Individualism,contractarianism, and morality

This study develops the ethical implications to ascribing to both individualism and contractarianism as ethical postulates. We define moral individualism as defining the morality of all normative judgments concerning human action in reference to the extent that these actions allow individuals to achieve their interests. Contractarianism defines right and wrong in terms of the conduct proscribed in voluntarily joined contracts. This individualistic-contractarian ethics is inherently relativistic. Right and wrong are defined only with respect to the actions of the set of individuals joined in contract. Yet, it is argued that the individualist-contractarian morality can be defended because it provides both clear definitions of right and wrong and provides individuals with arguments and incentives to do that which is right.     

Strain,Crime, and Contingencies

Hypotheses from General Strain theory are addressed using data from a random sample of adults in Raleigh, NC. Analyses examine three issues: (1) whether strain predicts self‐projected criminal behavior; controlling for past self‐reported crime; (2) whether negative emotions mediate the relationship between strain and projected crime; and (3) whether social support and criminal peers serve as contingencies or mediators for strain in predicting criminality. Results are generally consistent with previous studies focusing on youth. Three of four measures of strain are found to predict the crime measures. However, that relationship is not mediated by negative emotion and the measures of social support and criminal peers do not act as contingencies or mediators. The results suggest that strain may not operate through negative emotions and that theoretical refinement is needed to identify which potential contingencies are likely to be operating under various circumstances.     

Rape,burglary, and opportunity

Following on the recent development of opportunity theory in criminology, we apply an opportunity approach to rape. Although rape is commonly viewed as a street crime, a substantial proportion of rape occurs inside homes following an unlawful entry of the residence. Drawing on this observation, we argue that rape and burglary, because they share a common locus in the home, should exhibit similar opportunity structures. That is, characteristics that place particular types of homes and householders at greater risk of burglary should also place (female) residents at greater risk of rape. An analysis of UCR rates and censusderived opportunity variables for 155 SMSAs in 1980 supports this position. We conclude that home-intrusion rape (rape following an unlawful entry of the home) is a violent crime with the opportunity structure of a property crime.     

Property Rights, Theft, Amnesty, and Efficiency

In this paper we show that costs associated with infractions of property rights, such as theft, can be reduced by imposing lower penalties on individuals who admit to such infractions and make restitution. We find that the socially optimal penalty on a confessed thief may be zero (complete amnesty) or even negative—a person may be given a reward for confessing a theft. This is because a thief's valuation of a good is generally lower that its valuation by its legal owner, and an amnesty permits the trade that such a difference in valuation makes calls for. It is interesting to note that the benefits of amnesties were apparently recognized in ancient times and they constitute part of Biblical Law. Moreover, such amnesties have also been informally incorporated into modern legal systems, wherein leniency (a form of partial amnesty) is generally shown to individuals who confess their infractions.     

On Theory, Models, Model-Testing, and Estimation

I reply to comments and criticisms of my article raised in this Special Issue by Cantor and Land, Britt, O'Brien, Levitt, and Paternoster and Bushway.     

Nation-states,Market-states,and Virtual-states

The advent of a global economic and physical superinfrastructure is in the process of transforming terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and the nation-state. A useful model for understanding this process of transformation is Philip Bobbitt's work, “The Shield of Achilles.” Bobbitt's work demonstrates that the nation-state is in a difficult and dangerous process of transition to a new form of governance, called the market-state, that is built to withstand and prosper despite the pressures of globalization. This process is complicated by the emergence of a vicious asymmetric competitor, in the form of a virtual state that leverages the huge flows of the global criminal economy, combined with the weakness of the nation-state during its phase transition to the market-state. This essay details the structure of this conflict and provides a scenario for its potential outcome.     

Religion,Conversion, and Rehabilitation

Rehabilitation and conversion within the penal context are deeply ambiguous concepts. This ambiguity stems in part from the fact that little consensus has been reached among scholars as to the meaning of the terms beyond their ability to foster adjustment to institutional rules and obedience to law. This paper argues that each concept receives greater clarity and practical significance when understood in terms of moral transformation. The article will utilize the methodological framework of social scientific studies to underscore a contention, most commonly found in theological literature that conversion, and a fortiori rehabilitation, signal a shift from a divided to a unified consciousness based upon the experience of unconditional acceptance and, ultimately, its bestowal upon others and upon all forms of life.     

Emotions,reason, and character

Utilizing a contractualist framework for understanding the basis and limits for the use of force by police, this article offers five limiting principles—respect for status as moral agents, proportionality, minimum force necessary, ends likely to be accomplished, and appropriate motivation—and then discusses uses of force that violate or risk violating those principles. These include, but are not limited to, unseemly invasions, strip searches, perp walks, handcuffing practices, post-chase apprehensions, contempt-of-cop arrests, overuse of intermediate force measures, coerced confessions, profiling, stop and frisk practices, and the administration of street justice.     

