The Hurried Justification of Sanctions

In this paper I try to see how the Derridean aporias of the law of the urgency of legal decisions (the law interrupts the input of knowledge in the decision-making process) and the épokhè of the rule (justice can never be done in the present) are revealed in the context of the justification of sanctions. I argue that sanctions can only be justified in a purposive manner in the last instance. They can only be means to an end of punishment which has been opted for, and which can be justified on grounds of principles, or an authoritative calculation of incommensurable entities. I argue against theories, which advocate the internal connection of law and morality, because if such a connection could be established, the aporia of the hurried and unjustified action would obviously disappear. In particular my target is discourse theory as formulated mainly by Robert Alexy with his Sonderfallthese(Special Case Thesis). My objection is that, because of their instrumental nature, sanctions cannot be justified on moral grounds. I also consider some objections that could be raised from Klaus Günther's theory of appropriateness and Habermas' distinction between the moral, ethical and pragmatic employments of practical reason. I am argue that the former, which would become relevant at the stage of application, that is sentencing, does not resolve the justificatory problem of sanctions, and the latter confirms rather than falsifies my claim that punishment can never be said to be just.     

Rules of Power and the Power of Rules

Abstract
The paper describes at length and then discusses critically Frederick Schauer's analysis of rules in his recent book Playing By the RuZes . For most of the book Schauer discusses rules in general, and only at the end talks about legal rules in particular. The chief message of Schauer's analysis is that rules permit, and even constitute, a particular kind of decision-making, one that quite deliberately insulates the decision-taker from considerations of what would be in the circumstances the best justified decision to take. Rules are thus for Schauer devices for the allocation of decision-making power: The effect of A delegating to B the power to decide by a set of rules devised by A is that A retains much control over B 's decision-making. Schauer canvasses the claims of what he calls "presumptive positivism" to be a theory of law which embodies such a view of legal rules. In his criticism, the author compares Schauer's view with Joseph Raz's notion of legal rules as exclusionary reasons. The author then compares "presumptive positivism" with some other recent versions of positivism and the idea of rules as devices for the allocation of power with theories of law in the Critical Legal Studies movement.     

Schauer on Coercion,Acceptance, and Schizophrenia

This article provides a comment on The Force of Law (Schauer 2015), which is Schauer's new and illuminating contribution to the place of law in our societies and in our lives. It constitutes a strong defence of the importance of coercion in law. First, I consider cases where the law is not able to motivate human behaviour adequately, in order to show that legal coercion is not always justified. Second, I examine the Rawlsian distinction between the ideal and the nonideal theory and its application to the theory of law. Third, I tentatively argue that coercion has no place in ideal theory, but a core place in nonideal theory. In this way, it may be plausible to reconstruct the motivation to accept the law, at least when the law is normatively justified.     

Analysing and exemplifying forensic conclusion criteria in terms of Bayesian decision theory

There is ongoing discussion in forensic science and the law about the nature of the conclusions reached based on scientific evidence, and on how such conclusions – and conclusion criteria – may be justified by rational argument. Examples, among others, are encountered in fields such as fingermarks (e.g., ‘this fingermark comes from Mr. A's left thumb’), handwriting examinations (e.g., ‘the questioned signature is that of Mr. A’), kinship analyses (e.g., ‘Mr. A is the father of child C’) or anthropology (e.g., ‘these are human remains'). Considerable developments using formal methods of reasoning based on, for example (Bayesian) decision theory, are available in literature, but currently such reference principles are not explicitly used in operational forensic reporting and ensuing decision-making. Moreover, applied examples, illustrating the principles, are scarce. A potential consequence of this in practical proceedings, and hence a cause of concern, is that underlying ingredients of decision criteria (such as losses quantifying the undesirability of adverse decision consequences), are not properly dealt with. There is merit, thus, in pursuing the study and discussion of practical examples, demonstrating that formal decision-theoretic principles are not merely conceptual considerations. Actually, these principles can be shown to underpin practical decision-making procedures and existing legal decision criteria, though often not explicitly apparent as such. In this paper, we will present such examples and discuss their properties from a Bayesian decision-theoretic perspective. We will argue that these are essential concepts for an informed discourse on decision-making across forensic disciplines and the development of a coherent view on this topic. We will also emphasize that these principles are of normative nature in the sense that they provide standards against which actual judgment and decision-making may be compared. Most importantly, these standards are justified independently of peoples' observable decision behaviour, and of whether or not one endorses these formal methods of reasoning.     

