构建高等学校学生党员立体式教育培训模式

高校学生党员的教育培训工作,是党的建设的重要组成部分。针对当前高校学生党员教育培训工作的新问题、根据高校学生党建工作的新要求,文章对高校学生党员的教育培训模式进行了新的探索——构建以党员自身建设为点、以学校分类教育为线,以党员全员教育为面的＂点、线、面＂相结合的立体式教育培训模式。     

Reinterpreting the Sino–Japanese War: 1939–1940, peasant mobilisation,and the road to the PRC

The War of Resistance to Japan (1937–1945) has long been recognised as the most important stage in the Chinese Communist Party's rise to power in 1949. Particularly in its North China base areas, the Chinese Communist Party is said to have pursued moderate, inclusive, and mobilisatory tactics during the war years to build a movement for national salvation from the bottom up, which eventually led to the establishment of the People's Republic of China. The evidence from the heart of the Taihang Base Area suggests the possibility of another contrasting history, masked by current interpretations, in which 1939–1940 was a crucial turning point in that process. Starting in September 1939, and for the following six months, there is evidence of more explicitly revolutionary endeavour. The Chinese Communist Party seized power locally from its allies and destroyed the opposition; it engaged in violent land reform and wealth redistribution; and it attempted to proletarianise itself. Understanding the causes of these phenomena and their consequences in one of the most important front-line base areas provides new perspectives on both the course of the war with Japan and the Chinese Communist Party's eventual success.     

构建高校学生党员教育培训的长效机制

高校学生党员的教育培训工作是高校党建的重要组成部分,构建高校学生党员教育培训的长效机制对于加强党的执政能力、落实人才强国战略以及加强学生党员的思想政治教育水平具有重要意义。构建高校学生党员教育培训的长效机制可以通过加强思想政治教育、创新教育方法、丰富教育载体等措施得以实现。     

高校大学生党员发展工作管见

高校发展大学生党员工作关系到我们党的事业的兴衰成败，高校党委要充分认识积极发展大学生党员的重要性和紧迫性，及早发现苗子，重点培养；坚持质与量的辩证统一，提高数量，保证质量；加强学生党员思想教育，提高理论水平。     

Tiananmen Square Protest and College Job Placement Reform in the 1980s

The Tiananmen Square massacre left a permanent scar on the Chinese government's legitimacy to govern. This article examines a little-known backdrop to the student movement: the college graduate job placement system reform and the civil service recruitment system reform that were rolled out together by the state in the mid to late 1980s. The two reforms were interlocking, because civil service jobs were the most desired jobs for graduates at the time. As the college job placement system reform placed a greater burden on the individual student to find a job for him or herself, the civil service recruitment system reform remained opaque. This led to strong student disaffection as graduates tended to believe that the forthcoming open job market was to be filled with more nepotism and less meritocracy and this perceived lack of fair recruitment opportunities extended to the greatly desired civil service jobs.     

在高校学生工作中践行党的群众路线问题探析

“一切为了群众,一切依靠群众,从群众中来,到群众中去,”是中国共产党群众路线,它是党的生命线和根本工作路线.学生作为高校工作群众主体,完全具备开展群众路线运用的可行性和科学性.其表述可借鉴为“一切为了学生,一切依靠学生,从学生中来,到学生中去”.立足群众路线,寻找高校学生工作的切入点,把学生的满意度作为衡量和检验标准,让广大学生从中得到实实在在的利益,看到实实在在的成效.坚持群众路线的与时俱进,将“教育梦”与“中国梦”的血肉联系变得更加紧密,让当代大学生的“学生梦”也更加鲜明地存在我们的“教育梦”之中.     

Turning a Chinese Kid Red: kindergartens in the early People's Republic

To win the hearts and minds of the Chinese people, Chinese Communist leaders launched a series of educational reforms to instill new socialist ideas and nationalistic fervor in kindergarteners immediately after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Under the strong influence of Soviet advisers and through a number of methods (games, singing, storytelling, site visits), Chinese kindergarteners were taught the nobility of labor, the sacrifice of soldiers, the grandeur of Tiananmen Square, the wise leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong, and the evilness of enemies. However, contrary to the conventional view, this article argues that Chinese education officials and kindergarten teachers never blindly followed Soviet educational models. They appropriated Moscow's techniques to suit their domestic needs, which included promoting nationalist feelings among children to consolidate the Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy and power. Ultimately, Chinese kindergarteners were turned into Party loyalists, not admirers of a foreign socialist model. Although the Party encountered difficulties in recruiting reliable teachers to implement its policies, it was able to impose nearly total control from above over the political content of kindergarten education. Under the one-party system, Chinese children were only taught what the Communist leaders wanted them to learn.     

