Dilemmas in a general theory of planning

The search for scientific bases for confronting problems of social policy is bound to fail, becuase of the nature of these problems. They are wicked problems, whereas science has developed to deal with tame problems. Policy problems cannot be definitively described. Moreover, in a pluralistic society there is nothing like the undisputable public good; there is no objective definition of equity; policies that respond to social problems cannot be meaningfully correct or false; and it makes no sense to talk about optimal solutions to social problems unless severe qualifications are imposed first. Even worse, there are no solutions in the sense of definitive and objective answers.This is a modification of a paper presented to the Panel on Policy Sciences, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Boston, December 1969.     

A general theory of interpersonal exchange

A general theory of interpersonal exchange is developed from a public goods, public choice point of view and within an analytical context that assesses both the benefits and the costs of social interaction. Social transaction benefits and costs are specified as a composite function of interpersonal bindingness, which itself depends upon five parameters. The model provides for the determination of an optimal personal degree of bindingness in a two-person relationship. Extensions encompass the more interesting reaction case, where two individuals each select their own optimal personal bindingness levels. Applications and conclusions complete the paper. qu]When love beckons to you, follow him, Though his ways are hard and steep ... For even as love crowns you so shall he crucify you. Even as he is for your growth so is he for your pruning. Kahlil Gibran The Prophet     

Citizenship studies: A general theory

Societies face two contradictory principles. They are organised around issues of scarcity, which result in exclusionary structures such as gender divisions, social classes and status groups, but they must also secure social solidarity. In social science, these contradictory principles are characteristically referred to as the allocative and integrative requirements. In a secular society, especially where social inequality is intensified by economic rationalism, citizenship functions as a major foundation of social solidarity. The article also explores the scope of citizenship studies through an examination of identity, civic virtue and community. It concludes with an extensive critique of the legacy of T. H. Marshall, pointing to the future of citizenship studies around the theme of globalisation and human rights.     

A general probabilistic spatial theory of elections

In this paper, we construct a general probabilistic spatial theory of elections and examine sufficient conditions for equilibrium in two-candidate contests with expected vote-maximizing candidates. Given strict concavity of the candidate objective function, a unique equilibrium exists and the candidates adopt the same set of policy positions. Prospective uncertainty, reduced policy salience, degree of concavity of voter utility functions, some degree of centrality in the feasible set of policy locations, and restrictions on the dimensionality of the policy space are all stabilizing factors in two-candidate elections. 3. CITIZEN. We have been called so of many, not that our heads are some brown, some black, some auburn, some bald, but that our wits are so diversely colored. And truly I think if all our wits were to issue out of one skill, they would fly east, west, north, south, and their consent of one direct way should be at once to all points o' the compass. (Shakespeare, coriolanus II.iii. 19–26)     

Toward a post-industrial planning theory

Post-industrial tendencies indicate changes in the composition of the labor force and changes in world-view. Increasingly, next to highly intellectual work and rational ways of thinking can be found work with affective content and existentially based ways of understanding. Rationalism loses effectiveness as a guide to social action because it leads to fragmentation of the experienced world. Existentialism holds out the promise of synthesizing experience into a coherent image. Because planning involves the translation of knowledge into action, these changes in cultural values and ways of understanding call for innovations in planning theory. Challenges to rationalism require creating a new constitution for planning. Synthesis of rationalism and existentialism requires articulation of an existental planning theory. Embracing existing social conflicts is necessary for accomplishing both tasks.     

If planning is everything,maybe it's nothing

Where planning does not measure up to expectations, which is almost everywhere, planners are handy targets. They have been too ambitious or they have not been ambitious enough. They have perverted their calling by entering into politics or they have been insensitive to the political dimensions of their task. They ignore national cultural mores at their peril or they capitulate to blind forces of irrationality. They pay too much attention to the relationship between one sector of the economy and another while ignoring analysis of individual projects, or they spend so much time on specific matters that they are unable to deal with movements of the economy as a whole. Planners can no longer define a role for themselves. From old American cities to British new towns, from the richest countries to the poorest, planners have difficulty in explaining who they are and what they should be expected to do. If they are supposed to doctor sick societies, the patient never seems to get well. Why can't the planners ever seem to do the right thing?     

Public administration planning in developing countries a Bayesian decision theory approach

Decisionmaking under uncertainty is visualized as a game against nature. The policymaker is the player and has a set of alternatives or strategies from which he desires to choose the most effective. He is confronted with a variety of possible states of nature that may evolve after his decision is made. The key states of nature are identified and their interactive relationship to the strategy options are specified. Important roles in the resulting analysis are played by the probabilities of successful project initiation and implementation. It is shown that neglect of the inherent uncertainty aspects leads to evaluations (benefit-cost ratios) of proposed reforms and projects which can be seriously upward biased.     

