covering 43 elections in 34 countries, we show that partisan affect indeed impacts perceptions of party ideology and that affective polarization alters beliefs about the nature of political competition.     

COVID-19 Infodemic: A study on the Fragile Five countries

During the COVID-19 pandemic, many rumors and conspiracy theories spread in various media outlets. The purpose of this study is to reveal the nature of the misinformation detected by fact check platforms that spread in the Fragile Five countries. To determine the themes of misinformation about COVID-19 and from which media it is disseminated are a possible way to prevent it. The data of the study were obtained from International Fact-checking Network's CoronaVirusFacts database. One thousand seven hundred thirty-four piece of misinformation collected by web scraping method during the period January 24, 2020 to November 14, 2020 and analyzed with MAXQDA Analytics Pro 2020. As a result of the research, it was found that rumors (96.3%) spread more in the Fragile Five countries than conspiracy theories (3.7%). While the main theme of the rumors is about illness (26.9%) and diagnosis-treatment (25%), conspiracy theories are mostly related to the cause of the disease (68.8%). 53.06% of misinformation was spread through the Facebook platform. 15.32% on Twitter; 13.34% on WhatsApp. Misinformation has been heavily false (85.12%) in both rumor and conspiracy theories. In the second place, misleading (10.09%) news spread.     

The 2020 presidential election and beliefs about fraud: Continuity or change?

The 2020 presidential campaign was plagued by charges of voter fraud both before and after the election took place. While past literature finds that electoral losers are most likely to express misgivings about election integrity, little else is known about the characteristics of individuals who exhibit these beliefs or how the beliefs have changed over time. Employing national surveys from 2012, 2016, 2018, and 2020, we examine the levels of pre-election expectations of fraud in the event of an electoral loss over time, as well as the individual-level correlates of beliefs in a range of election-related conspiracy theories prominent in 2020. Our analysis reveals that beliefs in election fraud are common and stable across time, and only occasionally relate to partisanship. Moreover, we find that, even accounting for the influence of partisan motivated reasoning, several psychological orientations––conspiracy thinking, anomie, dark triad personality traits, and denialism––play a unique role in promoting perceptions of voter fraud.     

Candidate and party affective polarization in U.S. presidential elections: The person-negativity bias?

We investigate the degree of affective polarization in presidential election years toward the two major parties and their nominees. Notwithstanding studies which show that individuating information about an out-group member can generate a person-positivity bias, we demonstrate a person-negativity bias directed at out-party candidates at least for some. We motivate and test two hypotheses: first, we expect more sophisticated partisans to display a greater difference in their feelings towards specific candidates compared to evaluations of the parties themselves; second, we anticipate sophisticated partisans will exhibit a person-negativity bias toward out-party candidates and a person-positivity bias toward in-party candidates. The results accentuate the conditional nature of the person-positivity bias and shed light on how political sophistication is linked to affective polarization.     

Volunteers in Ukraine: From provision of services to state- and nation-building

This article discusses the volunteer movement in Ukraine. After the 2013–2014 Revolution of Dignity and the subsequent military confrontation with Russia, the volunteer movement became an influential and trusted actor capable of mobilizing a large number of supporters and a significant amount of resources. Donations made to volunteer initiatives represent in Ukraine a percentage of the country's GDP similar to that seen in some Western countries. However, compared with volunteerism in developed countries, volunteer initiatives in Ukraine have several distinct features: a mostly informal character; their reliance on a hard core of committed and active leaders; and connections with the nationalist movement understood here as an actor aiming to attain and maintain the identity of the Ukrainian nation-state in the making. The article explores the intersection between warfare, nation-building, state-building and democratization using Ukraine as a case in point. Data from two sources inform the analysis: a series of in-depth qualitative interviews with leaders of the volunteer movement (N?=?22) and results of a survey conducted on a representative sample (N?=?2040).     

Regional arrangements for providing liquidity in a financial crisis: developments in East Asia

Abstract

During the last decade three books have had a disproportionate impact on China Studies because of their controversial interpretations: Jenner's The Tyranny of History, which predicts the disintegration of the Chinese state; Menzies' 1421: The Year China Discovered the World, which describes how Chinese sailors circumnavigated the globe well before any Europeans; and Jung Chang and Jon Halliday's biography Mao: The Unknown Story. All are revisionist histories that amongst other (usually controversial) conclusions suggest there has been a conspiracy to keep the information they convey hidden. Considering their arguments and the manner of their enquiry and expression is interesting in more general ways about the construction of narrative and the nature of conspiracy, as well as about the lessons for academic research.     