高校艺术类大学生党员发展工作探析

近年来，随着全国高校贯彻落实《党中央、国务院关于进一步加强和改进大学生思想政治教育意见》的不断深入，大学生要求入党的愿望逐渐升温，人数不断增加，大学生党员发展工作也取得了较大的进步，我校基层党支部在学校党委和组织部的关怀指导下，探索出了许多发展大学生党员工作的新路子。然而，高校中的艺术类大学生由于有着自身的特殊性，其党员发展工作与其他专业的大学生有着很大的不同。为此，研究和探讨艺术类大学生党员发展工作，已成为高校基层党组织一个不容忽视而且迫切需要解决的现实问题。     

用科学发展观统领高校党建与思想政治工作——关于公安院校大学生党建工作的调查与思考

调查主要以问卷调查和召开座谈会两种形式进行,问卷调查主要围绕大学生党员的政治思想、学习态度、大学生党支部建设、大学生党员教育培训等四个方面展开。调查显示：公安院校大学生党建工作在大学生思想政治教育中占主导地位．应用科学发展观统领高校党建与思想政治工作。     

Ideological and political tendencies of factions in the red guard movement

This paper observes the most important ideological and political tendencies of the Red Guard Movement during the first three years of China's Cultural Revolution. This paper focuses on the differences between them—the Old Red Guards, conservative Red Guards, rebel Red Guards and ultraleft Red Guards. The Old Red Guards were the initiators of the Red Guard movement. They mainly attacked the intellectuals, overthrown ‘class enemies’ and some leaders in the educational and cultural fields. The core members of the Old Red Guards were children of leaders. They stressed their red family background and strove for political and social superiority and privilege. The conservative Red Guards followed the example of the Old Red Guards but depended on and defended the local Party's leadership. The rebel Red Guards mainly attacked the power holders and the organs of the Party and government. They came from the social groups that had been out of power. In politics, they relied on the support of Mao and the left wing of the Party. The ultraleft Red Guards negated and criticized the political leadership and the existing system as a whole. They were in small groups and suppressed by Mao and his headquarters but they left independent thinking on Chinese politics and society.     

A dangerous game: Deng and the intellectuals

This article examines one aspect of China's “second revolution” led by Deng Xiaoping: the relationship between the post‐Mao leadership and the intellectuals, who were the most persecuted during the “Cultural Revolution.” When Deng took power in 1978, one tough challenge was to mobilize China's well‐educated men and women for the nation's modernization. New policies toward them were introduced to rekindle their enthusiasm in creative and critical academic activities. The anticipation of a new period of cooperation between the authorities and the intellectuals was, however, dashed by the bloodshed in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. Why did Deng, who sought the support of Chinese intellectuals for his modernization program, side with the Party's hard‐liners to order the military crackdown on pro‐democracy demonstrations? Will China's post‐Mao leadership no longer need the intellectuals’ help? This article argues that the Communist Party of China has been playing “a dangerous game of cooperation” with the intellectuals. Despite the tragic events, the game is likely to continue as long as the CCP proceeds with its modernization program and the intellectuals maintain their sense of mission. What remains uncertain is how the next round of game will be played out and who will emerge as the winner.     

略论大学生盗窃犯罪

昔日被视为“天之骄子”的大学生 ,有的却成了今天的盗窃犯罪嫌疑人 ,这是一件令全社会感到惋惜的事情。我们作为大学生中的一员 ,对与大学生盗窃犯罪的有关问题作一探讨。     

Consultative Leninism: China's new political framework

This paper puts forward the concept of consultative Leninism to describe the political system that has taken shape in China after the death of Deng Xiaoping. It argues that the Communist Party has made its essentially Leninist political machinery more resilient in confronting the huge social and political challenges that the current global financial crisis may unleash in China by incorporating consultative elements. Consultative Leninism has five defining characteristics: an obsessive focus upon staying in power; continuous governance reform designed to pre-empt public demands for democratization; sustained efforts to enhance the Party's capacity to elicit, respond to and direct changing public opinion; pragmatism in economic and financial management; and the promotion of nationalism in place of Communism.     

Farewell to idealism: mapping China's university students of the 1990s

This article portrays China's university students of the 1990s and the differences between these youths and earlier generations. Corresponding to the political apathy and commercial ardor of post‐1989 China, the once appealing political idealism and activism of the 1980s was quickly replaced by a sort of fast‐food consumer culture that dominated Chinese society and campuses in the 1990s. Many students chose to distance themselves from sensitive political issues, though they still followed current affairs closely and held a strong nationalist outlook. They learned how to reconcile with existing social conditions and made their decisions, on career or politics, based on the principle of individual interests. Being compelled to shift their status from the ‘proud children of heaven’ to ordinary members of society, students readily went to great lengths to merge in and be submerged by the secular world.     