Mental disorder and legal responsibility: The relevance of stages of decision making

The paper discusses the relevance of decision-making models for evaluating the impact of mental disorder on legal responsibility. A three-stage model is presented that analyzes decision making in terms of behavioral control. We argue that understanding dysfunctions in each of the three stages of decision making could provide important insights in the relation between mental disorder and legal responsibility. In particular, it is argued that generating options for action constitutes an important but largely ignored stage of the decision-making process, and that dysfunctions in this early stage might undermine the whole process of making decisions (and thus behavioral control) more strongly than dysfunctions in later stages. Lastly, we show how the presented framework could be relevant to the actual psychiatric assessment of a defendant's decision making within the context of an insanity defense.     

Reviewable Automated Decision-Making

In this paper we introduce the concept of ‘reviewability' as an alternative approach to improving the accountability of automated decision-making that involves machine learning systems. In doing so, we draw on an understanding of automated decision-making as a socio-technical process, involving both human (organisational) and technical components, beginning before a decision is made and extending beyond the decision itself. Although explanations for automated decisions may be useful in some contexts, they focus more narrowly on the model and therefore do not provide the information about that process as a whole that is necessary for many aspects of accountability, regulatory oversight, and assessments for legal compliance. Drawing on previous work on the application of administrative law and judicial review mechanisms to automated decision-making in the public sector, we argue that breaking down the automated decision-making process into its technical and organisational components allows us to consider how appropriate record-keeping and logging mechanisms implemented at each stage of that process would allow for the process as a whole to be reviewed. Although significant research is needed to explore how it can be implemented, we argue that a reviewability framework potentially offers for a more useful and more holistic form of accountability for automated decision-making than approaches focused more narrowly on explanations.     

Minor or adult? Introducing decision analysis in forensic age estimation

Nowadays, forensic age estimation takes an important role in worldwide forensic and medico-legal institutes that are solicited by judicial or administrative authorities for providing an expert report on the age of individuals. The authorities’ ultimate issue of interest is often the probability that the person is younger or older than a given age threshold, which is usually the age of majority. Such information is fundamental for deciding whether a person being judged falls under the legal category of an adult. This is a decision that may have important consequences for the individual, depending on the legal framework in which the decision is made. The aim of this paper is to introduce a normative approach for assisting the authority in the decision-making process given knowledge from available findings reported by means of probabilities. The normative approach proposed here has been acknowledged in the forensic framework, and represents a promising structure for reasoning that can support the decision-making process in forensic age estimation. The paper introduces the fundamental elements of decision theory applied to the specific case of age estimation, and provides some examples to illustrate its practical application.     

Parents as decision-makers--do the attitudes of Norwegian doctors conform to law?

This article studies whether the attitudes of Norwegian doctors regarding surrogate decision power in end-of-life care conform to legal rules, particularly as they apply to the protection of children. The article is based on a hypothetical scenario concerning a critically ill child, believed to be dying, presented to 406 doctors. The study indicates that doctors may permit parental/surrogate decision-making to a greater extent than justified by law, sometimes in contravention of the child's best interests, which should be a fundamental guideline in all decisions that concern children. This article suggests a need to improve knowledge of doctors concerning parents'/surrogates' right to participate in life-or-death decisions. We conclude that Norway needs a precedent decision from the Supreme Court that confirms the right of judicial review of end-of-life decisions, and which applies the principle of the child's best interests as a fundamental guideline in the final decision.     

