Spatial and Temporal Patterns of Terrorist Attacks by ETA 1970 to 2007

Rational choice perspectives maintain that seemingly irrational behavior on the part of terrorist organizations may nevertheless reflect strategic planning. In this paper we examine spatial and temporal patterns of terrorist attacks by the Spanish group ETA between 1970 and 2007. Our analysis is guided by a public announcement by ETA in 1978 that the group would shift from emphasizing attacks in the Basque territory to instead launch attacks more widely in the hopes of exhausting the Spanish government and forcing it to abandon the Basque territory. This announcement suggests that prior to the end of 1978 ETA attacks were based mostly on controlling territory in the Basque region that they hoped to rule; and after 1978 the organization decided to instead undertake a prolonged war of attrition. Accordingly, we argue that before the end of 1978 ETA was mostly perpetrating control attacks (attacking only within the Basque territories) and that the diffusion of attacks between provinces was mostly contagious (spreading contiguously). After the 1978 proclamation, we argue that the attack strategy shifted toward attrition (attacking in areas outside of the Basque territories) and that the attacks were more likely to diffuse hierarchically (spreading to more distant locations). As predicted, we find that after ETA moved toward a more attrition based attack strategy, subsequent attacks were significantly more likely to occur outside the Basque region and to target non-adjacent regions (consistent with hierarchical diffusion). We also find that hierarchical diffusion was more common when a longer time elapsed between attacks (a likely consequence of the fact that more distant attacks require more resources and planning) and that attacks against Madrid were unlikely to be followed immediately by more attacks on Madrid or surrounding provinces. After ETA announced a shift in policy, they maintained a highly dispersed attack strategy even during their period of decline. Using information about where and when prior attacks occurred could provide useful information for policy makers countering groups like ETA.     

Microcycles of Violence: Evidence from Terrorist Attacks by ETA and the FMLN

Recent research has demonstrated that individual crimes elevate the risk for subsequent crimes nearby, a phenomenon termed “near-repeats.” Yet these assessments only reveal global patterns of event interdependence, ignoring the possibility that individual events may be part of localized bursts of activity, or microcycles. In this study, we propose a method for identifying and analyzing criminal microcycles; groups of events that are proximate to each other in both space and time. We use the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to analyze over 4,000 terrorist attacks attributed to the FMLN in El Salvador and the ETA in Spain; two terrorist organizations that were both extremely active and violent but differed greatly in terms of history, grievances and motives. Based on the definition developed, we find strong support for the conclusion that many of the terrorist attacks attributed to these two distinctive groups were part of violent microcycles and that the spatio-temporal attack patterns of these two groups exhibit substantial similarities. Our logistic regression analysis shows that for both ETA and the FMLN, compared to other tactics used by terrorists, bombings and non-lethal attacks are more likely to be part of microcycles and that compared to attacks which occur elsewhere, attacks aimed at national or provincial capitals or areas of specific strategic interest to the terrorist organization are more likely to be part of microcycles. Finally, for the FMLN only, compared to other attacks, those on military and government targets were more likely part of microcycles. We argue that these methods could be useful more generally for understanding the situational and temporal distribution of crime.     

The Impact of the Terrorist Attacks of 9/11 on Anti-Islamic Hate Crime

Abstract

Using existing data from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, time series analyses were conducted on hate crime data from 2001 around the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. A statistically significant increase in anti-Islamic hate crime occurred after 9/11, and anti-Islamic hate crime leveled off within 8 weeks of the occurrence. News stories reporting anti-Islamic hate crimes, stories reporting fear of such bias crime, and public calls for calm, tolerance, and/or reaction to anti-Islamic bias crime followed a similar pattern found within the official data. A city-by-city analysis found that UCR reported anti-Islamic hate crime was essentially non-existent in New York City and Washington, DC. It is suggested that public calls for calm and tolerance and in-group/out-group dynamics may have impacted anti-Islamic hate crime frequency, thus accounting for rises and reductions in this form of bias crime over time.     

Microcycles of Terrorist Violence in Turkey: a Spatio-temporal Analysis of the PKK Attacks

Asian Journal of Criminology - Geography and time are the two constraints on illegal acts. The extant research on terrorism suggests that terrorists make an expected cost-benefit analysis, and thus...     