高校学生党员培训应加强社会实践性教育

本文在分析了大学生党员培训存在的问题基础上指出：高校应把实践教育作为加强和改进大学生党员培训教育的一项重要内容,以实践教育为引导,创新大学生党员培训形式,构建实践育人平台,完善实践育人体系,把握实践育人的关键点,使实践教育成为培养高素质人才的重要途径,同时提出了学生党员社会实践教育的四种途径。     

大学生思想政治教育教学中加强国学教育的实效性

国学是指以儒学为主体的中华传统文化与学术,自20世纪90年代以来,国学开始受到重视。当代部分大学生思想道德状况存在社会公德、诚信观念、理想信念等方面的缺失,说明培养大学生国学素质很有必要。＂国学＂在大学生思想政治教育中起着培养大学生民族精神、健康的人格、节俭朴素的品德等诸多作用。     

Peasant challenge in post‐communist China

Peasants constitute about 73% of China's population. To a large extent, the success of China's modernization program and transition depends on where peasants are heading. Peasants have posed new challenges for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the 1990s after 17‐year economic reform. This article argues that these challenges derive from the empowerment of the peasants since the mid‐1980s. How well the CCP could deal with these challenges directly concerns China's political stability and reform. Through the examination of the evolution of the peasant‐CCP relations and of the implications of the challenges for China in the 1990s and beyond, this article raises an open question for China scholars to address.     

Dispelling misconceptions about the red guard movement: The necessity to re‐examine cultural revolution factionalism and periodization

This paper argues that the Chinese Communist Party's 1981 official definition of the “Cultural Revolution” was a gross distortion of historical reality. In presenting the “Cultural Revolution” mainly as one of power struggle among the ruling elite, the official version denies that there were serious conflicts within society. It also covers up the fact that a main thrust of the violence in 1966–69 was directed against what the Rebel Red Guards called “the bureaucratic class” or the “red capitalist class”. The re‐periodization of the “Cultural Revolution” from three years (1966–69) to ten years (1966–76) was a conscious attempt to try to obfuscate what actually happened in the years from 1966 to 1969.

By manipulating historical facts, even today the CCP is able to continue to suppress members of the Rebel Faction, who had led in challenging the ruling authorities in the Sixties. The last major suppression of rebels took place in the mid‐Eighties in the political campaign to “Weed Out the Three Types of People”. The Party was able to do so with ease because Chinese society has accepted its distorted version of Chinese history.

The article ends by poiting out how this distorted history of the Cultural Revolution has had a pernicious effect on the democracy movement in China.     

China's brain drain problem: Causes,consequences and policy options

The brain drain has become a growing problem for China's overseas education, especially after the Tiananmen Incident of June 1989. Brain drain is a symptom of a home country's social, economic, or political problems. In China, political alienation, low income, poor living conditions, insufficient research facilities, and mismanagement of high‐level manpower are the major factors pushing intellectuals to seek development opportunities abroad.

Beijing has found it difficult to bring students back home. Restrictions often anger students abroad. Family members also discourage students from returning. Many students find it difficult to adjust to the home environment after years living abroad; some are afraid that they will be punished at home for their outspoken political opinions abroad. However, Beijing has limited control over students overseas. Also, after the 1989 June crackdown, most host governments have decided to allow Chinese students to stay.

Concerned with the brain drain problem, Beijing is adjusting its policy of study abroad. There are various policy scenarios. Each has its merits and limitations, and each will lead to different consequences. Some technical solutions are also worth considering. Although a brain drain will still occur in the future, the tendency can be reduced if appropriate measures are adopted. China's future policy on overseas education depends on the future domestic situation and foreign relations. Apparently, a continued open policy of overseas education is in the interest of the students and the country. For an effective and long‐term policy, some strategic adjustments are necessary. Beijing needs to shift its attention away from the symptoms and concentrate on to the causes of the brain drain. Also, Beijing needs to redesign its future strategy to balance the benefits and costs of overseas education, instead of attempting to eliminate the brain drain.

The brain drain is not permanent. More professionals will return home as the economic and political situation significantly improves. The experience of Taiwan and South Korea in coping with their brain drain problem is a valuable reference for Beijing.     

新时期高校基层党建工作的现状分析与对策研究

高校基层党建工作是党的建设的重要组成部分,也是高校党建工作的核心和关键,必须以改革创新精神全面推进高校基层党建工作。当前高校基层党建工作面临着许多新问题、新挑战,对此只要正确地分析,找出解决问题的对策,在加强学生党员自身建设、发挥大学生党员主体作用、开拓网上党建等方面进行努力,就一定能把高校基层党建工作开展得有声有色,为高等教育事业又好又快发展提供坚强的政治保证和组织保证。