On universal relevance in legal reasoning

The purpose of this essay is to defend a claim that a certain consideration, which I call unworkability, is universally and necessarily relevant to legal reasoning. By that I mean that it is a consideration that must carry legal weight in the justification of some judicial decisions in every legal system in which (1) all disputed matters of law can be adjudicated, and (2) all judicial decisions are to be legally justified. Unworkability's necessary relevance has important implications for a theory of relevance presented by Rolf Sartorius. On this theory, nearly all considerations that are relevant to a judicial decision are supplied by legal principles embedded in the legal rules and decisions, or by extralegal principles dependent, in some way, on the legal principles. (The exceptions to the embedding thesis that Sartorius would, no doubt, recognize are elaborated in the text but can be set aside here.) But there are possible legal systems which do not contain an embedded legal principle concerning unworkability; and nonetheless, unworkability is relevant to judicial reasoning in those systems. Hence, a theory of relevance that relies on principles embedded in the content of rules is too simplistic. Some substantive considerations are relevant for other reasons.     

Gardner on Legal Reasoning

In Chapters 2, 3 and 7 of his new book, Law as a Leap of Faith, John Gardner provides the elements of an account of legal reasoning. It is on the basis of this account that Gardner defends or supports some of the most important theses of his book, viz. theses pertaining to how law can be made, to the relation between law and morality, and to the legitimacy of judicial law-making. A central element of Gardner’s account is a distinction (suggested originally by Joseph Raz) between two forms of legal reasoning, namely, reasoning about the law and reasoning according to law. In this paper I intend to describe and evaluate Gardner’s account. Among the critical remarks that will appear in the paper is the claim that Gardner’s concept of reasoning according to law is overly inclusive.     

Comparative Law for Legal Translation: Through Multiple Perspectives to Multidimensional Knowledge

With this paper, I suggest a multiperspectivist approach for assessing conceptual legal knowledge with relevance for the translation of legal terms in translation between two or more different legal systems. The basic quest is to present a set of categories and analytical approaches for legal translators to generate (collect) and classify knowledge necessary for their professional conceptual needs. In this paper, I will focus on the translational, juridical, and cognitive basics of such an approach. In order to cope with the broad range of possible translational purposes in different translational situations and choose relevantly between alternative formulations, translators need methods and strategies in order to construct the necessary conceptual knowledge. This presupposes a broad knowledge structured in ways that enable the translator to recognize relevant characteristics of legal systems and relevant differences between different legal systems. Concerning translational theory, the basis is the functional theory of translation as adapted to legal translation, based upon the idea of translation as choice between alternatives and distinguishing between documentary translation, at one end of a scale, and instrumental translation, at the other. This basis and the distinction presuppose relevant knowledge from comparative law. Hence, existing approaches and fundamental tenets concerning comparative law inside and outside of translation are presented. In order for knowledge to be presented in a manageable way with relevance to translators, I work with the approach of concept frames as basic unit of knowledge gathering and categorization. This way of presenting knowledge is embedded more generally in a knowledge communication approach, focusing on knowledge asymmetry. Within this general framework, the multiperspectivist approach combines insights from cultural studies (especially the study of law-as-culture), law as a disciplinary social system, and communicative interaction generating meanings in legal communication, also across national borders.

     

Necessary and Universal Truths about Law?

Prominent analytical jurisprudents assert that a theory of law consists of necessary, universal truths about the nature of law. This often‐repeated claim, which has not been systematically established, is critically examined in this essay. I begin with the distinction between natural kinds and social artifacts, drawing on the philosophy of society to show that necessity claims about law require a fundamental reworking of basic understandings of ontology and epistemology, which legal philosophers have not undertaken. I show law is a poor fit for a priori and a posteriori knowledge. I distinguish between universal application and universal truth, showing the former is sound while the latter is not. I expose the implications that follow from the initial selection of the central case of law, demonstrating that this choice must be justified, and I reveal two ways analytical jurisprudents shield their theories of law from refutation. This analysis raises significant doubts about the claim by analytical jurisprudents that they are identifying necessary, universal truths about the nature of law.     

The Drafting of ICJ Decisions: Some Personal Recollections and Observations

This paper is a study of the process of drafting of decisionsof the International Court of Justice from the standpoint ofthe Registry, showing on the basis of the author's personalrecollections how the Registry contributes to the process. Thequestion of the legal propriety of such contribution is examined,on the basis of a distinction between the task of decision,and that of expression of the decision. Some remarks are alsooffered on drafting techniques.     

