DEVOLUTION,GOVERNANCE AND THE PEACE PROCESS

Devolution and the associated mechanisms of governance—a power-sharing Executive, elected assembly, cross-border bodies, a reformed system of public administration and civic engagement —are a part of the wider mosaic of peace-building. Their implementation is an attempt to institutionalize stability and copper-fasten a political settlement. This article outlines the changing governmental arrangements existing within Northern Ireland, as it has shifted tentatively away from direct rule. It maps the wider public sector in Northern Ireland, including civil administration (chiefly the Northern Ireland Civil Service), an extended mosaic of nondepartmental public bodies (NDPBs) and other public agencies that, together with local government, form a complex, multi-layered, subregional governance. Our contention is that the manner in which the administration of Northern Ireland has been conducted yields fruitful insights into issues of territorial management in other areas afflicted by intractable constitutional wrangles and attendant violence. In short, an agreed system of governance is integral to the transition from conflict to peace (or at least stability) and, in the case of Northern Ireland, was central to the substance of the Belfast Agreement, characterized by a power-sharing Executive.     

Public Support for Political Violence and Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland

Most of the research on paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland has concentrated on either the historical origins of paramilitary organizations or the background characteristics of individuals who engage in this activity. Less attention has been given to analyzing public attitudes in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland toward the use of paramilitary violence as a political tool within this society. In this paper we argue that one of the reasons for the intractability of the conflict and the current impasse over the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons is the widespread latent support for paramilitary activity among the civilian population in both these societies. Overall, the results suggest that only a lengthy period without political violence in Northern Ireland will undermine support for paramilitarism and result in the decommissioning of weapons.     

Pathways Out of Terrorism in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country: The Misrepresentation of the Irish Model

This article focuses on the reasons why the attempt to achieve the end of ETA's violence in the Basque Country during the mid- to late-1990s was unsuccessful when compared to the IRA's case in Northern Ireland. It argues that the different roles played by Basque and Irish nationalism in that decade and the distortion of the Irish model by Basque nationalist parties and the terrorist organization ETA were decisive in this outcome. The radicalisation of constitutional nationalism in the Basque region, as opposed to the constitutionalisation of radical nationalism that was a key factor in the achievement of the consensus enshrined in the 1998 Belfast Agreement, contributed to the continuation of terrorism. Contrary to the spirit of this Agreement, Basque nationalists moved away from an existing consensus with non nationalist parties around the principle of full development of the Basque autonomy strengthening ETA's will to carry on with their campaign.     

Marching Down the Garvaghy Road: Republican Tactics and State Response to the Orangemen's Claim to March their Traditional Route Home after the Drumcree Church Service

This study outlines the background and circumstances of the dispute over the Orange Order's claim to the right to parade down the Garvaghy Road after their annual Drumcree church service. This dispute has soured community relations in Northern Ireland and caused deep embarrassment to the British government, Unionists and many other groups for over five years now. However, it is the analysis of this article that such embarrassment and bad community relations was the desired outcome for one of the major participants in the dispute, the Republicans. It is argued that they deliberately set about conducting protests against Orange parades in the most confrontational manner possible. Their aim was to create a substitute for bombs and guns, an ongoing form of violence which they could use for political advantage during the talks known as the peace process. Whilst there is undoubtedly a long-established degree of nationalist resentment against the Orange Order on which Republicans were able to play, the open confrontations on the Garvaghy Road in recent years took much deliberate manipulation to become the violent clashes of today. The dispute is thus an example of terrorist tactics in which conventional terrorist violence is replaced by street violence. It is also an example of a case in which a weak and uncomprehending state made matters worse by trying to bargain with the perpetrators of violence.     

Bosnia on the Border? Republican Violence in Northern Ireland During the 1920s and 1970s

Unionist politicians have argued that Republican political violence on the Irish border, during both the partition of Ireland and more recent Northern Ireland conflict, constituted ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Protestant/Unionist community in those areas. These views have been bolstered by an increasingly ambivalent scholarly literature that has failed to adequately question the accuracy of these claims. This article interrogates the ethnic cleansing/genocide narrative by analysing Republican violence during the 1920s and the 1970s. Drawing from a wide range of theoretical literature and archival sources, it demonstrates that Republican violence fell far short of either ethnic cleansing or genocide, (in part) as a result of the perpetrators’ self-imposed ideological constraints. It also defines a new interpretive concept for the study of violence: functional sectarianism. This concept is designed to move scholarly discussion of political and sectarian violence beyond the highly politicised and moral cul-de-sacs that have heretofore characterised the debate, and has implications for our understanding of political violence beyond Ireland.     

