Seeking Shelter in Personal Insolvency Law: Recession,Eviction, and Bankruptcy's Social Safety Net

Many legal systems understand consumer insolvency laws as social insurance, providing relief and a ‘fresh start’ to over‐indebted households who fall through gaps in the social safety net. Personal insolvency law in England and Wales in practice functions similarly, but in terms of legal principle and policy is ambivalent – sometimes emphasizing household debt relief, other times creditor wealth maximization. This article assesses, in the context of novel debt problems brought to prominence by recession and austerity, the extent to which the law has embraced personal insolvency's social insurance function. The discussion is framed particularly by the escalating United Kingdom housing crisis and the case of Places for People v. Sharples concerning consumer bankruptcy's (non)protection of debtors from eviction. The analysis illustrates how tensions between conceptual understandings and personal insolvency law's practical operation undermine the law's ability to fulfil its potential to produce positive policy responses to contemporary socio‐economic challenges.     

The Evolutionary Game‐Theoretic Foundations of Law

Interdisciplinary work in the law often starts and stops with the social sciences. To produce a complete understanding of how law, evolutionary game‐theoretic insights must, however, supplement these more standard social scientific methods. To illustrate, this article critically examines The Force of Law by Frederick Schauer and The Expressive Powers of Law by Richard McAdams. Combining the methods of analytic jurisprudence and social psychology, Schauer clarifies the need for a philosophically respectable and empirically well‐grounded account of the ubiquity of legal sanctions. Drawing primarily on economic and social psychological paradigms, McAdams highlights law's potential to alter human behavior through expressions that coordinate. Still, these contributions generate further puzzles about how law works, which can be addressed using evolutionary game‐theoretic resources. Drawing on these resources, this article argues that legal sanctions are ubiquitous to law not only because they can motivate legal compliance, as Schauer suggests, but also because they provide the general evolutionary stability conditions for intrinsic legal motivation. In reaction to McAdams, this article argues that law's expressive powers can function to coordinate human behavior only because humans are naturally and culturally evolved to share a prior background agreement in forms of life. Evolutionary game‐theoretic resources can thus be used to develop a unified framework from within which to understand some of the complex interrelationships between legal sanctions, intrinsic legal motivation, and law's coordinating power. Going forward, interdisciplinary studies of how law works should include greater syntheses of contemporary insights from evolutionary game theory.     

Work Rules: How International NGOs Build Law in War‐Torn Societies

Drawing on socio‐legal literature and fieldwork in South Sudan, this article argues that international aid groups operating in conflict settings create and impose a rules‐based order on the local people they hire and on the domestic organizations they fund. Civil society actors in these places experience law's soft power through their daily, tangible, and mundane contact with aid agencies. As employees they are subject to contracts and other rules of employment, work under management and finance teams, document routine activity, and abide by organizational constitutions. In analyzing how South Sudanese activists confront, understand, conform to, or resist these externally imposed legal techniques and workplace practices, this article decenters state institutions as sites for understanding law's power and exposes how aid organizations themselves become arenas of significant legal and political struggle in war‐torn societies.     

Jurisdiction,Crime, and Development: The Impact of Public Law 280 in Indian Country

Public Law 280 transferred jurisdiction over criminal and civil matters from the federal to state governments and increased the extent of nontribal law enforcement in selected parts of Indian country. Where enacted, the law fundamentally altered the preexisting legal order. Public Law 280 thus provides a unique opportunity to study the impact of legal institutions and their change on socioeconomic outcomes. The law's controversial content has attracted interest from legal scholars. However, empirical studies of its impact are scarce and do not address the law's endogenous nature. We examine the law's impact on crime and on economic development in U.S. counties with significant American‐Indian reservation population. To address the issue of selection of areas subject to Public Law 280, our empirical strategy draws on the law's politico‐historical context. We find that the application of Public Law 280 increased crime and lowered incomes. The law's adverse impact is robust and noteworthy in magnitude.     