微观权力分析——读米歇尔·福柯的《规训与惩罚》

通过对微观权力分析,指出福柯与传统自由主义"司法-论述性的分析"模式不同之处,他并没有采用合法与非法的二元对立的模式,而是将自由主义分析框架之中对权力分析所需要的价值基础从它的分析中剥离出去,因而将其自由主义社会本身中隐藏的微观权力用系谱学的方法揭示出来,指出的微观权力的隐匿性与生产性的特征.微观权力就隐藏在社会运作体制之中,隐藏在我们的日常生活之中,并且生产出了我们所认可的真理与知识,并且形成了规训社会.面对这样的规训社会,我们主体的本真性如何表达出来.因此随后分析了微观权力与反抗的关系,指出了福柯与司法-论述性的权力模式的代表哈贝马斯的不同,以及福柯给出的与韦伯对于现代性中个体的出路不同的分析.在对福柯的审美个体的反抗的进一步分析中指出,他的反抗模式在理论上可能存在暗含有基础性的可能性以及审美个体之间冲突的可能性,从而在理论上存在危险.同时在实践中,也对福柯提倡的大众生活的日常反抗的实践效果的可行性与个人的审美体验进行了质疑.     

Legal Paternalism and Legal Moralism: Devlin, Hart and Ten*

Abstract
H. L. A. Hart in his Law, Liberty, and Morality (1963) defended the view that legal paternalism and legal moralism can be clearly distinguished from each other. Hart also stated that while legal moralism is always unacceptable, paternalistic laws are often justifiable. In this paper it is argued that Hart held the right view for the wrong reasons. Hart defended legal paternalism by claiming, against J. S. Mill, that for various psychological reasons individuals do not know their own interests best. It will be shown in the paper that if this view is taken, it is impossible to reject legal moralism. The fact that paternalism is sometimes justifiable while moralism is not can be more firmly founded on a distinction made by C. L. Ten (1971). Ten's point is that in matters which concern only the individuals themselves, their actions cannot be legitimately restricted by appeals to the consequences of their action alone. Paternalistic control can be justified only if the decision-making abilities of the controlled individual are temporarily diminished.     

Producing race disparities: A study of drug arrests across place and race*

In studies of race disparities in policing, scholars generally employ quantitative methodologies with the goal of determining whether race disparities exist or, in fewer instances, of ruling out correlates. Yet, lacking from theoretical and empirical efforts is an elucidation of how and why on‐the‐ground policing produces race disparities that are justified in legal, race‐neutral terms. To address this knowledge gap, I analyze officers’ self‐reported accounts of their enforcement activities, justifications, and decision‐making in a representative sample of 300 official reports of drug arrests made in St. Louis from 2009 to 2013. These accounts are analyzed across neighborhood racial contexts and arrestee race, revealing important differences that help illuminate the race disparity problem. Unlike drug arrests in White neighborhoods or of White citizens that primarily stem from reactive policing, drug arrests in Black and racially mixed neighborhoods and of Black citizens result from officers’ greater use of discretionary stops based on neighborhood conditions, suspicion of ambiguous demeanor, or minor infractions. During such stops, officers’ discovery of drug possession often results from discretionary Terry frisks or searches incident to arrests for outstanding bench warrants. These findings fill important theoretical and empirical gaps and have implications for reforms toward racially just policing.     

法律论证理论述评

法律论证理论要解决的核心问题是：如何使人确信某一法律评价或法律决策是正确的？解决这一问题的进路主要有三条：逻辑分析的进路,修辞学的进路和对话（论辩）的进路。通过从问题意识角度梳理这三条路径迄今为止的发展史,可以说：第一,他们都没能解决法律论证理论的核心问题。第二,其原因是：他们都回避了对这样的问题的解决：一个正确的法律评价或决策的实质标准是什么？如何证立？第三,德性伦理学是可能解决法律论证理论问题的新路径。     

法律推理中的法律理由和正当理由

法律推理具有逻辑方法和审判制度的双重属性,它的发展经历了一个从前者向后者的演进过程。法律推理是一个综合运用法律理由和正当理由的法庭决策过程。法律解释作为该过程的一个环节,是以正当理由阐释法律理由而获得法律推理大前提的手段。