“Academics for Peace” in Turkey: a case of criminalising dissent and critical thought via counterterrorism policy

ABSTRACT

On 11 January 2016, 1128 academics in Turkey and abroad signed a petition calling on Turkish authorities to cease state violence in mainly Kurdish populated areas of the country, which had been under curfew and an extended state of emergency. The petition received an immediate reaction from President Recep Tayyip Erdo?an, who accused the signatories of treason and terrorist propaganda. He subsequently demanded that public prosecuters launch an investigation. Criminalisation of the petition has been exacerbated by disciplinary action by universities against many of the signatories. Many have suffered insults, arrest, detention or suspension as a result of the ensuing smear campaign. This massive crackdown on academic freedom has been masked by discourses of counterterrorism, which have also been deployed to criminalise dissent more generally in Turkey as a part of a process of rapid “democratic retrenchment” since 2013. This article is an attempt to put the criminalisation of academics within the larger framework of human rights violations, increasing curtailments of academic freedom and rising authoritarianism in Turkey. It argues that the prosecution of the signatories of the petition is an extension of an established tradition of targeting academic freedom in times of political crisis in Turkey but is also a product of growing authoritarianism under the ruling party and President Erdo?an. It shows that counterterrorism laws can be extended far beyond eliminating security threats by instrumentalising them to suppress dissent in a declining democracy.     

Human rights and the fight against terrorism in Northern Ireland

After a discussion of the United Kingdom's responsibilities under the European Convention of Human Rights and the political background to the re‐emergence in 1968–69 of terrorism and the stationing of British troops in the Province, the article analyses those human rights issues which derive from the way the fight against terrorism has been conducted over the past 20 years. The issues discussed are, deaths resulting from the actions of the security forces, complaints of ill‐treatment by the police during interrogation, the detentioning of terrorist suspects, the use of exclusion orders to deport from the United Kingdom to Northern Ireland persons formerly resident in that Province, the use of juryless courts (Diplock Courts) for terrorist and other offences, and the banning of political organizations.     

Interpretations of political violence in ethnically divided societies

This article challenges traditional interpretations of political violence in Northern Ireland. Based on a series of ethnographic studies undertaken in republican and loyalist communities in Belfast, Northern Ireland, I argue that it is the question of state legitimacy, not materialism, culture or religion, that is core to understanding the underpinnings and history of political violence in Northern Ireland. Research findings suggest that communal support for and tolerance of paramilitary groups and their tactics are underpinned by security‐related concerns and a crisis of legitimacy which renders the state unable to claim a monopoly on the use of force. In contradistinction to counter‐insurgency theorists, I argue that the basis for paramilitarism is not created by fear of reprisal or intimidation. Rather, intra‐communal fears of identity loss and threats (both perceived and real) from the outgroup have created a space for republicanism and loyalism in both its political and paramilitary forms.     

“The Movement Moves Against you”: Coercive Spoiler Management in the Northern Ireland Peace Process

More than a decade on, the Northern Ireland peace process can largely be considered a success. Despite the failure of the Provisional Republican Movement to achieve a united Ireland free of British control, the large-scale violence of “The Troubles” has been relegated to the past. Applying the logic of coercive diplomacy, this study examines the role of threats and the use of selective and limited violence by the Provisional Movement to manage real and potential opponents and challengers that have emerged within its own ideological ranks to maintain its position of dominance and prevent a spoiling of the peace process. This study shows that the Provisional Movement retained the capability to employ violence and demonstrated the credibility of coercive threat through a willingness to use force against its opponents on the Republican spectrum, and was able to do so with a high degree of impunity.     

Do Terrorist Attacks Increase Closer to Elections?

The shadow of violence that elections cast remains poorly understood. A key obstacle impeding cross-national empirical analysis of electoral violence has been the varied nature of such violence. To address this challenge, I examine terrorist attacks as one particular form of electoral violence. By tracking the incidence of terrorist violence relative to election dates over time and across countries using an original dataset for the period from 2000–2005, I find strong support for the hypothesis that terrorist violence increases as we move closer to an election date. In fact, terrorist violence approximates a normal distribution centered on the election date.     