When the Elders of Zion relocated to Eurabia: conspiratorial racialization in antisemitism and Islamophobia

Zia-Ebrahimi’s objective in this article is two-fold. First, to argue that antisemitism and Islamophobia display similar dynamics in representing their target population as a separate and antagonistic race (a process referred to as ‘racialization’). Second, to suggest that conspiracy theories of the ‘world Jewish domination’ type or their Islamophobic equivalent ‘Islamization of Europe’ type are powerful enablers of racialization, something that the race literature has so far neglected. In pursuing these two interrelated objectives, he offers a textual comparison of two conspiracy theories featuring Jews and Muslims. The first is The Protocols of the Elders of Zion (1903), the notorious forgery claiming to be the minutes of a meeting of Jewish leaders planning to take over Europe and the world. This text is largely considered to be at the very heart of modern-day antisemitism and an essential ingredient of the ideational context of the Holocaust. The second is Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis (2005), a pamphlet by polemicist Bat Ye’or claiming to have uncovered another ominous conspiracy, that of Muslims plotting to turn Europe into Eurabia, a dystopic land in which jihad and sharia rule, and non-Muslims live in a state of subjection. Zia-Ebrahimi argues that, despite some differences in format, the two texts display strikingly similar discursive dynamics in their attempt to racialize Jews and Muslims as the ultimate Other determined to destroy Us. This process is referred to as ‘conspiratorial racialization’.     

Ticking all the boxes? A comparative study of social sorting and affective polarization

This study explores whether, in societies around the world, affective polarization – or animosity between citizens based on their political allegiance – is stronger if political divisions align with non-political ones. Such ‘social sorting’ has earlier been established to foster affective polarization in the United States. In this study, I argue that the underlying mechanism travels across the globe. I then present two complementary studies which confirm this hypothesis. First, I employ CSES data to predict the level of affective polarization by social sorting at 119 elections in 40 countries, showing that greater alignment of partisan divisions with non-political divisions in a society (along the lines of income, education, religion and region) is associated with stronger dislike towards political outgroups. Second, using Dutch panel data, I show that individuals who fit the socio-demographic ‘profile’ of their party better tend to be more affectively polarized. This has important implications for our understanding of affective polarization.     

Advertising and the Image of Politicians in Evolving and Established Democracies

Abstract

The article¹ analyzes the constructivist and realist approaches to research on voting behavior in presidential elections in evolving (Poland) and established (U.S.) democracies. The influence of a politician's image on affective attitudes toward the candidate is stressed in the first approach; the other approach stresses the role of affect in forming such an image. Using experimental data from the 2000 presidential elections in each country, the research applied structural equation modeling and multiple regression analysis to show the best way to use image construction to influence voting behavior and, in the realist approach, the key role of affects as the starting point for designing and creating politicans' images. The results of the research also show that Polish and American voters perceive slightly differently the socio-political reality created by the media, but in both countries political advertising plays an important role in creating political images.     

Conspiracy Theories and the Paranoid Style(s) of Mass Opinion

Although conspiracy theories have long been a staple of American political culture, no research has systematically examined the nature of their support in the mass public. Using four nationally representative surveys, sampled between 2006 and 2011, we find that half of the American public consistently endorses at least one conspiracy theory and that many popular conspiracy theories are differentiated along ideological and anomic dimensions. In contrast with many theoretical speculations, we do not find conspiracism to be a product of greater authoritarianism, ignorance, or political conservatism. Rather, the likelihood of supporting conspiracy theories is strongly predicted by a willingness to believe in other unseen, intentional forces and an attraction to Manichean narratives. These findings both demonstrate the widespread allure of conspiracy theories as political explanations and offer new perspectives on the forces that shape mass opinion and American political culture.     

Affective polarization and the salience of elections

In this article we analyze the effects of election salience on affective polarization. Campaigns and elections epitomize the moment of maximum political conflict, information spread, mobilization, and activation of political identities and predispositions. We therefore expect that affective polarization will be higher just after an election has taken place. By the same token, as elections lose salience, affective polarization will diminish. We analyze this question using CSES data from 99 post-electoral surveys conducted in 42 countries between 1996 and 2016. Our identification strategy exploits variation in the timing of survey interviews with respect to the election day as an exogenous measure of election salience. The empirical findings indicate that as elections lose salience affective polarization declines. The article further contributes to the debate on the origins of affective polarization by exploring two mechanisms that may account for this relationship: changes in ideological polarization and in the intensity of party identification. Both are relevant mediators, with ideological polarization seemingly playing a more important role.     