Politics by Other Means in South Africa Today

Rick Abel's classic Politics by Other Means (1995) used South Africa to argue for law's ‘potential nobility’, but it did so avoiding a heroic mode characteristic of much anti-apartheid writing. Abel showed how law could, with strenuous exertion, be turned into a defensive shield for the oppressed. As a sword, however, it was ‘two-edged’. It allowed the powerful to frustrate or overturn hard-won symbolic victories. Recently, the heroic mode has returned to South Africa. The Constitutional Court, in particular, is lauded for having combated ‘state capture’ under deposed President Jacob Zuma. A closer examination of this period, however, does much to vindicate Abel's earlier scepticism about law's offensive value. The spectacular deployment of law to fight politicians’ crimes has exposed the judiciary to unexpected political threats. Meanwhile, civil society's efforts to entrust judges with administrative duties shirked by the government has inevitably entailed the sacrifice of some rule of law values.     

How to Make Bad Law: Lessons from Cyberspace

There is a clear trend for law and regulation, particularly in cyberspace, to become increasingly precisely specified. The perceived benefit of this approach, increased certainty as to compliance, may be illusory. Over‐complex laws have serious disadvantages, particularly a greatly weakened normative effect, and problems of contradiction and too‐frequent amendment. The combined effect of these disadvantages can be to produce a ‘bad’ law system, assessed in terms of Fuller's internal morality of law. It may also result in a law‐system which substantially fails to achieve its intended aims. This article proposes that these defects can be cured by abandoning the search for precision and substituting a method of lawmaking which requires the law's subjects to make their own qualitative assessments of whether they are meeting the obligations imposed on them. This will make the law more easily understandable by those to whom it applies, and will also increase the normative effect of cyberspace law.     

Symbol and Substance: Effects of California's Three Strikes Law on Felony Sentencing

California's “three strikes and you're out” law is the most notorious example of the wave of mandatory sentencing policies that many states enacted beginning in the late 1970s. While advocates and critics predicted the law would have profound effects on aggregate punishment trends and individual case outcomes, Feeley and Kamin's analysis of previous sentencing reforms suggested the law's impact would be mainly symbolic because local officials would ignore, subvert, or nullify its major provisions. While aggregate analyses have tended to confirm this argument, so far there has been no systematic test of the law's effect on individual cases. This analysis uses multilevel models applied to case‐level data from 12 urban California counties to test hypotheses about shifts in average punitiveness, the relative influence of legal and extralegal factors on sentencing, and the uncertainty of sentencing outcomes. Results mostly support Feeley and Kamin's symbolic interpretation, but also reveal important substantive impacts: since Three Strikes, sentences have become harsher, particularly in politically conservative counties, and black felons receive longer prison sentences.     

Mos Geometricus and the Common Law Mind: Interrogating Contract Theory

Euclidian theories have it that there exist one or a small number of apex principles from which the entire fasciculus of rules of contract law can be logically deduced. Two arguments are marshalled against the Euclidian project. First, that it has been unsuccessfully attempted before – in the form of the nineteenth century contract law treatise which emulated the civil lawyer's rationalistic model, mos geometricus – cautioning us against setting much store by its present reincarnation. Second, that the common law's methodology makes it resistant to this form of theorising. Euclidian theory presupposes a picture of rules on which: a) cases involve an application of logically prior rules; b) rules are reliably identifiable by different actors in the legal system; and c) rules normatively range over an indefinite spectrum of future cases. It will be argued that the common law defies this picture of rules thus rendering Euclidian theory analytically impossible.     

Time in Law's Domain

Law bends the past of a community's common life towards its future. 1 Precedent is one of law's favored tools for doing the bending, and legal systems that assign precedent a starring role seem especially mindful of time. Yet, mindfulness of time goes far deeper into law's DNA. It is not limited to the doctrine of precedent or unique to common‐law jurisdictions. Recognizing that time is an elemental dimension of human experience and basic ordering principle of practical agency, law utilizes and orders time. Temporality is essential to law's distinctive mode of governance and guidance.     

The Negotiability of Promissory Notes and Bills of Exchange in the Time of Chief Justice Holt