Victim selection in ethnic conflict: Motives and attitudes in Irish republicanism

Through examination of statements made by Irish republicans involved in the Northern Ireland conflict and of the social identities of victims of republican violence, White has argued that the Irish Republican Army is not sectarian but that the loyalist paramilitaries are. This response challenges both the interpretation of republican rhetoric and the conclusions drawn from the study of victim selection. It draws attention to a wide range of indices of communal hatred to make the case that sectarianism is endemic in the Northern Ireland conflict and that much of the variation in victim selection is a product of opportunity rather than motive. Furthermore, it questions the wisdom of analysing victim selection by imputing to victims just one social identity.     

The United Kingdom's “War Against Terrorism”

This article examines the United Kingdom's current response to international terrorism and argues that the response has been driven by heightened concerns of major terrorist attacks. From the enactment of emergency legislation to major structural changes within the intelligence community, the article surveys a range of measures that have been introduced since 11 September in an effort to reduce the vulnerability of the UK to a major terrorist attack. It conclueds with the observation that although, to date, the UK has avoided terrorist attacks at home, it is unrealistic to expect total security.     

Terrorist violence and the enrollment of psychology in predicting Muslim extremism: critical terrorism studies meets critical algorithm studies

Discourse on terrorist violence has long facilitated an especially liberal form of securitisation. Originally evoked in reference to anarchists and communists, a rational consideration of terrorist violence, inaugurated by the concept, asks for deferred judgement about the nature of, or reasons behind, violence related to terror on the premise that state and international legal norms governing the legitimate use of violence fail to circumscribe the proper capacities of the state to regulate and explain terrorism. Where sovereign powers along with their military and civilian instruments of coercion are deemed unable to regulate violence effectively, analysts of terrorist violence and their readership are invited to consider and cultivate new sensibilities. Beginning in the 1980s, studies by psychologists found renewed urgency among a growing cadre of interdisciplinary terror experts who found religion, Islam especially, a key variable of analysis. I situate their contributions in a longer history of secular and racialising discourse about terrorist violence. Central to this history are practices of reading, translating, interpreting and archiving texts. Evidence for the argument is based on the analysis of an algorithm that allegedly predicts the likelihood of terrorist strikes by counting words spoken by al-Qa?ida leaders and correlating their frequency with over 30 psychological categories.     

Mainstream Revolutionaries: Sinn Féin as a “Normal” Political Party?

Despite the seismic shift of Sinn Féin from being the “mouthpiece” of the Provisional Irish Republican Army to the largest nationalist force in Northern Ireland, the party continues to project its objectives within the revolutionary politics and tradition of 1916. Whilst various groups across the island of Ireland stress their loyalty to Irish independence and allegiance to their republican forefathers, 2016 also plays host to devolved assembly elections in Northern Ireland. The centenary of the Easter Rising is therefore a poignant moment to reassess republican politics, more specifically, the relationship between the armed revolutionary tradition and constitutionalism. Within the post-peace process era Sinn Féin have been accused of maintaining an autocratic culture and an intra-party framework that is more representative of a clandestine revolutionary organisation than a political party. Yet, simultaneously, Sinn Féin have not been immune to the pressures experienced by other modern political parties, bound by the laws of electoral competition and driven by office-seeking priorities. In order to explore Sinn Féin within the modern political arena, this article firstly examines the broader debate surrounding how armed groups make the transition into constitutional politics. Secondly, public opinion survey data is used to judge the basis of Sinn Féin's electoral appeal. Finally, internal party documents are used to examine party structure, intra-party democracy, and professionalisation in order to judge the extent to which Sinn Féin have completed the transition from being a “mouthpiece” to their armed counterpart, towards being a “normal” political party.     

Just the Two of Us? Civil Conflicts,Pro-State Militants,and the Violence Premium

Quantitative literature discussing violence in civil conflicts tends towards a typical model of engagement between governments and revolutionaries. Whilst recent work has shown the significant impact of multiple anti-government groups, a further feature remains understudied—the role of pro-state militants. This article theorizes a “violence premium” when such groups arise, which leads to all connected groups devoting greater energy to conflict than they would in isolation. Employing duration analysis and data from The Troubles in Northern Ireland, where Republicans act as revolutionary insurgents, Loyalists as pro-state militants, and the British Army as government forces, the violence premium is empirically confirmed. Both Loyalists and Republicans deviate from their underlying strategies to attack more frequently when violence by their rivals increases, with Republicans and the British Army engaging in the same way. An extended analysis, accounting for the status of the victim, shows that the violence premium resulting from interaction between Loyalists and Republicans targeted only the civilian population of Northern Ireland, elucidating the sectarian component of The Troubles. These results show that including all conflict parties and considering how they are linked are important features in studies that aim to determine the net level of violence in civil conflicts.     