The bounds of smart decline: a foundational theory for planning shrinking cities

Economic decline has led to a new wave of population decline throughout the US, meaning more and more cities are shrinking. Growing interest in using smart decline principles to respond to shrinkage has been met with controversy in cities such as Detroit and Cleveland. This paper advances a foundational theory of smart decline that takes as its starting point discussions of ethics, equity, and social justice in the planning and political theory literature, but is well grounded in observations of successful smart decline practice.     

A tribute to Earl A. Thompson and, in his own words, a summary of his general economic and social theory

Brilliant but little known, in part because his style was dense and crucial papers unpublished, Earl Thompson reformulated standard theory to achieve policy relevance, focusing on significant rent-seeking inefficiencies stemming from private information and transaction costs. Drawing on history, he showed a vast array of institutions to be efficient which economists had previously found to be inefficient, modeled governments and their nature, defined government’s functions, and showed why dominant states rise and fall.     

On the theory of political competition: Comparative statics from a general allocative perspective

It is a widely held belief that interest groups respond competitively to political challenges from other groups. This view is found not only in the traditional theory of interest groups, but also in the literature on policy typologies. Though it is not necessarily supposed that groups form in response to opposition, it is believed that when groups exist, they compete. If an interest group is thought of as a multipurpose organization, whose leaders might spend organizational funds on nonpolitical programs which directly serve the members, the supposition of competition can be subjected to rigorous examination. Political competition causes the cost of political success to rise. Since group leaders must allocate scarce revenue among projects, it seems that nonpolitical projects might become more attractive when the political environment becomes competitive. Political scientists have usually been disposed to take the opposite view, believing that demand for political activity rises as the cost of political success increases. The nature of political action as an organizational investment is discussed from the allocative perspective in this essay. It is shown that competition cannot be safely assumed unless other strong hypotheses are invoked. A Slutsky-type theorem is deduced for political reaction.     

A general analysis of rent-seeking games

In this paper we reconsider the basic model of “efficient rent seeking.” We stress the importance of the shape of the players' reaction curve in order to understand the impact of the technology of rent-seeking on the structure of the outcome of the game. We give a complete characterization of the pure strategy equilibria. Moreover, the possibility of preemption by a Stakelberg leader is discussed according to the nature of the technology of rent-seeking available to the agents.     

A theoretical basis for participatory planning

Arguments are presented for the reconsideration of models which guide planning behavior and structure planning organizations. Hierarchical organizations are contrasted with reticular organizations and the latter are presented as necessary for effective citizen participation. Legitimacy is presented as a fundamental basis of justifying planning action and historical shifts in forms of legitimacy are noted. Participation, as a form of legitimacy, and several aspects of participatory planning are discussed in terms of recent systems thinking. It is argued that participatory planning increases the effectiveness and adaptivity of the planning process and contributes adaptivity and stability to the societal system. Further, it is argued that citizen participation is an essential element in making the planning process a learning system. This leads to a strengthening of the definition and role of communities in the urban system, and to an unexpected requirement of planners who would adopt a participatory planning process.     

A general constitutional possibility theorem

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem shows that there exist no transitive social preferences in nonoligarchic societies for all possible profiles of individual preference orderings. Similarly, a generalization of Sen's Theorem of the Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal implies under the same conditions that non-Pareto-optimal outcomes may be present in the resulting cyclical preference relations. This essay changes the customary perspective. It demonstrates that, for any profile of individual preferences, we can always find a nonoligarchic assignment of rights to different subsets of society, to decide between pairs of outcomes, together with adequate decision rules, which escapes these problems. This assignment of rights can be a purely liberal one even for each profile, but not one in which everybody participates in all decisions and which uses simple or qualified-majority voting (Total Direct Democracy). The adequate purely liberal constitution, on the other hand, may imply an oligarchy if too few outcomes are present.     

A theory of credit bureaus

When both the buyer and seller have the potential to exercise opportunistic behavior some balancing of these mal-incentives must be found. Seller financing has the potential to work as a quality assurance device because the lien holder is clearly at risk when mortgaged property fails. The buyer is at risk in the amount of the down payment and installments if the property is abused. Credit bureaus act as arbitrators. Our model accurately predicts the shifting in contract terms to account for relative opportunism and the incidence of this contract based on changes in the relative costs and benefits.