This paper explores the development of bills of exchange and promissory notes in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It will be argued that the early law of negotiability was founded on a principled interpretation of the common law and that parliament's eventual rejection of this law resulted in a half-century of confusion. This time period, however, was fundamental in the development of the modern principle of negotiability as the courts struggled to create a workable framework for the transfer of written instruments. This paper examines the early conceptual difficulty of transferring written instruments and studies why bills of exchange were capable of transfer, despite the common law's bar on the assignment of choses in action, whereas promissory notes were not considered transferable at common law prior to the eighteenth century. The most important figure for the development of this area was Chief Justice Holt, whose legal interpretation of the transferability of bills of exchange was based on clearly defined and long-standing principles of common law. This interpretation of the common law was viewed as a hindrance to trade, and in response to Holt CJ's decisions, parliament passed the Statute of Anne 1704, allowing promissory notes to be transferable in the same manner as bills of exchange. This began to collapse the distinction between bills of exchange and promissory notes, which created numerous conceptual difficulties in the law of negotiable instruments. It was not until the case of Grant v Vaughan, heard in 1764, that the courts fully developed a new framework for the negotiability of written instruments. This early law displays the difficulty that courts had in developing the underlying principles of the assignment of written instruments, and deciphering its development is fundamental in understanding the modern principle of negotiability.     

Law's Strange Allure: The Power of Legal Lore beyond the Law-Politics Divide

American political culture is both seduced and repulsed by legal power, and this essay reviews Gordon Silverstein's contribution to understanding the causes and consequences of “law's allure.” Using interbranch analysis, Silverstein argues that law is dangerously alluring as a political shortcut, but ultimately he concludes that law offers no exit from “normal politics” and the hard work of “changing minds.” This essay suggests that Silverstein's framework—his dyadic focus on courts and Congress, constructive and deconstructive patterns, legal formality and normal politics—strips law from its animating context of interests, inequality, and ideology. Without consideration of these larger forces of power, Silverstein's framework misplaces law's ability to “change minds” in perverse and unexpected ways.     

Victorious Transsexuals in the Courtroom: A Challenge for Feminist Legal Theory

Transsexual and transgendered people, despite their exclusion from most civil rights laws, nonetheless occasionally prevail as plaintiffs in litigation. What should feminist legal theorists make of these victories? The theory one uses to win has implications for future conceptions of gender and sexuality in the law as well as for understanding contemporary conflicts and alliances among sex and gender theorists, lawyers, and activists. Conflicting theories of how to ground law's liberation claims abound, however. Evidence suggests that transsexuals secure legal victories only through a disheartening process of medicalization, normalization, and demonstration of traditional sex and gender role adherence. Recent cases, however, reveal some interesting destabilizations in law's account of the transsexual, and they provide critical legal scholars with a new perspective on rights‐claiming as a liberation strategy. Attention to the diversity of transsexual and transgendered priorities as well as to the properties of the legal process shows feminist legal theorists how to navigate the problems of identity construction and legal protection raised here sympathetically but unromantically.     

Legal Capacity at a Crossroad: Mental Disability and Family Law

In this introductory essay to the Special Issue, I argue that both family law and disability rights law scholars should examine a key point of intersection across areas: legal capacity or the law's recognition of the rights and responsibilities of an individual. For example, parental termination proceedings center on parental fitness and functional capabilities. I contextualize the articles in the Special Issue by Leslie Francis and Robyn Powell on the role of reasonable accommodations for parents with disabilities in parental termination proceedings. In addition, I call upon legal scholars, family law courts, and practitioners to reimagine governing legal standards in family law according to principles of universal design to shift the baseline capabilities associated with parenting and parental fitness.     

Between the Law: The Unmaking of Empire and Law's Imperial Amnesia

Asian victims of Japanese imperialism have filed lawsuits against the Japanese government and corporations since the 1990s, which became prime sites for redress decades after Japan's defeat in World War II. As this ethnography demonstrates, this process paradoxically exposes a legal lacuna within this emergent transnational legal space, with plaintiffs effectively caught between the law, instead of standing before the law. Exploring this absence of law, I map out a post‐imperial legal space, created through the erasure of imperial and colonial subjects in the legal framework after empire. Between the law is an optic that makes visible uneven legal terrains that embody temporal and spatial disjuncture, rupture, and asymmetry. The role of law in post‐imperial transitions remains underexplored in literatures on transnational law, legal imperialism, postcolonialism, and transitional justice. I demonstrate how, at the intersection of law and economy, post‐imperial reckoning is emerging as a new legal frontier, putting at stake law's imperial amnesia.     