Fractured Lives,Splintered Knowledge: Making Criminological Sense of the January, 2015 Terrorist Attacks in Paris

Cottee (Br J Criminol 54(6):981–1001, 2014) makes the case that criminology has much to contribute to an understanding of theistic violence. However the ‘hubris of positivism’ (Young in The criminological imagination, Polity, Cambridge, 2011) curtails the criminological imagination and this is particularly evident in the debates that permeate contemporary understandings of religious extremism and radicalisation. Using the terrorist attacks in France 2015 as a touchstone, this paper explores the current state of criminological engagement with these issues. First a synopsis of orthodox current criminological talk about religious extremism and violent crime is considered. Next a critical analysis of the events in Paris based around what is ‘known’ about them is offered in the light of this knowledge. Finally, drawing on the work of Young (2011) the implications of this analysis for criminology are considered resulting in a refinement of the biases identified by Cottee (2014).     

A Test of Competing Hypotheses about Homicide Following Terrorist Attacks: An Interrupted Time Series Analysis of September 11 and Oklahoma City

There is substantial evidence that catastrophic events, including terrorist attacks, lead to increased levels of post-traumatic stress, especially in communities in close proximity to the incident. Some scholars also argue that these events disrupt social organization. On the other hand, many contend that these incidents produce social cohesion as community members coalesce to help each other in time of need. These ideas have resulted in competing hypotheses in the literature. The first is that violence will increase in the wake of catastrophic events due to heightened levels of individual stress and community disorganization. The second is that violence will decline after these events because of increased social cohesion, especially in the face of an outside threat. In order to test these competing hypotheses, we employed autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) techniques to model the impact of the Oklahoma City bombing and the September 11 attacks on monthly homicide counts at the local, state, and national level. Unlike prior studies that provided evidence of an effect but did not use rigorous time-series techniques, we found no support for either of the competing hypotheses. We conclude that while such catastrophic events may have an effect on individual and collective efficacy well beyond the immediate impact of the incidents, these effects are not strong enough to influence homicide rates. An erratum to this article can be found at     

论恐怖组织及其侦查防范

当今世界,恐怖活动越来越频繁,严重威胁着人们生命财产安全和国家安全。我国“东突”恐怖分子在国际恐怖组织的影响下也日渐嚣张。因此,侦查部门必须采取各种手段,侦查和防范恐怖犯罪活动。     

恐怖主义犯罪的界定

恐怖主义犯罪的界定应当立足于犯罪学的角度 ,而不应限于刑法学或者政治学的范围 ;恐怖主义犯罪的目的具有层次性和多样性的特征 ,而不应锁定为纯粹的政治性目的 ;恐怖主义犯罪是有组织犯罪的一种表现形式 ,个人不能成为恐怖主义犯罪的主体 ;恐怖主义犯罪的手段不限于传统的暴力范围 ,而是日益呈现出高科技化的发展趋势 ;恐怖主义犯罪的袭击目标是特定的 ,但受害对象却具有广泛和不确定的特征。恐怖主义犯罪与恐怖犯罪、政治犯罪与黑社会性质犯罪等相近概念之间的界限有必要加以明确。     

俄罗斯恐怖主义犯罪问题研究综述

近年来,俄罗斯恐怖主义犯罪问题的研究逐渐受到国内外学者的关注。我国学者对此问题的研究起步较晚,成果多集中在恐怖主义的根源、应对措施和相关立法等方面。俄罗斯的相关研究成果比较丰硕,为我们从多学科、多角度研究俄罗斯恐怖主义犯罪问题提供了可资借鉴的参考。     

恐怖组织认定模式之研究

当前,我国对恐怖组织事实上采取了司法认定和行政认定并存的模式,这种模式缺乏明确的法律依据与分工。在世界范围内,各国对恐怖组织的认定主要存在司法认定和行政认定两种模式,而我国刑法中除恐怖组织以外其他组织也存在司法认定和行政认定两种模式。从实际情况、人员配备,以及认定后果来看,我国应对恐怖组织采取行政认定模式,以达成刑法与反恐怖法的衔接。     