Affective Polarization in Multiparty Systems? Comparing Affective Polarization Towards Voters and Parties in Norway and the United States

A growing body of comparative studies on partisan hostility – a phenomenon known as affective polarization – is providing evidence that partisan affective polarization is generally no greater in the United States than it is in many European multiparty systems. This article takes the comparative literature on affective polarization one step further by presenting the first comparative study on affective polarization that simultaneously uses, compares and combines a direct measure of affective polarization towards voters (using the inter‐party marriage measure) and an indirect measure of affective polarization towards parties (using the like/dislike of party measure) while accounting for the fact that multiparty systems have numerous political parties. This is done by comparing the levels of affective polarization in the United States and Norway. The results show greater affective polarization in the United States relating to parties, but the differences between these two countries are indistinguishable from chance when focusing on the affect relating to voters. This provides empirical evidence that comparative evidence of negative affect towards parties cannot necessarily be generalized to suggest that there is comparative evidence of negative affect towards voters. Yet the results also suggest that negative feelings towards out‐parties move to some extent to the personal level in terms of negative feelings towards voters of these out‐parties.     

Alexa,Alert Me When the Revolution Comes: Gender,Affect, and Labor in the Age of Home-Based Artificial Intelligence

The fantasy of automation is one of liberation from alienating tasks. Today, domestic artificial intelligence (AI) enacts this dream of frictionlessly offloading monotony. This article deploys theories of Marxist feminism, affective labor to interrogate domestic AI’s unprecedented promise of absorbing forms of labor we hardly acknowledged that we did. While these devices make the reproductive labor of the household legible as labor, we interrogate their quasi-emancipatory promise. We argue that devices such as Amazon’s Alexa or Google Home elide and reproduce the gendered and racialized dimensions of domestic labor, streamline this labor for capture by capital, and heighten the very affective dynamics they promise to ameliorate. Only critical political theories of work can illuminate the unfulfilled transformations and ongoing dominations of gender, race, and affect that saturate labor with domestic AI – expressed, we contend, by re-articulating the framework of the “social factory” to that of the “social server.”     

US Intelligence Performance and US Policy during the Polish Crisis of 1980–81: Revelations from the Kukliński Files

Drawing on intelligence documents that were recently declassified, this article assesses the quality of US intelligence analysis during the 1980–81 Polish crisis and the impact of the intelligence analysis on US policy toward Poland and the Soviet Union. After discussing the value and limitations of the declassified materials, the article raises questions about US policy during the crisis and discusses how intelligence inputs helped to shape policy. The newly available documents confirm that the US intelligence community's analytical products were often deficient and that these shortcomings put a crimp on US policymakers' choices.     

We Need to Compare,but How? Measurement Equivalence in Comparative Public Administration

In addition to public administrations and public managers, there is increasing interest in studying citizens’ interactions with and views toward government from a comparative perspective in order to put theories to the test using cross‐national surveys. However, this will only succeed if we adequately deal with the diverse ways in which respondents in different countries and regions perceive and respond to survey measures. This article examines the concept of cross‐national measurement equivalence in public administration research and explores methods for establishing equivalence. Two methodologies are examined that test and correct for measurement nonequivalence: multiple‐group confirmatory factor analysis and multilevel mixture item response theory. These techniques are used to test and establish the cross‐national measurement equivalence of two popular measurement constructs: citizen satisfaction with public services and trust in public institutions. Results show that appropriately dealing with nonequivalence accounts for different forms of biases that otherwise would be undetected. The article contributes to the methodological advancement in studying public administration beyond domestic borders.     

Banking, interest intermediation and political power

Abstract. This article seeks to introduce the concept of political power more explicitly into the discussion of the organizational attributes of societal interests. In pursuit of this objective, it defines a set of empirical indicators of the organisational conditions of interest intermediation systems that enhance the exercise of political power. The indicators are illustrated through a comparative study of the banking sector at the European Community level and in five countries: Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The comparison of the banking sector interest intermediation systems shows that the power of banks in Germany rests not only on their equity participation in large industrial concerns, but also on a highly developed interest intermediation system, the most integrated of the five countries. The analysis demonstrates from still another perspective the close imbrication of the state and finance in France. Finally; the article demonstrates the deep fragmentation of the US associational system, a system that has acted as a serious obstacle to banking system reform in America.     

Affective blocs: Understanding affective polarization in multiparty systems

Research has suggested that affective polarization (AP)—the extent to which partisans view each other as a disliked out-group—has increased, especially in two-party political systems such as in the US. The understanding of AP in multiparty systems remains limited. We study AP in Finland, characterized by a strong multiparty system and a low level of ideological polarization, between 2007 and 2019. We find that AP has increased, driven mainly by voters evaluating their least favorite party more negatively. We also propose an approach that goes beyond earlier literature, which has mostly used a single aggregate metric to measure AP. Using latent profile analysis, we find that voters are grouped into blocs that view some parties positively and others negatively. This suggests that the complex dynamics of AP in multiparty democracies involve relationships between not just individual parties but between what we call affective blocs that span across party lines.