WHY DO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS PRIVATIZE THE PROVISION OF WATER SERVICES? EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN

Why do some local governments privatize water services, while others opt for public management? Economic literature has been unable to demonstrate that private management is more efficient than public management, so there must be other reasons that lead governments to privatize the service. But what are they? This paper presents the results of a study that analyses the factors behind the privatization of water services with data from 741 municipalities located in the South of Spain over a period dating from 1985 to 2006. A discrete choice model analyses the influence of each factor on the likelihood of privatization. One of the novelties of this paper is that we take the value of the explanatory variables at the time when water services are privatized. Among our findings, it is worth highlighting the importance of the size of municipalities, their financial burden and the neighbouring effect.     

IS OUTPUT PERFORMANCE ALL ABOUT THE RESOURCES? A FUZZY‐SET QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STREET‐LEVEL BUREAUCRATS IN SWITZERLAND

This article refines Lipsky's assertion that lacking resources negatively affects output performance. It uses fuzzy‐set Qualitative Comparative Analysis to analyse the nuanced interplay of contextual and individual determinants of the output performance of veterinary inspectors as street‐level bureaucrats in Switzerland. Moving ‘beyond Lipsky’, the study builds on recent theoretical contributions and a systematic comparison across organizational contexts. Against a widespread assumption, output performance is not all about resources. The impact of perceived available resources hinges on caseloads, which prove to be more decisive. These contextual factors interact with individual attitudes emerging from diverse public accountabilities. The results contextualize the often‐emphasized importance of worker–client interaction. In a setting where clients cannot escape the interaction, street‐level bureaucrats are not primarily held accountable by them. Studies of output performance should thus consider gaps between what is being demanded of and offered to street‐level bureaucrats, and the latter's multiple embeddedness.     

PARALLEL,TRANSFER OR COLLABORATION STRATEGY OF RELATING THEORY TO PRACTICE? A CASE STUDY OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT DEBATE IN GERMANY

The relationship between theory and practice is essential to ‘applied sciences' such as public management. However, the current debate on this topic lacks empirical substantiation. Here I develop a methodology for the indication of how the theory‐practice gap is actually addressed in a given subfield of management enquiry. I distinguish three archetypal strategies of relating theory to practice and develop several bibliometric indicators for them. Subsequently, I apply this methodology in a case study on the German public management debate from 1989 to 2005, a study based on bibliometric data of some 900 articles on public management. As will be demonstrated, in Germany, the theory‐practice divide is predominantly framed as a problem of knowledge transfer between scholars and practitioners. Reflections on the institutional structures of public management in Germany make it clear why the transfer strategy is chosen, thus proving the validity of the suggested indicators.     

THE USE OF PERFORMANCE INFORMATION IN BUDGETARY DECISION‐MAKING BY LEGISLATORS: IS ESTONIA ANY DIFFERENT?

The goal of this article is to examine to what extent legislators in Estonia use performance information in budgetary decision‐making. Interviews with the members of the finance committee of the parliament show that legislators make only limited use of the formal documents containing performance information. Instead, they rely, for the most part, on informal social networks for gathering information they consider necessary for budget discussions. According to the legislators, the main reasons for limited use of performance information are the following: the documents containing performance are too long and cumbersome, the legislative budget process is too time‐constrained, and the parliament has only a limited role in making substantive changes to the budget. The study also indicates that more experienced politicians are less interested in performance information than the novices but there are no significant differences between legislators from governing and opposition parties.