Patterns of Onset and Decline Among Terrorist Organizations

Despite considerable speculation among terrorism researchers regarding the conditions leading to organizational desistance from terrorism, quantitative analysis of terrorism frequently focuses on terrorist attacks as the unit of analysis, resulting in a near complete absence of analyses of terrorist organizations themselves. Moreover, research on organizations that engage in terrorism has generally been limited to case studies of individual organizations. Toward a more general understanding of what conditions predict organizational desistance from terrorism, this study uses newly available data from the Global Terrorism Database to analyze the terrorist activity of 557 organizations that were active for at least 365 days between 1970 and 2008. Much like research on conventional crime, prior research on terrorism has focused almost exclusively on the onset of criminal behavior and has neglected determinants of declining activity. Here I use group-based trajectory models to investigate patterns of decline in organization-level terrorist activity. In particular I examine how patterns of onset relate to patterns of decline among these organizations. I first estimate the trajectory models for the organizations’ frequency of attacks, and then calculate the annual ratio of attacks to attacks-at-peak for each organization in order to isolate patterns of decline, independent of the magnitude of activity. I then repeat the trajectory analysis to determine if the relative shape of the organizational trajectory has significance beyond the overall frequency of attacks. I find that the speed and magnitude of an organization’s emergence are correlated with its longevity such that those organizations characterized by rapid onset are two to three times more likely than those characterized by moderate onset to reach moderate or high levels of attacks per year. Likewise, as the rate and overall volume of attacks at onset increase, so does the likelihood that the group will follow a persistent pattern of decline. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of patterns of decline among terrorist organizations for research and policy.     

Commodities and Terrorist Financing: Focus on Diamonds

Commodities, trade, and natural resources have long been part of the political economy of conflict, as soldiers and militants usually employ accessible means and methods to raise funds unless there is a clash with honestly held religious or ideological positions. Reports about the role of commodities in the financing of terrorist groups cover many areas of legal and illicit trade, foremost among these diamonds. A brief background to the diamond industry, with particular attention to vulnerabilities and their exploitation in conflict areas, provides the necessary context for two case studies about al-Qaeda (AQ) and Hezbollah. These utilize primary and secondary data to explore the linkages between diamonds and these particular groups. We found conflicting and weak evidence as well as vague language to describe interfaces between terrorist groups and the diamonds trade. We conclude that while there is cause for concern that this industry can be used to support terrorist activity, deeper factual grounding, meaningful context, and a more nuanced understanding of the diamond industry are necessary to fully inform policy makers and law enforcement about the connections between terrorist finance and the commodities trade.Research on which this paper is based was sponsored by a National Institute of Justice (NIJ) grant for a study of "Terrorist Finance and the Nexus with Transnational Organized Crime: Commodities Trade and the Social Organization of al Qaeda Groups," grant no. 2003-DT-CX-0001. We would like to thank Christian Dietrich and an anonymous peer reviewer for their very constructive comments.     

How to Make a Terrorist Out of Nothing

R v G concerns the controversial offence of collecting or recording information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism. We comment on a number of deficiencies in that judgment and investigate the proper approach that ought to be taken to that offence under the Human Rights Act 1998.     

国际恐怖主义犯罪及其刑事处置

恐怖主义是当今国际社会普遍关注的焦点问题之一,对恐怖主义犯罪的惩治也愈加成为当今世界及各国关注的热点。如何有效地惩治恐怖主义犯罪既是国际社会和各国需要迫切解决的课题,也是目前学术界研究的热点话题。     

Terrorist victimization: A case study from India

The focus of terrorist victimization is largely upon the people hurt by terrorist groups or by state agencies acting in retaliation. However, victimization also comes from the policies and actions of the state that gives rise to the terrorism in the first place. This paper examines the nature of terrorist victimization in India. It focuses upon left‐wing terrorism in the state of Bihar and describes the anarchic situation prevailing there. The paper argues that victimization is coming both from the brutalities of the terrorist squads as well as the illegal actions of the police agencies. However, underlying these terrorist actions are government policies that have failed to address the democratic concerns of the citizens and which are unable to develop the economy. The paper also argues that it is necessary to ensure that state agencies do not go beyond the purview of legal boundaries. Only a state, dealing fairly, ensuring a rule of law and concerned about the victimization of all kinds can bring about the desired recovery of the people who alone suffer grievously.     

恐怖主义犯罪与国际协作机制之建立

文章提倡“核心恐怖主义”的观点,提出恐怖活动的定义包含下列因要素:其一,对平民基本权利的严重暴力袭击;其二,散布恐慌的特殊意图;其三,有一个有能力实行一系列此类暴力行为的犯罪组织.《国际刑事法院规约》对核心恐怖主义概念的阐释将对各国产生重大示范效应,从而减少不同的应对方式,甚至减责条件间的分歧.另一更具创新性、更先进的处理方式是在《国际刑事法院规约》的修正案中明确规定核心恐怖主义的条款,从而将其适用范围扩展至危害人类罪的定义之外的恐怖行为.