Civics,Policy, and Demoralization

Civics can be distinguished from policy. Civics concerns basic principles and institutions of political and legal order. Policy concerns specific ways in which particular ends are pursued by the state. Different conceptions of civics involve different views of criminal sanction, its justification, and its aims. The discussion highlights some of the main contrasts between different conceptions of criminal justice and the relation of criminal justice to a more comprehensive conception of justice. However, current carceral practice (in the U.S. and also the U.K.) has several morally objectionable features that impede and erode prisoners’ capacities for participating successfully in civil society. In addition, former prisoners face obstacles that, in effect, continue their punishment after completion of sentence. Those are respects in which current practices cause demoralization. The morally objectionable features of demoralization merit being addressed regardless of the state of the debate between rival conceptions of civics and the relationship of criminal justice to justice more comprehensively understood.     

Restitution, Rectification, and Mitigation: Negligent Solicitors and Wills, Again

A solicitor, when drafting a will, can owe a duty of care in tort to the intended beneficiary of a bequest under that will. The Court of Appeal has recently confirmed that where a solicitor has misdrafted the will, the intended beneficiary can sometimes rectify it, and recover the intended gift. The pattern of this rectification is restitutionary, raising the question analysed in this article of whether an intended beneficiary can have a direct personal action in restitution to reverse the unjust enrichment of an unintended recipient. It seems that, though fraught, such an action may indeed in principle lie.     

Risk,Precaution, Responsibility,and Equal Concern

Systemic risks are risks produced through interconnected non‐wrongful actions of individuals, in the sense that an individual's action is a negligible cause of the risk. Due to scale effects of interaction, their consequences can be serious but they are also difficult to predict and assess via a risk assessment. Since we can have good reason to engage in the interconnected activities giving rise to systemic risk, we incur a concurrent collective responsibility to ensure that the risks are fairly distributed and well regulated. James argues that fairness in this context requires taking reasonably available precautions ensuring for each risk‐bearer a favourable ratio of expected benefits over expected losses. In sections 2 and 3 we argue that such a conception of fairness applies but only on the condition that the systemic risks created are irreversible risks and that the general background conditions of justice are imperfectly fair. When risks are reversible, compensatory justice can correct for unfairness in risk imposition. Where risks are irreversible, compensatory justice necessarily fails, giving rise to a collective responsibility to regulate fairly ex ante. Additionally, where background conditions of justice are fully fair and the systemic risk is well understood, risk bearers can be said to have consented to the systemic risk. If they are not fair, we argue that the primary political obligation should lie in fixing the fairness of the backgrounds of justice. A related reason for addressing the general background conditions of fairness is that James’ account of fairness in systemic risk imposition encounters a baseline problem. If expected risks and benefits are calculated again an unfair historic background condition, systemic risk imposition would not be fully fair. Section 4 shows why differences in evidentiary uncertainty as to probability and levels of harm and effective responses require a normatively appropriate response in the form of additional precautions. We show that the evidentiary standards set for risk‐based cost‐benefit analysis have a connection with deontology because they express a postulate of equal treatment in formal terms. Systemic risks can have different possible degrees of epistemological certainty due to factors of social and natural origin, such as more available research funding or higher degrees of complexity for some systemic risks but not others. These differences have to be mitigated by taking even greater precautions in difficult‐to‐research systemic risks.     

Religious and Spiritual Support,Reentry, and Risk

Systems and agencies intent on pursuing an evidence-based approach to correctional interventions have widely adopted the risk principle. For a variety of reasons, many studies have found that giving treatment to low risk people has little impact on reducing recidivism and can even increase recidivism. Because of the risk principle, many prison and community correctional systems now target their treatment resources to medium and high risk. This study tests whether the effects of religious/spiritual support on reentry success generalize across offenders as a function of risk. Results from random effects count models suggest that religious and spiritual support does have a strong and robust effect on the likelihood of ex-offenders desisting from substance abuse. Findings also reveal that the risk principle was not supported; religious and social support was associated with significantly lower levels of substance abuse among low risk offenders, but not among higher-risk offenders. On the other hand, religious and spiritual support did not significantly relate to criminal offending at any risk level. Implications for religious programming and services, as well as the study of religion and reentry, are discussed.     

Autonomy, justice, and disability

In this Article, Professor Carlos A. Ball explores the philosophical foundations for the types of rights and benefits that our society currently provides to individuals with disabilities. The concept of autonomy places on society a moral obligation to assist individuals with disabilities when their basic human functional capabilities are impaired. The exercise of this obligation entails assisting individuals with crossing a minimum threshold of functional capabilities below which it is not possible to lead autonomous lives. In making this argument, Professor Ball responds to libertarian critics who contend that notions of freedom or liberty proscribe an activist role for government in this arena. He explains how even a libertarian state redistributes wealth in order to provide for some incapacities. Professor Ball also disputes the idea that the meeting of the needs of the disabled is enough to provide moral justification for the rights and benefits provided to individuals with disabilities. The problem with the concept of needs, Professor Ball argues, is that it fails to account sufficiently for the human good of personal autonomy.