Terrorism and public opinion: A five country comparison

This article examines public attitudes towards terrorism in five countries: Uruguay, Spain, Italy, Germany and Northern Ireland. It analyzes public concern over terrorism, images of the terrorists, support for the terrorists' goals, and public approval of anti‐terrorist measures. There are significant differences between nationalist and revolutionary terrorism. Nationalist terrorists have a high degree of support from an ethnic constituency, while revolutionary terrorists attract a much smaller degree of support primarily from the educated young. It is concluded that public opinion towards terrorism is a product of complex historical situations, and that public attitudes are unaffected by the terrorist campaign itself.     

Terrorist Groups and Political Fronts: The IRA,Sinn Fein,the Peace Process and Democracy

By characterizing the relationship between political fronts and their terrorist organizations this article sets out to explain the underlying reason for the impasse that has come about in the Northern Ireland peace process over decommissioning. It argues that political fronts are subordinate to their terrorist groups and that dual membership between the two is a common feature. Sinn Fein, at least until the autumn of 2001, has been subordinate to the IRA Army Council and so was unable to deliver IRA disarmament. It is then suggested that this misunderstanding, or willingness to overlook the fact, in 1998 has led to the legitimization of Sinn Fein by three democratic states and this has been fundamental in bringing about the party's electoral advance. Loyalist disenchantment, with both this advance and what it has perceived to be the flood of concessions to republicans because of the implied threat of violence, could ultimately have led to violence on a worse scale than the 30 years of the 'Troubles'. The international strategic environment that the republican movement was confronted with changed this. The departure of President Bill Clinton from office and the election of George W. Bush, the Colombian episode, and the declared 'war on terrorism' following the 11 September attacks, were all significant factors behind the IRA's first act of putting weapons beyond use. The possibility, however, that the move was a tactical one-off merely to stave off American pressure and cement Sinn Fein's position in the new political dispensation (and thereby confirm Sinn Fein's status as a political front subordinate to the IRA) should not be discounted. It could also be argued, however, that, because of the apparent shift in control that took place within the Army Council after the events of August and September 2001 towards the 'Sinn Fein element' that supported putting weapons beyond use, the act represents the beginning of an incremental process that will, events permitting, lead to further such moves and the ultimate disbandment of the IRA. If this is the case then the autumn of 2001 is the time that Sinn Fein ceased to be a political 'front', and was henceforth the senior partner in the Republican movement. Nevertheless, the party would still have a long way to go before becoming a democratic party.     

Ideology Isn't Everything: Transnational Terrorism,Recruitment Incentives,and Attack Casualties

In the current literature, the primary determinants of terrorist attack casualty rates have been attributed to religious fundamentalism. While zealotry, martyrdom, and the pursuit of salvation certainly empower religious fundamentalists with the liberty to decimate human targets, I argue that the sustaining necessity to recruit more terrorists from within the population, not religious fundamentalism alone, is an important predictor of the brutality of an attack. When targets are located within a potential recruitment population, there is an imminent need to restrict violence, as unnecessary collateral damage turns potential supporters away, rather than attracts them. Conversely, transnational attacks occurring outside the recruitment population abrogate these restrictions on violence. I test this argument on terrorist attacks from 1998–2005 and find empirical evidence that transnational attacks are a predictive cause of high casualty rates in a target population.     

Beating the water: The terrorist search for power,control and authority

Starting from Mao's well‐known metaphor of ‘water and fish’, this article examines the nature of power as it applies to terrorist groups. Terrorists are under constant pressure actively to increase their influence and control over their constituent communities. Our understandings of how terrorist groups can do this has generally suffered from being too limited and overly simplistic. Focusing on Northern Ireland, this article explores how terrorist groups can first identify and then access various sources of power which can be used to strengthen the group's position and authority. The article argues that there are identifiable strategies which can be exploited by current and future terrorists in virtually any setting. It is in the interest of those combating terrorism to study these principles closely if they wish to limit the power and durability of terrorist opponents.