Sustaining the State: Legal Consciousness and the Construction of Legality in Competing Abortion Activists' Narratives

This article investigates how activists involved in both sides of the street politics of abortion simultaneously create, are constrained by, and use law when recounting a period of conflict that resulted in litigation. The activists‐turned‐litigants' construction of legality is explored by identifying and analyzing patterns of inclusion, absence, amendment, and type of law (i.e., state or extrastate) in and across the stories they tell. It is found that even though there are multiple reasons to expect all of these activists to resist or amend the state's conception of law, their narratives ultimately reproduce state law's legitimacy and power. The activists' stories also illustrate that legal consciousness is contextually and experientially based and is therefore subject to change. This finding has implications for legal mobilization as well as for the nature of legal consciousness.     

Employment Discrimination Law and Industrial Psychology: Social Science as Social Authority and the Co‐Production of Law and Science

This article combines Monahan and Walker's classification of social facts, social authority, and social frameworks with political‐institutionalism's view of law and science as competing institutional logics to explain how, and with what consequences, employment discrimination law and industrial‐organizational (I‐O) psychology became co‐produced. When social science is incorporated into enforcement of legislative law as social authority—rationale for judicial rule making—law's institutional logic of relying on precedent and reasoning by analogy ensures that social science will have ongoing influence on law's development. By helping set research agendas and providing new professional opportunities, institutionalized legal doctrine shapes social science knowledge. But because of differences in institutional logic, wherein legal cumulation is backward looking whereas scientific cumulation is forward looking, co‐production of law and science may produce institutional mismatch between legal doctrine and scientific knowledge.     

The Scientific and the Social in Implementing Atkins v. Virginia

Atkins v. Virginia (2002) categorically exempts intellectually disabled defendants from execution, yet some constitutionally suspect punishments suggest a gap between law and practice. This article moves beyond critiquing Atkins’ formal implementation to provide a decentered analysis of the Atkins gap focused on the category of intellectual disability. It explores how drawing boundaries around intellectual disability in capital cases requires law to grapple with fluid scientific and social constructs through a study of how courts operationalize intellectual disability in capital cases. It draws from literatures considering the construction of intellectual disability and law's relationship to the scientific and the social and finds that this intersection first enables a conceptual disconnect between scientific and legal constructions of intellectual disability and, second, invites the use of stereotypes to inform the category. These processes undermine Atkins’—and other categorical exemptions’—ability to functionally limit extreme punishments and also reveal law as mutually constitutive.     

New York's Landmark October 2003 Brownfields Legislation and Environmental Claims Exposures

New York's new 107-page brownfields law encourages the redevelopment of contaminated properties in order to increase tax revenues, revitalize communities, create jobs, protect the environment, and preserve open space. The legislation contains significant financial incentives to volunteers and municipalities to investigate, remediate, and redevelop brownfields to promote the reuse of such properties. While the law provides certain liability protection for claims by the State, it retains the “polluter pays” philosophy and contains scary re-opener provisions. This article will provide a brief overview of New York's recently enacted environmental law and explain why the legislation encourages the procurement of environmental insurance to mitigate the risks inherent with brownfield redevelopment projects.     

When Is a Regime Not a Legal System? Alexy on Moral Correctness and Social Efficacy

Robert Alexy defines law as including a claim to moral correctness and demonstrating social efficacy. This paper argues that law's social efficacy is not merely an observable fact but is undergirded by moral commitments by rulers that it is possible for their subjects to follow the rules, that the rulers and others will also follow the rules, that subjects will be protected from violence if they act in accordance with the rules, and that subjects will be entitled to legal redress if others act violently towards them otherwise than in accordance with the rules. Alexy is correct in his conclusion that a system of norms that is not by and large socially efficacious is not a valid legal system, but wrong insofar as he follows legal positivism in distinguishing this aspect of law's validity from law's claim to moral correctness.     

Who are Law's Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects

What is it to be a legal person? A review of the jurisprudence of persons reveals considerable confusion about this central legal question, as well as deep intellectual divisions. To certain jurists, law's person should and does approximate a metaphysical person. Depending on the metaphysics of the jurist, the legal person is thus variously defined by his uniquely human nature, by his possession of a soul, or by his capacity for reason, and therefore his moral and legal responsibility. To other jurists, law's person is not a metaphysical person but rather a pure legal abstraction; he is no more than a formal, abstract, but nonetheless highly convenient device of law. This paper endeavours to bring some order and clarity to these scholarly debates about the nature of legal personality. It also considers their implications for feminist legal theorists, with their enduring interest in the character of law's subject.